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Introduction
Ken Herold
Luciano Floridi’s 1999 monograph, Philosophy and Computing: An In-
troduction, provided the impetus for the theme of this issue, more for what
it did not say about librarianship and information studies (LIS) than oth-
erwise. Following the pioneering works of Wilson, Nitecki, Buckland, and
Capurro (plus many of the authors of this issue), researchers in LIS have
increasingly turned to the efﬁcacy of philosophical discourse in probing the
more fundamental aspects of our theories, including those involving the
information concept. A foundational approach to the nature of informa-
tion, however, has not been realized, either in partial or accomplished steps,
nor even as an agreed, theoretical research objective. It is puzzling that while
librarianship, in the most expansive sense of all LIS-related professions, past
and present, at its best sustains a climate of thought, both comprehensive
and nonexclusive, information itself as the subject of study has deﬁed our
abilities to generalize and synthesize effectively. Perhaps during periods of
reassessment and justiﬁcation for library services, as well as in times of cur-
ricular review and continuing scholarly evaluation of perceived information
demand, the necessity for every single stated position to be clariﬁed appears
to be exaggerated. Despite this, the important question does keep surfac-
ing as to how information relates to who we are and what we do in LIS.
Floridi’s broader program of Philosophy of Information (PI) may pro-
vide intellectual coordinates bridging our community’s discussion with that
of like-minded colleagues beyond LIS. These invited papers do not direct-
ly address my own intuitions surrounding LIS as a potential applied PI. The
collection as a whole results from some preliminary inquiries along those
lines, but practically speaking it required little provocation and amounts
to a treasure trove on the subject of information. In the actual working of
our libraries, special collections, archives, and physical repositories, we ﬁnd
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ourselves struggling with new information policies and protocols and
changing long-term strategies for dealing with a plethora of new and old
information objects, types, and artifacts. For instance, the paradox of in-
vention and discovery runs rife through our conceptions of knowledge
classiﬁcations and retrieval languages. Another difﬁcult challenge is how
nonphysicality affects the bases for our assumptions about records, evi-
dence, works, storage, access, ownership, and provenance. Of the multi-
plicity of additional questions of concern to the reader, the following syn-
opses are offered as all-too-brief overviews of the extensive and complex
contents of this issue.
To paraphrase Cornelius, who expresses careful reservations of the
practicing librarian, let us not info-educate ourselves beyond the social
bounds of our traditional duties. He admits, however, any PI must “offer
an explanation for a very wide range of phenomena and practices, from
book history and curatorship, reading stories to children, and model-build-
ing in information retrieval (IR) and information seeking.” This is the ex-
citing challenge, and Cornelius cites as wide-ranging goals for better un-
derstanding information within a future PI both our subjective identities,
personal and library-practitioner, evincing our individual cognitive appa-
ratus, as well as efﬁcacy in the social context of our host environments.
Frohmann disclaims a putative status for information as a primary catego-
ry, favoring instead documents, practices, and ties of documentary author-
itativeness. His phenomenological tour de force supports a Wittgenstein-
ian shift “away from mentalistic pictures of meaning and toward practices
with documents . . . from theories of information to descriptions of documentary
practices.” [emphasis in original] Frohmann presents four properties for
the latter: materiality, institutional embeddedness, social discipline, and
historicity, with examples of how a document becomes informing.
While Day investigates the paramount linguistic and, generally, affec-
tive bases for these social relations in his exploration of an anti- or a-meta-
physical concept of information, his engagement is through political phi-
losophy and ontology. He utilizes a Negrian critique of representation,
agency, and power and a Heideggerian and Negrian critique of time, ar-
guing for a concept of information as an event and for a concept of being
as a codeterminate emergence, both grounded in information as affect and
respons(ibility). Furner, too, delves into the philosophy of language in an
analysis disclosing deeper questions into the relationship of classes and
propositions with purported information objects or structures. His termi-
nological distinctions and information taxonomy are delivered in a gener-
al ontological system of categories rich in detail and implication for further
study. Budd expounds a dynamic theory of relevance and describes the
importance of the dialogic, phenomenological, transformative, and perfor-
mative qualities of relatively inner and outer information contexts. Among
his sources are Habermas and Bakhtin, and particularly pertinent is his
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assessment acknowledging the sheer complexity of the relevance concept,
noting its psychological, cognitive, and linguistic aspects.
Fallis questions the accuracy of information sources from the stand-
point of testimony and veriﬁability, notions in ﬂux in our networks of knowl-
edge. His epistemological treatment applies to the issues of authority, cor-
roboration, plausibility, and presentation, with the hope that LIS
professionals have important techniques to offer. Hjørland borrows from
the realist–antirealist debate in the philosophy of science to advocate and
reintroduce a realist and proper sociohistorical perspective for LIS. He
criticizes antirealism, idealism, or nominalism as absolute methods for in-
formation science, outlining support for his theory of domain analysis and
its pragmatic investigation of knowledge: “[a] philosophy is not something
that you just choose, it is something you work out or construe in order to
solve problems related to your ﬁeld of study and your profession.” Thellef-
sen introduces his method for investigating the knowledge domain using
Peircean semiotics, an intriguing and innovative basis in pragmatics for
knowledge organization termed “knowledge proﬁling.” His work may pro-
vide an exemplar for the design and problem-solving character of an ap-
plied PI in the realm of concepts and categories.
Jacob puts forward a new and essential study of information dynamics
in her insightful inquiry into the differences between systems of classiﬁca-
tion and categorization. She imposes a rigorous analysis on the concepts
of order, organization, and structure with respect to semantic information.
Mills articulates a thorough and intimate case study in concept analysis and
logic in the design of faceted classiﬁcation for information retrieval. He
elaborates the detailed methodology for implementation of indexing and
searching information in a manner optimally predictable for locating and
relating it. Svenonius identiﬁes foundational qualities of retrieval languages
and classiﬁcation systems by examining theories of meaning: operational,
referential, and instrumental. Her aim is to clarify the design implications
for each theory through better understanding of their effectiveness at rep-
resenting knowledge. Paling links classiﬁcation and rhetoric in his decon-
structivist study of the development of bibliography and retrieval, expand-
ing on Gadamer’s idea of “intellectual horizon.” Paling’s own notion of a
classiﬁcatory horizon “represents a convergence of ideas from related ﬁelds
that, taken together, can provide a theoretical framework for studying rhe-
torical aspects of classiﬁcation” and “a better understanding of the materi-
al and cultural limits that act on the representations in our classiﬁcatory
systems.”
Olson describes the notion of hierarchy as a negative example of the
rigid application of axiomatic rule-making over propositional elements
associated with a nineteenth-century information concept. She explores the
practices of Melvil Dewey and Charles Cutter in relation to Hegel and Scot-
tish Common Sense philosophers. Spink and Cole probe the provocative
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relationship of human information behavior and evolutionary psychology.
Their ambitious work emphasizes the conceptualizing phase of an informa-
tion process, integrating problem solving along a continuum from preat-
tentive and nonpurposive through adaptive intelligence. Brier summarizes
his theory of “cybersemiotics” as a foundation for LIS: “What is new in the
Cybersemiotic approach is the knitting together of a theoretical framework
for LIS from recognized theories of cybernetics, systems, semiotics, com-
munication, and language that span the gap between technical, scien-
tiﬁc, social scientiﬁc, and humanistic approaches to the design and devel-
opment of [document retrieval]-systems in LIS. This trans-disciplinary
framework will make communication between the different approaches and
theories of these processes possible, without reducing everything to mere
information processing.” Brier argues forcefully that, among other things,
the scientiﬁc aspect of LIS should not be dominated by a design model in
which knowledge is a purely rational, truth-oriented cognitive structure.
Lastly, Floridi offers his reappraisal of LIS as applied PI in the After-
word. Explaining his approach to PI from a liminalist and constructionist
perspective, he further clariﬁes his metaphysical stance with respect to in-
formation ethics. Any implications of Floridi’s notion of stewardship of the
infosphere for the global responsibilities and traditional duties of librari-
anship (together with the more recent information disciplines) are yet to
be discovered. The LIS community shares responsibility for the design of
services and systems affording our patron communities a continuous and
integrated information environment respecting the vast polycultural heri-
tage entrusted to our care. We may variously encounter information as an
engineered object of practical communications, as a potential structure in
the devising of our increasingly digitally inﬂuenced experiences and per-
spectives, or perhaps we may treat the notion as a pseudoentity worthy of
disdain or ambivalence. This issue promises a richer understanding of all
informational aspects and entities, however conceived.
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Information and Its Philosophy
Ian Cornelius
Abstract
Three problems in relation to Luciano Floridi’s work on the Philos-
ophy of Information (PI) and the relationship of PI to Library and Infor-
mation Science (LIS) are considered: the claim that LIS is a materials-based
discipline, Floridi’s claim about Information as a message transfer system,
and his downgrading of Social Epistemology to be a subset of PI. The re-
cent history of LIS and the practice of professional library work are exam-
ined for evidence of the basis for making claims about LIS. A view of infor-
mation based on individual interpretations is preferred to Floridi’s account,
which is found to be too innocent of LIS practice to be accepted without
revision, as is his view of LIS as an applied PI.
Luciano Floridi has provided us with a sweeping review of work on Informa-
tion. He has, in particular, advanced claims for a Philosophy of Information
(PI), and has identiﬁed Library and Information Science (LIS) as applied
PI. He has labeled us thus contra the claims of Shera and others that LIS is
based on a social epistemology. If we accept Floridi’s claims, we will see our-
selves as part of a larger PI movement whose problems and program have
been identiﬁed by Floridi in his forthcoming Open Problems in the Philosophy
of Information (OPPI )(Floridi, in press-b). Many of these problems and sev-
eral parts of the program will be familiar to LIS readers, especially those con-
cerned with work in information retrieval. Much of Floridi’s work is com-
mendable on several counts. In particular, he has proposed a philosophical
grounding to support much of what we in the LIS community do. His work
reveals a deep structure of support in straight philosophy and in logic for
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many of our research concerns. It would be convenient to be able to use his
work as the philosophical foundation some have sought for so long.
However, there are three main concerns that make it more difﬁcult to
take Floridi’s claims without some further work. First, is the kind of idea
he has about information, as a root concept for his philosophy of informa-
tion (which he labels PI). Second, is the view he takes, entirely consistent
with his view about information, of LIS that allows him to call it an applied
PI, which effectively settles LIS as a materials-based discipline. Third, there
is room for debate about the way Floridi downgrades Social Epistemology
to be a sibling of LIS rather than a grounding explanation for it. Floridi
allows that:
a good test for a “foundational” candidate is to check whether it is able
to learn from its applied counterpart . . . LIS does not need to acquire
some ready-made philosophical foundation, it can play a key role in
shaping one. (Floridi, 2002, p. 38).
We shall see that Floridi’s account of LIS needs some amendment, and
perhaps if an enhanced view of LIS is accepted, then we can secure a more
advanced PI as a more fruitful base for LIS. In this article I shall be taking
up some of Floridi’s claims about deﬁning information and the scope of
LIS. There is also an alternative view of how the politics of LIS operate to
produce the kind of ﬁeld and profession that it is. First, we must consider
how LIS constructs itself.
LIS and Professionalism
I claim ﬁrst that the broad ﬁeld of LIS separated itself from philoso-
phy in the mid-nineteenth century. By “broad ﬁeld” I mean both the aca-
demic discipline of LIS and the practice of librarianship—the business of
running libraries and providing information. Broad LIS has been a profes-
sion equipped with professional tools that quintessentially solve the practi-
cal task in hand rather than construct a philosophically acceptable arrange-
ment of knowledge. Since Dewey, and some others, we have the tools to
arrange books on shelves and describe what they are and where they orig-
inated, and we have concentrated on being good at that. A concern for the
true relationship of any item to knowledge, or of the exact information
content of any item, has remained the domain of specialists. The claims of
LIS to be normative are muted and speciﬁc to the professional apparatus
of LIS—the classiﬁcation and description of materials, the identiﬁcation
of information-seeking behaviors, and the control (that is, universal aware-
ness of the existence) of information materials. LIS is not normative about
knowledge or its epistemology—we shall return to this later—but it oper-
ates within a cultural frame that gives purpose to its professional devices.
LIS, I maintain, has a dual focus: ﬁrst toward the rest of the academy, pro-
ducing the work on information retrieval and information-seeking behav-
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ior, the history of books, and the dissemination of ideas; and second toward
the practice of running libraries and other information agencies, where LIS
works to produce the working tools and devices of the practice. The prac-
tice of librarianship is closely related to but not co-extensive with LIS.
Second, in the twentieth century, LIS has reconstructed itself away from
an overwhelming concern with information materials (documents) and
their organizational systems to an equal concern with the behavior of indi-
vidual people who use libraries, and documents. This concern with indi-
vidual information use reﬂects an ambiguity about library service, which is
a public community facility provided for individual use. Everyone entering
a library has his or her own program in mind: there is no common social
goal, but the cumulative practice of these individuals is a social act. Librar-
ianship is a social practice, and any social epistemology must account for
this individual behavior within the social practice, and any philosophy of
LIS must account for it too. The close relationship between the way peo-
ple construct their own individual identity and individual information seek-
ing must be reﬂected in the concept of information that LIS embraces.
The practical orientation of LIS leads to a third claim. No common or
shared view exists in the LIS community about the philosophical or theo-
retical underpinnings of LIS. Indeed, many practitioners work in the be-
lief that theories can tell them little in the performance of their daily tasks.
Theoretical and philosophical explanations of what LIS might be are com-
peting for attention and primacy in rendering an account to the members
of the LIS community of what it is that we do. Within the professional so-
cial struggle for deﬁnition of the subject, those researchers, theorists, and
practitioners who want to ﬁnd and assert the intellectual underpinnings for
LIS, and who want to seek, promote, and work within an understanding of
our relation to other parts of the academy, work at times as a minority within
the ﬁeld. This is not necessarily bad and is certainly not unique. Within the
ﬁeld of law, for example, there is a similar imbalanced (in terms of num-
bers) relationship between the relatively small coterie of legal theorists and
philosophers, including U.S. Supreme Court justices and their like, and the
vast body of practicing attorneys. These latter work in a daily environment
where clients come to them seeking not learned disquisitions on whether
this or that law is good or bad, or what the intentions of a system of justice
might be, but seeking to get the law to work on their side in some dispute.
These practitioners know which forms to complete, which is the best judge
to come before, how to turn a piece of evidence to an advantage; the nice-
ties of jurisprudence they leave to others.
When I go into the library and seek the help of a librarian, I do so
because I just want that person to ﬁx the system for me by getting the book
I want, ﬁnding the references I need, ﬁxing an extension of my loans, and
getting some more copies on the shelves for my students. Many librarians
not only seem happy to work that way but are content without knowledge
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of the imperfections in our understanding of the nature of information.
When they make a point about what librarianship is, they point to custom-
er satisfaction, management of resources, and personal fulﬁllment. If they
are to give credence to a view of LIS as a social epistemology or an applied
PI, they want to be given good reasons. The tension in the LIS workforce is
not just between this theory and that philosophy, but between all the sets
of competing claims, theoretical and nontheoretical. The appeal of some-
thing like Floridi’s PI must be not just that it is right, or at least gives a more
complete explanation of our situation in the ﬁrmament of academic disci-
plines in a way that all fair-minded people must assent to, but that it is a
useful weapon in the social and political struggles within LIS for one par-
ticular set of interests. Practitioners within LIS learn about the practice
through experience of it and build their understanding by reﬂection that
leads them to adjust their practice and understanding. This subjectivity
extends beyond performance in the workplace to include reﬂection on both
personal identity and the appeal to the host-funding community of the
conception of LIS that practitioners present (Cornelius, 1996a). Any PI
must: (1) offer an explanation for a very wide range of phenomena and
practices, from book history and curatorship, reading stories to children,
and model-building in information retrieval (IR) and information seeking
and (2)take account of how we remodel ourselves (say, from being librari-
ans to being information scientists and then to being information manag-
ers) from time to time, according to the presentation of ourselves and of
our practice that we wish to make to the world.
Accounting for LIS
Floridi’s account of LIS needs to recognize the plurality of LIS, and
also the changes in the things we do and the changing status, through time,
of different parts of the LIS universe. Floridi makes LIS a normative study,
but I think this is too sweeping. Although LIS is normative in respect to
its sense of purpose, much of LIS and library practice is based on observa-
tion of use. Within strictly professional concerns, the only area where nor-
mative stances in relation to knowledge are obvious is in collection-build-
ing, and normative practices even here are largely limited to the public
library: in academic and special libraries, collection-building follows use
and clients’ demands. I think Floridi’s account is confused by the ambi-
guity that he explicitly identiﬁes in Shera’s approach to social epistemol-
ogy (Floridi, 2002, p. 40). This leads Floridi, in my view, to conﬂate two
things: the practical work of managing the work of the library by the librar-
ian and the construction of LIS. The ﬁrst, the daily focus of the librarian,
will at its best be informed but not totally prescribed by, on the one hand,
professional education, and, on the other hand, by some overall sense of
involvement in a world of liberal learning—the sense of purpose that
comes with acceptance of the benign role of knowledge in the world. The
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second, the construction of LIS, will have as one of its objectives the con-
struction of a realistic representation or schema of knowledge. In part, this
will be informed by a sense of what the organization of classes of knowl-
edge should be, but to be successful any such organization of knowledge
by LIS must mirror what the customers accept.
Consider, for example, the construction of a subject bibliography, which
could well serve as an introduction for some readers to a subject new to them.
Let us say that a subject bibliography of sociology is being compiled. What-
ever subject organization is adopted is effectively a claim by the author and
compiler to assert the character, scope, subdivisions, signiﬁcance, and se-
quence of sociology and of topics within it. Several introductory textbooks
adopt their own organization of topics and so mirror the organizational as-
sertions of the bibliographer about sociology. But, if the readers fail to ac-
cept the compiler’s version of the subject’s organization, then the bibliog-
raphy will fail. LIS cannot be normative except by accepting and adopting
the normative frame of the people using the subject. The practicing librar-
ian has but two degrees of freedom over classiﬁcation of subjects: ﬁrst, in
the decision as to which classiﬁcation scheme to use and second, a purely
local option, either to accept, because it privileges what is local and thus of
most interest and signiﬁcance, or to deny, because international consisten-
cy should be maintained, some local warrant about the sequence of subdi-
visions of a subject—and then only if the classiﬁcation scheme allows it.
The practicing librarian may be inﬂuenced by the sense of liberal learn-
ing, keeping the light of knowledge burning like a beacon for all to see more
clearly, and may be inﬂuenced by the rubrics of a professional education,
but in the sense of discovering by a cycle of reﬂection, clearer understand-
ing, and improved practice what it is that LIS might be, any librarian will
ﬁnd that their own sense of identity and their sense of the practice they are
engaged in determine what LIS is for them more so than any sense of a
social epistemology.
No practice is merely the sum of its activities. Cooking is not just the
organization of what is in the kitchen; law is not just the organization or
even the intellectual antecedents of laws; medicine is more than what is in
the textbooks. No librarian will presume to give legal or medical advice on
the basis of knowing what the books say. Although the daily practice and
focus of the librarian may be heavily centered around housekeeping tasks,
the sense of what they make available to readers is not limited to manag-
ing access to the books. For this reason, the view of LIS as either the body
of knowledge that allows the librarian to do her job or the view of LIS as a
science of information is critically short of content, particularly in Floridi’s
formation of LIS and librarianship. Floridi wants to cement LIS onto a basis
of dealing with physical materials—“its object is not knowledge itself but
the information sources that make it possible” (2002, p. 41). Because any-
thing can be a source of knowledge, and therefore of interest to LIS, he
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claims that LIS extends beyond the domain of organized knowledge, sug-
gesting that the organization of knowledge is partly outside the scope of
the librarian and that the librarian’s interest in knowledge is limited to
sources. Floridi wants this to mean that LIS needs something more basic
than a social epistemology, something that can deal with the question of
information.
It is true that LIS could make use of a PI, but for such a philosophy to
be in some kind of hierarchical relation to LIS requires more than Floridi
has so far offered us. Floridi actually has different ambitions for his PI than
merely accounting for LIS. It would be possible to argue, though, that he
needs his PI to be able to explain LIS, for otherwise a science that claims
to deal with information is being left outside and unaccounted for by PI.
Floridi summarizes the objectives of PI as follows:
PI is the philosophical ﬁeld concerned with (a) the critical investiga-
tion of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, in-
cluding its dynamics, utilization, and sciences and (b) the elaboration
and application of information-theoretic and computational method-
ologies to philosophical problems. (Floridi, 2002, p. 43)
Part (b) of this deﬁnition states clearly Floridi’s ambition for a philosophy
based on information: our concern is with part (a), but in passing we should
note that in claiming for PI a methodology for all philosophy he is also
implicitly stating a preference for PI as something that explains philosoph-
ical issues, rather than a means of explaining an information profession or
discipline.
With respect to PI (a) we have to confront some variation in Floridi’s
prescription. In several places he emphasizes the possibility of multiple the-
ories or concepts of information, setting for PI only the task of investigat-
ing the question “What is x?” (i.e., information). He quotes Shannon ap-
provingly (p. 43), “It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of
information would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible appli-
cations of this general ﬁeld” (1993, p. 180). Earlier Floridi states of PI that
“On the whole, its task is not to develop a uniﬁed theory of information,
but rather an integrated family of theories that analyze, evaluate, and ex-
plain the various principles and concepts of information . . .” and “recent
surveys have shown no consensus on a single uniﬁed deﬁnition of informa-
tion” (2002, p. 43). Contrary to this, we have substantial work by Floridi
(Floridi, in press-a) that concentrates strongly on information as well-for-
mulated, meaningful data in a data set, which seems to limit the range of
possible concepts of information to one or more of those concerned with
information as a transferred message. Furthermore, he explicitly conﬁnes
the form of information that concerns LIS to information in documents.
(LIS) Library and Information Science as Applied Philosophy of Infor-
mation is the discipline concerned with documents, their life cycles and
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the procedures, techniques, and devices by which these are implement-
ed, managed, and regulated. LIS applies the fundamental principles
and general techniques of PI to solve deﬁnite, practical problems and
deal with speciﬁc, concrete phenomena. In turn, it conducts empiri-
cal research for practical service-oriented purposes (e.g., conservation,
valorization, education, research, communication, and cooperation),
thus contributing to the development of basic research in PI. (Floridi,
2002, p. 46)
Let us pass over the evasion and unexplained entailment of “thus” in the
last line above. A science that concerned itself only with documents could
not, for example, attempt a classiﬁcation of knowledge, or even an under-
standing of how the documents are used. While the practical daily work of
many librarians is concerned with the management of documents, the rea-
son for the documents being there in the library is the expressed need of
the clientele. This expressed need, or even a need anticipated by the library
staff, is not information, it may not even translate directly into knowledge,
and it is not just documents. In our descriptive and classiﬁcatory exercises,
we deal with the concept of an idealized document of which the example
we have is but one, possibly imperfect, copy. The idea we have of a docu-
ment is not just a book in the hand, it is a concept of a complete work. That
work may be an online bus timetable, but it also may be a multivolume edi-
tion of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–1778). We may
have a one-volume abridged edition or a four-volume or an eight-volume
edition of Gibbon, but they are all linked to an abstract idea of the origi-
nal work. Gibbon’s work is a good read, but its truth-value may be disput-
ed. It certainly could not be represented as a sacred text or as a statement
of current historical scholarship. Many students would even doubt that it
is a good read. Why then can it have space, or the possibility of space, in a
modern public or academic library? It is a “Desert Island” book, along with
Shakespeare, the Bible, and Wisden (“the cricketers’ Bible”)—it is a part of
our cultural heritage. As our cultural horizons expand, we legitimize more
and more within the library—so War and Peace, the poems of Wang Wei,
Buddhist philosophy, the Gettysburg address, and others are appropriated
by us, and we in turn are expanded by contact with them. The link between
information, documents, and knowledge is the concept of learning, and it
is in a commitment to the processes of learning that LIS builds its sense of
a discipline. We can build a science of document management, what Flori-
di wants in LIS, if we have only a sense of the value of documents. To build
a knowledge and understanding of, and a philosophy for, the modern li-
brary, we need a more sophisticated sense of involvement in our culture and
the driving forces behind it. Floridi, in part, accepts this when he writes of
educational needs and values being implemented in the library (2002, p.
39). The understanding behind the library, shared by clients and librari-
ans, is that the library can meet a purpose such as education, information,
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or entertainment. Libraries, or information generally, can help attain these
ends because we all believe, usually implicitly, in some version of the En-
lightenment Project. Libraries, of course, predate the Enlightenment, but
modern librarianship, making information available to all, is a child of the
Enlightenment. We connect to our past (and thus Gibbon) both because
they enrich our sense of ourselves and because they help explain our world
to us. The belief in progress and individual betterment or empowerment
through the application of reason and the use of knowledge is the engine
of the library world, and documents are just its fuel. The conceptions we
build from time to time of what LIS is and what librarians do reﬂect our
changed understanding of the ﬁeld. (Cornelius, 1996a). The techniques
we have to manage documents are directionless without the sense of pur-
pose, cultural context, and possibilities allowed by the epistemology of the
Enlightenment. LIS cannot be reduced to the techniques of document
management and should not be confused with the job of running a library.
The library job, in fact, relates closely to the sociology of social knowledge
that Floridi rejects as a foundation for LIS. It is the social nature of library
practice that makes poignant the confusion about the deﬁnition of infor-
mation in LIS. Those seeking to build LIS based on documents would be
well-served by a concept of objective information with stable meaning; those
who look ﬁrst at the character of human information seeking are more likely
to ﬁnd information a far more complex phenomenon, with no stable mean-
ing and a base in the cultural and social contexts in which the information
is sought and used.
Floridi’s account of Information
The second problem with Floridi’s PI is its concentration, mentioned
above, on a message transfer concept of information. The possibility of
many concepts of information, seemingly allowed for by Floridi but never
openly discussed, let alone worked through, is given some attention in OPPI
(in press-b). In discussing these open problems, Floridi allows, in passing,
that it may be the case that information exists only in the mind of the in-
formee (see OPPI, Proposition 16). We can discuss this point in several ways.
It might be that we just employ the word “information” as a technical term
and limit its use to the sense in which Floridi and others commonly refer to
it, as some sense of the content of a document or proposition. To do so would
remove the possibility of discussing information as a phenomenon, or of
building a philosophy around it.
If we accept that there is a move from data to information to knowledge,
and that the latter is only in the mind of one or more receiving agents, then
we must also discuss the point at which data becomes information. Clearly
one possible explanation is that the change occurs as the information is re-
ceived by the informee. Clearly, too, the word “information” must be relat-
ed in some way to the idea of meaning, a point Floridi also raises in OPPI.
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The relationship between meaning and information is much discussed: all
that needs to be said here is that a concept of information limited to the
semantic content of a message cannot be limited to the message itself. If the
message is semantic, it must in most cases be semantic for someone. Lan-
guage is a social construction, and the meanings of messages are effectively
socially constructed too. The only exception is where information is some-
how immanent in a message and will always be there whether or not there
is an informee. The example given by Floridi is the case of tree rings. The
tree stump displays its message of how old it is by the incidence of count-
able rings in the stump, regardless of the presence or absence of a recipi-
ent. Dinosaur footprints in solidiﬁed mud also convey information despite
the dinosaur having no known intention of doing so. There is also informa-
tion of which I am unaware. As I sit in the garden with my radio turned on,
I can comprehend the information it imparts to me; when I turn the radio
off, the radio signals carrying the information are still being beamed at me
and my radio but I am unaware of them or their content. It would seem that
with the tree rings or the footprints I have the means to comprehend and
interpret the message, but with the radio waves I do not without the radio.
Thus, for an information connection to be made, it must be that I am in an
information system, which means I am dependent on technology and on a
level of education in a particular culture. To accept information, we also
must be willing to accept the authority of it. It may be that the cobblestones
in the street outside my window are varied in color and a pattern can be
distinguished in them. The pattern could appear to me to be random, but
in fact it traces the face of my neighbor’s uncle, or it could trace a date that
by coincidence is my birthday, or it could trace the words “No Parking.” It
could be that a clairvoyant revealed to me the circumstances of September
11, 2001, in New York well in advance, but that I discredited the idea as too
far-fetched. In all these cases the decision about meaning and information
is made at the point of receipt by the potential informee.
Information is what we recognize as information, but our capacity to
recognize it as such depends on several factors. Notoriously, information
received by different people is interpreted in different ways (Cornelius,
1996b). Supreme Court justices, using the same information and the same
laws, can arrive at different decisions, as the U.S. Supreme Court Justices
have done in split decisions on many occasions. Business people in similar
circumstances make different decisions—look at how airlines worldwide
responded to the problems of late 2001 onward. People in fractured com-
munities react to the same information in different ways, according to cul-
tural preferences. Furthermore, it cannot be, as Fox (1983) claimed, that
information can only be conveyed if, and only if, the informee has the ca-
pacity to know that the information is right. In the case of schoolchildren,
they cannot know whether what they learn from the teacher is right: they
must take it on trust, but they do have the capability to know because they
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function within a language game or form of life. It is the capacity to work
successfully within such a form of life that allows us to recognize libraries
and their purpose and to recognize what can count as information. These
capabilities are all learned and are dependent on memory, a sense of pur-
pose, and the ability to operate within a communication system. This is
consistent with what Evans (1982, p. 23) calls “being in an informational
state” where an information system works as a substratum of our cognitive
lives. Information becomes the function of an individual’s cognitive appa-
ratus, but it also is given effect only within a social context. Information is
a social product.
Conclusion
In summary I want to say that Floridi’s PI, as it stands, is innocent of the
social character of a ﬁeld like LIS and the way it constructs itself. His view
of information needs some easing away from a simple message transfer sys-
tem, and the unexamined concerns expressed about the position of the in-
formee in OPPI (Proposition 16) need to be accommodated within the un-
derstanding of information. Finally, his PI would be more widely applicable
in LIS if it could take into account individual information behavior.
These remarks do not dent Floridi’s PI severely, but it is legitimate to
ask that the representation of LIS as an applied PI be reworked. We need a
more empirically sensitive understanding of what LIS is and how it varies
from the practice of managing libraries. We also need an account of infor-
mation that takes into consideration the relationship between our purpose,
our practices, and the social context of information, which cannot have an
objective meaningful existence independent of a recipient. What we need,
to account for LIS practice, is “PI-2.”
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Documentation Redux: Prolegomenon to
(Another) Philosophy of Information
Bernd Frohmann
Abstract
A philosophy of information is grounded in a philosophy of doc-
umentation. Nunberg’s conception of the phenomenon of information
heralds a shift of attention away from the question “What is information?”
toward a critical investigation of the sources and legitimation of the ques-
tion itself. Analogies between Wittgenstein’s deconstruction of philosoph-
ical accounts of meaning and a corresponding deconstruction of philosoph-
ical accounts of information suggest that because the informativeness of a
document depends on certain kinds of practices with it, and because infor-
mation emerges as an effect of such practices, documentary practices are
ontologically primary to information. The informativeness of documents
therefore refers us to the properties of documentary practices. These fall
into four broad categories: their materiality; their institutional sites; the ways
in which they are socially disciplined; and their historical contingency. Two
examples from early modern science, which contrast the scholastic docu-
mentary practices of continental natural philosophers to those of their peers
in Restoration England, illustrate the richness of the factors that must be
taken into account to understand how documents become informing.
The Phenomenology of Information
In his essay, “Farewell to the information age,” Geoffrey Nunberg (1996)
proposes a phenomenology of information. His proposal has important
implications for a philosophy of information. Rather than posit a particu-
lar deﬁnition or argue what the nature of information might be, Nunberg
directs our attention to the manner in which information presents itself at
this particular historical moment. Instead of elaborating a theoretical model
Bernd Frohmann, Associate Professor, Faculty of Information and Media Studies, The Uni-
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of the essence of information, Nunberg asks, “How is the impression of ‘in-
formation’ constituted. . . ?” (p. 115). His reason for this approach is that
the ambiguities, contradictions, and confusions inherent in the phenomenon
of information account for its force and authority. Ideas of information that
enjoy the theoretical rigor of deﬁnitions and essences are not useful in un-
derstanding the phenomenon of information, because “any effort to try to
extract a coherent conceptual structure for the notion would be not just fu-
tile but false to its phenomenology: ‘information’ is able to perform the work
it does precisely because it fuzzes the boundaries between several geneti-
cally distinct categories of experience” (p. 114). And the work it performs
is signiﬁcant, because the confusions between different senses of the word
“information”—confusions that constitute information as a phenomenon—
permit, inter alia, information age enthusiasts to use “information” in a sense
“which bears the ideological burden in discussions of the new [information]
technologies,” discussions in which those technologies are believed to “usher
in a new and epochal discursive order” (p. 110). Moreover, because quan-
tiﬁability is one of the phenomenological characteristics of information, we
tend, Nunberg notes, to take seriously such popular claims as “a daily issue
of the New York Times contains more information than the average seven-
teenth-century Englishman came across in a lifetime” (p. 111). Once infor-
mation presents itself in countable bits, we have a resource—the amount of
information—that permits us to denominate not only new experiences, such
as “information anxiety” (Wurman, 1989), but also new socio-historical phe-
nomena such as an “information society,” an “information age,” or an ex-
panding “infosphere” (Floridi, 1999). The study of the phenomenology of
information can, therefore, help us trace the sources of the many imagin-
ings associated with the word “information.”
Nunberg’s essay is important to the approach this paper takes to a
philosophy of information, because the question “What is information?”
which might be taken as the foundation of such a philosophy, belongs as
much to our current phenomenon of information as does the idea of quan-
tiﬁcation. Information presents itself as a particular kind of thing; our im-
pression of it is of a kind of substance. Since the grammar of “substance”
and its cognates license conceptual explorations of what, precisely, the
properties of the stuff in question might be, it legitimates the question
“What is information?” Whereas the impression of information-as-substance
leads the popular imagination toward pursuits of remedies for the delete-
rious psychic effects of being overwhelmed by too much of the stuff, it di-
rects the theoretical and philosophical imagination toward puzzles posed
by information imagined as a coherent theoretical kind, that is, the sort of
thing about which general, theoretical knowledge may be gained. (Once
substance presents itself, the quest for essence is not far behind.)
According to Nunberg’s argument, the key properties of our abstract
impression of information-as-substance, those he calls the syntactic prop-
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erties of quantiﬁability, uniformity, and morselization (or boundedness),
and the semantic properties of objectivity and autonomy, “are simply the
reiﬁcations of the various principles of interpretation” (p. 116) we bring
to reading speciﬁc, historically contingent document forms, most notably
among them: the newspaper, the modern reference work, national dictio-
naries, and encyclopedias; travel guides, census and other statistical reports;
the printed schedules, work rules, and forms of modern managerial orga-
nizations; and the modern novel (pp. 115–116). Our various impressions
of information, he argues, “grow directly out of the material organization
of [these] informational genres” (p. 117). In addition, he notes, there arose
a set of institutions “charged with representing the modern world,” whose
manner of representation “closely mirrored” these document forms (p.
116). They include various kinds of public museums, especially those de-
voted to representations of ﬁne art, natural history, and science and indus-
try, in addition to department stores and “public libraries, great and small,
card catalogues, and the ‘library science’ (now ‘information science’) that
grew up along with them” (p. 116). Because the properties of our current
phenomenon of information that Nunberg reveals in his analysis of their
documentary and institutional roots pertain to the category of substance,
they lead, in spite of their contradictions and ambiguities, to ideas of in-
formation as a coherent theoretical kind. They lend a theoretical aura to
the question “What is information?”
There is another source, beyond the material organization of document
forms and their supporting institutions, of our phenomenon of informa-
tion. This second source has a venerable philosophical ancestry, and sever-
al remarks in Nunberg’s essay point in its direction, although he does not
address it directly. He notes that authors of “manifestos issued on behalf
of the new technologies” typically imagine the content of electronic media
as “a noble substance that is indifferent to the transformation of its vehi-
cles” (p. 107). Its nobility consists in its abstract, immaterial, and asocial
nature: it “will be preserved intact when its material and social supports are
stripped away” (p. 107), and it “doesn’t change its nature according to ei-
ther the medium it is stored in or the way it is represented” (p. 117). “In-
formation” in its abstract sense is the current name of this “noble substance,”
because information, whether speeding through electronic media or trans-
mitted at a more leisurely pace through print, is imagined as the content
of a message or document. The connection between this sense of informa-
tion and some deeply held philosophical convictions is suggested in Nun-
berg’s characterization of the phenomenon of information as “a kind of
intentional substance that is present in the world” (p. 110; emphasis added).
The reference to intentionality marks a connection between information-
al and mental substance. To imagine the information conveyed by a mem-
ber of the rapidly expanding universe of documents as abstract, noble doc-
ument content indifferent to the transformation of its vehicles and stripped
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of all material, institutional, and social supports is to imagine it as belong-
ing to the same ontological category as the immaterial, intentional, and
mental substance present to an individual mind in a state of understand-
ing that document. The document is imagined as the mere conveyance, or
channel, for the transmission of intentional substance from the mind of the
sender to the mind of the receiver, an idea implicit in Nunberg’s observa-
tion that according to cyberspace enthusiasts, thanks to the new digital tech-
nologies, the content of documents now “can be liberated and manipulat-
ed as a kind of pure essence.” John Perry Barlow, for example, is almost clear
about the ontology of the “complex and highly liquid patterns of ones and
zeros” ﬂowing through the Internet; once it becomes “the principal medi-
um of information conveyance, and perhaps eventually, the only one,” then
“all the goods of the Information Age—all of the expressions once con-
tained in books or ﬁlm strips or newsletters—will exist either as pure
thought or something very much like thought” (Barlow, 1994). Informa-
tion is thus already imagined, not only as material “voltage conditions dart-
ing around the Net at the speed of light” (ibid.), but also, modeled on a
venerable philosophical paradigm, as belonging to the same ontological
category as “immaterial and abstract representational entities, such as prop-
ositions, concepts, mental images, and the epistemic content of sentences
or other sorts of signiﬁers” (Frohmann, 2001, p. 16).
The idea of life breathed into the spoken word, printed text, or any
documentary form by mental activity is a central paradigm of the Western
philosophical tradition, and it persists to the present day.1  When this par-
adigm interacts with the impression of information as intentional sub-
stance—an impression that derives from the material properties of the
document forms and institutions analyzed by Nunberg—there arises a com-
plex and conﬂicted phenomenology of information, which crisscrosses
concepts of meaning, the content of documents, what their authors intend
in writing them, what a mind grasps in understanding them, and their in-
teractions. This complex phenomenon licenses a range of theoretical con-
troversies, among them: whether information inheres in documents or in
the minds that understand them; how intentional substance is related to
and how it can be transmitted through inert, dead, and lifeless matter; what
it is for a person to be informed; what it is for a document to be informing;
how the differences in the scope and range of the informativeness of doc-
uments may be explained; how we are to understand the relations between
various social phenomena and the production, circulation, and reception
of information.
Meaning, Information, and Practice
Nunberg’s approach is one example of a promising philosophical ap-
proach to information: rather than take for granted the legitimacy of the
question “What is information?”— thereby locating theories of information
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at the center of investigation—focus instead on the sources and legitima-
tion of the question itself. But other powerful models exist, and the one
suggested in this section derives from the later philosophy of Ludwig Witt-
genstein. It is well known that Wittgenstein often deﬂates philosophical
versions of questions of the form “What is X?” One such question, central
to his philosophical project, is “What is meaning?” His investigation of this
question is important for information studies because it is closely connect-
ed to the question “What is information?” Moreover, in troubling the ques-
tion of meaning, he targets the same deeply held philosophical conviction
from whence, it was argued above, our current impression of information
in large part derives.
Wittgenstein opens his Philosophical Investigations with a passage from
Augustine’s Confessions, where Augustine imagines how he learned language
as a child:
When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved
towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called
by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their in-
tention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural
language of all peoples. . . . Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in
their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to under-
stand what objects they signiﬁed; and after I had trained my mouth to
form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.
Immediately following this passage, Wittgenstein remarks,
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence
of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name
objects—sentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of
language we ﬁnd the roots of the following idea: Every word has a
meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for
which the word stands. (Wittgenstein, 1958, §1)
Wittgensteinian exegesis of this text is no less prodigious than that of
many other parts of his corpus; readers who wish to pursue it can refer to
Part I of Wittgenstein: Meaning and Understanding (Baker & Hacker, 1983).
The aim here is modest: to focus just on those aspects most useful to a phi-
losophy of information. The ﬁrst thing to notice is that Wittgenstein’s tar-
get is not full-blown theories of meaning. He speaks instead of “a particular
picture of the essence of human language,” distinguishing it from a particu-
lar idea rooted in it. The picture is that words stand for objects, and the idea
rooted in it is that the word’s meaning is the object for which the word stands.
Taken together, these two conceptions form a picture of language that pre-
cedes theories, as Baker and Hacker point out: “Augustine’s conception of
language is an Urbild. The family of philosophical accounts of meaning that
grow out of it are full-blown ‘theories’” (Baker & Hacker, 1983, p. 4). If Witt-
genstein is right in supposing that the Augustinian picture is a deeply seat-
ed philosophical conviction underlying theories of meaning, and if this pa-
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per’s argument is plausible, that there is a close connection between the Au-
gustinian picture and an analogous picture of information, then it’s also
plausible that to uproot the ﬁrst, as Wittgenstein intends is, ipso facto, to
uproot the second—together with the philosophical theories of informa-
tion rooted in it. There is much at stake, therefore, for a philosophy of in-
formation, in Wittgenstein’s attack on Augustine’s Urbild.
One of the main features of the Augustinian picture that ties it closely
to an analogous picture of information is the role of mental activity in trans-
forming dead, lifeless matter—whether marks on a page, images on a com-
puter screen, or the spoken word—into meaningful signs. According to the
Augustinian picture, it takes a mind to make the connection between a sign
and its meaning. Because the sign, so it appears, stands for its meaning,
understanding a sign appears to consist in a mental projection of the sign
onto its sense by means of thought—an idea Wittgenstein addresses in many
places but especially lucidly in his comments on Frege’s impatience with
mathematical formalists:
Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that
the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the im-
portant, the meaning. Surely, one wishes to say, mathematics does not
treat of dashes on a bit of paper. Frege’s idea could be expressed thus:
the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dash-
es, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously
have a kind of life. And the same, of course, could be said of any prop-
osition: Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would
be an utterly dead and trivial thing. And further it seems clear that no
adding of inorganic signs can make the proposition live. And the con-
clusion which one draws from this is that what must be added to the
dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immateri-
al, with properties different from all mere signs. (Wittgenstein, 1969,
p. 4)
Baker and Hacker’s gloss on the Augustinian picture also emphasizes its
mentalistic aspects:
Since understanding seems to be a mental activity, we are inclined to
characterize the content of understanding as being “in the mind.”
Understanding consists in a mental association of a word with an ob-
ject. . . . The word is correlated with its meaning by means of the inten-
tion that it should stand for this thing. . . .Understanding is, as it were,
a form of mental pointing at an object, a way of projecting language
on to the world. . . . Meaning and understanding are activities separate
from the physical activity of uttering or writing words; they take place
in the medium of the mind, give life to language. . . . (Baker & Hack-
er, 1983, pp. 6–7)
The deeply seated conviction that life is breathed into language by the
mental act of connecting signs to meanings—a conviction Wittgenstein calls
“a disease of thinking which always looks for (and ﬁnds) what would be
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called a mental state from which all our acts spring as from a reservoir”
(Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 143)—is closely related to the idea that the infor-
mativeness of a document also requires the mental act of projecting its signs
onto their sense (or meaning). In other words, it takes thought to transform
documents from lifeless matter into living information. A document, so it
seems, can be informing only if the reader is mentally formed, a process imag-
ined as the content of the document becoming present to readers’ minds
when they are in the mental state of understanding the document. The
document itself seems to be just a disposable medium that simply transmits
the genuine object of theoretical desire: information itself, Nunberg’s noble,
intentional substance, present in the world as the content of documents,
and owing its indifference to the transformation of its vehicles to its onto-
logical status as mental substance.
This picture of information sows the seeds of theories of information.
By licensing appeals to the presence of the document’s content to a mind
in a state of understanding, it warrants mentalistic explanations of what it
is for a person to be informed by a document. It licenses explanations of
differences in the informativeness of documents by appealing to individu-
al differences in the properties of the mediating entity—the human mind—
that account for variations in the abilities of individual minds to success-
fully transform dead, lifeless marks on a page into an informing document,
such as the intelligence, degree of education, innate cognitive ability, and
so on, of the readers of documents. The idea that information is a theoret-
ical kind populates the world with subjects who pursue it, now familiar to
us as “information seekers,” a term of the art of library and information
science. When the informativeness of a document is seen as the content
present to a mind in a state of understanding it, then “information uses”
gain the stability they need to be counted, tabulated, and processed by sta-
tistical methods. Relations between various social phenomena and the pro-
duction, circulation, and reception of information can be similarly ex-
plained; for example, the popular view of the direct function between
increased access to information and the spread of democracy often appeals
to the rise of a literate, enlightened citizenry, on the assumption that with-
out the progressive development of the minds from whose mental acts the
informativeness of documents depends, the mere spread of the documents
themselves can have but little effect.2  The close connection between the
Augustinian picture of meaning and the mentalistic picture of information
is important, because insofar as being informed seems to consist in the
presence of meaning to consciousness, to deﬂate meaning as a theoretical
object is also to deﬂate information as a theoretical object.
Wittgenstein’s treatment of the Augustinian Urbild is to set beside it a
very simple, imagined use of language—a language-game—which is worth
quoting in full:
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Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping.
I give him a slip marked “ﬁve red apples.” He takes the slip to the shop-
keeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up the
word “red” in a table and ﬁnds a colour sample opposite it; then he says
the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by
heart—up to the word “ﬁve” and for each number he takes an apple
of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.—It is in this and
similar ways that one operates with words.—“But how does he know
where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and what he is to do with
the word ‘ﬁve?’”—Well, I assume that he acts as I have described. Ex-
planations come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of
the word “ﬁve?”—No such thing was in question here, only how the
word “ﬁve” is used. (Wittgenstein, 1958, §1).
In this example, Wittgenstein erases all vestiges of the Augustinian pic-
ture of meaning that lies at the root of the idea that a mental act projects a
sign onto its sense. The shopkeeper moves directly, with no mental inter-
mediary, from the word “red” to the color sample, and then to the apple
matching it; he moves directly, with no mental intermediary, from the word
“ﬁve” to a rote utterance of the numerals from one to ﬁve, each time tak-
ing an apple from the drawer. In this picture, as Wittgenstein remarks, no
such thing as the meaning of a word is in question. It is a fact that human
beings operate with words as described. It is a fact that there exist such lan-
guage-games, or practices with words. “When we look at such simple forms
of language the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of
language disappears.” (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 17)
The Augustinian picture assumes that there must be a mental interme-
diary between word and deed, because, otherwise, how could the shopkeep-
er know what he is to do? Words, after all, are arbitrary conventions, mere
marks on a slip of paper in this example, with no essential connection to the
world. Only a mind, we think, can make the kind of connection required.
The wonderful thing about a mind, it seems, is that it can correlate arbi-
trary symbols with meanings. Meanings are something like symbols, but dif-
ferent in a crucial respect: they are not arbitrary—they seem to reach right
out to the world by thought, a kind of mental projection or pointing. But
the idea of a mental pointing that correlates mental content present to
consciousness directly to the world is a superstition:
If the meaning of the sign (roughly, that which is of importance about
the sign) is an image built up in our minds when we see or hear the
sign, then ﬁrst let us adopt the method . . . of replacing this mental
image by some outward object seen, e.g., a painted or modeled image.
Then why should the written sign plus this painted image be alive if the
written sign alone was dead?—In fact, as soon as you think of replac-
ing the mental image by, say, a painted one, and as soon as the image
thereby loses its occult character, it ceases to seem to impart any life to
the sentence at all. (It was in fact just the occult character of the men-
tal process which you needed for your purposes.) (p. 5)
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Wittgenstein’s point in this passage is made at many other places in his
writings. It can be easily adapted to the simple language-game of the shop-
keeper. If there is no problem about how the shopkeeper fetches a red ap-
ple on the basis of the presence to his mind of the meaning of the word “red,”
then why is there a problem of doing so just upon his looking at the word
“red”? To insist that the problem simply doesn’t arise for meanings is to
impute magical or occult properties to them. We are also tempted to im-
pute the same occult properties to rules when we try to explain meaning
by appeal to rules governing the use of language. Rules, like meanings, are
pictured as magical when imagined as anticipating what is in accordance
with them. Regarding the +1 rule for extending the series, 1,2,3 . . ., Witt-
genstein remarks: “The expression ‘The rule meant him to follow up 100
by 101’ makes it appear that this rule, as it was meant, foreshadowed all the
transitions which were to be made according to it. But the assumption of a
shadow of a transition does not get us any further, because it does not bridge
the gulf between it and the real transition. If the mere words of the rule
could not anticipate a future transition, no more could any mental act ac-
companying these words” (Wittgenstein, 1969, p. 143).
Wittgenstein’s pursuit of the myriad and labyrinthian ramiﬁcations of
the conceptual confusions surrounding the Augustinian picture of language
has generated a monument of philosophical exegesis. For the purposes of
this paper, it is enough to provide a brief sense of his argument and to ap-
ply it to our thinking about information. Wittgenstein’s description of the
simple language-game of the shopkeeper shows that, in philosophical reﬂec-
tion on what meaning itself might be, the idea of the presence to conscious-
ness of a particular kind of mental entity that attaches words, sentences, rules,
or other elements of a language to the world is idle. The upshot of his in-
vestigations is that when meant philosophically, the question “What is mean-
ing?” expresses a confusion. Once it is recognized that the shopkeeper acts
as described, then the generalized idea of meaning evaporates, thus elimi-
nating the source of philosophical angst about the deﬁnition, nature, or
essence of meaning. Meaning is not a coherent theoretical kind awaiting
explication. Wittgenstein deﬂates the very idea of a theory of meaning:
“meaning” is a garden-variety word whose purposes and uses are open to view.
Because “meaning” is grammatically related to “information” by virtue
of the unexciting truth that a meaningless sign can not be informing, sim-
ilar conclusions follow for a philosophy of information. If the shopkeeper
acts as described, we say he knows the meaning of the words “ﬁve,” “red,”
and “apples”—to say so is to know the meaning of “meaning.” And if the
shopkeeper’s knowledge of these words is shown by his actions, then it is
his actions that also show that the shopkeeper is informed by the phrase “ﬁve
red apples”—as opposed to a meaningless mark on the slip of paper. The
informativeness of the phrase has as little to do with any mental process as
does its meaningfulness. Once the philosophical idea of meaning as a theo-
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retical kind drops out of the picture of the shopkeeper’s way of operating
with words, so too does the corresponding idea of information. In neither
case is there anything like a particular kind of thing answering to the words
“meaning” and “information”: neither meaning nor information is a theo-
retical kind. Similarly, no substantive answers exist to the questions “What is
meaning?” and “What is information?”
When we look at Wittgenstein’s example, we do not see minds engaged
in cerebration but embodied persons engaged in activities of operating with
words. Wittgenstein calls such activities language-games; at other places, he
uses different terms: “To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to
play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sen-
tence means to understand a language. To understand a language means
to be master of a technique” (Wittgenstein, 1958, § 199). We can bring these
ideas together under the category of practice: for Wittgenstein, attention to
the actual practices with language deﬂates philosophical ideas of meaning
by exposing them as occult and magical fantasies of essential connections
undergirding language use. And since informativeness follows from mean-
ingfulness, attention to practice also deﬂates ideas of information as the
equally occult, noble, and intentional substance by virtue of which a docu-
ment is informing.
Wittgenstein’s examples of simple language games are especially use-
ful for thinking about information because they often involve, as in the case
of the shopkeeper, familiar items such as written words on slips of paper,
color charts, tables, geometrical ﬁgures, and so on (see especially Part I of
The Brown Book; Wittgenstein, 1969, pp. 77–125). Many of his cases there-
fore involve practices with documents. Just as Wittgenstein’s treatment of the
Augustinian picture shifts our attention away from mentalistic pictures of
meaning and toward practices with language, so too does it shift our atten-
tion away from mentalistic pictures of information and toward practices with
documents. The Wittgensteinian perspective heralds a shift from theories of
information to descriptions of documentary practices.
Certain properties of practices are especially salient in such descrip-
tions. The ﬁrst is materiality: since documents exist in some material form,
their materiality conﬁgures practices with them. (The shopkeeper’s lan-
guage game excludes persons afﬂicted with color blindness from learning
and engaging in it because it involves color samples.) A familiar example
of constraints imposed by the materiality of documents is the difﬁculty of
coordinating meetings when committee members rely upon their “hard
copy” of the same Web document, each with unique pagination, thus ex-
posing a minor advantage of typographical ﬁxity, a feature of the printing
press championed by Eisenstein (1979) and challenged by Johns (1998).
Brown and Duguid (2000) provide similar examples. A second property of
documentary practices is how deeply embedded they are in institutions.
Much of the authority of the informativeness of documents depends on the
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institutional sites of their production, a point made by Foucault in his dis-
cussion of the importance of institutions to the formation of enunciative
modalities (Foucault, 1972, pp. 51–52). A third property is social discipline:
documentary practices, like most others, require training, teaching, correc-
tion, and other disciplinary measures; the point is reinforced by the role
of training in many of Wittgenstein’s language-games and emphasized by
Foucault’s link between disciplinary apparatus and the ﬁeld of documen-
tation (Foucault, 1979, pp. 189–194, 197). A fourth property is historicity:
practices arise, develop, decline, and vanish—all under speciﬁc historical
circumstances. These four constraining properties of documentary prac-
tices are only analytical notions; full descriptions of such practices will fea-
ture interactions between some or all of them. Nor is this short list meant
to be exhaustive. But the ideas of materiality, institutions, social discipline,
and history provide a useful beginning for a philosophy of information
whose point of departure is the concept of documentary practices. The next
section presents two historical examples from the history of early modern
science to show that a document becomes informing only given certain kinds
of documentary practices.
Writing the Book of Nature
Something new, we know, occurred in the early-sixteenth- to the late-
eighteenth century with respect to our knowledge of the natural world. The
story—the narrative of the scientiﬁc revolution—has been told many times.
A popular version goes something like this: inspired by thinkers such as
Bacon and experimenters such as Boyle and Galileo, the natural philoso-
phers of the period opened their eyes to the natural world, gathering ob-
servations to support inductive generalizations, thereby rejecting their pre-
decessors’ habit of drawing deductive conclusions from Aristotelian
“essences” or “natures” (for a dissenting view, see Shapin, 1996). As a fa-
miliar metaphor would have it, they turned from the books of the philoso-
phers to the book of nature. Robert Boyle made his reading preferences
quite clear: “. . . I could be very well content to be thought to have scarce
looked upon any other book than that of nature” (quoted in Shapin, 1984,
p. 496). Peter Dear, whose analysis of the relationship between experiment
and documentation is very useful for understanding the historical dimen-
sions of documentary practices, puts it this way:
Historians routinely refer to Baconianism, the Royal Society, and the
metaphor of reading the book of nature . . . to argue that the seven-
teenth century saw a move towards discovering nature through the
senses, using observation and experiment. Certainly, something hap-
pened to experience in the seventeenth century; talk of experimental
and experiential demonstration, or sometimes “ocular” demonstra-
tion—culminating in the term “experimental philosophy”—rapidly
became widespread. (Dear, 1991, p. 135)
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The metaphor of the book of nature can be recast from the perspective of
an admittedly anachronistic philosophy of information: in the period of the
scientiﬁc revolution, natural philosophers opened their eyes to observe the
information nature had to offer—the noble substance inscribed in the book
of nature by nature itself. When present to minds tuned to sensory experi-
ence, observation, and experiment, nature’s information is reinscribed in
the burgeoning scientiﬁc documentation of the age, thus precipitating a
seventeenth-century version of an information revolution.
It is not so easy, however, to transcribe the book of nature into the books
of mankind. The story gets more complicated when institutionalized doc-
umentary practices are taken into account. For the natural philosophers
of the time, it was not at all obvious how to document the new kinds of
observations—especially those generated by lashing nature to the rack of
experiment; as Francis Bacon put it, phenomena revealed by “nature un-
der constraint and vexed; that is to say, when by art and the hand of man
she is forced out of her natural state, squeezed, and moulded” (Bacon, 1960,
p. 25)—as revealing nature’s secrets rather than freaks spawned by myste-
rious manipulations of fantastic instruments by devotees of a secret cult.
While it is common today to accept that laboratory phenomena produced
by an elite cadre expert in the techniques of recondite apparatus can speak
for nature, it was anything but common in the mid-seventeenth century. The
idea that an event produced by experiment could generate truths of nature
was entirely new. From the perspective of a PI, the natural philosophers of
the seventeenth century faced the challenge of how to make their written
reports of observations informative or how to convey the information inscribed
in the book of nature.
The difﬁculty may be seen as a case of the familiar Aristotelian prob-
lem of the possibility and legitimacy of a science of the individual. Experi-
mental results are singular, individual events. But Aristotelian science de-
rives its conclusions from universal principles. These principles draw their
certainty and authority from common experience; they are what everyone knows,
such as “Heavy bodies fall,” or “The sun rises in the east.” In Aristotelian
science, an “experience” was “a universal statement of how things are” (Dear,
1995, p. 22)—“a statement of how things happen in nature, rather than a state-
ment of how something had happened on a particular occasion” (p. 4). And,
although the truth of such experience is known by the senses, “one did not
need to have acquired such experiences personally in order to use them in
argumentation, provided that they were commonly accepted, either through
daily familiarity or through the statements of a weighty authority” (p. 22).
The stability of such “experience” rested upon the obviousness of the universal
statement, which was underwritten by common consent and which warrant-
ed its use in deductive reasoning—the Aristotelian way of true science. Since
singular, individual, historical events cannot reveal how nature behaves
normally, they cannot provide grounds for natural knowledge. Moreover,
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because occasional deviations from the regular course of nature are not
ruled out by the Aristotelian conception, a ready explanation for laborato-
ry events inaccessible to common experience was available: “they might be
classiﬁed as ‘monsters’ or even ‘miracles’” (p. 14).
How, then, did the natural philosophers of the early seventeenth cen-
tury, dedicated as they were to observing nature through new instruments
(such as Galileo’s telescope) and forcing nature to yield new phenomena
through new devices (such as Boyle’s air-pump; see Shapin & Schaffer,
1985), manage to make their claims credible when reports of singular his-
torical events had no epistemic status? “How could ‘experiences’ be estab-
lished as common property,” Dear asks, “if most people lacked direct ac-
cess to them?” (1995, p. 59). The answer relies upon his insight that
experiment and its documentation are closely linked. Scientiﬁc literary
practice, he argues, is “a crucial feature of scientiﬁc practice as a whole . . .
an account of an experiment is an essential part of its performance” (Dear,
1991, p. 135). Documents are credible only given certain kinds of documen-
tary practices, and in the early seventeenth century, “epistemology, meth-
od, and text were woven together in the assumptions of that dominant scho-
lastic pedagogy which took Aristotle as its touchstone of legitimacy” (Dear,
1991, p. 137). The purported “observations” yielded by experiments and
new instruments had, somehow, to be documented as Aristotelian “common
experiences.” Since the only discursive resources available to convey the
information revealed by nature to the private experiences of specialists
working with mysterious instruments were deeply embedded in the insti-
tutions of Aristotelian scholarship, the manufacture of credibility fell to the
documentary task of mutating Aristotelian discursive resources such that
the discrete observations of a few could express the common experiences
of the many. It was not enough simply to present the observations of an
experiment, or the new kinds of observations made available by new kinds
of instruments, as if they belonged to a book written by nature itself. In other
words, when it came to the manufacture of knowledge, it was not possible
to suppose that nature’s information could speak for itself. The experiment
had ﬁrst to be “constructed linguistically as a historical account of a speciﬁc
event that acts as a warrant for the truth of a universal knowledge-claim”
(Dear, 1995, p. 6). The unwritten, undocumented experiment could not
stand on its own: “For the singular experiment to stand for the universal
experience, an appropriate kind of argumentative framework needs to be
in place, explicitly or implicitly, within which it can play that role” (Dear,
1991, p. 162). Such linguistic construction, however, took much labor, es-
pecially for scholars working within the documentary practices of scholas-
tic science and pedagogy. How did they struggle to make their documents
credible? Posed in the terms of a philosophy of information, how did they
manage to make their documents informative?
One technique was to draw upon the familiar literary device of the
400 library trends/winter 2004
geometrical problema. Geometry was a model of the Aristotelian ideal “to
have principles, or premises, that were evident and therefore immediately
conceded by all. In the case of geometry, Euclid’s ‘common opinions’—
what Aristotle called ‘axioms’—represent the concept precisely” (Dear,
1995, p. 42). If the familiar, institutionalized literary form of the geometri-
cal construction could be used successfully to document empirical state-
ments as clearly evident as Euclid’s “common opinions,” then the “common
consent” enjoyed by the latter could be transferred to the former. More-
over, the already recognized geometrical expertise of the writer is extend-
ed at the same time to natural-scientiﬁc investigations. The new sciences
of astronomy and optics, although driven by new instruments, were espe-
cially amenable to the geometrical form of documentation. The transpar-
ency of the geometrical construction, where “in following its steps one sees
the outcome generated inevitably before one’s eyes; even recourse to com-
pass and ruler is unnecessary” (p. 60), was used to link the procedures and
outcomes of optical experiences: “Just as constructions in geometry were
generated from postulates that expressed conceded possibilities, so the use
of a geometrical paradigm served to re-create unfamiliar experience by
generating it from familiar experience—that is, easily picturable operations”
(p. 60). By yoking the documentary practices of the geometrical problema
to the presentation of their experiments, the contemporary natural philos-
ophers could enact a literary performance of the experiment such that the
experimental phenomena—the observations—could become as evident
and as obvious as geometrical axioms. The problem, says Dear, was clear:
“The deductive, demonstrative model of natural knowledge meant that
empirical statements had to play the part of axioms; that is, they had to look
like universal statements of the way everyone knows how things are—like
geometrical axioms” (Dear, 1991, p. 162). Nature’s information could
emerge only as an effect of prevailing documentary practices, together with
the social and pedagogical disciplines that maintained them. Far from be-
ing a noble substance indifferent to the transformation of its vehicles, the
information about nature conveyed by the documents of seventeenth-cen-
tury astronomy and optics emerged only as an effect of the labor expend-
ed on adapting the existing conventions of Aristotelian documentary prac-
tices to new situations. The book of nature turns out to be a
multiple-authored product of socially disciplined literary practices. Written
according to institutionalized documentary practices, it is informative; writ-
ten by nature itself, it is unintelligible.
A second technique used to render empirical statements with the ob-
viousness of Aristotelian ﬁrst principles was multiple repetition. This strat-
agem merits mention especially because its use was not driven by anything
like our modern understanding of the role of repeated experimental tri-
als. The aim was not to strengthen hypothetical claims, but to place an
observation in the same class as the “experiences” authenticated by com-
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mon consent, many of which, like “The sun rises in the east,” are exemplars
of multiple repetition. Dear explains that the
justiﬁcation of multiple repetition has nothing to do with epistemolog-
ical problems of induction; it concerns simply the avoidance of decep-
tion by the senses or by choice of an atypical instance, so as to ensure a
reliable report of how nature actually behaves “always or for the most
part,” as Aristotle put it. The relevant aspects of nature are themselves
neither opaque nor capricious—if they were, there could be no ques-
tion of making a science of them by having their characterizations pass
into “common assent.” (Dear, 1991, p. 139)
The idea was not to record the degree of agreement between the outcomes
of speciﬁc historical events repeated many times, but to describe experimen-
tal phenomena in the manner characteristic of scholastic documentation
of ﬁrst principles.
This technique was deployed by Galileo.
Instead of describing a speciﬁc experiment or set of experiments car-
ried out at a particular time, together with a detailed quantitative record
of the outcomes, Galileo merely says that, with apparatus of a certain
sort, he found the results to agree exactly with his theoretical assump-
tions—having, he says, repeated the trial “a full hundred times.” He had
shortly before claimed to have done this “often.” Both phrases are just
ways of saying, in effect, “again and again as much as you like.” Galileo
thus establishes the authenticity of the experience that falling bodies
do behave as he asserts by basing it on the memory of many instances—
a multiplicity of unspeciﬁed instances adding up to experiential con-
viction. (Dear, 1995, p. 125)
If successful, Galileo’s strategy presents his experimental observations as
typical. The literary appeal to typicality is a mode of documentation: it is
the use of a “familiar rhetorical tactic of appealing to common experi-
ence . . . to establish . . . empirical assertions, appropriately, as things that
‘everyone knows’” (p. 90). Galileo does not provide narrative reports of
speciﬁc instances of what he had done and seen at speciﬁc times, but in-
stead tells his readers what happens in the kind of situation he presents; he
documents a recurring phenomenon of nature: a type, one constructed whol-
ly in keeping with Aristotelian documentary practices. The documentary
transformation of experimental statements into “experience” of how na-
ture typically behaves thus converts empirical assertions into Aristotelian
ﬁrst principles: “Galileo’s use of experience [is] tantamount to the invo-
cation of thought experiments: the reader is reassured that the world’s
working in a particular way is entirely to be expected, entirely consonant
with ordinary events” (Dear, 1995, p. 126). Employing once again the
anachronistic language of information, we can say that the information
about nature emerges as an effect of these institutionalized documentary
practices. Far from conveying nature’s information—the noble substance
ﬁrst presented by nature to the newly tuned minds of natural philosophers
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who then communicated it to others through writing—the documentary
practices of the period constituted it.
Dear’s investigations reveal the role, at a particular time and place, of
the institutions that disciplined the manner in which the science of nature
was documented, and how they provided a particular set of discursive re-
sources for the articulation of scientiﬁc truth. Different times and differ-
ent places exhibit different kinds of documentary practices and different
kinds of institutions—think of the corporate form of the scientiﬁc enter-
prise in our own time (Galison & Hevly, 1992). A nice contrast to the con-
tinental natural philosophers’ deployments of Aristotelian practices of in-
scribing nature is the production of knowledge in Restoration England.
Working in the absence of the strong scholastic pedagogical and academic
institutions of their continental counterparts, Robert Boyle and the Fellows
of the early Royal Society could legitimate alternatives to demonstrative
methods of knowledge production modeled after logic and geometry. True
to their Baconian practice of building knowledge from the certiﬁed occur-
rence, at a particular time and place, of the granular, theory-resistant fact
of nature rather than from the certainty of axioms or “essences,” they saw
the form of Aristotelian accounts of scientiﬁc results as a surrender to dis-
credited authority. Rejecting certainty as the standard of natural knowledge,
they adopted the more modest criterion of high probability. Steven Shap-
in puts it this way:
Physical hypotheses were provisional and revisable; assent to them was
not necessary, as it was to mathematical demonstration; and physical
science was, to varying degrees, removed from the realm of the demon-
strative. The probabilistic conception of physical knowledge was not
regarded as a regrettable retreat from more ambitious goals; it was
celebrated by its proponents as a wise rejection of failed dogmatism.
The quest for necessary and universal assent to physical propositions
was seen as improper and impolitic. (Shapin, 1984, p. 483)
Having abandoned Aristotelian conventions for articulating natural knowl-
edge, the members of the Royal Society did not attempt to make their sin-
gular experiment stand for universal experience. Their problem was dif-
ferent: how to court trust in reports of what had happened on particular
occasions under highly contrived circumstances using recondite apparatus.
“The probabilistic model of Boyle,” Dear writes, “required a category of the
‘matter of fact,’ the legitimacy of which depended precisely on accredited,
and therefore speciﬁable, occurrences” (Dear, 1991, p. 162). Continental
and English practices were radically different: “Boyle did not use axiomat-
ic deductive argumentative structures, which were supposed to constitute
science in an Aristotelian sense, whereas Galileo and the Jesuits did. The
difference is of great signiﬁcance. . . . Boyle reported singular historical
events; they needed universal statements of behavior even when giving his-
torical accounts by way of collateral” (Dear, 1991, p. 162). To the continental
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philosophers, a “historical report of a speciﬁc event, of the kind that Boyle
wrote endlessly, would have been scientiﬁcally meaningless; it would have
been philosophical antiquarianism” (Dear, 1995, p. 209).
The literary practices of scientiﬁc report writing of the early period of
the Royal Society were therefore quite different from the scholastic prac-
tices pursued on the continent. Since the aim was to engender the read-
er’s trust that the singular, historical event presented in the scientiﬁc report
was indeed as it was purported to be—that it was a fact of nature, a matter
of fact, rather than a man-made artifact of the laboratory—a literary tech-
nique was designed to put the reader at the scene, to have the reader per-
form a virtual witnessing of the event occurring in the laboratory (Shapin
& Schaffer, 1985, pp. 60–65). Boyle realized that if “one wrote experimen-
tal reports in the correct way, the reader could take on trust that these things
happened. Further, it would be as if that reader had been present at the
proceedings. He would be recruited as a witness and be put in a position
where he could validate experimental phenomena as matters of fact” (pp.
62–63). There developed a style of writing that presented the experiment
by an “ornate sentence structure, with appositive clauses piled on top of
each other,” in order “to convey circumstantial details and to give the im-
pression of verisimilitude” (p. 63). This ornate rather than succinct style
was required to present simultaneously, in one snapshot as it were, all of
the details required for virtual witnessing: “Elaborate sentences, with cir-
cumstantial details encompassed within the conﬁnes of one grammatical
entity, might mimic that immediacy and simultaneity of experience afforded
by pictorial representations” (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985, p. 64). Dear makes
the same point this way: “The credentials that established the actuality of
the event were provided by surrounding the description by a wealth of cir-
cumstantial detail. This detail generally included information regarding
time, place, and participants, together with extraneous remarks about the
experience, all serving to add verisimilitude” (Dear, 1995, pp. 229–230).
A second feature of this literary style was modesty, which was not only a
documentary performance of the very qualities of the civility and gentle-
manly posture of the actual witnesses Boyle brought to the real experimental
scene to assure others of the veracity of experimental phenomena, but also
an exemplar of the properly Baconian nondogmatic attitude appropriate
to inductive and probabilistic, rather than demonstrative and axiomatic,
assertions of natural science. Here is Boyle’s advice to his nephew on the
proper style for venturing what he calls “opinions” in the experimental
report: “in almost every one of the following essays I . . . speak so doubtingly,
and use so often, perhaps, it seems, it is not improbable, and other such expres-
sions, as argue a difﬁdence of the truth of the opinions I incline to, and
that I should be so shy of laying down principles, and sometimes of so much
as venturing at explications” (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985, p. 67). Immodesty
is a sign of scholastic dogmatism; it signals the performance of individual
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conjecture. Modesty is the appropriate intellectual posture of a natural
scientist who would soberly and with circumspection document the matters
of fact that nature presents. The documentary practices of the Reformation
transform readers into participants in a literary performance of the exper-
iment through the eyes of credible witnesses. Stated once again from the
perspective of a philosophy of information: nature’s information emerges
from the documentary practices of the early Royal Society as a singular
historical event authenticated and certiﬁed as a matter of fact that did indeed
occur as documented.
For both the Fellows of the Royal Society and their continental peers,
the question of whether their reports were scientiﬁcally meaningful—
hence, whether they communicated the information nature had to give—
depended on institutionally disciplined and historically contingent docu-
mentary practices. On the continent, the documentary practices of
scholasticism had to be exploited under new conditions, whereas in Refor-
mation England the relevant practices ﬁrst had to be created. The book of
nature, it turns out, is not only hospitable to a wide variety of human au-
thors and institutions, but also incorporates novelty, conﬂict, and strife.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to point toward some useful avenues for phi-
losophizing about information. Much more work needs to be done to fol-
low up the suggestions presented here, in what is intended merely as a pro-
legomenon to a philosophy of information. Two main directions have been
indicated.
The ﬁrst direction points toward a phenomenology of information and
away from a philosophical theory of information. Nunberg’s essay is pre-
sented as a useful example of a way of thinking about information, one that
shifts our attention away from questions of what information itself, as a
theoretical kind, might be, and toward questions of how, in both our own
but also at other times and places, the phenomenon of information is con-
structed. A promising conclusion for thinking about information philosoph-
ically is that a phenomenology of information implies that the very ques-
tion “What is information?” is itself an aspect of a contemporary cultural
space in which information is conceived as a theoretical kind—the sort of
thing about which it makes sense to ask such a question in a philosophico-
theoretical vein. More studies along the lines of the cultural phenomenol-
ogy practiced by Nunberg should help us gain a broader, and certainly
historically deeper, understanding of how an underlying picture of infor-
mation arises as the self-sufﬁcient sort of substance about whose nature it
makes sense to theorize.
The second fruitful direction is a pursuit of the implications of Wittgen-
steinian ideas about language-games, or language-practices. The chief im-
plications are that the study of practices with documents should yield a more
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promising set of concepts for thinking philosophically about information
than studies centered upon a theoretical, philosophical excogitation of the
nature of information. The reason for this conclusion is that a Wittgenstein-
ian approach suggests that practices and documents—by which we mean
inscriptions, occasioned utterances, and the wide variety of records that
circulate in a myriad of formats—are more fundamental concepts than
information. Attention to practices with documents reveals how it is that
particular documents, at particular times and places and in particular ar-
eas of the social and cultural terrain, become informative. Wittgenstein
himself was not interested in pursuing the variations or historical contin-
gencies of the many social and political forces that conﬁgure practices. But
once they are seen as fundamental, then the genie is out of the bottle: the
informativeness of documents, when recognized as dependent on practices,
is also dependent on what shapes and conﬁgures them. The promising
directions to take to look for the conﬁguring factors are the materiality of
the documents studied, their histories, the institutions in which they are
embedded, and the social discipline shaping practices with them.
The brief examples presented here from the early history of modern
science are intended to indicate some of the institutional factors and his-
torical contingencies that must be taken into account to show how scientiﬁc
documents become informative. Examples from science are especially ger-
mane to an approach to information that begins from Wittgensteinian ideas
about language-practices, because the information nature conveys is a par-
adigm case of objective, culturally independent, epistemic content. If any
sort of information were to be a noble substance independent of the trans-
formations of its vehicles, this would be it. Social studies of science show that
even scientiﬁc information depends for its emergence on culturally speciﬁc,
historically determined, and institutionally disciplined documentary prac-
tices. If the case can be made here, it is much easier to make it elsewhere.
An implication of a focus on documentary practices for a philosophy
of information is that such a philosophy is subordinate to a philosophy of
documentation. Informativeness is not the only property of documentary
practices worthy of study. Many practices with documents have little, if any-
thing, to do with informing anyone about anything. An example is the role
of popular music in articulating social difference in youth culture (Frohm-
ann, 2001). The uses of such documents are many and deserving of study
even when their informativeness is not the issue. Social studies of science
and sociological studies of knowledge production provide further examples,
such as those that rely on concepts like trading zones (Galison, 1997) and
boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989)—where the idiom of convey-
ing information is not rich enough to capture the role of such documents
in coordinating work among members of different social worlds. Contem-
porary information studies owe much to the documentalist movement of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Rayward, 1975; Rayward,
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1991; Buckland, 1996; Rayward, 1997), but documentation as envisaged
here covers more territory than information studies. Although the subject
of this issue of Library Trends is the PI, the title of this paper signals its in-
tention to recuperate and rethink the early documentalists’ concern for
documentary practices, and to situate the philosophy of information as but
one, although important, aspect of a philosophy of documentation.
A ﬁnal word concerns the historical imperative for a PI. Some think-
ers, prominent among them Luciano Floridi, Rafael Capurro, and Michael
Eldred, believe that a philosophy of information is especially urgent in the
digital age. The claim is that because of the expanding “infosphere” (Flo-
ridi, 1999) or the “digital casting of being” (Capurro; Eldred), the need for
a new digital ontology constitutes an imperative to philosophize anew about
information. The implication of a philosophy of documentation as present-
ed here dissents. Documentation recognizes as urgent an imperative to
study ancient, medieval, or early modern documentary practices as those
that feature electronic documents. What we do with electronic documents,
how such practices are conﬁgured, and what they do to us are eminently
worthy of study. But the digital form of contemporary documents creates
no special philosophical imperatives, since the concept of documentary
practices was there all along.
Notes
1. A vigorous e-mail correspondence on the JESSE listserv in the spring of 2002 attests to the
strength of the paradigm in library and information science (LIS). The chief protagonists
were Loet Leydesdorff and Tom Wilson, with the latter championing the Cartesian view
that mental representations, such as those present to the mind in the state of understand-
ing meanings, inhabit an immaterial realm. According to Wilson, the material properties
of documents that account for the squiggles of print that constitute their texts, the curves
that constitute their graphs, and so on, are dead, inert, and meaningless in themselves,
because they are simply material. It takes minds to breathe life into them; only when the
mind interprets these marks does “meaning” come into being. (Unlike some of his LIS
colleagues who would use the word “information” as he uses “meaning,” Wilson reserves
the former for the dead, inert graphemes.)
2. This popular view is refuted in a work whose analysis of the materiality of writing is ger-
mane to the themes of this paper: “an ever-widening educational apparatus has always
secured power and privilege for a small number to the exclusion of many,” and “[w]herever
we look, in every period, social stratiﬁcation presides over the history of literacy”(Goldberg,
1990, pp. 47–48).
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Community as Event1
Ronald E. Day
Abstract
Concepts and technologies of information and communication are dis-
cussed in the context of political philosophy and ontology. The questions
of what is the meaning and sense of “information” and “communication”
in modern political philosophy and what are the roles of technologies of
such are discussed in regard to two notions of power and community: con-
stitutional and constituent. The responsibility of designing and using infor-
mation and communication technologies in response to an ontologically
primary “social net” is discussed. One, ethical-political, role of the relation
of philosophy to information is discussed.
I. Introduction
In this article, I would like to consider two models of community—
one founded upon constitutional power and one founded upon constituent
power—that give rise to various forms of agency and identity: the modern
state or nation, cultural or social senses of community, and last, but not least,
the organization of the self. I would like to consider these two models from
the perspective of ontology, communication, and information. To position
communication and information events and technologies within a problem
of community through the framework of ontology means to engage such
events and technologies within political philosophy. In particular, I would like
to ask if the information and communication model popularly known as the
“conduit metaphor,” which is still the dominant theoretical model in com-
munication studies and in library and information studies, adequately models
the different levels of community or organization that make up our macro-
social selves and our more micropersonal selves. In two early, but foundation-
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al, works, “Animal Songs” (Day, 1996) and “Diagrammatic Bodies” (Day,
1998), I investigated the issue of community in terms of the “in-common”
relations of beings, including humans and other animals, that occur within
three horizons of bodily relation and temporality: language, physical exten-
sion, and ﬁnitude. In this work, I would like to more fully develop that anal-
ysis in terms of two concepts: “the people” and “the multitude.”
This article attempts to disrupt simplistic, but common, assumptions
that divide modern politics into totalitarian or fascist forms of government
on the one hand and democratic ones on the other hand because it chal-
lenges the notion of “communicative reason” (to use Habermas’s term)
that, I argue, forms the basis for all constitutional or “rational” forms of
government. My argument assumes a different origin for democracy—one
that starts from what is in-common: affects, language, and at least for hu-
mans, a temporality beginning with a shared sense of ﬁnitude. Such an
origin for democracy sees individuals as singular expressions of in-common
relations rather than as a priori individuals. As an important horizon for
forming social relations and, therefore, individual beings, the topic of lan-
guage constitutes an exemplary horizon for discussing the in-common
nature of beings. If my argument emphasizes human communities, how-
ever, I would like to stress that it is not limited to such. Humans share lan-
guage, affect, and possibly some senses of time with other beings. Togeth-
er these form the in-common horizons for our zoological community and,
in some ways, extend out into the community of the physical universe as a
whole. In so far as language, affect, and forms of temporality constitute pri-
mordial ontological horizons to which we reply, they are informational and
communicational and they give rise to the appearance of our selves as be-
ings and as individuals. Thus, in sharp contrast to the concepts of “the
people” and “communicative reason,” the multitude and the ontological
horizons of the multitude, however speciﬁc, may not in general exclude all
that which is outside of “man” or the human.
II. The “common” of constitutionality
The tradition of political philosophy that ﬁnds community resting on
constitutional interpretations of common law or “reason” itself has, of
course, a long history in, particularly, the Anglo-Saxon countries. Thomas
Hobbes, for example, in the seventeenth century argued that left to their
own devices men form a mob or “multitude” of desires that result in a state
of war (Hardt and Negri, 2000). According to Hobbes, for the sake of peace
the multitude must be organized as a “people” under sovereignty. Later,
Locke would, of course, translate this notion of sovereign law into a notion
of democracy by shifting the basis of reason from the monarchical seat to
that of citizens. The right of individual communication would, under the
guidance of reason, lead to a type of “communicative reason” that would
be the foundation of the democratic State.
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Sovereign and democratic forms of political community are constitu-
tional because they constitute community through reason and reason’s
embodiment in law. Such an assemblage is often “capitalistic” in the sense
that the constituted assemblage is also accumulated under a smaller body
(that is, in the largest sense, “capitalized”); democratic relations are often
synthesized into representational forms that are governmentally higher than
themselves. By this, some powers are selected and combined so as to in-
crease power in certain manners. Direct democracy is replaced by a repre-
sentative democracy that also has a responsibility of managing and leading
the State. Other powers, thus, are simply seen as surplus—trash or leftovers
in regard to the future (what Walter Benjamin (1968b) termed Abfall).
Power here—the “potentia” (Hardt and Negri, 2000) of the multitude in
their individualities and groups—is trimmed and increased according to
ordained rational parameters, and this trimming begins with the basis of
“rational” speech.
The constitutional tradition in political philosophy has deep historical
roots, of course, in the Western democratic tradition, which can easily
enough be seen in the opening words of the United States constitution, “We
the people. . . .” Equally, however, we must recognize that this tradition of
unity founded upon constituted plurality also has been embodied in more
fascist, mystical understandings of the “people,” namely, as the soul of the
nation as in, for example, the National Socialist understanding of das Volk
during the Third Reich in Germany. Though the actual manifestation of
constitutional plurality has been quite different in practice over political
modernity, the form of the modern State remains quite similar. In gener-
al, the modern State is said to embody the people as the common surren-
der of individual desire within a totalizing, “rational” whole—whether that
totalizing whole is understood in terms of legislated laws, a sovereign who
embodies those laws or decrees those laws, or as a mystical soul of a people
that rediscovers itself in national unity especially during moments of nation-
al crises or war.
What I am emphasizing here is the common explanatory logic of dif-
ferent evolutions of the modern State: sublimated individual desire and the
triumph of constitution via a common sense beginning with language.
Language, here, is “public” and “rational” not “private” and “irrational.”
Understanding is achieved by a correspondence of meaning between indi-
viduals beginning with a mutual attunement to a “common sense” of the
world and of language ﬁrst of all. Rationality in language is the ﬁrst proper
measure that then brings about the correspondence of minds and selves
in understanding. Language in the constitutional society must be, as Norb-
ert Wiener claimed, “clear”—that is, exact in terms of correspondence—
else the entire rational community of the State falls apart (Wiener, 1954).
The communicational as well as the informational models that follow
(or precede) this general logic or form for constitutional communities can
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be seen in terms of Realpolitik during times of war or similar moments of
crisis, when the national body is understood as “pulling together”—that is,
reestablishing, or in reality redeﬁning, its cultural, social, and geopolitical
boundaries by means of common pronouncements and judgments. In times
of crisis the community of the State is explicitly expressed in patriotic state-
ments, in the explicit use of force, and in the establishment of new types of
laws. As always, when the implicit borders of a common sense or common
ratio are threatened, then the concept of reason explicitly appears in state-
ments and in the formation of new laws. In this event of direct articulation,
explication, and formalization, the ﬂexibility of a common sense or reason
that deﬁnes the public sphere of a modern nation State becomes less ﬂexi-
ble. “Reason,” as the regulative ideal of common sense, explicitly appears
in the formalization of that “common sense” during periods of crisis.
The democratic political tradition, particularly within the framework
of economic capitalism, stresses the necessity of there being a plurality of
choices for desire to ﬁxate upon and ﬂow through. Particularly the capi-
talist State requires a certain degree of ﬂexibility so as to neither fully re-
press desire nor to allow it to overﬂow the object and thus make the sub-
ject appear to be irrational. The point is not to end desire, but rather to
sublimate it into work or, from the aspect of consumption, satisfy it tempo-
rarily but not permanently. Rather than totally repress or conquer desire,
one wishes to direct it to ﬂow through the conduits, objects, institutions,
and identities of expression that mark the common (this is the nature of
“discipline” according to Foucault [1977]). Common sense, thus, not only
characterizes forms of communication in general in the constitutional State,
but it also is the formal condition for production in general.
At the highest level of the modern State the concern about language
and other “commerce” is not that of maintaining content, but of preserv-
ing (and with that as far as imaginable, recreating) form, not that of repeat-
ing statements per se, but rather that of perpetuating a common sense for
meaning through formal continuity. If change is to occur, in other words,
it should occur conservatively, that is, it should conserve ﬁrst of all the for-
mal conditions for reproduction in the future’s production. And the con-
servation of “form” means here, in its most radical transformation, the
conservation of the most general governing economies through which pow-
er ﬂows and subjects emerge: the preservation of the notion of accumula-
tion and the premise of the necessity of surplus value and proﬁt as govern-
ing principles of everyday relations. (These terms must be thought both
within and outside of speciﬁcally ﬁnancial determinations—that is, these
terms must be thought in regard to representation as accumulation or cap-
ital-ization in general, as well as economically.) The controlled ﬂow of de-
sire is essential for the modern state in its highest form, which today takes
the form of the capitalist “democratic” State. Other twentieth-century forms
of the modern State here (e.g., Stalinist) are “immature” forms that fail
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because they fail to understand the interests that the State has in maintain-
ing itself through and by change, ﬁrst of all, through language or “expression.”
Desire not only may, but it also must be allowed to express itself, but it must
do so within the forms of rationality. Individual subjects are utterly desir-
able, but they are productive subjects only in so far as they are disciplined
for production (Foucault, 1977). The older, “communist” States utterly
failed to understand the necessity for “freedom of expression” insofar as
this phrase does not deeply care about controlling the content of expression
but rather is largely concerned with maintaining forms of expression. And,
except in moments of crisis, it relies on making the “rules” for such innate,
self-censored, and at the level of common sense and the “moves” of ordi-
nary language-games, not at the level of statements, deﬁnitions, or laws. In
this way, the “reason” of the State, its sovereign power, seems to only appear
in times of crisis, and we believe that democracy ﬂourishes because of this.
Where in reality, what we often call “democracy” in the modern constitu-
tional State is sovereign power at the level of formal, immanent, and com-
monsense relations, concerned with maintaining its capacity for reproduc-
tion. On such a social and political basis, all language comes to be seen as
a problem of measure, that is, as a problem of rationality. “One” voices
opinions, “one” makes statements about one’s emotions, and “one” com-
municates information about private and public states. And in times of crisis
or ambivalence, one is given more explicit rules for making such statements.
In communication and information theory, this famous principle of
“freedom of expression” is articulated in Warren Weaver’s rereading of
Claude Shannon’s “The Mathematical Theory of Communication” (“Re-
cent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication” [Shan-
non and Weaver, 1949]) within the concept of “freedom of choice.” In this
essay Weaver confuses Shannon’s strictly technical notion of “freedom of
choice” with human choices made within, among other realms, natural
language. In Shannon’s original paper the notion of statistical choice is
explained by the ability to predict words through the statistical occurrence
of letters in relation to one another within a given language. In Weaver’s
interpretation of Shannon’s “freedom of choice,” however, this statistical
example of alphabetic occurrence within a language gives way to semantic
and discursive “choices” (i.e., choices of expression), and, thus, Shannon’s
technical transmission model is reinterpreted within a particular speaker–
hearer model of language (i.e., the conduit metaphor) with the “speaker”
understood as the intentional “individual” of the liberal, and more gener-
ally, the constitutional political tradition. In other words, in Weaver’s work
Shannon’s conduit model of signal transmission becomes a metaphor for
communicative reason. The political meaning of such communicative rea-
son in the Cold War would be expressed more fully in the two editions of
Norbert Wiener’s book, The Human Use of Human Beings (published in 1950
and 1954; Day, 2001).
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In Weaver and Wiener’s readings, communicative reason enters the age
of statistics; there is no absolute border between communicative reason and
irrationality, but rather it appears in terms of statistical possibilities for se-
mantic clarity and “understanding.” As Wiener argues, the entire appara-
tus of the State, particularly its judiciary and laws, depends on semantic
clarity (Wiener, 1954, chapter 6). Here, empirically veriﬁable statements,
tropes, opinions, and all sorts of linguistic and epistemological types become
a certain type of information “sent” from someone to another or to others.
The conditions for understanding and for clarity are not interrogated in
this model, however. Nowhere in Weaver or Wiener’s texts can one ﬁnd any
discussion of the production of meaning outside of the concept of “free-
dom of choice.” Subjects and language remain distinct from one another,
as if language was only a commodity. No account is given in their texts of
language being a communal property. No account is given of the possibil-
ity for this world—or of any world—by and through language. No account
is given of the subject’s development, that is, the subject’s subjectivity, in
terms of forms of language. Instead, the subject is spoken of in terms of
eighteenth-century Enlightenment values (a certain notion of freedom
based on classical subjectivity) and in terms of capitalist values (a commod-
itized notion of choice).
Philosophically, and poetically as well, communicative reason stems
from a tradition of interpreting truth from Plato to Descartes to, at least,
Kant. Plato in his Republic expels actors because they ambivalently appear
to be someone other than who they are and thus cannot embody true and
trustworthy identity. Descartes describes truth in terms of the attributes of
“clear and distinct” ideas; vague or ambivalent ideas are untrue or worse,
false. For Kant, objects are represented in the understanding according to
the formal conditions of the understanding, and those formal conditions
constitute the basis for the universal judgments of practical reason, and thus,
for morality and law, as well as, of course, judgments of taste and knowledge.
Since ideas can be formed by nothing other than language, the relation-
ship between truth and writing in Western metaphysics is to be found in
the problem of representation.2
It is with the greatest unconscious irony that Wiener in The Human Use
of Human Beings rests his “republic” on the clarity of language, foremost, the
clarity of scientiﬁc language, only then to undercut this claim in the begin-
ning of the ﬁfth chapter of his book by arguing that mathematics (“which
most of us see as the most factual of all sciences” [Wiener, 1954, p. 95]) is,
in essence, metaphorical. The key to understanding this tension lies in
Wiener’s belief that language must be controlled in order for human systems
to exhibit the highest rational order in the face of chaos. This control be-
gins with knowing “man’s built in purpose” (Wiener, 1950, p. 210). Wien-
er, like Weaver, with the latter’s “engineering theory” whose goal is to de-
sign a language “with a view to the totality of things that man may wish to
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say” (Shannon and Weaver, 1949, p. 117), argues through a circular and
regressive logic that reduces all truth value to rhetoric, speciﬁcally, to a
discourse that we, today, term “informational” or “communicational.” Ac-
cording to Wiener, we must say only what we know is true, but we can say
what we know is true only if it is rhetorically clear. Thus, for Wiener the
“true” can only occur in language representationally. In this model, lan-
guage is not seen as a production of meaning or knowledge, but, rather, it
is the medium for such, but only in so far as it is “clear.” What the “clear”
is, however, is never stated nor can it be, but rather than being a grammat-
ical or linguistic category, it is a category of judgment. And judgment and
its production are not contested, for they rest in “common sense.” In such
an account there is little room for discussing knowledge as a function of
linguistic production even though by grounding truth as a function of rhet-
oric that is precisely where the grounds for discussion lie. Such a discussion
has occurred: for example, in the third chapter of Rousseau’s Essay on the
Origins of Language (1781/1968) where representation is seen as a product
of linguistic production beginning with ﬁgurative speech. Wiener, howev-
er, rejects metaphor or other such rhetorical ﬁgures as the basis for truth
because the social implications of this exceed the truth conditions required
by the constitutional and representational State as Wiener conceives of it.
Of course, even as Wiener (1954) suggests at the beginning of his ﬁfth
chapter, the very problem of philosophy, as a discourse on truth, is that
language exceeds and, indeed, produces this truth rather than is embod-
ied by it. Wiener’s text amply demonstrates this when it evokes metaphor
again and again as its central vehicle for textual production. What is lack-
ing in the positivist account is precisely that which Rousseau attempted to
account for, that is, language as a means of production for “truth” and for
many other discursive and social values. Because Wiener and Weaver are
unwilling to seriously engage language as a generational means of production
instead of simply as an instrumental tool for production, language becomes
reduced to a discourse on truth, most speciﬁcally in terms of meaning. The
concept of meaning, within the domain of truth, is then divided into a set
of binary distinctions such as “clear” and “unclear,” “true” or “ambivalent”
(at best, or at worse, “false”), “scientiﬁc” or “nonscientiﬁc,” and in terms
of communication and information, “successful” or “unsuccessful” trans-
mission, “true” or “false” documents or information. Bluntly stated, Wien-
er would have been wise to engage in a more materialist analysis because,
like Weaver, his conception of expressive “freedom” is even more restric-
tive than the democratic capitalist State he was trying to defend against what
he saw as the twin evils of the day, fascism and communism.
The classical understanding of truth in terms of highly formalized or
restrictive economies of language—valued not only in eighteenth-century
scientiﬁc discourse (Foucault, 1970) but also in eighteenth-century drama
and poetry, and as JoAnne Yates (Yates, 1989) has shown, in commerce
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during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—was challenged in the arts
beginning with Romantic poetics. In Romantic poetics (in different man-
ners, German, then English and French), and later in the form of the twen-
tieth-century avant-garde, knowledge takes the form of “new” statements
produced by artistic techniques. The production of the modernist “new,”
however, splits off into different aesthetic veins in the twentieth century:
one type of modernism follows capitalism in premising “the new” in terms
of new content while maintaining old forms, while the other type of mod-
ernism premises “the new” in terms of new forms, sometimes explicitly join-
ing with Marxism (i.e., Brecht’s work and Benjamin’s commentaries on it)
in a critique of economic production through a critique of aesthetic pro-
duction (that is, production as the production of the primary forms and
relations for reproduction, including, of course, that of a common sense or
aesthesis). While the ﬁrst type of aesthetics continues in the more tradition-
al representational “modern” arts, such as painting, the second type of
aesthetics reached its logical climax, at least in terms of aesthetics per se, in
the avant-garde performance “happenings” of the 1960s, where the very
sensuousness of the event itself was seen as a moment of “truth” by virtue
of its immediacy and nonreducibility.
One of the important elements of the counterclassical movements of
literary Romanticism was the insight that the repetition of form was always
already inclusive of a difference that differed from the same by virtue of time-
valued and site-speciﬁc qualities. (This insight was central to philosophic
Romanticism, as well, such as Hegel’s philosophy, while at the same time then
subsuming this insight to philosophy’s reduction of such difference to the
self-same exactness of truth [e.g., Left and Right readings of Hegel’s work]).
To put the matter another way, difference was seen as the basis for identity
itself, existence and history as the basis for essence or truth. Now, if repeti-
tion was never simply a production of the same, then categories or mecha-
nisms that produced an absolute sameness within repetition (i.e., philosoph-
ical truth) must be utilizing other forces than that of their simple repetition
in order to do this just as machinery uses formal molds to contain and shape
the material being expressed. The avant-garde attempted to exploit this dif-
ference inherent in the same by developing it by means of difference in scale,
context, material, and time, as well as by bringing to light the extratextual
forces that were deployed so as to maintain truth over time and space. Es-
sential to the avant-garde was the notion of recombination with a disregard
for normative instrumentality but, also, with a complete dedication to rec-
ognizing the material means for production. The material necessity of pro-
duction, however, was expanded beyond a teleological formalism to a larg-
er ethical realm. And, on the other hand, the Kantian category for art,
“purposeless purpose,” was employed not toward aestheticism but rather
toward a reassertion of art or skill (techne) beyond the narrow “technologi-
cal” parameters employed in the modern machine “industries.”3
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III. The Affective Bond
It may seem that such considerations as philosophy and art are very far
from discussing community in terms of new information and communica-
tion technologies. But, as I have been suggesting, they are not if we consid-
er that the suppositions that we make about the nature of knowledge and
language are presuppositions upon our understanding of what communi-
ty and other forms of relations and identity are and can be and that new
information and communication technologies act as important mediators
in bridging the relationship between knowledge and language in the
present and past and the relationships and identities that are and will be
with us in the present and future.
The ways that these new technologies form a bridge to the future are
always important considerations of their invention and speculations about
their social meaning (speculations that often drive momentous economic
events, for example, that of the recent dot.com “bubble,” as well as drive
further technological design and innovation). Doug Engelbart considered
the networked sharing of knowledge to be of tremendous importance, and
he embodied this in his vision of shared computer networks. Bill Gates and
others have recently attempted to return computers to handwriting vis-à-
vis the Tablet PC. Graphic User Interfaces, as well as, obviously, command
languages, have worked toward standardizing language in information re-
trieval. Microsoft PowerPoint has revolutionized and truly changed what
constitutes, today, a public lecture and the amount of time and intellectu-
al space a speaker and audience can assume for that event.
The effects of information and communication technologies took hold
on a mass scale beginning with ﬁlm and radio in the 1930s and television
particularly after the Second World War. Print media is comparatively re-
stricted in relation to auditory or multimedia broadcast media because of
issues of literacy, distribution, and attention. With the arrival of modern
broadcast technologies, an entire nation could be reached, allowing for
both broadcast information to ﬁlter into all aspects of local demographics
and the standardization of those demographics in terms of language and
culture (as, for example, was the case with Italy following the Second World
War). In other words, broadcast technologies allowed the formation of a
cultural cohesion and hegemony across nation-states as never before. Gov-
ernments in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century showed a great deal of
interest in using such technologies for these purposes nationally and inter-
nationally, and one sees the effective nationalistic uses of such technologies
not only in the fascist and totalitarian States during this period, but also in
the democratic States, along with the use of increasingly popular techniques
and tools from the social sciences such as those involved with polling. With
such technologies and techniques, not only could persons individually and
collectively be organized around central symbols and themes, but also, and
even more importantly in the democratic countries, through opinion polls
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their wishes could be monitored and guided so as to coincide with commer-
cial and State priorities. Such technologies and techniques gave rise not only
to the “masses” as the basis for the fascist States, but they also helped form
and express the desires of “the people” within the formal interests of those
polling them and broadcasting to them in democratic States.
Walter Benjamin observed these uses of information and communica-
tion technologies in the 1930s, seeing in them standardizing tools for in-
troducing and maintaining formal constraints for language and actions
while allowing consumerist expression through events such as entertain-
ment and opinion. For Benjamin and Marxist avant-garde artists of the time
such as Bertolt Brecht, reality under capitalism was characterized by con-
tradictions and paradoxes that were then obscured and forgotten in nar-
ratives of progress. For Benjamin the disappearance of local traditions
opened the door to the construction of national traditions erected by the
State or by industry (for example, those erected under German National
Socialism) (Benjamin1968a, 1968b). The manufacture of tradition suggest-
ed that “everyman” could be the teller of stories that he or she read in the
newspapers, stories whose very function is to distance reality within a gen-
erality of public information and opinion (Benjamin, 1968a). Local tradi-
tion gave way to public information, which supplied the range of opinions
to be expressed on sanctioned matters of importance, leading to an end-
less circulation of what Heidegger termed during the late 1920s “Alltägli-
chkeit” (everyday) chatter (Heidegger, 1996), which was so well parodied at
the time in Robert Musil’s novel, The Man Without Qualities. With mass ﬁlm,
radio, and television, the viewpoint that was adopted was that of a modern
“everyman,” an everyman that expressed shared known desires and opin-
ions about a world that no one ever fully lived in, but about which every-
one was constantly concerned.
In Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement Between the Mental Lives of
Savages and Neurotics (1913, 1950), Freud presents a modern political model
through a psychoanalytic reading of ethnographic materials. This political
model is founded upon the psychoanalytic sublimation of desire through
an object of identity. In Totem and Taboo the social, emotive concern that
each person expresses for one another, what Freud termed the “emotion-
al or affective bond” (Gefühlsbindung), is transformed into an identity with
a sovereign or leader (Führer) through a combination of jealousy and guilt
(Freud, 1913, 1950). Reason is embodied in the leader (the father), and it
forms the transcendental bond that both binds and suppresses the desire
of the primitive brothers who plot to overcome it by really or symbolically
killing the father. Freud’s historical myth in Totem and Taboo reenacts the
central myth of the Freudian Oedipal economy, the child’s hatred and love
for the father that leads to his “rational organization” and maturation, ex-
cept now the male child increases his power through political, not just in-
dividual, organization.
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As Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen (1993) has suggested, however, Freud’s so-
cial bond presupposes a bond before reason, that is, a bond before either the
identiﬁcation with the father or the resulting identiﬁcation of the “broth-
ers” with one another, just as Hobbes’s model of the State does, without
Hobbes realizing it. The affective bond is the ontologically primordial bond
prior to its reinvestment in terms of reason via identiﬁcation, and with that,
the resultant forces of love and hate. Indeed, as Freud’s model shows, iden-
tiﬁcation, or the reduction of the many to the one, is the principle of truth
that supports the concept of “reason” in the Western tradition. In this way,
psychoanalysis, as much of the Western metaphysical tradition, works toward
the rational organization of affects toward a concept of true identity. Where
for Hobbes the absence of reason leads to a state of war by the fact of war-
ring individual desires, for Freud lack of sublimation leads to the emptiness
of a state without a State, a community without reason—that is, without
reason as an organizing principle for community, as a transcendental prin-
ciple for law and discipline, or even as a regulative principle for a State yet
to come. The myth of the State founded in reason brings with it not only
the possibility for common identity, but also the possibility for common
misidentiﬁcation and even resultant war. Working from the top down, we
can see that within this State, in fact, the logic of reason and its opposites
are logical and pragmatic necessities that require that force be used to
enforce not only the rational but also the irrational as ﬁgures inscribed on
more primary affective relations.
The function of mass information and communication technologies in
modernity often has been to appropriate this common ground, this com-
mon Gefühlsbindung in affect, so as to “capitalize” or accumulate this in-
common power within ﬂows that would create political and/or ﬁnancial
power in terms of direct sovereignty or in terms of indirect proﬁt and oli-
garchy. In so doing, the rational organization of the affective bond is nec-
essary, and so with this, the mythology of desire and reason, “messages” and
“communication.” With mass information and communication, the in-com-
mon of affect, inclusive of language, is made common for the production of political
or ﬁnancial accumulation and proﬁt.
IV. “In-common”
Benjamin suggests, however, that information and communication
technologies evolve faster than their appropriation by conserving social
forces. For Benjamin, photography and then ﬁlm are prime examples of
this: by expanding and refocusing what could be seen in a new scale and
rhythm, new political techniques then needed to be developed to catch up
to these innovations and reappropriate them (Benjamin, 1968b). A mid-
century example of this may be seen in Manuel De Landa’s analysis of
United States spy photography in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Accord-
ing to De Landa, this technology became so accurate as to cause the Unit-
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ed States’ Pentagon to awkwardly change its claims of Soviet bomber and
missile production and even to begin claiming that the Soviet’s military
threat lies not in what could be seen by high-resolution spy-satellites, but
rather in what could not be seen by these technologies: in other words, to
claim that “there had to be Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) hid-
den somewhere” (De Landa, 1991, p. 199), and that this, indeed, was the
source of the threat itself. This rhetorical shift from positive assertions of
proof to negative assertions for a proof always said to be shortly around the
corner suggests that sometimes the advancements in information and com-
munication technologies outstrip political control, forcing embarrassing
political situations on the very agents that depended on that technology for
maintaining and asserting power. Technological series and social, political,
and, overall, technical series are not exact in terms of their effects (partic-
ularly over large populations) even when there is a causal relationship be-
tween them.
“Information commons” arguments in regard to the Internet have ar-
gued for preserving the Internet as a public space where “the public” can
maintain itself against commercialism and its instrumental reason. In the
past, this argument was made for radio and television, and as the Internet
has become more heavily directed toward multimedia convergence and,
subsequently, toward corporately mediated broadband, the information
commons argument has reappeared with this set of technologies as well.
Though this argument about the need for an information commons
seems to me important, as could be expected from what has preceded I feel
that there is a concept of “common” that, ontologically at least, goes beyond
that offered by the liberal conceptualization of “the public” and, in fact,
underlies this latter notion. Such an argument, centered on issues of the
in-common, goes “beyond good and evil,” placing moral and policy con-
cerns on a wider conceptual ground of ontology, focused on questions about
the total relation of bodies as both physical and intellectual entities. Such
a focus doesn’t negate the importance of the moral or the judicial realm
nor that of governmental policy, but rather it focuses on the always already
in-common that underlie these “common” realms of mediation.
As has been earlier suggested in the discussion of Freud’s work, the
philosophy of the constitutional state presupposes social bonds that are then
organized into a political State. In these models of the modern State, de-
sire is viewed as belonging to and emerging from each individual, and each
desire must then surrender itself to a sublimation within an implicit com-
mon sense (“reason”), explicitly formalized or “deﬁned” in moments of
doubt or crisis. Such a model of desire underlies Hobbes’s account of the
Stateless state characterized by “every man against every man,” but in so
doing it also asserts a prior social bond whose presence it then negates.
Let us clarify this issue of primordial ontological relations further. What
are these relations and what are their implications? How do they differ from
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the ontic and political assumptions of constitutional forms of the State as
deﬁned by various types of communicative reason? We have suggested sev-
eral answers. First, the priority of affect is central to this ontology and its
conception of any state or community of being—individual, group, govern-
mental “State,” etc. All bodies are affected by one another, and their very
“being” is a product of these affects. “Being” is a trace of affects. Second,
the facticity of language is privileged in this ontology as one of the funda-
mental horizons for affect. We are born into language. Language is not just
a tool. The fact that there is language is coextensive with being. Third, our
in-common relations with sentient beings are characterized by a temporal-
ity of ﬁnitude. With humans, at least, this basis for community takes the form
of a sense of ﬁnitude in which death and the thought of death are emblem-
atic events. Further, this sense of ﬁnitude is marked and remarked by our
existential limitations, giving birth to identiﬁcation and misidentiﬁcation,
love and hate. In this manner, the sense of ﬁnitude marks both the in-com-
mon and the common, the ontological and the ontic in Heidegger’s terms
(Heidegger, 1996). Finitude characterizes our ontological being insofar as
it is the in-common structuring of our general mode of temporal existence.
Insofar as it is experienced individually in the mode of death, concern,
anxiety, etc., then it appears on ontic, existential grounds.4  The meaning
of time in terms of ﬁnitude in regard to information and communication
systems is difﬁcult to ascertain. Insofar as such systems are seen as means
or as products of will and representation, they may be read in terms of a
relation to death and limitations, or equally, as desires for overcoming such
through “reason” and “communication.” However, insofar as they are seen
as issuing from and developing always already prior relations of affect and
language, they may be seen as expressions of such (as we will soon touch
upon in reference to Berardi’s comments).
Thus, humans, as well as other animals, always already share various
ways of being in-common with one another. As various writers—most fa-
mously, Maurice Blanchot (1988), George Bataille in various writings (which
Blanchot is partly responding to), and more recently, Jean-Luc Nancy
(1991), Giorgio Agamben (1993), and Antonio Negri (2003b), and Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000)—have noted, community is a function of
an always already in-common ontological ground.
The constituted community is always impossible, it is “always already”
because it is both always present and always yet to come. In Derrida’s words,
after Blanchot, it comes to us from the future (a-venir) in so far as that fu-
ture is made up of potential pasts and presents. Human historical existence
is characterized by the future anterior: in Heidegger’s words (Heidegger,
1996) by a certain type of historical retrieval or repetition (wiederholen).5
For Spinoza in his Ethics, thought and extension are two attributes of sub-
stance or being. The expression of this sharedness, though, takes place, as
Negri writes, “at the edge of time” (Negri, 2003b). As language shows us,
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community is the constant expression of a shared being, led by affects and
by the fact of language and diverging by the fact of languages.6
What, then, is the role of information and communication technolo-
gies in regard to community? This is a difﬁcult question if we limit their
“role” to actions occurring within the common assumptions and metaphors
for language and to supporting a conception of State that founds itself
upon, and preserves itself by, these same assumptions and metaphors. On
the one hand, in what we may term in this context “high modernity,” much
of the role of such technologies within political economy has been that of
the formal, if not the substantial, reproduction of the conditions for pro-
ducing meaning at the behest of controlling modes and persons in power.
This occurs negatively through sovereign suppression or more positively
through the formal directing of in-common powers via education, training,
discipline, recognition, and the social construction of hopes and dreams.
On the other hand, sometimes opposing the modern state and its disciplin-
ary uses of information and communication technologies, we have the
narrative of the information commons, which largely avoids these formal
issues and instead attempts to reestablish the republic on a narrative of free
exchange.
But what happens when the information commons is always already
there, when what is in-common is the constant ebb and ﬂow of affects, of
the phenomenology of in-formation—not yet, or even ever, a fact or a com-
modity (“information”): not that of an orderly production but rather in-
formation as affects and their relations and self-organization? Not just
“philosophical” or more broadly, “theoretical,” the question is always his-
torical and ethical-political in character: How can we think of information and
communication technologies in relation to the in-common of in-formation? Asking
this question is the essence of any “philosophical” or “theoretical” politi-
cal view of information and information technologies. More broadly,
though, asking the question of “in-formation” in relation to “information”
means working against the often inevitable institutionalization or habitua-
tion of events. This is why, too often at least, any metaphysics of informa-
tion (Spinoza, 1982)7  is simply tautological: “information” today is almost
always solely understood according to the metaphysics of presence and re-
presentation that runs through Western philosophy and culture and that
dominates modernity.
To think, literally, against information means to think against not only
metaphysics and its dominating presence in modern societies but it means,
most importantly, to think against this in terms of our historical conceptions
of time itself, most importantly, against conceptions of time as simple, ob-
jective, and sequential presences (what Heidegger [1996] calls the “ordi-
nary” or “vulgar” concept of time)—a foundational “context” in which his-
tory too is understood as a series of progressive “nows.” It is neither possible
nor necessary to think dialectically opposite of this, but rather it is neces-
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sary to think critically against this if we are to account for human agency
“in” history and thus reopen history to the experience of time itself. To
reopen history to time itself means, for humans, to disclose historical time
to the essence of time, that is, to the complexities of events, wherefrom
various senses of time and series of histories open up and unfold. Further,
this means that agency (though not at all necessarily that agency of the clas-
sical subject and its will and its freedom) is once again seen as important
in relation to time and that its freedom is seen not as an attribute to its
subjectivity but rather as foundational for the possibility of their being a
subject at all. To think being at the “edge of time,” which is, at the same
time, the edge and possibility of beings and the “site” where dwells the po-
tentiality of being altogether (Negri, 2003b), is the essential activity of any
critical philosophy (Derrida, 1982; Heidegger, 1996; Dalton, 2002; Negri,
2003a, 2003b;), including a critical philosophy of knowledge and, today,
information. The analytical necessity is to realize that this “edge” is not
divorced from beings and doesn’t simply exist objectively from them as the
inﬁnite but rather is being itself insofar as this latter constitutes the essence
of beings and makes up the eternal of each their own “nows.” This is the point
where being as potentia is the multiple series of both pasts and futures that
meet in each singularity, in so far as that singularity exists as an event and
not simply as an “individual” traditionally conceived.
To return to the problem of the in-common in relation to the common
and information and communication technologies, I think that in the past
few years we have come to realize that various new, digital information and
communication technologies are not the driving force to the in-common,
but rather they are a means for its expression today.
To borrow from Franco Berardi, we may state that the essence of the
Internet is the social net—that is, the net of being (Berardi, 1998), the relations
of the in-common. Information and communication technologies are means
of expression for this “net” of the in-common, but only one set of means.
In the beginning of his essay “The Question Concerning Technology”
(“Die Frage nach der Technik” (1953) [Heidegger, 1977b]), Heidegger
challenges the traditional view of technology that is itself technological.
Instead of viewing technology as a means to an end, Heidegger counters
the modern conception of technology, as a teleological mechanism, with
the Ancient Greek notion of techne. He does this by reengaging Aristotle’s
four causes from the Physics, that is to say, the four conditions of technolo-
gy in terms of causation—formal, material, efﬁcient, and ﬁnal. Heidegger
challenges the Latin tradition’s interpretation of cause (aitia), arguing that
Aristotle’s notion of cause is not that of a means for teleological determi-
nation but rather of coresponsibility for bringing a thing into being (poie-
sis) by man, a process in its speciﬁcity (in contrast to the poiesis of nature)
that characterizes techne (regardless of whether it occurs in the “ﬁne arts”
or in what used to be called the “industrial arts”).
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Information and communication technologies and techniques also may
be considered in the mode of their coresponsibility in bringing things forth,
in allowing them to be expressed in certain manners. According to the
epistemological framework of modern technology that governs so many
forms of human life today, nature is understood as a resource and as a means
for this technology (“natural resources”), persons are understood the same
way (“human resources”) and so are social relationships even in their most
general and “private” manners (“social capital”). Heidegger was quite right
to point to this issue, including in this list, as the most problematic and also
as the most threatening because it mediates understanding as a whole, lan-
guage (technologically understood as a resource for communication and
information transmission).
Today, even more than in Heidegger’s day, however, clearly the re-
sourcehood of our modern resources is running out. Marx termed the
overextension of capital to the point where it snuffs out the extracapitalist
resources that support it “real subsumption.” Instead of aiding in real sub-
sumption by increasingly monitoring human and natural activity for the
purposes of further surveillance and exploitation, information and com-
munication technologies need to be viewed in terms of their coresponsi-
bility regarding affects, language, and, ultimately, time, and the relation of
these three “elements” to the poiesis or emergence of community and be-
ing in general.
To “respond” means that one responds to something given. Thus, re-
sponsibility in terms of information and communication technology means,
foremost, to listen to affects, language, and time in a way other than the
rationality of modern “common sense,” that is, in terms other than as “re-
sources” or commodities, or to put it another way, as “presences” that are
then, in Heidegger’s words, objectively available as “ready-to-hand” (zu-
handen) entities. The response that information and communication must
give to the question of community will be formed in how it addresses these
three “elements.” Each element needs to be listened to in relation to the
other; each must be listened to in terms of the whole. Each is coresponsi-
ble for “community,” whether such a term refers to the singularity of “indi-
viduals” or “groups.” To listen to a whole means to help it emerge toward a
whole—a whole that is never a totality nor is a fully rested “state.” Informa-
tion and communication technologies are only responsible insofar as they
maintain this openness that is being, and they are only politically responsi-
ble insofar as they assert this openness in contrast to the constituted State.
This event is primordial, a function of being and time.
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Notes
1. An early, oral version of this paper was given in a session at the 2002 American Society for
Information Science and Technology Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Novem-
ber 21, 2002. I would like to thank my copresenters, Leah Lievrouw and Elisabeth Daven-
port, for their presentations and comments during the session.
2. Derrida’s work (1982), particularly his early work, engaged this problem in the domain
of philosophical linguistics, beginning with the trope of voice as a privileged means for
logos.
3. Heidegger’s valorization of this “purposelessness” in the face of instrumentalism can be
seen in his defense of aesthetics in the face of generalized cybernetics (Heidegger, 1977a).
Unfortunately, Heidegger’s critique of art often ended with a reduction of art to an aes-
thetized understanding of philosophical truth, forming a weird parallel to performance
art’s philosophical understanding of aesthetics. In both cases, art ends at the point of truth,
just as much as philosophy ends at the point of aesthetics. In both cases, a more material-
ist understanding of production would have revealed different surfaces or “rhetorics”
operative in the production of meaning (philosophy or episteme) and sense (art or aesthe-
sis). In other words, the parallel deadend of performance art and the Heideggerian un-
derstanding of truth lie in their confusion of the ends of production with the means of
production. Despite a common concern with phenomenology, phenomena are read in
both these approaches according to a metaphysics of identity rather than of difference:
the identity of meaning in sense or the identity of sense in meaning. What fails to be
thought are phenomenon as the event of relation between sense and meaning, between
episteme and aesthesis. The two categories are not reducible to one another because they
are two aspects of becoming: singularities and the “affects” or senses of their production.
This is the basis from which all post-“logocentric” arts and knowledge must proceed, in-
cluding those that study language in events of “communication” and even “information”
(if, indeed, it is possible to displace these terms from their modern logocentric inscrip-
tions).
4. It must be noted that language, and even affect too, of course, may be viewed ontological-
ly or ontically. Language may be interpreted in terms of individual intention, affect in terms
of will and representation. But, as we have noted, these ontic modes are structured by social
parameters. Death, however, is deﬁned in this way to a lesser extent because it is not an
expression of an in-common relation but rather the withdrawal of beings back into an in-
common inorganic being. As such, in anxiety, death literally “throws” beings out of their
in-common relations in ways that may drag language and affect with it. In other words,
with the thought of death the chasm between the ontological and the ontic becomes much
stronger, though with the experience of death this difference becomes so much weaker
as to, of course, eventually collapse.
5. An insightful reading of temporality in Heidegger, Blanchot, and Derrida’s works is Her-
man Rapaport’s classic (1989).
6. This fact of language and this fact of languages that so much characterizes the relation of
being to beings for humans, and that, when seen in a larger context of affects and “lan-
guage” characterizes the relation of being to beings universally is that which is most over-
looked in information studies that are concerned with the linguistic metaphor of seman-
tic “messages” and their rational correspondence. Insofar as this latter, rather than the
former, sense remains the focus of information, we will remain caught within an anthro-
pomorphic and rationalist science. One purpose of this article, as well as an important strain
of almost all my work in the ﬁeld of information studies, has been to shift the grounds for
analysis from a cognitive and anthropomorphic focus to a perspective that looks at the
problem of information ontologically and historically, not to mention sometimes attempt-
ing to address a zoological, if not to say, a cosmic scope. In this manner, it critically ad-
dresses the Enlightenment discourse on “man” (a discourse that clearly can be seen in
Norbert Wiener’s works [see Day, 2001]) from the aspects of episteme (inclusive of the
modern concept of information), ontos, and aesthesis before the “reﬁnement” of these cat-
egories according to modern subdivisions dictated by “technical” approaches (itself, as I
have suggested following Heidegger, a “perversion” of the ancient Greek concept of techne).
The increasing division of knowledge (episteme) into knowledge and information, the di-
vision of being (ontos) into public action and policy and that of private psychology, and
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the division of feeling (aesthesis) into the physical senses and the ﬁne arts, along with the
division of making (techne) into the practices of the “industrial arts” and the “ﬁne arts”
(following the Kantian discourse on teleological pragmatism or “purposefulness”) is long
in coming in Western culture, but its full blossoming (far from over, today) is relatively
recent, dating from the late Enlightenment and the coemergence of modern industrial-
ism and modern capitalism. The category of the “modern” may perhaps be seen as the
beginning of this “turn” in Western thought in relation to, but also in counterdistinction
to, the “Ancients,” particularly the works of the Ancient Greeks.
7. This is not to be confused with a philosophy of information, however, which, properly
speaking is not philosophy applied to the problem of information (i.e., a philosophy of
information), but rather is information, as a component or synonym for events, applied
to the rewriting of the dominant metaphysics of philosophy, that is, of representation struc-
tured according to Aristotelian form–content, genre–species, analytical analysis. Gilles
Deleuze’s work [for example, Deleuze 1993 and 1994] is exemplary for challenging this
tradition of representation with one of surfaces and emergence, utilizing baroque archi-
tecture, thermodynamic theory, material emergence analyses (chemical, genetic, evolu-
tionary), and various elements from the history of philosophy (stoicism, empiricism, Spino-
za’s work, etc.) to rewrite dominant notions in philosophy and Western cultures. The
articulation of information as an event, and events in terms of information, is yet to be
written for LIS, though it has appeared in the physical sciences, to some extent in the so-
cial sciences, and in philosophy, and in different ways than Deleuze, sociology (e.g., Ni-
klas Luhmann’s work).
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Information Studies Without Information
Jonathan Furner
Abstract
In philosophy of language, the phenomena fundamental to human
communication are routinely modeled in ways that do not require commit-
ment to a concept of “information” separate from those of “data,” “mean-
ing,” “communication,” “knowledge,” and “relevance” (inter alia). A tax-
onomy of conceptions of information may be developed that relies on
commonly drawn philosophical distinctions (between linguistic, mental,
and physical entities, between objects and events, and between particulars
and universals); in such a taxonomy, no category requires the label “infor-
mation” in order to be differentiated from others. It is suggested that a
conception of information-as-relevance is currently the most productive of
advances in theoretical information studies.
Unsurprisingly, the nature of information has long been a topic of central
concern for scholars of information studies (IS).1  The body of literature
in which authors have attempted to provide answers to the question “What
is information?” may be viewed in any (or any combination) of the follow-
ing ways: (i) as contributing to science—if information is cast as a naturally
occurring phenomenon; (ii) as contributing to social science—if information
is considered to be a product of human artiﬁce; or (iii) as contributing to
philosophy—if “information” is treated primarily as a fundamental concept
existing at the same level as, for example, meaning, knowledge, and truth.
Although this body of literature is sizeable when taken as a whole, the
quantity of work that may be classed under the third heading is small. One
approach that is often taken in studies representative of the third class is
to compare theories of information with theories of knowledge. Commonly,
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the everyday conception of knowledge (as the content of mental states) is
contrasted with a philosophical conception of knowledge (typically, as
justiﬁed true belief); and information is identiﬁed as knowledge (that is,
knowledge in the ﬁrst, everyday sense) that has been recorded or that is in
some sense objective, external, or public. Somewhat oddly, given the nature
of the conception of knowledge that is typically adopted in such accounts,
a tendency has been for authors to go on to use the results of this kind of
analysis to locate IS with respect to epistemology. A more productive approach
might instead be to relate work in IS to that in philosophy of language, since
it is the latter branch of philosophy that is concerned more exclusively with
the content of mental states (i.e., thoughts); with the ways in which such
content may be expressed, represented, or recorded; and with the ways in
which such expressions may be interpreted or their meaning understood.
My suggestion is that if this alternative direction is taken, we shall ﬁnd
that philosophers of language have modeled the phenomena fundamen-
tal to human communication in ways that do not require us to commit to a
separate concept of “information.” Indeed, we can conclude that such a
concept is unnecessary for IS. Once the concepts of interest have been la-
beled with conventional names such as “data,” “meaning,” “communica-
tion,” “relevance,” etc., nothing is left (so it may be argued) to which to apply
the term “information.” One corollary of such a conclusion is the equally
negative judgment that the ﬁeld of IS is itself misnamed, and that its sub-
ject matter should more appropriately be treated as a branch of communi-
cation studies, semiotics, or library studies.
In this paper, I will present a simple taxonomy of common conceptions
of information—a taxonomy in which no single category seems to unequiv-
ocally require the label “information” to differentiate it from others. Before
reaching that point, however, I wish to review some terminological distinc-
tions that are commonplace in the literature of philosophy of language and
that may correspond to certain distinctions that lie at the core of philoso-
phy of information. And I would like to begin by attending to two prelim-
inary questions that immediately present themselves when embarking on
any attempt to develop a philosophical theory of information or to distin-
guish between competing theories.
The Desirable Properties of a Philosophical Theory of
Information
First: What is the distinctive nature and scope of a philosophical theo-
ry of information (as distinguished from a theory of information of any
other kind)?
A philosophical theory of information—or, more precisely, a metaphys-
ical or ontological theory of information—is assumed here to be a speciﬁ-
cation of the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions under which a phenome-
non may be identiﬁed as “information.” Arriving at such a speciﬁcation
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involves conceptual analysis—that is, analysis of the meaning of the
concept(s) referred to by the word “information.” Conceptual analysis
emerged as the primary method used by philosophers in the particular
paradigm (“analytic” philosophy) that rose to dominance in anglophone
countries in the twentieth century. In our present case, the analysis also will
involve conceptual classiﬁcation, since it happens that several different
conceptions of information have risen to different levels of prominence,
and it is often helpful to construct a taxonomy highlighting the differences
perceived to be most important.
Our second preliminary question is, On what criteria may a philosoph-
ical theory of information be evaluated?
Given the parallel existence of multiple (and perhaps mutually exclu-
sive) conceptions of information, it would be helpful to choose from among
them on the basis of some agreed-upon criterion (or set of criteria). The
possibilities include the following:
1. Coherence. Our understanding of information should plausibly cohere
with our understanding of other related concepts such as knowledge,
meaning, truth, cognition, relevance, etc.
2. Parsimony. According to the principle of Occam’s razor, a theory should
not posit the existence of unfamiliar kinds of entities, unless it proves
impossible to account for certain phenomena in terms of primitive or
familiar concepts.
3. Utility. The primary purpose of a theory, one might argue, is to enhance
our understanding of the object of study. Understanding may be im-
proved by many means; one of the most productive is the process by
which we come to recognize the simultaneous validity of multiple per-
spectives on a single issue. If a theory is suggestive of an agenda for fu-
ture work, either through further theorizing or through empirical re-
search, then it is doing its job.
The Physical, the Mental, and the Linguistic
A simple model that one may use to show how some of the concerns
of modern philosophical inquiry relate to one another is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. In this model, entities of interest are divided among three catego-
ries: (i) physical entities, such as objects and situations; (ii) mental entities,
such as concepts and thoughts; and (iii) linguistic entities,2  such as words
and utterances.3  The nature of entities in the physical world is the concern
of metaphysics;4  the nature of entities in the mental world is the concern of
philosophy of mind; and the nature of entities in the linguistic world is the
concern of philosophy of language.
Where these separate areas of inquiry overlap is in their shared inter-
est in the nature of the relationships between entities in different catego-
ries. We might wish to say, for instance, that linguistic entities (e.g., utter-
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ances) both “express” mental entities (e.g., thoughts) and are “about” phys-
ical entities (e.g., situations). We might also wish to say that mental entities
are, in some similar sense, “about” physical entities. This simple rendering
of the triangular structure immediately raises questions that seem to require
more complex answers—answers upon which, ideally, there would be con-
sensus in multiple branches of philosophy.
For example, we might ask, What, more precisely, is the nature of the
linguistic (or semantic) aboutness that relates words and objects? Is this
linguistic aboutness different from the cognitive aboutness that relates
concepts and objects? If one of these kinds of relationship is to be charac-
terized as “meaning,” how is the other to be differentiated? Each of these
kinds of relationship has been the object of extended analysis; indeed, the
central project of the philosophy of language in the twentieth century may
be viewed as an extended exploration of the meaning of “meaning.” What
is it to say (i) that something has meaning (i.e., is meaningful) and (ii) that
something has the particular meaning p? A comprehensive review of the
contributions to the literature on these topics is well beyond the scope of
the present paper.5  Instead, what is provided here is a brief introduction
to some of the more basic issues, with the aim simply of reaching the point
where we may comprehensibly suggest deﬁnitions of the categories that, it
is argued, are most relevant to a philosophy of information.
expression
representation “presentation”
Linguistic Mental
Physical
•  wordsJ
•  utterancesJ
•  etc.
•  conceptsJ
•  thoughtsJ
•  etc.
(linguistic aboutness) (cognitive aboutness)•  objectsJ
•  situationsJ
•  etc.
Figure 1. Entities of interest to modern philosophical inquiry.
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Situations and Utterances
One way of beginning a review of some of the very early steps to be
made in any pursuit of a theory of meaning is to distinguish between phys-
ical situations and linguistic utterances.
A situation is a particular state of affairs in the physical world. At ﬁrst
sight, the phrase “state of affairs” may seem vague and obscure. The essence
of the idea is that a situation is composed of certain things, that it has a
structure of some kind. There are a number of different ways in which we
might wish to describe the composition of a situation. Our choice will de-
pend on our basic ontological views on the existence of certain fundamen-
tal categories of physical entities—categories such as objects, events, classes,
properties, and relations. On one account, we might say that a situation is
made up of a set of objects arranged in a certain way; which (some would
argue) is tantamount to saying that any situation may be considered (in
mathematical terms) as a graph made up of (i) a set of objects, together
with (ii) a set of object-pairs denoting the relationships among objects. On
this account, it is also common (but not necessary) to view each individual
object as a set of properties or attribute/value pairs.6  For example, we might
imagine a situation in which I am standing in front of my car. In this par-
ticular situation, two of the important objects are me and my car; these two
objects are arranged in a particular way (i.e., with me in front of my car
rather than behind it, in it, or jumping over it, etc.); and, to take just one
of the two objects in question, my car may be described as being small in
size, red in color, Japanese in origin, and so on.
An utterance (or expression) is a particular vehicle of meaning. “Mean-
ing,” of course, is a complex concept of central interest to us and requires
further analysis. In the meantime, we can be somewhat more speciﬁc and
suggest that an utterance is the product of a human decision to act by us-
ing words in a way that has meaning. An example of an utterance is the
particular string of words that I spoke at 6 p.m. yesterday: “I am standing
in front of my car.” At 6 p.m. yesterday, I decided to act in a way that would
have a particular meaning, and I acted on that decision by voicing a partic-
ular sequence of sounds. (Of course, not all utterances are spoken; many
are written. And although utterances may be said to occur at the moment
they are ﬁrst spoken or written, they can be—and often are—recorded for
future consideration.)
As well as being something that has meaning, an utterance is something
that happens, that takes place. In other words, an utterance is an event—
something that occurs on a particular occasion (or, we might say, over a
particular period). As an event, an utterance is datable, in the sense that we
may, in principle, determine its temporal properties; we may specify, for
instance, its time of commencement and/or of completion. Indeed, the
category of events is itself a plausible candidate for inclusion in any list of
fundamental categories of entities, and thus our categorization of utter-
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ances as events—in virtue of their physicality rather than their meaning or
semantic content—would commit us to identifying utterances themselves
as, potentially, components of situations.
We also need to bear in mind that an utterance is the product of a
human decision to act. Utterances occur because people make them. As a
human artifact, an utterance is authenticatable, in the sense that we may, in
principle, determine the identity of its author or speaker. We also may spec-
ulate as to the intentions of the speaker of an utterance when making the
decision to utter. We may ask: What was the goal of the speaker? What did
the speaker hope to achieve through uttering the set of words that were
uttered? Is it sensible to talk about differences between the meaning that
was intended and the meaning that was actually expressed?
Finally, we must be aware that, typically, at least one component of a
speaker’s set of intentions in making an utterance is to affect a hearer in
some speciﬁc way—to bring about a change of some kind in the hearer’s
mental state. With respect to any given utterance, we may thus additionally
ask, Is it sensible to talk about differences between the meaning that was
expressed by the speaker, and the meaning that was understood by the
hearer?
We now can return to what might be conceived as the basic issue: to
specify ways in which utterances have (or are perceived to have) meaning.
We might proceed by considering the suggestion that, in general, we talk
about situations; that human discourse is about the world; that the things
we say (i.e., our utterances) are about things (i.e., situations) that exist in
the physical world. A suggestion of this kind seems to be an argument for
recognition of a particular kind of relationship: one that is exempliﬁed by
an utterance and the situation that that utterance is about. We could call
this relationship “aboutness.” We could even call it “meaning” and propose
that my utterance (at 6 p.m. yesterday) of the words “I am standing in front
of my car” stands in a relationship of meaning with the situation in which
(at 6 p.m. yesterday) I was standing in front of my car. Just as we could say
that the utterance u is about the situation s, so we could say that u means s
or that s is the meaning of u. If we were to use the latter formulation, we
would need to be careful to note the distinction between the two different
senses of “meaning” we would already be using: (i) our name for a kind of
relationship between u and s and (ii) our name for a category in which, with
respect to u, s falls. Whenever we say that an utterance “has” meaning (or
semantic content, or indeed aboutness), we seem to be saying both that it
stands in a relationship of a certain kind with another entity of a certain
kind and that that other entity “is” its meaning (or content, or aboutness).
In the account just given, utterances mean situations. We might iden-
tify such an account as a referential theory of meaning, since there is a sense
in which, by this account, utterances are deemed to be meaningful in vir-
tue of their reference to situations. Moreover, it might seem possible to
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enrich such an account by suggesting both that the components of utter-
ances (e.g., subject terms and predicates) refer to the components of situ-
ations (e.g., objects and properties) and that it is in virtue of this reference
that the components of utterances are meaningful. Referential or compo-
sitional theories of meaning are commonly associated with correspondence
theories of truth, whereby an utterance is evaluated as true if it corresponds
with (i.e., refers to) “the facts”—in other words, if it corresponds with a sit-
uation that “obtains,” that is “actual,” that is “the case.”
Sentences
Linguists, lexicographers, information retrieval system designers, and
others interested in the use of words often need to be careful to distinguish
between word-tokens and word-types. In the previous sentence, for exam-
ple, the single word-type “to” is instantiated by two word-tokens or occur-
rences, as is the word-type “and.” Similarly, we should be careful to distin-
guish, in the current context, between utterance-tokens and utterance-types.
If I utter the words “I am standing in front of my car” at 6 p.m. on Monday,
and then again at 6 p.m. on Tuesday, a single utterance-type has been in-
stantiated by two utterance-tokens. To avoid confusion, we might reserve
the term “utterance” to stand for “utterancetoken,” and use another term
to stand for “utterance-type.” From now on, in this paper, I shall use “sen-
tence” instead of “utterance-type,” while fully recognizing that such usage
conﬂicts with the ordinary, everyday usage of “sentence.”7  Some examples
of sentences are listed in Table 1.
Two utterances of the same sentence can have different truth-values: for
example, my utterance on Monday might correspond with the facts, in which
case I would be telling the truth, whereas on Tuesday I might be lying. Two
utterances of the same sentence also can have different references. Suppose
I own two cars. My utterance on Monday might refer to the situation in which
I am standing in front of my Honda; my utterance of the same sentence on
Table 1. Some examples of sentences.
1
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I am standing in front of my car
Je me trouve devant ma voiture
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Tuesday might refer to the different situation in which I am standing in front
of my Toyota. Alternatively, the two utterances may have different references
simply because they are spoken by two different people.
We also might wish to consider that two different sentences can have
the same reference. If, at 6 p.m. yesterday, I utter the sentence “I am stand-
ing in front of my car,” and simultaneously my friend Hank utters the sen-
tence “Jonathan is standing in front of his car,” the two utterances are of
different sentences, but they share the same reference. Similarly, if I were
to utter the three sentences “I am standing in front of my car. I am posi-
tioned upright before my vehicle. Je me trouve devant ma voiture,” all three
would have the same reference.
But there is another general way in which two utterances of the same
sentence can have different meanings and in which two different sentences
can have the same meaning. Just as a single word-type can have different
meanings depending on the context in which it is used or instantiated as a
word-token, a single sentence can have different meanings depending on
the context in which it is uttered. For example, there seems to be a sense
in which the meaning of the utterance “I am standing in front of my car”
has a different meaning when spoken in response to the question “Are you
ready to go?” than when in response to the question “Where are you,” no
matter what is understood to be the physical reference of the utterance.
Many would argue that referential theories fail to give a comprehen-
sive account of meaning. One cause of failure (it is suggested) is the inability
of such theories to deal with utterances that seem to refer, if to anything at
all, to abstract concepts rather than to physical objects. Another problem
is the suggestion that, on many occasions, our intention in making an ut-
terance is not to refer to anything at all, but rather to have an effect of some
other kind on the world (hence, the common characterization of utterances
as speech acts). In these cases, our intuitive notion of “meaning” might lead
us to wish to commit to a sense in which utterances with nonreferential
functions have meaning. If the meaning of a sentence is not its referent (i.e.,
the situation that it represents or for which it stands), then what is it?
Thoughts
A common proposal in response to this kind of failure is to exploit the
idea of a third broad category of entities existing alongside linguistic enti-
ties and physical entities. This third category is one of mental entities—a
category of thoughts or ideas. In the same way that we can conceive of sit-
uations as comprising objects and properties, we might wish to treat an
individual thought as a composite of concepts of different kinds.
We would then have an alternative to the idea that, whenever we talk,
we refer to situations. This alternative is to say that, whenever we talk, we
express our thoughts; that we think about the world, and our talk repre-
sents our thoughts.8  The relationship of meaning that is now proposed is
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one between an utterance and a thought. The meaning—the semantic
content, the message—of an utterance is the thought that it expresses.
It might then appear to be a simple step to retain both ideas—that ut-
terances express thoughts and that utterances refer to situations—by con-
sidering the additional suggestion that thoughts themselves represent (or
perhaps “present”) situations in some way. In other words, the suggestion is
that linguistic entities represent mental entities, and any representation that
occurs of physical entities is carried out through the mediation of mental
entities. A typical composite account of this nature runs as follows: that there
exists a world of physical objects, among which are included people and
recorded utterances; that each individual person forms a mental image of
that physical world; that the content of each mental image is expressed or
“reﬂected” in the form of a person’s utterances, which are, in turn, consid-
ered by other minds in the formation of new mental images.
Propositions
In the philosophical literature, the term “thought” is sometimes replaced
in this context by the term “proposition.” The meaning of the utterance “I
am standing in front of my car” is the proposition that I am standing in front
of my car; in general, the meaning of utterance u is proposition p. Theories
of meaning that assume the existence of propositions might be referred to
as propositional theories, to distinguish them from referential theories.
We might consider, however, that it is additionally important to recog-
nize a distinction between the particular thought entertained by an indi-
vidual person—which is unique—and the class of thoughts of which that
particular thought is a member by virtue of its similarity to others within
that class (which others may or may not be entertained by the same per-
son). Just as we can distinguish between utterance-token and utterance-type,
we also may wish to distinguish between thought-token and thought-type,
speciﬁcally by substituting “proposition” for the latter category. And just as
we may characterize two utterances of the same sentence as sharing the
same form, we might characterize two thoughts of the same proposition as
sharing the same content.
So far, we have shied away from consideration of an obvious and cru-
cial issue for any theory of meaning, which derives from the essential com-
municative function of utterances. One of the primary reasons for our going
to the trouble of expressing our thoughts is our desire that others should
have access to those thoughts. Typically, our primary intention when mak-
ing an utterance is that our audience should interpret the utterance by
assigning to it the same meaning—the same proposition—as the one that
is instantiated by the thought we are expressing. Unfortunately, however,
our success in achieving this goal of perfect understanding never can be
guaranteed, primarily as a result of the underdetermination of the speak-
er meaning or hearer meaning of any utterance by its form.9  Whatever the
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proposition that is conventionally understood as the meaning of a given
sentence, it is possible for the speaker to intend that an utterance of that
sentence has a different meaning from the conventional one. Similarly,
whatever the proposition that an utterance is intended by its speaker to
express, it is possible for the hearer to interpret the utterance in a differ-
ent way, i.e., to understand the utterance as having a different meaning from
the intended one.
If only for analytical purposes, three separate components of the com-
munication process can be isolated at this point. One is expression, i.e., the
act of the speaker in producing an utterance, which involves making deci-
sions of the following kinds (inter alia): (i) a decision to select, from the stock
of thoughts making up the speaker’s mental state, a particular thought to
express at time t; (ii) a decision to select a particular set of utterances as the
language from which an utterance will be chosen; and (iii) a decision to se-
lect a particular utterance from that set. Another component is the establish-
ment of convention, i.e., the process by which speakers and hearers reach an
intersubjective consensus on the ordinary meanings of wordtypes and sen-
tences. The third component of the process is interpretation, i.e., the act of
the hearer in assigning meaning to a heard utterance. This act should be
recognized as one that is essentially creative, in that the hearer’s knowledge
of any meaning that is conventionally assigned to utterances of the given
sentence is only one (if a signiﬁcant one) of the factors that will inﬂuence
the assignation in any particular instance. Other contextual factors include
the extent and nature of the hearer’s prior knowledge, the nature of the
discourse of immediately prior utterances, the nature of the hearer’s inter-
pretation of that discourse, and so on. Interpretation is also creative in the
important sense that the meaning assigned to a heard utterance may be new;
the thought triggered by a heard utterance may be one that has not been
previously entertained by the hearer. Moreover, the response of the hearer
to a particular utterance may not be limited simply to an increase in the
quantity of thoughts making up her mental state; her attitude toward other
propositions may change. One thought has a habit of leading to another.
In principle, given a speaker, an utterance, a hearer, a discourse of prior
utterances, and a community of language users to which the speaker and
hearer belong, we may determine that the utterance simultaneously has
meanings of at least three different kinds: (i) its conventional meaning, i.e.,
the proposition conventionally attributed by the community to the sentence
instantiated by the utterance; (ii) its speaker meaning, i.e., the proposition
instantiated by the thought expressed by the speaker of the utterance; and
(iii) its hearer meaning, i.e., the proposition instantiated by the thought en-
tertained by the hearer on interpreting the utterance. These meanings may
or may not coincide. If (ii) is not the same as (i), then the likelihood of (iii)
being the same as (ii) will depend on the hearer’s success in making sense
of the discourse that provides the context for the utterance.
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A Simple, General Ontology
The system of categories presented in Table 2 is provided both as a
summary of the foregoing discussion and as an example of the sort of tax-
onomy that is typically proposed in philosophy of language. Entities in the
“Token” categories are datable particulars; entities in the “Type” categories
are nondatable classes of particulars.
The distinctions between categories formalized in this system are one
possible result of our determining the necessity of differentiating among
entities of the following kinds:
1. particular physical states of affairs: e.g., the situation (at time t) in which
Hank is standing in front of his car;
2. general representations of individual states of affairs: e.g., the proposi-
tion that Hank is standing in front of his car;
3. particular internal instantiations of such representations: e.g., Lucy’s
thought (at time t) that Hank is standing in front of his car;
4. general external expressions of such representations: e.g., the English
sentence “Hank is standing in front of his car”
5. particular instantiations of such expressions: e.g., Lucy’s utterance (at
time t) “Hank is standing in front of his car”
A situation is a possible state of affairs in the physical world. At any giv-
en time t, only some situations “obtain” or are “the case” in actuality.
A proposition is an abstract, mental representation of a particular situa-
tion. There is a one-to-one correspondence between situations and propo-
sitions. Propositions may be evaluated in terms of their truth: a true prop-
osition is one that represents a situation that obtains.
A thought is a particular attitude toward a proposition in the mind of a
particular person. Different people can have thoughts about the same prop-
osition; a single person can have different thoughts about the same propo-
sition. Thoughts include beliefs; a belief is an acceptance of a given prop-
osition as true.
An utterance is a particular expression in symbolic form of a particular
thought. The same thought may be expressed by different utterances. Ut-
terances are what can be said to have meaning (i.e., to be meaningful); in
this sense, meaning (i.e., meaningfulness) is a property of utterances.
Whether an utterance is meaningful or not depends on the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of an event in which a human recognizes that utterance to
Table 2. Some entities commonly deﬁned in philosophy of language.
Linguistic Mental Physical
Tokens Utterances Thoughts Situations
Types Sentences Propositions
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express a particular thought. In this sense, strictly speaking, an utterance’s
meaningfulness is a property of the situation consisting not only of utter-
ance u, but also agent a and time t.
A sentence is the class of all utterances that share a particular symbolic
form. The same form can be used (by a single person or by different peo-
ple) to express different thoughts. The meaning of a sentence is a proposi-
tion p: we might say that the conventional meaning of the sentence “Hank
is fat” is the proposition that Hank is fat. Since we are free to interpret any
given sentence in any way we like, however, there is a many-to-many corre-
spondence between sentences and propositions. The same sentence can
represent different propositions; the same proposition can be represent-
ed by different sentences. In a strict sense, the particular proposition p that
is assigned at time t by agent a to a sentence s is a property of a situation—
is literally assigned as the outcome of a human act—and not something that
inheres in the sentence itself.
We might say that the form of an utterance is the sentence that it instan-
tiates, and the content of an utterance is the proposition that is instantiated
by the thought that the utterance expresses.
Conceptions of Information
We are now in a position to distinguish among three general kinds of
sense in which “information” has historically been used in the IS literature.
These three genera may be considered as the top level of a taxonomy of
concepts denoted by the term (Table 3). In the ﬁrst kind of sense, the con-
cept of information is understood to designate particulars (i.e., individual
objects or events) of certain types; in the second kind of sense, the desig-
nata are certain types of human action; and in the third kind of sense, the
designata are universals (i.e., properties) of certain types.
Information-as-Particular
Objects or events of the kinds that are designated by the concept of
information-as-particular are not necessarily “physical” or tangible. In this
particular context, the term “object” is used to refer both to linguistic enti-
ties (such as words) and to mental entities (such as concepts), as well as to
physical entities. The distinction between the linguistic, the mental, and the
Table 3. Conceptions of information
Information-as-particular Utterances
Thoughts
Situations
Information-as-action Communication
Information-as-universal Informativeness
Relevance
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physical serves as the basis for a division of the information-as-particular
category into three subcategories: the utterance as information; the thought
as information; and the situation as information.
The utterance as information
In this sense, corresponding roughly to Buckland’s category of “infor-
mation-as-thing,”10  the concept of information is understood to designate
symbols, signs, or signals,11 i.e., noises or marks (or even aromas or ﬂavors)
that are interpreted in some way by the hearer or viewer (or smeller or tast-
er). A generic term commonly used in many different contexts to denote
aggregations of such signals is “data.” Binary digits are data of one of the
simplest kinds; words, images, and sounds are also data. Data may be ag-
gregated in various forms and at various levels, as (to take the example of
textual data) alphabetic characters, words, sentences,12  paragraphs, chap-
ters, and books. Middle-range aggregations of data are typically considered
generically as documents (or “document-like objects”). In the sense present-
ed here, then, “utterance,” “data,” “signal,” and “document” are more or
less functionally equivalent.
The conception of the utterance as information may be considered as
an objectivist view, not simply by virtue of the physical existence of utter-
ances, but primarily by virtue of the supposedly objective nature of the cri-
teria to be used in determining whether something is classiﬁable as infor-
mation or not. In effect, this view commits one not only to the proposition
that information is anything that is interpretable—i.e., anything that is
capable of being interpreted—but also that the interpretability of an enti-
ty does not depend on its historically having been interpreted. Entities can
thus be classed as information on the basis of their potential to inform.
A distinction is often drawn between natural signs—the forms of phys-
ical objects such as clouds, tree stumps, smoke, tracks, and rocks—and
conventional signs. This distinction can serve not only to separate naturally
occurring signs from human artifacts, but also to highlight a supposed dif-
ference between the objective meaning of natural signs and the (at best)
intersubjective meaning of conventional signs. Once the decision is taken
to consider naturally occurring entities as interpretable, the way is clear for
a deﬁnition of information that encompasses “everything”—everything that
has the potential to be treated as a source of meaning, that is.
The thought as information
In this sense, corresponding to Buckland’s category of “information-
as-knowledge,” the concept of information is understood to designate
messages, i.e., the concepts or thoughts that are the product of a hearer’s
interpretation of signals. The distinction between signal and message is
explicitly drawn not only in the philosophy of language (where the distinc-
tion may be cast as one between utterance and thought, or between sen-
tence and proposition), but also, famously, in the mathematical theory of
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communication13  and in semiotics (where the contrast is between the
signiﬁer and the signiﬁed).
A metaphor in widespread illustrative usage is the distinction between
physical container and mental content: documents are regarded as the
(physical) expressions, representations, or records of conjunctions of (men-
tal) thoughts. Some authors, developing the metaphor further, have pro-
moted the view of documents as vehicles by which messages are transferred,
via a channel, conduit, or canal, across space and time. We should be care-
ful, however, not to infer from such an account of the communication pro-
cess that any given document has a single corresponding message—for
example, that intended by its author—the recovery of which is the aim of
any hearer; for it is clear both that any individual signal can be interpreted
in multiple ways and that any individual message can be expressed in mul-
tiple ways. The conduit metaphor seems to serve only to reify the contro-
versial idea that information is something that can somehow “ﬂow” from
one place to another. Such ﬂow would be possible only if messages were
inherent properties of signals, rather than separate entities assigned to sig-
nals by humans. These two different views of the nature of messages may
be characterized as, respectively, an objectivist and a subjectivist perspec-
tive on information.
Signals formed or recorded on media of certain kinds (e.g., paper, tape)
persist over time, with the result that they may be considered at a date lat-
er than that of their creation. The set of messages expressed by all signals
stored in this way is sometimes referred to as the world of recorded, pub-
lic, explicit, or objective knowledge, to contrast to the world of private, tacit,
or subjective knowledge. The sense in which “objective” and “knowledge”
are used in such formulations is sometimes ambiguous, however. If it is
actually the set of signals themselves (rather than the set of messages ex-
pressed by those signals) that is being referred to, then “objective” is ap-
propriate but “knowledge” is not; if instead the referent is the set of
thoughts or meanings that could potentially be assigned to those signals,
then “knowledge” (in the everyday sense) seems appropriate, but it might
be argued that “objective” is not, since such knowledge exists in people’s
minds—i.e., in the subjective realm of consciousness that is usually contrast-
ed with the physical world—not in signals.
A common strategy in IS is to deﬁne “information” in such a way as to
denote that class of messages that share a particular property, or (more
accurately) those that stand in a relationship of a particular kind to the
context in which their source signals are interpreted. A message might be
classiﬁed as information if it satisﬁes any (or any combination) of criteria
of the following kinds: (i) truth—i.e., its corresponding with the facts; (ii)
utility—its potentially being used to further the goals of the hearer; (iii)
novelty—its not having been assigned by the hearer to any previous signal;
(iv) unexpectedness—its coming as a surprise to the hearer; (v) uncertainty-
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reduction—its increasing the strength of the hearer’s current attitude to-
ward any proposition; and so on.14  Taken together, such criteria may be
considered as criteria for the relevance of a message to a hearer.
On this account, the effect of the signal that is the source of the mes-
sage is not simply to trigger some interpretative response on the part of the
hearer, but more speciﬁcally to cause a transformation of a particular kind
in the hearer’s mental state. It is the message that is information; the sig-
nal that serves as the source of the information is merely “informative,” or,
as philosophers of language might say, “meaningful.”15  All signals are at
least potentially informative; only some—those whose hearer meanings are
true and/or useful and/or novel, etc.—are actually so. Thus the determi-
nation of the informativeness of a signal at time t is a subjective matter, one
that relies on our determining the truth, utility, novelty, etc. of the mean-
ing assigned to it at time t by an individual hearer. This is roughly the posi-
tion of adherents to the inﬂuential “cognitive viewpoint” in IS.16
One reading of the cognitive view of information amounts to saying that
only some messages—those that fulﬁll the informative potential of signals—
are information. But we might decide that it is more useful to consider (i)
not only that all signals are potentially informative, but also that all mes-
sages are potentially relevant and (ii) that potential informativeness and
potential relevance are matters of degree. If we deﬁne information to en-
compass only actually relevant messages, then any decision as to whether
some entity is information or not becomes a wholly subjective matter (in
the sense that only individual hearers can determine the actual relevance
of messages), and the term “information” becomes of limited application.
On the other hand, if we deﬁne information to encompass all potentially
relevant messages, then the class denoted by “information” becomes the
same as that denoted by “message,” and the former term becomes redun-
dant. In any case, it would appear that determining the extent to which a
message is relevant to hearer a at time t is what is more important. I shall
return to this point in a moment.
The situation as information
In this sense, the concept of information is understood to designate
situations—i.e., states of affairs, arrangements of physical objects and prop-
erties, that may or may not obtain in actuality. Such a conception may be
considered as an extended version of the idea (discussed under “The ut-
terance as information,” above) that information is everything that is inter-
pretable; in the present case, even the requirement of interpretability be-
comes irrelevant since it is assumed that every possible entity is necessarily
interpretable. On this reading, the physical world is made up of data, or
(as is often said) of differences. Any entity, from the simplest to the most
complex, may be deﬁned by specifying the ways in which it may be distin-
guished from another; such a speciﬁcation is the substance of the entity;
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the entity is its own speciﬁcation. The distinction that, until now, we have
sustained between physical and linguistic entities is eradicated. For many,
the usefulness of assigning the label “information” to the class of all things
remains to be demonstrated.
Information-as-Action
The category of information-as-action corresponds roughly to Buck-
land’s “information-as-process,” encompassing conceptions of information
that apply the term to sequences of events that involve humans either as
agents (subjects) or as patients (objects) or both, and that may thus be treat-
ed as acts or actions.
Communication as information
It might be instructive at this point to contrast the common usages of
two words of similar morphology. We might talk about having received “a
communication” (i.e., a document), but more generally “communication”
is used to refer to the process of communicating, whereas “information” is
seldom used (in ordinary English language, at least) to refer to the processes
of informing or of becoming informed, of expressing thoughts or of inter-
preting utterances. Yet these latter are the technical senses that are meant
here. Instead of saying that documents are information, or that documents
contain information, we might wish to say that our very acts of creating,
classifying, storing, retrieving, and/or interpreting documents are informa-
tion. I would suggest, however, that we already have perfectly adequate la-
bels for those acts.
Information-as-Universal
The category of information-as-universal includes conceptions of infor-
mation that apply the term to certain attributes, or properties, of objects
or events. For example, the particular conception of information that is
associated with the mathematical theory of communication is one that
deﬁnes information as a measurable, quantitative property of signals. Thus
it makes sense to talk of the amount of information in a given signal.17
Informativeness as information
Given the everyday usage of “information” in reference to objects rather
than properties, it can be helpful, when thinking about information-as-prop-
erty, to substitute “informativeness” for the more common term, and to
consider the degree of informativeness (rather than the amount of infor-
mation) of signals.
Is there an analogy to be drawn between the informativeness of signals
and the meaningfulness of utterances? Given the sense in which meaning-
fulness was spoken of earlier, it might seem that to talk of the degree of
meaningfulness of a signal would be to stretch the notion inappropriately.
We might decide that it is more sensible to retain the idea that meaning-
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fulness is a binary property—that a signal is either meaningful or not. There
do seem to be other senses, however, in which we can comprehensibly as-
sess the value both of signals and of propositions.
One of these is the sense in which “information” is used in the mathe-
matical theory of communication. To evaluate the extent to which a signal
is informative, we need to determine the size of the set of signals from which
the given signal is selected; the larger this set, the greater the uncertainty
that a particular signal will be selected, and the more informative the ﬁnal
selection. Strictly speaking, then, informativeness is less an inherent prop-
erty of a signal per se, and more a property of the decision made to select
that signal from a particular set of alternatives.
Relevance as information
Decisions of this kind might well be construed as events rather than
objects. Once we realize that we are not necessarily restricted to signals when
identifying the kinds of entities that may “have information” to a greater
or lesser extent, other conceptions of information in the category of infor-
mation-as-property suggest themselves. For instance, we might wish to de-
velop a conception of the informativeness not merely of signals, but of mes-
sages, or even of situations. Such a conception might involve taking into
account not only the size of the set of entities from which the given entity
is selected, but also the history of previous such selection-events. In this way
we might arrive at conceptions of information that are essentially equiva-
lent to contemporary conceptions of relevance.
Some Concluding Remarks
We have now seen, through an analysis of the categories to which the
term “information” is variously applied in IS, how those categories are well-
understood in ﬁelds such as philosophy of language, communication stud-
ies, and semiotics, and how labels other than “information” have been used
to effectively distinguish among those categories in those ﬁelds. I would like
to conclude by suggesting that the treatment of the theory of meaning
adopted in this paper serves the purpose of highlighting the precise loca-
tion where any theory of information becomes truly interesting—and
where, incidentally, ﬁelds other than IS have made, and continue to make,
a greater deal of progress.
The point is that a good theory of meaning should do more than ex-
plain what it is to say that a signal is meaningful. It needs to explain how a
person assigns a particular meaning to a given signal; how one person de-
termines the meaning that has been assigned to a signal by another (in
other words, how communication takes place); how certain meanings come
to be conventionally associated with certain signals, and so on. However,
these seem to be less metaphysical questions than they are psychological—
questions, in other words, for the cognitive sciences, or (to the extent that
they involve philosophy at all) for the philosophy of mind.
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Now, if we wished to maintain one view of the nature of information
that is commonly assumed in the IS literature—that of the thought as in-
formation—then it would seem that these questions about the mechanics
of cognitive processes become crucially important for us to answer . . . or
at least for us to ﬁnd answers for in the literature of cognitive psychology.
(I am prompted to inquire what exactly it is that is achieved by attempting
to corral such weighty and long-standing questions under the rubric of “in-
formation studies” when they already attract wide interest from communi-
ties that, on the face of it, are rather better equipped to deal with the kinds
of issues that are raised by practical brain research.)
Alternatively, if we are more convinced of the usefulness of another
common conception of information—that of relevance as information—
then we should recognize, perhaps, that a good theory of information
should do more than simply explain what it is to say that a document’s
content is relevant. Ideally, it would explain how the extent to which a doc-
ument’s content is relevant (to agent a at time t) may accurately be predict-
ed. Of course, we have several such theories in IS, the most advanced be-
ing those that cluster in the area known as probabilistic information retrieval
(IR). Relevance research lies at the heart of probabilistic IR and of infor-
mation studies in general. Relevance researchers are also those IS people
who are most keenly aware of the signiﬁcance for IS of current work being
done in pragmatics and the philosophy of language.18  For those of us who,
while sharing a concern for the ways in which deﬁnitions of terms shape
perceptions, directions, and agendas, do not view ourselves as relevance
researchers per se, I suggest that it would be worthwhile to reﬂect on the
coherence, parsimony, and utility of a theory of information that, in its
essential conception of information-as-property, also happens to trace its
lineage back to Shannon’s original “information theory.”19
Notes
1. Recent reviews in information studies (IS) of the literature on the nature of information
include those by Capurro and Hjørland (2002), Case (2002), Cornelius (2002), and Dick
(2002).
2. Some might prefer the substitution of “symbolic” for “linguistic” in formulations of this
kind.
3. The division into three and the distinctive nature of the categories recall the Popperian
conception of worlds 1, 2, and 3. But Popper (1968) wished to emphasize the epistemic
qualities of worlds 2 and 3; each was conceived as a world of “knowledge” (subjective knowl-
edge in the case of world 2, and objective knowledge in the case of world 3). A closer anal-
ogy would be to any triadic model of the sign in semiotics: see, for example, Nöth (1990)
for a review of these models.
4. The explicit identiﬁcation of a category of physical entities in this model betrays a com-
mitment to realism about the external world, i.e., an assumption of the existence of a world
beyond our collected mental states that constrains those mental states in certain ways.
5. There are many good introductions to the main issues in philosophy of language; a re-
cent example is by Lycan (2000). Blair (2002) provides an overview of the applications of
philosophy of language to the study of information retrieval.
6. Another account might privilege events rather than objects but treat events similarly as
property-bearing entities occurring in relation to one another.
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7. Other technical deﬁnitions of “sentence” are also variously suggested in the philosophi-
cal literature.
8. We might say that such a proposal asks us to commit to the ontological priority of the
physical world over thought, and thought over language.
9. It is intended that the term “speaker” denotes any human source of an utterance, in spo-
ken or written form; similarly, “hearer” denotes any human interpreter of an utterance.
10. See Buckland (1991).
11. Semioticians are usually careful to distinguish the senses of these three words. The con-
cept of “sign” is commonly modeled as a dyad of word and object (e.g., signiﬁer and
signiﬁed) or as a triad (e.g., sign vehicle, signiﬁcatum, and denotatum). It is important to
note that the intention at this point in the present paper is to use “signal” and “utterance”
interchangeably, to denote signiﬁer-tokens.
12. “Sentence” is used here in the everyday sense of the term.
13. See Shannon and Weaver (1949).
14. See, for example, Machlup (1983).
15. Cognitivists might even prefer “transformative.”
16. See, for example, Belkin (1990).
17. It should be noted that this conception of amount of information is quite different from
the notion of quantity that is assumed, for example, in studies that seek to determine how
much information there is to be found in the world. In studies of that kind, it is the quan-
tity of data (numbers of documents or numbers of bytes) that is measured.
18. In his paper summarizing the signiﬁcance for IS of the theory of psychological relevance
developed by the pragmaticists Sperber and Wilson (1986), Harter (1992) suggests that
“[r]elevance and information-as-process are intimately related; we may not need both ideas
(or terms) in information science. Moreover employing two terms may be detrimental to
the development of theory, since it suggests that information and relevance are different,
when perhaps they can usefully be regarded as one and the same.”
19. The implications for IS of the particular vision of information-as-property developed by
Dretske (1981) have perhaps not yet been fully recognized; see van Rijsbergen and Lal-
mas (1996) and Bonnevie (2001) for interpretations from different perspectives.
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Relevance: Language, Semantics, Philosophy
John M. Budd
Abstract
The literature within library and information science (LIS)
on relevance comes primarily from the subﬁelds of information retrieval
and information systems design. This literature has developed over time
from an orthodoxy that has focused on relevance as an objective measure
to a comprehension of the dynamic nature of relevance judgment. Other
literatures, such as those of the philosophy of language and semantics, also
have offered cogent thought that could and should be incorporated into
LIS. This thought has broadened discussion to the context in which rele-
vance is assessed, the speech acts that are evaluated, and the dialogic ele-
ment of human communication.
An individual may use any number of ways to begin an examination of rele-
vance. One beginning is provided by Fred Dretske in his Knowledge and the
Flow of Information. Dretske acknowledges the usefulness of quantitative the-
ory applied to information but asserts that such theory is limited in that it
cannot elucidate the nature of meaning or tell us about the meaning of a
particular statement. He says that “if we consult a dictionary, we ﬁnd in-
formation described most frequently in terms of “intelligence,” “news,” “in-
struction,” and “knowledge.” These terms are suggestive. They have a com-
mon nucleus. They all point in the same direction—the direction of truth.
Information is what is capable of yielding knowledge, and since knowledge
requires truth, information requires it also” (Dretske, 1981, p. 45). Dret-
ske’s notion may make us wonder about the connection between informa-
tion and knowledge.
The role of relevance as it relates to knowledge will recur in this pa-
John M. Budd, School of Information Science and Learning Technologies, University of Mis-
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per, but some background should guide this exploration of the philosophy
of relevance. Fortunately for us, Stefano Mizzaro (1997) undertook an ex-
haustive review of the information science (IS) literature relating to rele-
vance. His work renders a descriptive literature review here unnecessary;
readers should consult his article and its extensive bibliography. In setting
the tone for his review, Mizzaro acknowledged that IS approaches to rele-
vance tend to cluster around two groups—one centering on the object, or
bit of information, and the other centering on the human element. The
ﬁrst group (the object cluster) includes three entities according to Mizza-
ro: a document, a surrogate (or representation of a document), and infor-
mation (or what the reader apprehends from a document). The second
group includes a problem faced by the information-seeker, an information
need (deﬁned as a mental representation of the problem), a request (a
natural language expression of a need), and a query (or system language
expression of a need) (p. 811). He then posited, “Now, a relevance (sic)
can be seen as a relation between two entities, one from each group: The
relevance of a surrogate to a query, or the relevance of a document to a re-
quest, or the relevance of the information received by the user to the in-
formation need, and so on” (p. 811).
We can take for granted, for the purposes of this examination, that
Mizzaro’s observations regarding relevance provide a reasonably accurate
and accepted summary of IS inquiry and system development work. They
do, however, raise some questions for more broadly deﬁned philosophical
treatment of relevance. Inherent in his set of clusters (particularly for the
ﬁrst, object-based, group) is the assumption that relevance applies prima-
rily to verbal communication. Further, the assumption is that this commu-
nication is formal and structured, that is, it can be shaped and presented
in the form of a document. Granted, “document” can be an encompassing
idea, but a formal structure inheres in it, even if it is not intended to be
limited to a physical artifact that would satisfy a popular notion of what a
document is. An assumption that is evident with regard to the second clus-
ter is that humans initiate a process whereby information is sought and
located. Further, the two clusters combined (as Mizzaro did to deﬁne rele-
vance) suggest a structured human action that entails the making of speciﬁc
kinds of judgments about objects by people. This model is not particularly
problematic (on the face of it) as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough.
There are information-related human actions that do not ﬁt so neatly into
the clusters, much less into the individual elements of the clusters.
This very brief bit of background serves to demonstrate some of the
complications one faces when examining relevance. There is no way that a
paper of this length can possibly address all deﬁnitions, uses, and implica-
tions of the word relevance; what is presented here is a selection of some
ways of thinking about relevance. One point needs to be made immediate-
ly: whether stated or not, relevance judgments are fundamentally construed
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in epistemological terms, that is, the aim of a relevance judgment is, in the
end, to foster or justify knowledge. First, a few approaches from library and
information science (LIS) will be discussed. Following that, some potentially
fruitful philosophical ideas will be dealt with. The desired result is (i) a
realization of the complexity of any notion of relevance; (ii) an understand-
ing that different starting points for an examination of relevance may well
lead to different conclusions; and (iii) while philosophers do not appear
to address relevance directly, many do give serious attention to matters that
impinge on our understanding of relevance.
LIS and Relevance
While Mizzaro provided a succinct summary of IS writings and thought
on relevance, a few speciﬁc works from the past have been especially inﬂuen-
tial or have provided examples of particular schools of thought regarding
relevance. The ﬁrst, and what for many readers may be the most striking,
aspect of the LIS literature is that the preponderance of writing on rele-
vance comes from IS (including the subﬁelds of information systems de-
sign and information retrieval). Very little is present in the literature about
libraries that directly addresses relevance (apart from systems-related con-
cerns). In works on the reference function in libraries, for instance, a tacit
assumption is that the process is intended to help library users ﬁnd mate-
rials and information that they will ﬁnd useful, but little reference to writ-
ings on relevance itself exists. It could (and probably should) be argued that
greater attention to the complexity of relevance and how individuals may
make relevance judgments is vitally important to the essence of the library’s
reason for being. Formal examination of relevance, both as an idea and as
a phenomenon, tends to be found in such journals as the Journal of the
American Society for Information Science and Technology and Information Process-
ing and Management. Whether practicing librarians read these journals to
learn more about things like relevance is an open question.
Given that the literature of IS tends to be the home of discourse on
relevance, it is essential that the substance of that discourse be considered
here. It should be noted with some emphasis that what follows is a focus
on some particular, but representative, ideas about relevance; what is cov-
ered here is by no means exhaustive. While Mizzaro did review a large
amount of literature, a few rather consistent themes recur. Moreover, the
themes seem to have a kind of temporal aspect, that is, at one point in time
a sort of orthodoxy prevailed, and over time alternative conceptions of
relevance have been articulated. The orthodoxy tends to ﬁt into Mizzaro’s
ﬁrst cluster that centers on the document (and the information system).
About four decades ago William Goffman’s approach expressed a particu-
lar, and apparently widely held, view of relevance assessment. In his article
he (Goffman, 1964) wrote that “relevance can be deﬁned as a measure of
information conveyed by a document relative to a query” (p. 201). There
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are some conceptual and practical difﬁculties with such a view. For one
thing, nowhere in the article is “information” deﬁned; for another, a de-
terministic theorem and proof are presented as rationale for the measure-
ment of relevance (recall Dretske’s skepticism regarding the sufﬁciency of
quantitative theory). Perhaps more fundamentally, relevance is explicitly
referred to as a measure. The assumption underlying the claim is that rel-
evance is a physical, or at least a tangible, thing that can be assigned a quan-
titative value, and that value can be related to the value of other variables,
such as information.
A similar way of deﬁning relevance was expressed a bit later by W. S.
Cooper (1971). He said, “A stored sentence is logically relevant to (a repre-
sentation of) an information need if and only if it is a member of some
minimal premiss (sic) set of stored sentences for some component statement
of that need” (p. 24). Inherent in this deﬁnition is a very speciﬁc equation
of relevance with representation; it embodies what Alvin Goldman (1993)
called a representational heuristic. This is “the tendency to judge the prob-
ability that an object x belongs in category C by the degree to which x is
representative of, or similar to, typical members of category C” (pp. 26–27).
Such a heuristic may be entirely effective for certain cognitive processes and
informational needs, such as the search for documents or statements that
have direct bearing on a claim. Suppose a student or a scholar is examining
a claim that an economic policy decision was made in a particular U.S. pres-
idential administration for the primary purpose of helping win votes in an
upcoming election. That person would probably seek documents that ad-
dress the claim rather directly, that is, that discuss the political implications
for the speciﬁc policy decision. In such an instance, the heuristic described
by Goldman holds. Suppose, however, we consider the description of a
method of inquiry by the historian William H. McNeill: “I get curious about
a problem and start reading up on it. What I read causes me to redeﬁne the
problem. Redeﬁning the problem causes me to shift the direction of what
I’m reading. That in turn further reshapes the problem, which further re-
directs the reading. I go back and forth like this until it feels right, then I
write it up and ship it off to the publisher” (Gaddis, 2002, p. 48). McNeill’s
experience describes a different kind of cognitive process; in his account
what Goldman refers to as categorization is dynamic, not ﬁxed. Because the
category is dynamic, representation is likewise dynamic and shifting. No lin-
ear algorithm is sufﬁcient to account for McNeill’s process.
Following Cooper were the beginnings of alternative conceptions of
relevance. The ﬁrst expressions of alternative discourse were still substan-
tively grounded in the orthodoxy, but some discomfort with that orthodoxy
seems apparent. Building upon Cooper’s work, Patrick Wilson (1973) add-
ed a reﬁnement, which he called situational relevance. The situation, or
context, within which an information-seeker assesses the relevance of a
document or an utterance implies a logical functioning that differs from
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the one Cooper suggested. In addition to what may begin as a deductive
process, iterative steps of reading, inference, and continued searching
necessitate, according to Wilson, probabilistic evaluation of each item plus
induction stemming from the reading of those retrieved items. On the face
of it, Wilson’s addition of these stages appears to be only a small twist to
the structure that Cooper, Goffman, and others posited. In actuality, the
logical complication Wilson interjected begins to resemble more closely the
complex process summarized by McNeill. The melding of deduction and
induction (and McNeill’s anecdote clearly supports this melding) stresses
that the ultimate judgment of relevance in all but the most simple instances
is a nonlinear and rich process.
Abraham Bookstein (1979), following Cooper and Wilson, added some
potentially complicating ideas to relevance assessment. He admitted that
“an information retrieval system cannot predict with certainty a patron’s
reaction to a document, and this, we believe, is the source of many of the
uses found in the literature for the term ‘relevance.’ [At this point Book-
stein seems to be migrating from that cluster of the literature centering on
the document to the cluster dealing with the user, but the continuation of
his thought suggests otherwise.] Rather, the system transforms both the doc-
ument and the request into forms it can manipulate, and on the basis of
these, it assesses the relevance of the document to the user” (p. 269). He
further deﬁned relevance in terms of a user’s satisfaction with the output
of a system. This idea begs some questions, including what constitutes sat-
isfaction (is it in fact the retrieval of topical, or more narrowly, linguistical-
ly related, documents) and how does an information retrieval system accom-
plish the goal of satisfaction. These are not trivial questions; if a user’s query
is reduced to linguistically morphological form (and it must be added that
sophisticated systems approach more semantically related goals), then as-
sessment is a simpliﬁed, but far less meaningful, task. Since satisfaction is
not uncommon in library-related discourse, the questions (and the associ-
ated problems) also apply.
Some other IS writings introduce some evaluative mechanisms that can
reinforce the objective idea of information. These measures recur in sever-
al sources, but two examples of their statement will sufﬁce for illustrative pur-
poses. In her book on information retrieval, Miranda Pao (1989) summa-
rized two measures that are intended to help assess relative effectiveness and
utility of searching for and retrieving information. These two measures are
(i) recall (the number of relevant items retrieved divided by the number of
relevant items in the database) and (ii) precision (the number of relevant
documents retrieved divided by the total number of retrieved items) (p. 59).
These measures are problematic inasmuch as they either leave “relevance”
undeﬁned or assume that items and documents can objectively be catego-
rized as relevant or not relevant (with little or no middle ground). A more
fundamental underlying assumption imbedded in such instrumental mea-
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sures is that relevance, once a search is expressed, is a property that inheres
in the document retrieved. There may be an admission that some informa-
tion-seeker is making a relevance judgment about the members of a set of
documents, but there remains the operational procedure of treating rele-
vance as something that is of the document. The measures also are referred
to by Michael Buckland (1991, p. 101). Buckland, however, recognized the
semantic challenges of claiming that a relevance judgment is an objective
one. While admitting that ascribing relevance to a document, as part of the
execution of the recall and precision measures, is a matter of treating in-
formation as a thing, he readily admitted that information also can be per-
ceived as knowledge and as a process. Both of these conceptions transcend
the limited view of relevance as objective.
The shift from orthodox to alternative ideas concerning relevance is
well-illustrated in an article by Linda Schamber, Michael Eisenberg, and
Michael Nilan (1990). They reviewed traditional and nontraditional con-
ceptions of relevance judgments and demonstrate a shift from static to
dynamic factors. In summary they concluded that
1. Relevance is a multidimensional cognitive concept whose meaning is
largely dependent on users’ perceptions of information and their own
information-need situations.
2. Relevance is a dynamic concept that depends on users’ judgments of the
quality of relationships between information and information-need at
a certain point in time.
3. Relevance is a complex but systematic and measurable concept if ap-
proached conceptually and operationally from a user’s perspective. (p.
774)
The third point relies on conﬁdence in formal relevance judgment as a
rational process. While some might challenge such a view, its debate is be-
yond the scope of our concern here. One thing that is of some importance
here is the nature of knowledge itself. A reductionist view of knowledge
would hold that knowledge is subject to either an internalist (all knowledge
resides inside the individual knower’s mind) or an externalist (all knowl-
edge is grounded outside the knower’s mind) stance. It seems clear that
the orthodox view of relevance is externalist; assessments of the relevance
of speciﬁc documents are possible primarily because of properties of the
documents themselves.
The third point articulated by Schamber et al. presents a difﬁcult, but
essential, characteristic of relevance. If we were to take a purely externalist
stance regarding knowledge, and if we make relevance analogous to knowl-
edge, then relevance would necessarily be external to the information-seek-
er, and researchers could conceivably evaluate the relevance of documents.
If, on the other hand, we were to take an internalist stance regarding justiﬁ-
cation (the grounds for generating belief about a claim or statement), and
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if relevance were analogous to justiﬁcation, then relevance would necessarily
be within the information-seeker. Rober Audi (1998) in his book on epis-
temology convincingly argued that knowledge and justiﬁcation are, to an
important extent, separate and that an externalist view of knowledge com-
bined with an internalist view of justiﬁcation is legitimate, and that, further,
justiﬁcation is important to knowledge (pp. 237–238). Taking a cue from
Audi, it may be that we need to look at relevance as dually external and
internal to the information-seeker. Some object is read and evaluated, but
the evaluation ( justiﬁcation) is an outcome of rational, internal processes.
In other words, some meaning inheres in a document (external) and the
meaning is contextualized and assessed by a user (internal).
Some recent work in IS incorporates the complex epistemological
notion of combined internalist and externalist factors. Stephen Harter
1992) recognized the methodological challenges of discarding ideas of
ﬁxed relevance but asserts that matters of topicality are less important than
assessment of cognitive change in the information-seeker. Harter drew, in
part, from work on the cognitive elements of relevance as set forth by Dan
Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1986), about which more will be said later.
In his introduction to a special issue of the Journal of the American Society for
Information Science, Thomas Froehlich (1994) offered a particular means of
broadening the discourse on the matter, tacitly incorporating the dualist
principle suggested by Audi. Froehlich wrote, “Hermeneutics can provide
a productive framework for modeling systems and user criteria” (p. 130).
He described some of the factors that impinge on a hermeneutics of rele-
vance, including the realization that users interpret their needs to and for
themselves, understanding how documents become part of an information
collection such as a library, and determining how a user’s query in inter-
preted by and through an information system (p. 130). The addition of the
interpretive element was not entirely new with Froehlich; hints of it were
offered by David Ellis (1984) who noted the need to take into account the
perception of the user and the impact of that perception on relevance judg-
ments. With the introduction of hermeneutics, Froehlich made apparent
how the interpretive process can itself be examined, without ignoring the
intentional nature of system creation and development.
One of the most sophisticated assessments of relevance as a concept
was that of Birger Hjørland. In one of his works, Hjørland (1997) remind-
ed us that awareness of relevance coincides with an explicit awareness of
information need; the criteria to evaluate the relevance of a document are
ineluctably attached to the need itself (p. 172). In this the simultaneous
internal and external elements are clear. Hjørland’s thought (2002) is most
helpful when he demonstrates that the conception of relevance is a mani-
festation—explicit or not—of a particular school of thought. The criteria
for relevance are derived from the epistemological framework within which
the researcher works. For example, if the researcher is an empiricist, rele-
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vance is related to observations, sense data, and not from outside authori-
ty or testimony (p. 117). It is essential to remember that the decisions re-
garding criteria for evaluation of relevance are grounded in a theoretical
stance, whether the theory is articulated or not. A criticism that emanates
from many quarters (many disciplines) is that the theory is, in general, far
too frequently unstated, even unrecognized. The sub-rosa aspect of theory
in LIS leads to problems of conceptualization, deﬁnition, assumption, eval-
uation, and, ultimately, understanding.
The View from Without
It is impossible to consider relevance without delving fairly deeply into
Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) book. Theirs has been the most substantive and
complete consideration of the cognitive elements of relevance as they re-
late to communication to date. LIS should pay attention to a few key aspects
of their position. One aspect (although not the most major one) is that, in
the communication process, interpreters are concerned with utterances
(complete, or nearly complete, statements, arguments, propositions, etc.),
rather than sentences. This seems minor, but it emphasizes that, as people
hear or read, they usually are not simply extracting individual and small parts
of a discourse; they are evaluating larger communicative acts. In customary
library and information-retrieval settings, individuals tend to be making
judgments about documents or substantial portions of documents.
Of greater interest here is an aspect that is more central to Sperber and
Wilson’s concept of relevance—context. They deﬁned context as “a psycho-
logical construct, a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world. It
is these assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the world,
that affect the interpretation of an utterance” (1986, p. 15). Anyone con-
sidering relevance seriously must heed the ﬁrst part of this deﬁnition (the
hearer’s or reader’s assumptions about the world). The second part, if not
examined further, could lead us down an unproductive path, though. It is
also essential that Sperber and Wilson wrote that context is determined by
more than the actual state of the world. If one were to interpret their deﬁni-
tion as meaning that context is independent of the world, then this would
represent an antirealist view of the world. A realist, even a weak realist, view
would necessitate that we accept that the state of the world, at the very least,
inﬂuences our assumptions. To afﬁrm that their position is not a completely
antirealist stance, they claim that mutual knowledge is vital to any relevance
assessment and, so, to communication. For mutual knowledge to be possi-
ble, there must be shared assumptions, which are most likely to come from
the common inﬂuence of the state of the world. The idea of mutual knowl-
edge applies in many information-related instances; the creator of a docu-
ment/utterance frequently has an audience (though sometimes an ideal
audience) in mind. The utterance, then, may be made with the knowledge
base of the audience taken into account. To the extent that there genuine-
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ly is mutual knowledge, there is the likelihood that members of that audi-
ence may ﬁnd relevance in the utterance.
What is most fruitful in the development of an idea of relevance by Sper-
ber and Wilson is their outline of the cognitive processes involved in the as-
sessment of relevance. This assessment depends on context, as deﬁned
above. Complicating the cognitive evaluation of relevance is the realization
that any hearer/reader constantly resides within the framework of multiple
contexts. This becomes obvious if we consider the actions of a student or
scholar living in a rich environment. At any given point in time, the individ-
ual is likely to be working on more than one project. Even when the indi-
vidual is consciously and intentionally trying to focus on one context (say
in conducting a search of a literature with the possible connection with one
project in mind), the other contexts do not simply disappear. To the extent
that the other contexts become conscious, the literature being assessed may
be assessed within more than one context. If the multiple contexts are re-
lated by content, then the assessment may be further complicated. The in-
dividual reviewing literature may read a given abstract to determine if the
related paper is relevant to the project. Something in the abstract, however,
is semantically connected to a second project, which shifts the individual’s
contextual state; the individual begins to read the abstract with the second
project in mind. It may be that, if there is a content relation between the
two projects, the assessment of the abstract within the context of the second
project affects the context of the ﬁrst project. In other words, as some writ-
ers within LIS have noted, relevance judgment is unavoidably dynamic.
Sperber and Wilson explicitly observed that any individual may be as-
sessing intuitions relating to relevance in multiple, and shifting, contexts,
and it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, for a third party to be certain within
which context assessment resides at any given moment. They wrote, “As a
discourse proceeds, the hearer retrieves or constructs and then processes
a number of assumptions. These form a gradually changing background
against which new information is processed” (1986, p. 118). Sperber and
Wilson offered another observation that is essential to a full consideration
of relevance—relevance judgment tends not to be a binary decision; rath-
er, it is an assessment made on a continuum. This means that the decision
is a relative one; utterance A may be deemed relevant but less relevant than
utterance B. One additional point by Sperber and Wilson (1986) must be
considered: “We have suggested that the context used to process new as-
sumptions is, essentially, a subset of the individual’s old assumptions, with
which the new assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects”
(p. 132). Relevance judgment is dynamic because context is dynamic be-
cause assumptions are dynamic. New assumptions may be formed both on
the basis of old assumptions and leading to a transformation of old assump-
tions. As the transformation takes place, the judgment of the relevance of
a particular utterance is subject to change.
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The points made by Sperber and Wilson are useful and informative as
we in LIS consider relevance more fully. Their thought, of course, did not
spring fully formed without being inﬂuenced (contextually and via assump-
tions) by other writings and utterances. Two of these inﬂuential utteranc-
es (one tacit and one explicit; that is, one not referred to in their book and
the other one included in their bibliography) deserve brief treatment here.
The tacit inﬂuence is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
(1958). In part, Sperber and Wilson appeared to be reacting against some
points by Wittgenstein. For example, Wittgenstein (1958) said, “A propo-
sition, and hence in another sense a thought, can be the ‘expression’ of
belief, hope, expectation, etc. But believing is not thinking. . . . The con-
cepts of believing, expecting, hoping are less distantly related to one an-
other than they are to the concept of thinking” (p. 154). His claim raises
the question of whether relevance judgment falls in the realm of belief or
of thought. The answer has decided implications for any inquiry into rele-
vance. It seems apparent that Sperber and Wilson did not follow Wittgen-
stein on this matter; they turned, in part, to some works by Jerry Fodor to
support an idea of greater coherence between such things as belief and
thought. Fodor (1975) maintained that meaningful use of language neces-
sitates at least some correspondence between an expressible belief and the
actual expression (in language) of the belief (p. 72). Wittgenstein, though,
posited a notion that requires addressing, even if there is no speciﬁc refer-
ence to his work. Curiously, this example could be taken to be indicative
of the complexity of relevance. While Wittgenstein was not cited in Sper-
ber and Wilson, his work is relevant, even if negatively in this singular in-
stance, to the program Sperber and Wilson set forth.
The explicit inﬂuential utterance referred to above is that of John
Searle (1983). Two points made by Searle sufﬁce to illustrate both the in-
dication of inﬂuence on Sperber and Wilson and some essential consider-
ations relating to relevance. First, Searle addressed the matter of commu-
nication from the standpoint of the speaker. If an utterance by a speaker is
to be meaningful, then the speaker must have had a set of intentions di-
rected at a set of hearers, at an audience. The set of intentions entails hav-
ing an effect on the audience (Searle, 1983, p. 161). The importance of this
point is to remind us that, as an individual judges the relevance of a docu-
ment (utterance), the judgment is inﬂuenced by the document itself, es-
pecially whether, at that moment, the individual falls into the category of
intended audience of the creator of the document. If the answer is yes, then
there is a higher probability (though almost impossible to calculate) that
there is a contextual connection between the individual and the document;
the individual’s assumptions are related to the content of the document.
Stated in Searle’s terms, a connection exists between the set of intentions
held by the individual seeking information and that set held by the speak-
er/author at the time of the uttering.
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Another point by Searle addressed the question regarding where rele-
vance resides. Sperber and Wilson emphasized their perceived importance
of an individual’s assumptions about the world (as opposed to the state of
the world). Searle (1983) reviewed the distinction (in the mind, or de dicto
beliefs, and beliefs that are about real objects, or de re beliefs). While the
evaluation of beliefs may be difﬁcult, he concludes that there can be both
de dicto and de re beliefs (pp. 208–210). If an individual is reviewing a re-
trieved set of documents, that individual may read one that states putative
facts about, say, cognitive processes employed in information retrieval. The
individual also may be reading another that argues for a particular kind of
behavior to be employed in reference transactions, based on claims of the
emotional state of the inquirer. An understanding of the assumptions un-
derlying assessment of these two documents requires attention to the na-
ture of content of the documents. Assessment of the content is itself sub-
ject to kinds of epistemic justiﬁcation. The one document may be deemed
justiﬁed on the grounds of physical evidence of cognitive processes; the
other may be deemed justiﬁed on the grounds of effective argumentation.
Clearly in Searle, but also apparent in Sperber and Wilson, both kinds of
beliefs are integral to relevance judgment.
Searle’s insights are certainly valuable for any consideration of rele-
vance, but it should be noted that his position represents one of at least a
few possible stances regarding meaning. For any document or utterance to
be judged relevant, it stands to reason, that document or utterance should
be deemed meaningful by the reader or hearer. Speech acts, which form
the core of Searle’s concern, can be assessed as potentially meaningful.
These speech acts, however, tend to be assessed on the grounds of the
matter or content they communicate (a second conception of meaning).
Paul Grice (1989) demonstrated that the kinds of communication that
generally are considered when attention is turned to relevance (that is,
formal assertions based on evidence or logic) are accompanied by particu-
lar communicative intentions. The intention is usually to communicate the
substance of the idea or thought that the speaker/writer has to an audience.
Grice’s position is dependent on an even more fundamental notion of
meaning (a third conception) as an explanation of “what it is to think that
P, what it is to believe that P, to desire that P, etc.” (Harman, 1999, p. 158).
This notion attempts to theorize on the nature of a language of the mind
that allows for communication that can be comprehended internally by the
thinker and then communicated to someone else. While this third concep-
tion is important, the ﬁrst two have more direct relationship to an under-
standing of relevance.
Borrowing from another work from outside LIS, while systemic con-
cerns are present within our ﬁeld for the consideration of relevance (i.e.,
answering the question of whether the information system—database, ser-
vice, etc.—meets the information need of the inquirer), it may be that “sys-
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tem” is even more useful metaphorically. Patrick de Gramont (1990) took
this tack when he compared the workings of language to a ﬁling system.
He wrote:
Filing systems have two distinguishing characteristics which enable one
to compare them to the way language works. First, they operate on the
basis of the fact that the information to be ﬁled has meaning before it
is ﬁled. Second, the system under which the information is ﬁled is
geared, not to the information per se, but to an ulterior purpose. For
example, if I ﬁle my correspondence alphabetically, the classiﬁcation
I use has nothing to do with the correspondence in itself; rather it is a
function of wanting to retrieve letters easily and efﬁciently. (p. 65)
De Gramont hastened to add that while this metaphor effectively illustrates
the ways we employ language for particular purposes, purposes may become
conﬂated and render meaning difﬁcult. De Gramont (1990) said that the
meaning of a ﬁle (that is, the categorical meaning it has so that items can
be attached to it) is not the same as the meaning of the content within the
ﬁle; the categorization, being an organizing technique, is ineffective as a
meaningful indicator of speciﬁc content (p. 69). One reason for the difﬁcul-
ty is that the employment of language for the purpose of categorization
(ﬁling) tends to be an application of process rules, and not necessarily re-
lated to meaning.
De Gramont’s metaphor maps onto our disciplinary concern regard-
ing relevance. The system-based work on relevance that characterizes some
IS literature is, if de Gramont is correct, not only limited, but also mislead-
ing. If the initial concern is determination of the relevance of documents
retrieved from an information system (including a library), then the vital
matter of the meaningfulness of possible connection of the intention of the
searcher, the stated search, and the retrieved output is forgotten. As the
process moves from stage to stage, some transformation, along the lines of
the metaphor of the ﬁling system, occurs. The searcher’s intention is trans-
lated into a query, which is further transformed through the mapping of
search terms onto document representations. Serious inquiry into relevance
judgment should not ignore the transformative processes that take place
along the way. Applying de Gramont’s thought to relevance might prompt
the profession to think seriously, apropos of Mizzaro, about the two clus-
ters of work on relevance, and especially whether the separation into two
clusters not only misses the point of relevance but also possibly perpetuates
a mistaken notion of system and human operating independently. This is
not to say that there is no awareness that the two clusters are really only two
emphases within an interrelated phenomenon; there is certainly work that
does integrate the two.
One additional view from the outside can help demonstrate the more
particular concerns associated with relevance judgment that may be a part
of a dialogic process (e.g., reference transactions). While a number of think-
459budd/relevance
ers could enlighten us, one philosopher in particular has addressed mat-
ters of communicative action—Jürgen Habermas. In one speciﬁc work
Habermas (1998) has critiqued some standard theories of meaning and has
found them wanting. A primary difﬁculty with these theories is that they
tend to be constituted almost entirely in language itself and not in what
Habermas referred to as the pragmatic relationship between speakers and
hearers that can be both linguistic and extralinguistic (p. 280). What is
missing in such a case is a lack of attention to action—theoretic contexts
in which meaning may be realized. As mentioned above, Birger Hjørland
in our ﬁeld has attempted just such a connection between meaning and
action theory. According to Habermas, traditional theory has not fully aban-
doned a certain articulation of semiotics wherein an object-centered idea
of knowledge holds that meaning (signiﬁed) relates to a sign (signiﬁer) in
the same limited way that a potentially meaningful sign (symbol) relates to
the signiﬁed object (designatum) (p. 281).
Habermas offered a replacement for the traditional theory by empha-
sizing the tripartite objective of “a speaker reaching understanding/ with
another person/ about something” (p. 293). He added to the dynamic com-
bination of de dicto and de re beliefs affecting meaning by explicitly recog-
nizing the shared social world in which communication resides (p. 296).
His addition of this component has the effect of clarifying that, rather than
being a linear, objectiﬁed process, communication (and relevance judg-
ment) is a dynamic and transformative force that can enable understand-
ing to take place.
The telos of reaching understanding inherent in the structures of lan-
guage compels the communicative actors to alter their perspective; this
shift in perspective ﬁnds expression in the necessity of going from the
objectivating attitude of the success-oriented actor, who seeks to effect
something in the world, to the performative attitude of a speaker, who
seeks to reach understanding with a second person about something.
(Habermas, 1998, p. 300)
Any dialogic effort to determine the relevance of documents or utterances
depends on the kind of teleological stance of which Habermas speaks. This
means that, from the professional point of view, it is not sufﬁcient to rec-
ognize a simply stated goal of service; a more robust and rich articulation
of purpose is required to meet the goal of ﬁnding relevance in a dynamic
and complex environment.
Summary
In recent writings, representatives from the IS ﬁeld have recognized the
dynamic and complex nature of relevance and relevance judgments. Some
of these writers go so far as to delve into work beyond LIS. The reality,
however, is that such treatments are limited. Furthermore, consideration
of relevance is to be found in the IS literature, rather than in the literature
460 library trends/winter 2004
on librarianship. As is the case with any absence, reasons are left to specu-
lation. It may be that librarians read the IS literature and learn from it. It
may be that librarians tacitly believe that practice effectively embraces rel-
evance in the form of reference service and measures such as user satisfac-
tion. When we traverse beyond our own literature, we can readily see a rich-
ness of thought relating to language, context, content, and other factors
that are closely connected to relevance. The potential for understanding
and misunderstanding may be the most fundamental of ideas that can guide
the inquiry and practice in which relevance holds a central place.
When Habermas’s critique of theories of meaning is considered, the
challenge of understanding what relevance is and how it can be assessed
becomes clear. Habermas, more so than many other writers on language
and communication, comprehends the inherently dialogic nature of com-
munication. To ground an examination of relevance even more explicitly
in dialogic communication, the work of Mikhail Bakhtin should be consid-
ered. Bakhtin, more effectively than anyone else, has captured the elusive
quality of dialogue. Underlying his program is the claim that all communi-
cation is dialogic or monologic. Monologic communication allows no re-
sponse, no appropriation by a reader or hearer; it simply is as it is stated.
Dialogic communication requires interaction between hearer and speak-
er, between writer and reader. This kind of communication also requires
the admission that “Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely
and easily into the private property of the speaker’s intentions; it is popu-
lated—overpopulated—with the intentions of others. Expropriating it,
forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difﬁcult and
complicated process” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 294).
We may be tempted, especially given the force of a narrow empiricist
tradition in our ﬁeld, to presume that a relevance judgment is not subject
to multiple, sometimes competing, intentions, that the information-seek-
er imposes her intentions on the document/utterance. The full realization
of relevance entails what Michael Bernard-Donals (1994) called the epis-
temological foundation of Bakhtin’s work—“the I–other relationship that
takes place between humans through the creation of signs (and more
speciﬁcally, with language). . . . [H]umans are radically ‘other’ in relation
to each other, but it is this relationship that deﬁnes human understanding,
and all epistemologies must come to terms with it, as Bakhtin’s does” (p.
43). As is stated early in this paper, relevance is necessarily connected to
knowledge. An understanding of the phenomenon of relevance also neces-
sitates examination that transcends a linguistics analysis that ignores the
dialogic nature of communication. Bakhtin (1986) summed up what ide-
ally occurs in relevance assessment:
The transcription of thinking in the human sciences is always the tran-
scription of a special kind of dialogue: the complex interrelations be-
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tween the text (the object of study and reﬂection) and the created, fram-
ing context (questioning, refuting, and so forth) in which the scholar’s
cognizing and evaluating thought takes place. This is the meeting of
two texts—of the ready-made and the reactive text being created—and,
consequently, the meeting of two subjects and two authors. (pp. 106–
107)
Any dynamic conception of relevance requires an understanding of the
dialogic, and essentially phenomenological, process of communication. As
Emmanuel Levinas (1969) has told us, discourse involves the production
of meaning, not merely an ideal meaning, but one that is grounded in the
present act of reading/hearing the words of the writer/speaker (p. 66). A
judgment of relevance is likewise grounded in the present. This brief ex-
amination demonstrates that fruitful thought from philosophy, language,
and semantics can help LIS delve more deeply into the study of relevance.
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On Verifying the Accuracy of Information:
Philosophical Perspectives
Don Fallis
The sooner a man begins to verify all he hears
the better it is for him.
—George Gurdjieff
Trust but verify.
—Ronald Reagan
Abstract
How can one verify the accuracy of recorded information
(e.g., information found in books, newspapers, and on Web sites)? In this
paper, I argue that work in the epistemology of testimony (especially that
of philosophers David Hume and Alvin Goldman) can help with this im-
portant practical problem in library and information science. This work
suggests that there are four important areas to consider when verifying the
accuracy of information: (i) authority, (ii) independent corroboration, (iii)
plausibility and support, and (iv) presentation. I show how philosophical
research in these areas can improve how information professionals go about
teaching people how to evaluate information. Finally, I discuss several fur-
ther techniques that information professionals can and should use to make
it easier for people to verify the accuracy of information.
Philosophy of Information (PI)
PI is “the philosophical ﬁeld concerned with the critical investigation
of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its
dynamics, utilisation, and sciences” (Floridi, 2002b, p. 123).1  Luciano Flo-
ridi (2002a) and Ken Herold (2001) recently looked at the broad connec-
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tions between library and information science (LIS) and PI. For example,
Floridi (2002a, pp. 47–48) considers whether PI might serve as the theo-
retical foundation for which library and information scientists have long
been searching. Of course, it is somewhat rare for philosophers to explicit-
ly address LIS issues.2  Also, PI has only recently been identiﬁed as a distinct
ﬁeld of inquiry. Even so, philosophers have been working on many issues
of concern to LIS for centuries (cf. Floridi, 2002a, p. 44).
This paper focuses on how PI can help with one speciﬁc practical con-
cern for LIS, namely, how one can verify the accuracy of recorded infor-
mation. In other words, how one can determine if the information found
in a book, in a newspaper, on a Web site, etc. is accurate.
Notably, library and information scientists typically talk about evaluat-
ing the quality of information rather than about verifying the accuracy of
information (see, e.g., Alexander & Tate, 1999; Cooke, 1999). In fact, ac-
curacy is usually just one of the traditional criteria for evaluating the qual-
ity of information (see, e.g., Alexander & Tate, 1999, pp. 11–13; Cooke 1999,
pp. 60–62).
Even for library and information scientists, however, accuracy is the sine
qua non of quality information sources. For example, consider some of the
other traditional criteria for evaluating the quality of information. The main
reason that we are interested in ﬁnding information sources that are au-
thoritative, objective, and current is that we think that they are more likely
to be accurate. In other words, these criteria are indicative of information
quality precisely because they are indicative of information accuracy.
Library and information scientists are legitimately concerned with
quality issues that do go beyond accuracy, such as the accessibility, relevance,
comprehensibility, and navigability of information sources. However, as
Peter Hernon (1995, p. 133) points out, “it is not enough that information
is readily available; before relying on any data or information, it may be
important to ascertain, for example, the veracity of the content.”
In this paper, I appeal mainly to the work of David Hume (1748/1977)
and Alvin Goldman (1999 and 2001) on the epistemology of testimony (as
well as to some work in game theory).3  Their work suggests four important
areas to consider when verifying the accuracy of information: (i) authori-
ty, (ii) independent corroboration, (iii) plausibility and support, and (iv)
presentation. I show how work in these areas can improve how information
professionals go about teaching people how to evaluate information. In
addition, I argue that information professionals can and should use some
further important techniques to make it easier for people to verify the ac-
curacy of information.
The Problem of Inaccurate Information
Even fairly reliable information sources contain some amount of inac-
curate information. Famously, the Chicago Tribune mistakenly reported that
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Dewey had defeated Truman in the 1948 presidential campaign. More re-
cently, Dan Rather mistakenly reported that James Brady had died after
being shot by John Hinkley (cf. Frické 1997, p. 887). However, since almost
anyone can post almost anything on the Internet with no editorial control,
we might expect much more inaccurate information on the Internet.4  In
fact, empirical studies have found a considerable amount of inaccurate
information on the Internet (see, e.g., Impicciatore et al., 1997; Connell &
Tipple, 1999; Berland et al., 2001).5
The reason that inaccurate information is a problem is that people
can often be misled by it. And the risks here are not just epistemic. Peo-
ple use the information that they have to make practical decisions. If
people are misled by inaccurate information, it can cause serious harm
to their ﬁnances (cf. Fowler et al., 2001) and their health (cf. Kiley, 2002).
In addition, while some people may be too credulous, other people may
be too skeptical. Because they are worried about being misled, some peo-
ple may fail to believe accurate information that it would have been beneﬁ-
cial for them to believe.
Of course, the mere fact that an information source contains some
amount of inaccurate information is not necessarily a problem (cf. Wach-
broit, 2000, p. 11). As long as people can distinguish the accurate from the
inaccurate information, they will not be misled. Unfortunately, it often can
be very difﬁcult for people to identify inaccurate information (cf. Cerf,
2002). For example, with the latest Web development software, almost any-
one can publish very professional-looking Web sites. As Silberg et al. (1997,
p. 1244) point out, the Internet “is a medium in which anyone with a com-
puter can serve simultaneously as author, editor, and publisher and can ﬁll
any or all of these roles anonymously if he or she so chooses. In such an
environment, novices and savvy Internet users alike can have trouble dis-
tinguishing the wheat from the chaff, the useful from the harmful.”
Thus, people need to be able to distinguish the accurate information
from the inaccurate information. In other words, they need to be able to
verify the accuracy of information. Since the problem of inaccurate infor-
mation seems to be most pressing on the Internet, this paper focuses speciﬁ-
cally on how to verify the accuracy of information on the Internet. Even so,
almost all of the points that are made can be applied generally to verifying
the accuracy of information from any source.
Library and information scientists have responded to the problem of
inaccurate information on the Internet primarily by publishing guidelines
for evaluating information (see, e.g., Ambre et al., 1997; Silberg et al., 1997;
Wilkinson et al., 1997; Alexander & Tate, 1999; Cooke, 1999; Smith, A.,
2002). These guidelines provide people with a list of features of Web sites
that are supposed to be indicators of accuracy (e.g., the author is identiﬁed,
the author is an authority on the topic, no advertising appears, no spelling
or grammatical errors are present, the Web site is up-to-date, authoritative
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references are cited). As I discuss in the following sections, work on the
epistemology of testimony provides a conceptual framework that encom-
passes such efforts to deal with the problem of inaccurate information. This
conceptual framework explains why these guidelines work and suggests how
they can be improved. In addition, having such a conceptual framework can
make it easier to apply and to communicate these guidelines.
Finally, notably, the problem of inaccurate information is not sui gen-
eris. This problem is analogous to a number of other problems that peo-
ple confront. For example, to deal effectively with the problem of counter-
feit currency, people need to be able to distinguish authentic currency from
counterfeit currency (cf. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 2002). Simi-
larly, to deal effectively with the problem of low-quality products, consum-
ers need to be able to distinguish high-quality products from low-quality
products (cf. Baird et al., 1994, pp. 122–125). I explain how strategies for
dealing with these other problems have the potential to be heuristically
valuable when we confront the problem of inaccurate information.
The Epistemology of Testimony
The problem of how to verify the accuracy of recorded information is
a special case of the problem of how to verify the accuracy of testimony. For
example, suppose that we want to know the height of the Eiffel Tower. Very
few people have the resources and expertise to measure the Eiffel Tower
for themselves. The rest of us have to look this information up in a book
or on a Web site. But when we get this information from a book or a Web
site, we are relying on the testimony of the author.
The epistemology of testimony is important because a large amount of
the information that we have about the world comes from others rather than
from direct observation (cf. Lipton, 1998, p. 2). As Hume (1748/1977, p.
74) puts it, “there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful,
and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testi-
mony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators.” And, in par-
ticular, a large amount of the information that we get from others comes to
us as recorded information (e.g., in books, in newspapers, and on Web sites).
While the epistemology of testimony certainly has not been the main
focus of traditional epistemology (cf. Goldman, 1999, p. 4), a lot of work
has been done in this area (see, e.g., Giedymin, 1963; Hardwig, 1985; Coady,
1992; Lipton, 1998; Goldman, 1999, pp. 103–130; Goldman, 2001;). In fact,
work in this area goes back to the ancient Greeks. Plato (380 BC/2002, p.
170d), for example, asked whether one can “examine another man’s claim
to some knowledge, and make out whether he knows or does not know what
he says he knows.”
One of the most inﬂuential early discussions of the epistemology of
testimony is in David Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(1977), originally published in 1748. In the chapter “Of Miracles,” Hume
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develops a general framework that can be used to evaluate any kind of tes-
timony. In particular, this framework can be applied to verifying the accu-
racy of recorded information.6
According to Hume (1748/1977, p. 77), “when any one tells me, that
he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself,
whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be
deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened.”
Hume is explicitly concerned here with evaluating testimony that a mira-
cle has occurred, but his strategy can just as easily be used to evaluate, for
example, the claim on a Web site that a particular treatment for a child with
a fever is safe and effective. In both cases, we should consider all of the
available evidence (including the fact of the testimony itself) and determine
what the best explanation of this evidence is. This strategy is known as “in-
ference to the best explanation.” Among philosophers, it is a common way
to analyze scientiﬁc inference, but it also can be applied to the evaluation
of testimony (cf. Lipton, 1998, p. 27). For example, what is the best expla-
nation of the fact that the Web site is claiming that this treatment is safe
and effective? Is it more likely that the Web site is promoting an ineffective
treatment either because its author is not medically qualiﬁed or because
the sponsor is selling pharmaceutical products? Alternatively, is it more like-
ly that the treatment really is safe and effective?
In addition to inferring the best explanation, Hume (1748/1977, p. 73)
claims that “a wise man . . . proportions his belief to the evidence.”7  In gen-
eral, if the evidence that a claim is accurate is greater than the evidence that
the claim is inaccurate, then we should be inclined to think that the claim
is accurate (cf. Hume, 1748/1977, pp. 73–74).8  However, our degree of
conﬁdence in the accuracy of the claim should depend on how much the
evidence of accuracy exceeds the evidence of inaccuracy. As Hume (1748/
1977, p. 74) puts it, “a hundred instances or experiments on one side, and
ﬁfty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hun-
dred uniform experiments, with only one contradictory, reasonably beget
a pretty strong degree of assurance.”
But what evidence should we consider when we are trying to verify the
accuracy of a piece of information?9  Hume has several suggestions as to
what evidence is relevant. For example, Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) says that
“we entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witness-
es contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful charac-
ter; when they have an interest in what they afﬁrm; when they deliver their
testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations”
(cf. Locke, 1690/1975, pp. 662–663). In fact, his suggestions sound a lot
like the published guidelines for evaluating information on the Internet.
The evidence that Hume suggests that people consider can be divided
into roughly four categories. These categories will be examined in more
detail in the following sections. However, before we move on to these de-
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tails, two important points should be emphasized about Hume’s recommen-
dations for evaluating testimony.
First, Hume is engaged in a normative project. That is, he is making
recommendations for how people ought to go about verifying the accura-
cy of information. The published guidelines for evaluating information on
the Internet are also engaged in this same normative project.
By contrast, a number of recent LIS articles (see, e.g., Fogg et al., 2001;
Eysenbach & Köhler, 2002; Rieh, 2002; Wathen & Burkell, 2002) have
looked at how people actually do make judgments about information qual-
ity. Of course, the features of Web sites that people actually ﬁnd credible
need not coincide with the features that they ought to ﬁnd credible. In fact,
determining what people ﬁnd credible is most directly relevant to helping
authors devise ways to convince their audience whether or not what they
are saying is accurate.
Second, the goal of following Hume’s recommendations is that we end
up with true beliefs. In other words, the goal is to acquire beliefs that cor-
respond to reality.10  Philosophers typically take this to be the goal of infor-
mation seekers (see, e.g., Goldman, 1999, p. 3).11  John Locke (1690/1975,
p. 697), for example, explicitly states that the reason that we should pro-
portion our belief to the evidence is so that we will end up with true beliefs.
Library and information scientists, however, are much less likely to take
this to be the goal of information seekers (cf. Fallis, 2000, p. 314). Jesse Shera
(1970, p. 97), for example, says that “false knowledge . . . is still knowledge,
it is knowable and known.” However, as a number of library and informa-
tion scientists have recently argued (see, e.g., Frické, 1997, p. 887; Meola,
2000, p. 174; Doyle, 2001, pp. 62–63;), information seekers often do have
the goal of acquiring true beliefs. For example, a student writing a report
on the Eiffel Tower wants to know how tall the Eiffel Tower really is. In oth-
er words, she is after the truth. Similarly, a parent wants to know whether a
particular treatment for a child with a fever really is safe and effective. In
fact, it does not really make sense for someone to bother about verifying the
accuracy of information unless acquiring true beliefs is her goal.12
Of course, this is not to say that information seekers exclusively seek
true beliefs (cf. Goldman, 1999, p. 26). Walter Kaufmann (1977, pp. 47–
83), for example, argues that the goal of reading should be to acquire more
than just true beliefs (e.g., understanding).13  But even if it is not our ulti-
mate goal, acquiring true beliefs is often a critical means to this further end
(cf. Bruce, 2000, p. 109).
Finally, even if our goal is simply to acquire true beliefs, it is important
to note that we are not just interested in the accuracy of the information.
A person can be misled by incomplete information as well as by inaccurate
information. Thus, we also are interested in the completeness of the infor-
mation (cf. Frické, 1997; Fallis & Frické, 2002, pp. 74–75).14  This paper,
however, focuses speciﬁcally on how to verify the accuracy of information.
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Who Testifies: Authority
Library and information scientists emphasize that people should con-
sider the source of a piece of information when trying to verify its accuracy.
In particular, people are advised to determine the authority of the informa-
tion source (see, e.g., Wilson, 1983; Alexander & Tate, 1999, p. 11; Cooke,
1999, pp. 58–60). This is what Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) had in mind when
he said that we should consider the “character . . . of the witnesses.”
Deciding what to believe based on who said it is referred to by philos-
ophers as an appeal to authority. An appeal to authority is often listed in
introductory logic texts as a fallacy. However, while some appeals to authority
are fallacious (e.g., taking medical advice from someone who plays a doc-
tor on TV), others are legitimate (cf. Salmon, 1995, p. 105; Goldman, 2001,
p. 88).15  An appeal to authority is legitimate whenever our source is likely
to be providing us with accurate information (i.e., if she is a reliable source
on the topic in question).
As Jerzy Giedymin (1963, pp. 288–289) points out, there are essential-
ly two ways to determine whether an information source is reliable. First,
has this information source usually provided accurate information in the
past? If an individual has been right about things in the past, then she is
more likely to be right about things now (cf. Hume, 1748/1977, p. 73).
Second, does anything suggest that this information source would not pro-
vide accurate information in this particular case? For example, the pub-
lished guidelines on evaluating information typically advise people to de-
termine if the information source has an obvious bias (see, e.g., Ambre et
al., 1997; Alexander & Tate, 1999, p. 13).16
Regarding “past track record” (Goldman, 2001, p. 106), many circum-
stances exist where people can directly determine whether an information
source has provided accurate information in the past (cf. Goldman, 2001,
pp. 106–108). For example, while a student may not know how tall the Eiffel
Tower is, she will probably know that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. Thus, if a
Web site incorrectly claims that the Eiffel Tower is in Brussels, she proba-
bly should not trust this Web site when it claims that the Eiffel Tower is
exactly 300 meters high.
However, a couple of practical difﬁculties arise with trying to directly
determine the past track record of an information source. For one thing,
people may not have had a sufﬁcient number of previous interactions with
this particular information source (cf. Lipton, 1998, p. 15). In fact, given
the size of the Internet, people often will be consulting particular Web sites
for the ﬁrst time. Also, people may not have the expertise to judge the ac-
curacy of the information previously provided by this information source
(cf. Goldman, 2001, p. 106). As a result, if people only rely on their own
past experience with information sources, they will only be able to verify
the accuracy of a limited amount of the information on the Internet.
Fortunately, people also can rely on the experience that other people
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have had with an information source. In other words, people can use the
testimony of others to determine the reliability of an information source
(cf. Goldman, 2001, p. 97). For example, the published guidelines on eval-
uating information typically advise people to determine if the information
source has a reputation for reliability (see, e.g., Wilkinson et al., 1997, p.
55; Cooke, 1999, p. 61). Based on sources’ reputations, someone seeking
ﬁnancial information can be reasonably conﬁdent in the accuracy of infor-
mation found on the Wall Street Journal Web site or the Bloomberg Web site.
In fact, even if an information source does not have a well-established
reputation, other factors can determine if people recommend or endorse
this information source.17  For example, the published guidelines on eval-
uating information typically advise people to determine if the information
source has appropriate credentials (see, e.g., Ambre et al., 1997). As Gold-
man (2001, p. 97) points out, conferring credentials, such as academic
degrees and professional accreditations, is a way in which experts commonly
endorse other experts. In addition, people can determine whether an in-
formation source on the Internet is endorsed by others by looking at how
many Web sites link to this Web site (cf. Burbules, 2001, p. 444). This is
analogous to using citation counts as an indication of the scholarly quality
of a journal (cf. Lee et al., 2002).
Bias is just one of a number of features that might suggest that an in-
formation source would not provide accurate information in a particular
case. As Hume (1748/1977, p. 77) suggests when he says that a witness may
“either deceive or be deceived,” these features fall roughly into two cate-
gories. First, is there any indication that the witness was not sincere in her
testimony?18  Second, is there any indication that the witness was not in a
position to know the fact that she is testifying to? This is a standard distinc-
tion made by philosophers.19  It is basically the same distinction that infor-
mation scientists have in mind when they talk about disinformation and mis-
information (see, e.g., Hernon, 1995, p. 134).
Finally, everything that has been discussed so far in this section (e.g.,
past track record, bias, reputation) is clearly an epistemically relevant con-
sideration. However, philosophers have claimed that some unexpected fea-
tures also might actually help people determine whether an information
source is reliable. For example, Ashley McDowell (2002, pp. 60–61) argues
that the general trustworthiness of an individual (e.g., she keeps her prom-
ises) may be indicative of epistemic trustworthiness. Linda Alcoff (1999)
even argues that the social identity (e.g., culture, race, gender) of an indi-
vidual may have an effect on her epistemic credibility.
How Many Testify: Independent Corroboration
In the last section, we looked at ways to determine the reliability of a
single source of information. However, in addition to the character of the
witness, Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) also notes that people should pay atten-
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tion to the “number of the witnesses.” This is because it is much more like-
ly that one individual will “deceive or be deceived” than that several indi-
viduals will “deceive or be deceived” in exactly the same way. For this rea-
son, several philosophers have noted that the agreement of a number of
experts on a topic can be an important indicator of accuracy (see, e.g.,
Goldman, 1987, p. 122; Salmon, 1995, p. 105). This suggests that another
technique for verifying the accuracy of a piece of information is to see if
other information sources corroborate the original source of the informa-
tion (cf. Burbules, 2001, p. 446; Wilkinson et al., 1997, p. 56).20
Notably, however, agreement between information sources is not always
an indication that their information is accurate. It depends on how these
different sources got their information. In particular, if they all got their
information from the same place, then ten sources saying the same thing
is no better evidence than one source saying it. Goldman (2001, p. 101)
refers to such information sources as “nondiscriminating reﬂectors.” In a
similar vein, according to Wachbroit (2000, p. 13), “Wittgenstein in On
Certainty presents the [absurd] image of someone trying to check a story
in a newspaper by buying other copies of the same newspaper and reading
the story again.”
This issue turns out to be especially important on the Internet since it
is so easy for the very same information to be copied by several different
Web sites. For example, in one of the Internet scams reported by Fowler et
al. (2001), the news service Internet Wire posted what turned out to be a
fraudulent press release about the Emulex Corporation. The inaccurate
information in this press release was then quickly picked up by several other
news services, such as Bloomberg, CBS Marketwatch, and Dow Jones. As a
result, those investors that did try to verify the accuracy of the information
by checking multiple sources still ended up being misled.
The same sort of replication occurs with consumer health information.
For example, over thirty different Web sites (including the National Library
of Medicine, 2002) provide the same information word for word on how
to treat children with fever. In this case, the information seems to be accu-
rate. However, the fact that all of these sites corroborate each other still does
nothing to help us verify that the information is accurate. Agreement be-
tween sources should not increase our degree of conﬁdence in the accura-
cy of a piece of information unless those sources are independent (cf.
Giedymin, 1963, p. 291).21
Of course, information sources do not always agree with each other. In
fact, it is fairly easy to ﬁnd conﬂicting information (e.g., about the height
of the Eiffel Tower) from different sources on the Internet (cf. Burbules,
2001, p. 452). If sources do conﬂict, then people simply have to determine
which source is more reliable (or use some of the other techniques for
verifying the accuracy of the information).
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What They Testify To: Plausibility and Support
Library and information scientists emphasize that people should con-
sider who the source of the information is when trying to verify its accura-
cy. Philosophers, however, are much more likely to emphasize that people
should look at what the information is. In particular, people are advised to
consider the plausibility of a claim and the reasons offered in support of
the claim.22
In addition to knowing about the reliability of the source, an informa-
tion seeker typically knows many other things about the world that should
be taken into account. If it is very unlikely that a piece of information is
accurate given everything else that we know about the topic in question,
then we should be inclined to think that the information is inaccurate (cf.
Lipton, 1998, p. 25). As Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) puts it, “the evidence,
resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in
proportion as the fact is more or less unusual” (cf. Locke 1690/1975, p.
663).23  So, for example, a Web site that depicts a city in Minnesota “as a
tropical paradise” (Piper, 2000) is immediately suspect.
In addition to considering the plausibility of the claim, philosophers
emphasize that people need to consider the reasons (if any) that an infor-
mation source offers in support of the claim (see, e.g., Goldman, 1999, pp.
130–160; Goldman, 2001, pp. 93–94).24  The reasons offered often can
provide the best evidence for the accuracy of the claim. This is certainly how
things are supposed to work in science and mathematics, for example. If a
mathematician wants to determine whether a mathematical claim is true,
she is not going to start by checking the credentials of the person making
the claim. She is going to check the proof that this person has given.
Under ideal circumstances, this is the sort of evidence that people
would use to verify the accuracy of information. However, once again, peo-
ple will not always have sufﬁcient expertise to evaluate the plausibility of a
claim or the reasons offered in support of the claim (cf. Goldman, 2001,
p. 94).25  This may explain why library and information scientists have not
focused on this particular technique for verifying the accuracy of informa-
tion. In those cases where people lack sufﬁcient expertise, they will have to
fall back on more indirect evidence of accuracy or inaccuracy (e.g., con-
sidering who testiﬁes and how they testify).
How They Testify: Presentation
In addition to who testiﬁes and what they testify to, Hume (1748/1977,
p. 75) notes that people should pay attention to the “manner of their de-
livering their testimony.” How a witness testiﬁes is often indicative of the
reliability of this witness (cf. section 4 above).26
Numerous features of Web sites proposed as indicators of accuracy fall
into this category. For example, does the Web site engage in any advertis-
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ing? Advertising may indicate a lack of objectivity (cf. Alexander & Tate,
1999, p. 27). The idea is that the desire to sell products might override the
desire to tell the truth. Also, does the Web site contain any spelling or gram-
matical errors? Such mistakes may indicate a lack of concern for quality and
accuracy (cf. Wilkinson et al., 1997, p. 57; Cooke, 1999, p. 61): The idea is
that if someone is careful enough to get the spelling right, she is more likely
to be careful enough to get the facts right. Finally, does the Web site cite
authoritative references (see, e.g., Ambre et al., 1997; Cooke, 1999, p. 61)?
These are just a few of the features of Web sites that have been proposed
as indicators of accuracy in the published guidelines for evaluating infor-
mation. Not enough space is available here to give an exhaustive list. How-
ever, it is possible to identify three general constraints that indicators of
accuracy must satisfy.27
First, an indicator of accuracy clearly must be correlated with informa-
tion being accurate. In other words, a Web site that displays an indicator
of accuracy (e.g., lack of advertising) must be more likely to contain accu-
rate information than a Web site that does not display that indicator (cf.
Fallis, 2000, p. 307). For example, Fallis and Frické (2002, p. 76) found that
a Web site with accurate health information was over three times more likely
to display the Health on the Net Foundation’s (2002a) HONcode logo than
a Web site with inaccurate health information.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the features of Web sites that are usu-
ally proposed as indicators of accuracy are really correlated with accuracy.
For one thing, most of the published guidelines for evaluating information
are not based on empirical data. Instead, these guidelines are often based
on surveys of “Web experts” (see, e.g., Ambre et al., 1997; Wilkinson et al.,
1997). However, it is not clear that the features of Web sites that these “Web
experts” believe to be indicators of accuracy really are indicators of accu-
racy. Even worse, in at least some cases, these guidelines have “clearly drawn
from one another” (cf. Burbules, 2001, p. 445). In other words, they are
nondiscriminating reﬂectors (cf. section 5 above).
An empiricist such as Hume, however, would certainly insist on basing
such guidelines on empirical data. For example, with respect to testimony
in general, Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) says that “the reason, why we place
any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion,
which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we
are accustomed to ﬁnd a conformity between them.” Unfortunately, the few
studies (see, e.g., Grifﬁths & Christensen, 2000; Fallis & Frické, 2002; Kunst
et al., 2002) that have empirically tested the features of Web sites that are
usually proposed as indicators of accuracy have not found them to be cor-
related with accuracy. According to Kathleen Grifﬁths and Helen Christen-
sen (2000, p. 1515), “currently popular criteria for evaluating the quality
of Web sites were not indicators of content quality.”
Second, people must put the right amount of faith in an indicator of
474 library trends/winter 2004
accuracy (cf. Hume, 1748/1977, p. 75). In other words, they need to pro-
portion their belief to the evidence. If people do not put the right amount
of faith in an indicator of accuracy, they can still end up being too credu-
lous (or too skeptical).
Indicators of accuracy are rarely guarantees of accuracy (cf. Hume,
1748/1977, p. 74). As a result, there is usually plenty of room for people to
overestimate the degree to which an indicator of accuracy is actually cor-
related with accuracy. Unfortunately, the published guidelines for evaluat-
ing information do not tell people how much faith to put in the features
of Web sites that are usually proposed as indicators of accuracy. Of course,
since their recommendations are not based on empirical data, it is not clear
how they could do so.28
Third, an indicator of accuracy must be correlated with accuracy in a
“robust” way. In particular, it must be difﬁcult for the author of a Web site
to “fake” an indicator of accuracy.
James Perry (1985, p. 251) once made the tongue-in-cheek suggestion
that “the presence of a colon in the title of a paper is the primary correlate
of scholarship.” While titular colonicity is almost certainly not correlated
with accuracy, it does provide a nice example of something that is deﬁnite-
ly not correlated with accuracy in a “robust” way. This is because it is very
easy for an author to put a colon in the title of her paper to gain credibility
even if her information is inaccurate. As Perry (1986, p. 177) notes, “when
an evaluation technique has been developed and tested, it will become fa-
miliar to the evaluatees as well as the evaluators. Thus, its utility will decrease
as evaluatees change their practices to gain higher evaluations” (cf. Bur-
bules, 2001, p. 445). In other words, even if titular colonicity were highly
correlated with information being accurate, it would probably not remain
correlated for long.
The same sort of worry arises with respect to indicators of accuracy on
the Internet. Many Web sites containing inaccurate information might sim-
ply be following the suggestions from Fogg et al. (2001) on “what makes Web
sites credible,” for example. In fact, it should be noted that some Web sites
containing inaccurate information do not simply try to look reputable. They
actually try to look like somebody else. For example, in one of the Internet
scams reported by Fowler et al. (2001), a Web site was designed to look like
the Bloomberg Web site to fool investors. Interestingly enough, such Web
sites are commonly referred to as “counterfeit sites” (cf. Piper, 2000).
Even so, it is possible for indicators to be correlated with accuracy in a
“robust” way (cf. Fallis & Frické, 2002, p. 78). The author of a Web site needs
to do something that she would be unable to do (or at least would be very
unlikely to do) if her information were inaccurate (cf. Goldman, 1999, pp.
108–109). In other words, the author needs to signal that her information
is accurate. For example, identifying oneself as the author of a Web site
using a digital certiﬁcate (cf. Froomkin, 1996) can be an effective signal if one
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has “such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great
deal to lose in case of . . . being detected in any falsehood” (Hume, 1748/
1977, p. 78).
The general properties of such signals have been studied extensively
in the literature on game theory (see, e.g., Spence, 1974; Baird et al., 1994,
pp. 122–158). For example, just as the quality of information on the Inter-
net varies, the quality of a product typically varies from supplier to supplier.
Some suppliers sell high-quality products and other suppliers sell low-quality
products. Unfortunately, consumers often cannot tell the high-quality prod-
ucts from the low-quality products just by looking at them. Such situations
are referred to as “games of asymmetric information,” where the consum-
ers are the uninformed players and the suppliers are the informed players.
In such situations, suppliers that sell high-quality products would like
to send a signal that would allow consumers to distinguish them from the
suppliers that sell low-quality products. For something to be an effective
signal, however, two conditions must be satisﬁed: ﬁrst, for the low-quality
suppliers, the cost of sending the signal must outweigh the beneﬁt; second,
for the high-quality suppliers, the beneﬁt of sending the signal must out-
weigh the cost. Under most circumstances, this means that it must cost low-
quality suppliers more to send the signal than it costs high-quality suppli-
ers. If the cost is the same for everybody to send the signal, then all suppliers
would make the same decision about whether to send the signal.
This game theoretic analysis can be directly applied to indicators of
accuracy on the Internet. This is because people seeking information on
the Internet are clearly involved in a game of asymmetric information. They
often cannot tell just by looking whether the information on a Web site is
accurate. Of course, people are not always literally buying the information
that they ﬁnd on the Internet. However, they are deciding how much of
their conﬁdence to invest in this information. In addition, the authors of
Web sites typically beneﬁt when people invest conﬁdence in their claims.
Using this game theoretic analysis, we can now say more precisely why
titular colonicity is not a good indicator of accuracy. Since putting a colon in
the title of a paper or a Web site costs everybody the same amount, titular
colonicity does not allow people to distinguish sources with accurate infor-
mation from sources with inaccurate information. Similarly, since automat-
ic spelling and grammar checkers are readily available, the cost of eliminat-
ing spelling and grammatical errors is unlikely to outweigh the beneﬁt to an
author of having more people believe that her information is accurate.
Notably, changes in technology can have an effect on what will be an
effective signal. For example, affordable color photocopying has made it
more cost-effective for counterfeiters to include many of the old signals of
authentic currency (e.g., green ink). As a result, the United States Treasury
has had to come up with some new signals (see Bureau of Engraving and
Printing, 2002). Similarly, some of the indicators of accuracy that worked
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in the world of print information (e.g., the professional look of a document)
may not work as well in the world of electronic information.
Verifiability of Information
Several techniques for verifying the accuracy of information have been
discussed in the preceding sections. However, notably, while it will be feasi-
ble to verify the accuracy of some pieces of information, it will be extreme-
ly difﬁcult (if not impossible) to verify the accuracy of other pieces of in-
formation. In other words, some information is veriﬁable and some
information is not.
The distinction between veriﬁable information and nonveriﬁable in-
formation is commonly made in the literature on game theory. For exam-
ple, Baird et al. (1994, p. 89) note that “some information is veriﬁable; that
is, it can be readily checked once it is revealed. For example, the combina-
tion to a safe is veriﬁable information. The combination either opens the
safe or it does not. Other information is nonveriﬁable. An employer wants
to know whether a guard who was hired was vigilant. The employer might
be able to draw inferences from some events, such as whether a thief was
successful or was caught, but such information may not be available and,
even if it is available, may not be reliable. Even a lazy guard may catch a thief,
and a thief may outwit even the most vigilant guard.” Basically, a piece of
information is veriﬁable if and only if it is easy to determine whether the
information is accurate or inaccurate.29
This characterization provided by Baird et al. captures some of the
essential aspects of veriﬁable information. For instance, the veriﬁability of
a piece of information is independent of the accuracy of the information.
The claim that 8–11–64 is the combination to the safe is veriﬁable wheth-
er or not 8–11–64 really is the combination. On the one hand, if you try 8–
11–64 and the safe opens, then you have veriﬁed that it is the combination.
On the other hand, if you try 8–11–64 a few times and the safe does not
open, then you have pretty much veriﬁed that it is not the combination.30
Similarly, the claim that the guard is vigilant is nonveriﬁable whether or not
the guard really is vigilant. However, a few important subtleties are hidden
by (though not inconsistent with) this characterization.
First, this characterization suggests that either a piece of information
is veriﬁable or it is not. However, veriﬁability is something that comes in
degrees. In fact, it is easy to ﬁnd pieces of information that fall at various
different points on the continuum of veriﬁability. For example, the claim
that the safe is gunmetal gray is somewhat easier to verify than is the com-
bination of the safe. Also, the claim that the guard is a descendent of Char-
lemagne is much harder to verify than is the vigilance of the guard. As a
result, we should really speak of the veriﬁability of information rather than
just veriﬁable versus nonveriﬁable information.
In general, the veriﬁability of a piece of information can be measured
477fallis/on verifying the accuracy of information
in terms of how much it costs to determine whether or not the informa-
tion is accurate. So, for example, the more time and energy that a person
must expend to verify a piece of information, the less veriﬁable that infor-
mation is. Of course, in some cases, it may not even be possible to verify a
particular piece of information no matter how much time and energy an
individual is willing to expend.
Second, this characterization suggests that the veriﬁability of a piece
of information is the same regardless of who is trying to verify it. However,
the veriﬁability of a piece of information depends on the circumstances and
capabilities of the individual who is trying to verify it. It will cost you a lot
more time and energy to check the combination if the safe is in New York
and you are in Los Angeles than it would cost you if you were in the same
room with the safe.31  Similarly, it is much easier for a trained physicist to
verify a claim about the behavior of subatomic particles than it is for a lay-
person to verify the same claim.
Finally, this characterization suggests that the veriﬁability of a piece of
information is static. However, it is sometimes possible for people to increase
the veriﬁability of a piece of information (cf. Goldman, 1999, pp. 108–109).
For example, it becomes much easier to determine whether or not the
guard is vigilant if we install a video camera to monitor the guard. As I ex-
plain below, this fact turns out to be important as we try to deal with the
problem of inaccurate information.
Increasing the Verifiability of Information
Library and information scientists have primarily responded to the
problem of inaccurate information on the Internet by teaching people how
to evaluate information (see, e.g., Alexander & Tate, 1999; Cooke, 1999).
Since it is ultimately up to people themselves to decide whether to believe
what they read on the Internet (cf. Cerf, 2002), people should certainly
receive instruction about what features of Web sites are indicative of accu-
racy (and about how indicative these features are). Unfortunately, this is
not a complete solution to the problem. This is because people do not al-
ways apply the techniques for verifying the accuracy of information even
when they know how.
People have to act on numerous beliefs to get through their daily lives,
but they only have a limited amount of time and energy to expend verify-
ing the accuracy of these beliefs. John Hardwig (1985, p. 335) is not unique
when he says that “though I can readily imagine what I would have to do to
obtain evidence that would support any one of my beliefs, I cannot imag-
ine being able to do this for all of my beliefs. I believe too much; there is
too much relevant evidence (much of it available only after extensive, spe-
cialized training); intellect is too small and life too short.” Thus, it is not
surprising that Gunther Eysenbach and Christian Köhler (2002, p. 576)
found that people seeking health information on the Internet rarely inves-
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tigate who the source of the information is even though they believe this
to be an important indicator of accuracy.
Fortunately, teaching people how to evaluate information is not the only
way that information professionals can try to deal with the problem of in-
accurate information. In addition, we can try to make it easier for people
to verify the accuracy of information on the Internet.32  In other words,
instead of just trying to change the people who are seeking information (by
teaching them how to evaluate information), we also can try to increase the
veriﬁability of the information that they seek. If it takes less time and ener-
gy to verify the accuracy of information, then people will be more likely to
do so (cf. Fallis, 2000, pp. 311–312).
The United States Treasury has adopted just this type of strategy in its
efforts to make sure that people can distinguish authentic currency from
counterfeit currency. The treasury does not only produce brochures and
videos to teach people how to distinguish authentic currency from coun-
terfeit currency. The government also tries to print currency that is easy to
authenticate (see Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 2002). Security fea-
tures (watermarks, color-shifting ink, concentric ﬁne-line printing, polymer
security threads, etc.) that are fairly easy for people to detect (and that are
fairly difﬁcult for counterfeiters to reproduce) are added to currency itself.
Notably, increasing the veriﬁability of information may actually be some-
what more cost-effective than teaching people how to evaluate informa-
tion.33  Each person who needs to verify the accuracy of a piece of infor-
mation has to expend energy to acquire and to apply these new skills.
However, only one person (e.g., the author) has to expend energy to make
the information more veriﬁable. For example, only one video camera must
be installed even though there may be several people who are interested
in whether or not the guard is vigilant. As a result, even if the author has to
expend more energy to make the information more veriﬁable than an in-
dividual has to expend to acquire and to apply new evaluation skills, less
energy will often be expended overall.
Techniques for Increasing the Verifiability
of Information
Several techniques for verifying the accuracy of information have been
discussed in the preceding sections. Information professionals can make
information more veriﬁable simply by making it easier for people to apply
these techniques. Of course, it often will be easier for the authors of Web
sites to increase the veriﬁability of information because, like the United
States Treasury when it comes to currency, they have more direct control
over the information. Also, since the veriﬁability of a piece of information
can depend on the circumstances and capabilities of the individual who is
trying to verify it, techniques for increasing the veriﬁability of information
often may need to be tailored to particular audiences. Even so, informa-
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tion professionals can do much to make the information that they supply
to users more veriﬁable.34
The basic idea behind making information more veriﬁable is to give
people easier access to evidence (cf. Fallis, 1999). This can be direct evi-
dence of the accuracy of the information, such as the results of empirical
studies on the effectiveness of a medical treatment (cf. section 6 above).
However, this also can be indirect evidence of the accuracy of the informa-
tion, such as the medical credentials of the individual promoting the treat-
ment (cf. sections 4, 5, and 7 above).
The main way that information professionals can make information
more veriﬁable is by organizing information (cf. Goldman, 1999, p. 163).
For example, this makes it easier for people to ﬁnd further evidence rele-
vant to the topic that they are interested in (cf. section 6 above).35  Also,
this makes it easier for people to consult other sources on this topic to ﬁnd
out if they corroborate the original source (cf. section 5 above).
In addition to organizing information (e.g., by maintaining metadata
about the content of information), information professionals can make
information more veriﬁable by maintaining metadata about the context in
which information was created and disseminated (cf. Ketelaar, 1997). This
makes it easier for people to identify and judge the reliability of the source
of the information (cf. section 4 above). It also makes it easier for people
to identify and judge the reliability of the methodology that was used to
create the information (cf. Giedymin, 1963, p. 289). A related strategy is
to promote interactivity on the Internet (cf. Goldman, 1999, pp. 165–166).
For example, if the e-mail address of the author of a Web site is provided,
people can request speciﬁc information that might clear up worries about
the accuracy of the information on the Web site.
Another important way to increase the veriﬁability of information on
the Internet is to simply point people toward the accurate information. For
example, information professionals have developed portals (or gateways),
such as the Internet Scout Project (2003a) and Blue Web’n (see SBC Paciﬁc Bell
2002), that provide links to Web sites that have been reviewed for quality.36
The fact that these Web sites have been selected by experts serves as an
indication of accuracy. As Alison Cooke (1999, p. 39) puts it, “this relieves
the user of much of the work in ﬁltering potentially useful sources from
the vast quantities of dross available via the Internet” (cf. Burbules, 2001,
p. 447). In other words, such portals provide the same epistemic beneﬁt
on the Internet that collection management has long provided in libraries
(cf. Atkinson, 1996).
Of course, simply creating such portals is not all that needs to be done
to increase the veriﬁability of information. First, such portals need to be
publicized. People cannot take advantage of these portals to ﬁnd accurate
information if they are not aware of them. Second, such portals need to
publish their selection criteria (see, e.g., Internet Scout Project, 2003b).
480 library trends/winter 2004
Third, information professionals need to develop systems that allow peo-
ple to “cross-search” several portals at one time (see Worsfold, 1998, p.
1484). Because the construction of such portals is so labor-intensive, a sin-
gle portal tends to include a fairly limited number of resources as compared
with general-purpose search engines (see Worsfold, 1998, p. 1484).
Information professionals also can make information more veriﬁable
by improving the indicators of accuracy. First, we can make it easier for
people to check for these indicators of accuracy. For example, Susan Price
and William Hersh (1999) have created a computer program that essen-
tially automates the published guidelines for evaluating information on the
Internet. The software checks Web sites for the proposed indicators of ac-
curacy rather than a person having to do this manually. This is especially
useful for those indicators, such as the number of other Web sites that link
to a Web site, that are not immediately observable features of Web sites.
Second, we can create better indicators of accuracy. In other words, we
can increase the degree to which existing indicators are correlated with
accuracy. For example, an Internet news service, already considered a reli-
able source of information, might raise its editorial standards. Increasing
the degree to which indicators are correlated with accuracy makes it more
cost-effective for people to check Web sites for these indicators (cf. Fallis,
2000, p. 311).
In addition to improving existing indicators, we also can create brand-
new indicators of accuracy. For example, the HONcode logo was created
by the Health on the Net Foundation to be an indicator of accuracy. Only
Web sites that abide by this foundation’s code of conduct for publishing
quality medical information are allowed to display this logo. In addition,
people can simply click on the logo to conﬁrm that a particular Web site is
in compliance with the code of conduct.
Of course, simply creating such indicators of accuracy is not all that
needs to be done to increase the veriﬁability of information. First, such
indicators of accuracy need to be publicized. People cannot take advantage
of these indicators of accuracy if they are not aware of them (or of how
much faith to put in them). Second, as noted in section 7 above, such indi-
cators of accuracy must be difﬁcult to fake. For example, unlike many
awards for quality on the Internet, it would be fairly difﬁcult for the author
of a Web site with inaccurate health information to display the HONcode
logo. The Health on the Net Foundation (2002b) has procedures in place
that are designed to prevent Web sites that do not comply with their code
of conduct from displaying this logo.37
Finally, a couple of somewhat less effective ways of dealing with the
problem of inaccurate information on the Internet should at least be men-
tioned. First, the authors of Web pages can, and probably should, employ
practices that make it more likely that their information is accurate. For
instance, the author of a Web page might only make claims that have been
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corroborated by at least two independent sources (cf. Connell & Tipple,
1999, p. 363). Since there would then be less inaccurate information on the
Internet, such practices would make it somewhat less likely that people will
be misled. However, such practices by themselves do not make it easier for
people to determine whether information is accurate. In other words, sim-
ply increasing the accuracy of information is not the same as increasing the
veriﬁability of information. To increase the veriﬁability of information, the
increased accuracy has to be tied to some observable feature of Web sites,
such as the HONcode logo.
Second, the inaccurate information could simply be removed from the
Internet. In other words, we could impose complete editorial control on
the Internet. If inaccurate information is not there, then people cannot be
misled by it. Also, in that case, information on the Internet would be easi-
er to verify because the mere fact that the information is on the Internet
would be a good indication that it is accurate. However, it is not clear that
this strategy would be either feasible (cf. Bruce, 2000, p. 102) or ethical (cf.
Doyle, 2001). But in addition, it is not clear that this strategy would really
help people to acquire true beliefs. John Stuart Mill (1859/1978) has fa-
mously pointed out that there are epistemic costs to restricting access to
information. First, since human beings are fallible, some accurate informa-
tion also would be removed. Second, having access to many points of view
(even if many of them turn out to be inaccurate) is essential if people are
to acquire justiﬁed beliefs. Thus, we should not focus on getting rid of the
inaccurate information but rather on making it easier for people to identi-
fy it (cf. Wachbroit, 2000, p. 10).
Conclusion
As Floridi (2002a) and Herold (2001) have suggested, a lot of work in
philosophy is relevant to issues of concern to LIS. In this paper, I have
showed how work in the epistemology of testimony is relevant to the issue
of how to verify the accuracy of recorded information. In particular, I have
argued that this work provides a useful conceptual framework for our ef-
forts in LIS to deal with the problem of inaccurate information. However,
it should certainly be noted that epistemology is not the only area of phi-
losophy that is relevant to this issue.
A number of people (e.g., Hardwig, 1994; Shapin, 1994; Burbules, 2001,
pp. 450–453) have pointed out that there is an important ethical dimen-
sion to the issue of how to verify the accuracy of recorded information.
Whenever we rely on someone’s testimony, we are putting our trust in this
individual. This individual has a moral responsibility not to betray this trust.
In fact, in at least two respects, the moral character of the authors of
Web sites is relevant to the issue of how to verify the accuracy of informa-
tion. First of all, the authors of Web sites certainly have a moral obligation
to testify sincerely.38  However, they also have a moral obligation to testify
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only when they are in a position to know the fact that they are testifying to
(cf. Hardwig, 1994, pp. 88–89). Failing to live up to this obligation is a form
of negligence. For example, it might be the case that the author of a Web
site “ought to have known” that a particular treatment for a child with a fever
was not safe and effective. The problem for people using the Internet is to
identify those authors who are living up to these moral obligations (cf. sec-
tion 4 above).
Of course, it is not just the moral character of authors that is relevant
to the issue of how to verify the accuracy of information. Given their spe-
cial role in selecting and organizing information sources, information pro-
fessionals also have moral obligations. Whenever we rely on a piece of re-
corded information, we are trusting that the information professional who
has provided that information has done her job. For example, we trust that
she has made sure that we will ﬁnd further information that is relevant to
the accuracy of this piece of information, such as a retraction (cf. Fallis,
2000, p. 312). In addition, information professionals arguably have a mor-
al obligation to encourage ethical behavior on the part of authors of Web
sites (cf. Hardwig, 1994, p. 91).39
But while ethical considerations are certainly critical to the epistemol-
ogy of testimony, they are not the whole story. In other words, it is not pos-
sible to reduce the epistemology of testimony to ethics as it seems that
Steven Shapin (1994) would like to do.40  When an individual testiﬁes falsely,
it is not always the result of a moral failing. As Peter Lipton (1998, p. 10)
puts it, “we may be quite convinced that our informant is an honest chap,
yet still wonder whether to believe what he says.” For example, a Web site
might promote an ineffective treatment for a child with a fever because of
an honest mistake and not because the author has been insincere or negli-
gent. The epistemology of testimony encompasses all of the considerations
that are relevant to the issue of how to verify the accuracy of recorded in-
formation.
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Notes
1. For an extensive discussion of the history and scope of the philosophy of information, see
Floridi 2002b.
2. Fallis (2000), Goldman (1999), Thagard (2001), Wachbroit (2000), and the articles in the
special issue of Social Epistemology, 16(1) on “Social Epistemology and Information Science”
are some of the exceptions.
3. Such an appeal to work in epistemology is in line with Shera’s (1970, p. 87) call for inter-
disciplinarity in LIS research. Work in game theory is also an area that Floridi (2002b, p.
139) explicitly had in mind as being relevant to PI. As Floridi (2002a, p. 41) notes, LIS
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does have a broader scope than epistemology. Even so, many of its main concerns are clearly
epistemological (cf. Shera, 1970, pp. 82–110).
4. Paul Thagard (2001, pp. 480–481), however, has pointed out that at least some features
of the Internet can promote accuracy (e.g., it is much easier to quickly correct errors on
the Internet than in print sources).
5. Ironically enough, library and information scientists themselves have put a lot of inaccu-
rate information on the Internet for the purposes of research (cf. Hernon, 1995) and teach-
ing (cf. Piper, 2000).
6. Giedymin (1963) applies work in the epistemology of testimony to the problem of verify-
ing the accuracy of historical documents.
7. Locke (1975/1690, p. 663) and Goldman (1999, p. 123) agree with Hume that putting
the right amount of faith in the evidence is the best way to maximize truth possession.
8. Similarly, if the evidence that the claim is inaccurate is greater, then we should be inclined
to think that the claim is inaccurate.
9. The amount of evidence that we should consider depends on how sure we need to be of
the accuracy of the information (cf. Burbules, 2001, p. 446). Philosophers typically say that
this ultimately depends on what the cost of being misled by inaccurate information is in a
particular case (cf. Smith, C., 2002, p. 71).
10. See, for example, Goldman (1999, pp. 59–65) for a discussion of the correspondence the-
ory of truth.
11. In addition, philosophers often require that these true beliefs be justiﬁed (cf. Goldman,
1999, pp. 23–24).
12. As Peter Lipton (1998, p. 6) puts it, “the problem of determining which testimony to ac-
cept and which to reject . . . presupposes a distinction between what is believed (or at least
asserted) and what is the case.”
13. Bertram Bruce (2000) applies Kaufmann’s notion of “dialectical reading” to the Internet.
14. For that matter, if our goal is to acquire true beliefs, we also are interested in the acces-
sibility and comprehensibility of the information (cf. Berland et al., 2001).
15. Goldman (2001) is explicitly concerned with determining which experts you should trust,
but what he says applies equally well to determining which Web sites you should trust.
16. As Hume (1977 /1748, p. 75) might put it, does the information source “have an interest
in what they afﬁrm”? Also, notably, bias can result in unintentionally (cf. Goldman, 2001,
pp. 104–105) as well as intentionally (cf. Fowler et al., 2001) inaccurate testimony.
17. Even with all these techniques, it still may be difﬁcult to determine the reliability of a lot
of potentially useful sources of information on the Internet.
18. If someone intentionally gives inaccurate testimony, her goal is not necessarily to mislead.
For example, mapmakers often include small inaccuracies to protect themselves against
copyright infringement (cf. Monmonier, 1991, pp. 49–51).
19. Goldman (1999, p. 123) further subdivides this second question into worries about (a)
opportunity and (b) competence. In addition, contextualists have pointed out that we
might be misled simply because we have a different (e.g., higher) standard of knowledge
than the person who is testifying (cf. Smith, C., 2002).
20. The published guidelines for evaluating information on the Internet do not tend to em-
phasize this technique.
21. As Goldman (2001, p. 101) points out, what is required here is only conditional indepen-
dence and not full independence. If two information sources are reliable, then their re-
ports will be correlated with each other simply because both their reports will be correlat-
ed with the truth.
22. Gwendolen, for example, relies on such direct evidence of accuracy when she says that
“their explanations appear to be quite satisfactory, especially Mr. Worthing’s. That seems
to me to have the stamp of truth upon it” (Wilde, 2003/1895).
23. It is interesting to note that, all other things being equal, it is actually the more surprising
claims that are more likely to be disseminated. This occurs even with extremely reliable
information sources. For example, as Steven Landsburg (1999) notes, “given two papers
that have both survived the vetting process, editors [of academic journals] tend to prefer
the more surprising, which means that on average they prefer the one that’s wrong.”
24. In addition, people need to consider how an information source responds to reasons that
have been offered by others against the claim (cf. Goldman, 1999, p. 142).
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25. This can happen even in science and mathematics. For example, a mathematician with a
particular area of expertise may not be qualiﬁed to check the proof of a mathematical claim
in another area.
26. Cecily, for example, relies on such indirect evidence of accuracy when she says that “I am
more than content with what Mr. Moncrieff said. His voice alone inspires one with abso-
lute credulity” (Wilde, 2003/1895).
27. Fallis (2000) shows how these constraints on indicators of accuracy can be formalized us-
ing Goldman’s (1999) theory of knowledge acquisition. Also, it is important to note that
these constraints apply to the issue of who testiﬁes as well as to the issue of how they testify.
28. For each indicator of accuracy that was identiﬁed in their empirical study, Fallis and Frické
(2002, p. 77) report how much more likely the indicator is to be on an accurate Web site
than on an inaccurate Web site.
29. For a piece of information to be veriﬁable, it does not have to be the case that we can ever
know for sure that it is accurate (or inaccurate). With the possible exception of mathe-
matical facts, there will always be some room for doubt.
30. A piece of inaccurate information that is veriﬁable is sometimes said to be falsiﬁable.
31. The veriﬁability of a piece of information can vary with time as well as location (cf. Gold-
man, 2001, pp. 106–107).
32. In a similar vein, Goldman (1999, p. 108) asks “what can truthful speakers do to make their
reports more credible to hearers than they otherwise might be?”
33. Of course, this is not to say that information professionals should not also be teaching
people how to evaluate information.
34. It should be noted that, with the exception of removing inaccurate information and cre-
ating portals to accurate information, none of the techniques that I discuss in this section
requires information professionals to make judgments about the accuracy of speciﬁc pieces
of information.
35. Goldman (1999, pp. 169–170) also points out how hypertext can allow people to quickly
access further information on their topic.
36. Some of these portals, such as the Digital Library of Information Science and Technology (2002)
and the Cleveland Digital Library (see Cleveland State University, 2002), are known as dig-
ital libraries, and they collect information resources as well as provide links to other infor-
mation resources on the Internet. See Cooke, 1999, pp. 34–37 for a list of other portals.
37. Of course, it would be even better if Web sites that displayed this logo without complying
with the code of conduct were subject to ﬁnancial penalties.
38. Not all would agree, however. For example, Gwendolen asserts that “in matters of grave
importance, style, not sincerity is the vital thing” (Wilde, 2003/1895).
39. The selection role of information professionals also raises another familiar ethical issue
(see, e.g., Wengert, 2001). Namely, when does selection of materials turn into censorship
of materials?
40. For an even more radical view that assigns intrinsic moral value to information itself, see
Floridi (2003).
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Arguments for Philosophical Realism in
Library and Information Science
Birger Hjørland
Abstract
The basic realist claim is that a mind-independent reality exists.
It should be common sense knowledge to accept this claim, just as any the-
ories that try to deny it soon become inconsistent because reality strikes
back. In spite of this, antirealist philosophies ﬂourish, not only in philoso-
phy but also in the behavioral and cognitive sciences and in information
science. This is highly problematic because it removes the attention from
reality to subjective phenomena with no real explanatory power. Realism
should not be confused with the view that all scientiﬁc claims are true or
with any other kind of naiveté concerning knowledge claims. The opposite
of realism may be termed antirealism, idealism, or nominalism. Although
many people confuse empiricism and positivism with realism, these tradi-
tions are by nature strongly antirealist, which is why a sharp distinction
should be made between empiricism and realism. Empirical research
should not be founded on assumptions about “the given” of observations,
but should recognize the theory-laden nature of observations. Domain
analysis represents an attempt to reintroduce a realist perspective in library
and information science. A realist conception of relevance, information
seeking, information retrieval, and knowledge organization is outlined.
Information systems of all kinds, including research libraries and public
libraries, should be informed by a realist philosophy and a realist informa-
tion science.
Introduction
Several forms of philosophical realism exist, including scholastic real-
ism, transcendental realism, scientiﬁc realism, critical realism, and naïve
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realism. The author of this paper subscribes to a view that may be termed
“pragmatic realism.” This paper does not, however, contain a detailed philo-
sophical defense for this view. It is a preliminary work aiming at contribut-
ing some important problems in information science, which to the author
seem deeply related to philosophical problems, in general, and to problems
related to realism, in particular.
The basic claim of realism is that a mind-independent reality exists: for
examples the mountains existed before mankind, and they exist indepen-
dently of whether or not people believe they exist or whether or what they
think about them. This is a claim about what exists. Technically speaking this
is an ontological or metaphysical claim, and the philosophical position is
termed “metaphysical realism.”1  It is shocking that one has to argue for the
existence of a mind-independent reality. It is even more shocking that anti-
realism seems to dominate the discourse today and that not many philoso-
phers or scientists are defending realism in a really scholarly way. It is also
shocking that antirealism seems to have brought about much confusion in
information science, among other ﬁelds. Richard Boyd (2002) writes:
What requires explanation is why this [scientiﬁc realism] is a philosoph-
ical position rather than just a common sense one. Consider, for exam-
ple, tropical ﬁsh realism—the doctrine that there really are tropical ﬁsh;
that the little books you buy about them at pet stores tend to get it
approximately right about their appearance, behavior, food and tem-
perature requirements, etc.; and that the ﬁsh have these properties
largely independently of our theories about them. That’s a pretty clear
doctrine, but it’s so commonsensical that it doesn’t seem to have any
particular philosophical import. Why is the analogous doctrine about
science a philosophical doctrine? [Electronic version]
Yes, it is indeed difﬁcult to see why philosophical realism is not com-
mon sense and thus the only legitimate philosophical position. However, I
do not understand (accept) Boyd’s tropical ﬁsh example. As a realist, I agree
that tropical ﬁsh exist.2  To consider this example, we have to look at the
philosophical positions that confront the realist ones.
The opposite of realism is today often termed “antirealism” (coined so
by Michael Dummett); in older philosophy the opposite was often termed
“idealism,” while Charles Sanders Peirce argued that realism is the oppo-
site of nominalism. In the Marxist and materialist traditions, the opposing
positions are termed “materialism” and “idealism,” respectively. Although
important differences exist, these oppositions are closely related. They are
all related to the same fundamental claim: The possibility of the existence
of a mind-independent reality. So, the realist/materialist position is that
tropical ﬁsh exist, while the antirealist/idealist/nominalist position would
say that they only exist as ideas, concepts, social constructions or the like,
not as mind-independent entities.
The difﬁculty in understanding the realist position is, in my opinion,
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much worse than Boyd describes it. It is not limited to the understanding
of scientiﬁc knowledge but is deeply involved with our everyday knowledge.
Yes, it is really shocking that well-informed, serious, and hard-working peo-
ple end up denying what seems to be the most obvious and fundamental
lesson of human knowledge. Often this denial is not explicit but implied
by other theoretical views.3  It is a real philosophical ocean to swim in, but
I do hope that this paper will demonstrate that we have no choice. The
problem simply is too important for the development of our ﬁeld.
Is Scientific Knowledge True? (About
Epistemological Realism)
(Scientiﬁc) realism is often associated with the view that science pro-
vides a true or realistic picture of the world. As opposed to a metaphysical
claim, this is an epistemological thesis, a thesis about human knowledge,
not about the world as such. Philosophically this is termed “epistemologi-
cal realism.” In the introduction to his article Boyd (2002) writes:
According to scientiﬁc realists, for example, if you obtain a good con-
temporary chemistry textbook you will have good reason to believe
(because the scientists whose work the book reports had good scien-
tiﬁc evidence for) the (approximate) truth of the claims it contains
about the existence and properties of atoms, molecules, sub-atomic
particles, energy levels, reaction mechanisms, etc. Moreover, you have
good reason to think that such phenomena have the properties attrib-
uted to them in the textbook independently of our theoretical concep-
tions in chemistry. Scientiﬁc realism is thus the common sense (or com-
mon science) conception that, subject to a recognition that scientiﬁc
methods are fallible and that most scientiﬁc knowledge is approximate,
we are justiﬁed in accepting the most secure ﬁndings of scientists “at
face value.”4, 5  [Electronic version]
A lesson of the history of science is, however, that scientiﬁc claims have
at least sometimes been wrong. I ﬁnd it dangerous to identify myself with a
theory that encourages me to a naïve or uncritical view of scientiﬁc claims.
Well, I also believe that a good contemporary chemistry textbook reports a
realistic picture about chemical phenomena. Chemistry is a science with a
relatively high level of consensus, and I am more inclined to believe that a
chemistry book reports the truth, than, say, a book in the social sciences.
In all sciences and ﬁelds of scholarship, however, debates and different
theories and views exist. Often such debates involve ontological views about
what really exists. It is not a fruitful position to presuppose a priori that
knowledge claims are true. This is not so for the scientists themselves, and
this is not so for teachers, librarians, information scientists, journalists, and
others who mediate or intermediate between knowledge producers and
users. The healthy attitude is to regard knowledge claims as just claims, not
as facts. It is also important to differentiate between degrees of substantia-
tion of knowledge claims. Some claims, e.g., mathematical proofs and some
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results of physical experiments, may be extremely well founded.6  The prac-
tical implication of this view for information science has been formulated
by Spang-Hanssen (2001):
Moreover, these terms are not seldom confused with a more or less
obscure use of the word “information” to mean something factual or
real as opposed to representations of such facts; what is found written
in documents—or what is said in a lecture—are according to this view
only disguises or at best surrogates of facts. This more or less vague
conception seems to be the basis of the distinction sometimes made
between “fact retrieval” and “document retrieval.”
This distinction I ﬁnd philosophically unbased; we here touch upon
the fundamental problem of the meaning of meaning and of the na-
ture of signs and symbols. What is more essential to us, this distinction
seems unfortunate in actual documentation work. There will, admit-
tedly, be cases in which a document or information center is set up with
the exclusive function of providing information concerning physical
data, or statistical ﬁgures, or exchange rates of currencies, or stock
market prices. But even in such cases, it applies that neither the per-
son who requests such information nor the person who delivers it
should ignore the reliability of data and forget about the general set-
ting in which the data is acquired. Information about some physical
property of a material is actually incomplete without information about
the precision of the data and about the conditions under which these
data were obtained. Moreover, various investigations of a property have
often led to different results that cannot be compared and evaluated
apart from information about their background. An empirical fact al-
ways has a history and a perhaps not too certain future. This history and
future can be known only through information from particular docu-
ments, i.e., by document retrieval.
The so-called fact retrieval centers seem to me to be just information
centers that keep their information sources—i.e., their documents—
exclusively to themselves. (pp. 128–129)
We may conclude that a certain amount of skepticism is a healthy attitude,
especially for information scientists (this was also the conclusion at which
Patrick Wilson, 1983, arrived). Society provides (and should provide) a spec-
trum of information services that allows fast utilization of research results
as well as critical examination of the knowledge claims in the information
systems. Newspapers, for example, provide fast but rather unsubstantiated
knowledge claims, while historical research provides slow but much better
substantiated knowledge. In this way the substantiation of knowledge claims
is divided among different professions in society. Information scientists
should not subscribe to a kind of realism that just takes scientiﬁc knowledge
claims for granted.7  We should distinguish between qualities of claims, what
kinds of arguments and evidence they are supported by. We should not just
provide “facts” but also data needed to contextualize and evaluate those
“facts.” We should be open to different perspectives and we should be “so-
cially and culturally aware and responsible” (cf. Hjørland, 2003). We should
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not go to the extreme alternative of naïve realism and accept extreme ver-
sions of constructivism and relativism. While Thomas Kuhn emphasized how
our ontologies are implied by our theories and paradigms, he nevertheless
emphasized that we cannot freely invent arbitrary structures: “nature can-
not be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes. On the contrary . . .
the history of developed science shows that nature will not indeﬁnitely be
conﬁned in any set which scientists have constructed so far” (Kuhn, 1970,
p. 263). The world provides “resistance” to our conceptualizations in the
form of anomalies, i.e., situations in which it becomes clear that something
is wrong with the structures given to the world by our concepts. In this way
Kuhn’s view may be interpreted as (pragmatic) realism, although he is of-
ten interpreted as antirealist (e.g., Niiniluoto, 1991).
Some Roots of Antirealism in Epistemology
According to Niiniluoto (1991), the roots of scientiﬁc realism go back
to the critical, dynamic, empiricist, fallibilist, and evolutionary epistemolo-
gies of the nineteenth century, such as C. S. Peirce’s pragmatism and
Friedrich Engel’s dialectical materialism. In the twentieth century, the de-
mise of logical positivism was according to Niiniluoto followed in the 1950s
by the rise of scientiﬁc realism,8  but the tide of neo-pragmatism in the 1970s
has made antirealist views fashionable once more.9, 10
Overall, I agree with Niiniluoto’s interpretation. Realism is thus con-
nected with pragmatic and materialist traditions and is opposed by, for
example, logical positivism (and its roots in empiricism). It is remarkable,
however, that pragmatism is both related to realism and to antirealism.
There are internal conﬂicts in pragmatism.11
The development of antirealism is perhaps most clearly demonstrat-
ed by considering the development of empiricism. Most people may think
of science as empirical and true (and thus as a realist endeavor). Howev-
er, one of the strongest forces against realism may come from just empir-
icism. Few people outside the philosophy of science realize that empiricism
and positivism are fundamentally antirealist positions. The development
of empiricism as a school of thought implied still deeper degrees of sub-
jective idealism and solipsism. On the basis of Newton’s demonstration that
white light consists of all the colors in the rainbow, evidently, perception
of color is dependent on our perceptual system and brain—we perceive a
mixture of all colors as being white, though they are in reality not. To deal
with this fact, Locke introduced a distinction between the primary or ob-
jective qualities of things (such as their mass and form) and their second-
ary or subjective qualities (such as color, smell, taste). This was the ﬁrst step
toward subjective idealism. The second step was taken by Bishop Berke-
ley, who pointed to the logical fact that the primary qualities of things also
must be subjective. The only way we can learn about the primary qualities
is through our senses. The nature of our senses must therefore inﬂuence
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what we perceive. In the end, it is metaphysical nonsense to claim that a
reality exists behind our observations. The only logical meaning of the
phrase “to exist” is “to be possible to perceive.” Do our bodies exist? Do
other people have minds? The logical answer is, Only if I can perceive
them. Hume brought this subjectivism still a step further. Concepts such
as “causes,” “laws,” “essences,” and “mechanisms” are not real, but only psy-
chological. If we see a ball hit another ball, it looks like the ﬁrst ball caused
the second ball to move. But an experiment can be made using lights in-
stead of balls. People who experience some speciﬁc patterns in the move-
ment of light spots will believe that one light spot causes another to move.
But this is purely psychological. In reality are causes, thus metaphysical con-
structs with no real function. We should describe our experiences, includ-
ing temporal variations in our experiences. To talk about causes, underly-
ing mechanisms, essential features, etc. is metaphysical and thus should
form no part of the empiricist vocabulary. Empiricism is thus a deeply
antirealist position, although related to naïve realism.
While empiricism represents an attempt to remove metaphysical and
ideological questions from science by sticking strictly to observations, crit-
ics have pointed out that pure observation does not exist, that our obser-
vations are theory-laden. The American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912–
1989) maintained that classical empiricism is a myth based on the “doctrine
of the given” (c.f. Vinci, 1999, p. 828). By not considering metaphysical,
theoretical, and ideological questions openly, empiricism tends to hide the
ideological commitments of its adherents. It has been demonstrated that
empiricism does imply a metaphysical view. This way empiricism becomes
just one ideology among others. Its belief in sensory information as “the
given” is a faulty assumption. The deep and consequent claim of this mis-
taken assumption has brought empiricism into a strong antirealist position.
Empiricism is a problematic philosophy, but this does not, of course, im-
ply that empirical research is mistaken. It may imply, however, that empir-
ical research should be based on a realist philosophy.
Many (post)modern epistemologists do not ﬁnd that science should
aim at objectivity. There is a tendency to associate positivist positions and
ideals with attributes such as “hard” and “objective,” whereas ideals from
the humanities and hermeneutics are associated with “softness” and “sub-
jectivity.” This is a wrong and harmful confusion. First, it is important to
realize that subjectivity is not the logical opposite of objectivity:
We shall not dwell at such length on the notion of subjectivity, insofar
as it refers to the opinions, beliefs, and feelings of conviction of this or
that individual. Let us mainly note that this is not in any way the logi-
cal opposite of objectivity. People said to be “reasonable” or “sensible”
will often give their (subjective) agreement to a well-corroborated (ob-
jective) statement such as “when an apple becomes detached from a
tree, it falls down and does not ﬂy towards the stars.” In that sense,
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obviously, any probabilistic statement, insofar as some individual ex-
presses his support for it, can always be said to be subjective. But this
does not exclude a priori its objectivity. An objective law, such as the
law of universal attraction, insofar as I believe it to be “true” can also
be said to be subjective, since it does, in fact, represent my personal
opinion. (Matheron, 1989/1978, pp. 26–27)
Second, objectivity should be an ideal for all epistemologies. Best (1998)
concludes his review of Harding (1998) as follows: “As Harding ably shows,
the politicization and pluralization of knowledge is not necessarily a threat
to (strong) objectivity, but one of its preconditions.” This quotation is im-
portant. It says that what are often regarded as soft, subjective methods are
in reality a precondition for “strong objectivity.” Harding seeks to replace
the “weak objectivity” of the male-dominated scientiﬁc world—a pseudo-
objectivity riddled with value-laden theories, political biases, domineering
interests, commodiﬁed research, and blinkered ethical vision— with the
“strong objectivity” that comes only from a “robust reﬂexivity” attained
through a rigorous self-scrutiny of one’s socioepistemological starting point.
Harding notes that the very concept of “value-free knowledge” is oxymo-
ronic since the goal of being disinterested is an interest in itself, and it al-
lows science to separate fact from value and abrogate responsibility for its
actions. Since “value-free” theories are impossible, Harding argues, one
might as well acknowledge the values that inform one’s research—be it to
make money or to improve the lives of the sick—debate their comparative
validity, and struggle to have science informed by progressive interests.
The roots of antirealism have thus been connected to problematic
epistemological assumptions in, for example, empiricism and postmodern-
ism. The problem is thus to identify those mistaken assumptions and to
correct them. For us in information science and other specialized ﬁelds,
this does not imply the construction of our own philosophy, but to learn
from the best articulated positions and those positions are forms of real-
ism, pragmatism, and activity theory/historical cultural theory. But, of
course, this can only be a postulate in this paper. Much more interdiscipli-
nary work needs to be done in the philosophy of science.
Antirealist Tendencies in the Cognitive Sciences
Antirealism is widespread in psychology, linguistics, artiﬁcial intelli-
gence, and related disciplines. This family of disciplines is often termed “the
cognitive sciences.”12  The antirealism of these disciplines is based on a
representationist theory of perception and is connected with methodolog-
ical individualism, i.e., the tendency to explain cognitive phenomena by
studying individual cognition and to disregard the social, cultural, and his-
torical implications of human cognition.13
In psychology, the Danish psychologist Erik Schultz (1988, pp. 65, 117)
presents the following example:
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Imagine a teller. What is she doing? Why does she now count the mon-
ey? Why does she now speak with that customer? Why does she now turn
to a colleague and give him a piece of paper?
How would different psychological approaches answer these questions?
Psychoanalysis might try to explain the teller’s behavior by her unconscious
conﬂicts, which can be traced to early childhood experiences. Behaviorism
might try to explain it by referring to reactions to stimuli and to learned
behavior. Cognitivism might try to explain her behavior by analyzing what
kind of information processing goes on in her brain, and so on. The “real-
istic” answer might be found in a detailed knowledge about the working
organization of the bank. Leontyev points out that persons are not moti-
vated by their biology but by “the structure of production” (Leontyev, 1981).
Behavioral and cognitive paradigms and sciences may appear to be
rather materialistic and realistic. However, their tendency to disregard
questions of meaning, cognitive implications of cultural-symbolic systems,
and the organization of knowledge in social institutions makes them, in fact,
deeply antirealist. Because of this tendency, those ﬁelds are often strongly
criticized, as, for example, in this quotation:
[Behaviorism is] a degenerating research programme. That is, speciﬁc
theories developed within the programme were continuously refuted
and constantly replaced with weaker, more trivial, and more ad hoc ones;
fundamental notions such as “stimulus” and “reinforcement” became
vaguer and vaguer, until virtually anything could qualify; and awkward
refuting results came to be explained in terms of assumptions which
broke the internal constraints of the research programme itself. In
other words, I want to suggest that the poverty of Behaviourism’s
achievements in helping us to understand behaviour was the result of
its false theoretical assumptions. (Briskman, 1984, p. 110)
Many people think that cognitivism is not better founded, that if you change
a few words the same criticism applies to what is often seen as the succes-
sor of behaviorism. Hamlyn (1995, p. 388) writes that a representationist
view of perception has become the vogue today, particularly among cogni-
tive scientists (and information scientists), who hold that the mind’s work-
ings have to do with mental representations. Many philosophers and sci-
entists have adopted the representationalist view of perception because it
seems obvious. “In the end, the only positive argument for idealism of any
form is to be found in the representative theory of perception, and that
theory is false” (Hamlyn, 1995, p. 388).
From a social semiotic point of view, Paul Thibault criticizes the anti-
realism of cognitivism:
Cognitive science retains the traditional model of the individual at the
same time that it relocates essentially social semiotic patterns in the
“mind” of the individual, so conceived. Cognitive science started out
as a reaction against behaviourism. The metalanguage of cognitive sci-
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entists is founded on notions such as “internal mental representations,”
“mental models,” and “mind as symbolic system.” In actual fact, these
notions really only amount to redescriptions of semantic patterns which
are located in the domain of social meaning-making. Cognitive science
posits an unnecessary level of “individual mind” between the biologi-
cal and social semiotic levels of organization. In so doing, it effectively
de-locates semantic patterns from the texts and social activity-structures
in which these are made and re-locates them in the “mind” of the indi-
vidual. More recently, cognitive scientists have increased their appeals
to the neurophysiological processes in the brain, yet there is no con-
vincing evidence that semantics is directly tied to or caused by such
processes [see Maze, 1991, pp. 171–172, for a critique]. Neurophysio-
logical and other bodily processes participate directly in social semio-
sis; they do not cause it, just as the latter is not explanatorily reducible
to the former [Bhaskar, 1979, pp. 124–128; Prodi, 1977]. (Thibault,
1993)
While the cognitive view assumes that “in the beginning there is the indi-
vidual” and focuses on individuals’ cognitions, the sociocognitive and do-
main analytic view assumes that “in the beginning there is a community”
as well as a body of more or less substantiated knowledge claims; its distin-
guishing charge is to locate interactional processes in their social structur-
al context as well as in their theoretical-substantial context. The relation-
ship with realism is that unless the rootedness of cognition (the mind) in
social structure and speciﬁc content is recognized, causal power is falsely
accorded to cognition or mind. Cognitive scientists may recognize that
cognition reﬂects experience, but experience does not enter theoretical
formulations or research designs; for sociocognitivism, on the other hand,
the sociological and philosophical perspectives are central: how experience
is organized is central to both theory and research. The implication for
cognitive views both in psychology and in information science may well be
that they represent
a degenerating research programme. That is, speciﬁc theories devel-
oped within the programme were continuously refuted and constant-
ly replaced with weaker, more trivial, and more ad hoc ones; fundamen-
tal notions such as “information,” “mental models,” and “interactivity”14
became vaguer and vaguer, until virtually anything could qualify; and
awkward refuting results came to be explained in terms of assumptions
which broke the internal constraints of the research programme itself.
In other words, I want to suggest that the poverty of Cognitivism’s
achievements in helping us to understand information behavior and
information phenomena was the result of its false theoretical assump-
tions. (Modiﬁed version of Briskman, op. cit.)
These parallels between cognitive views in psychology and in library and
information science (LIS) are examined further next.
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Realism and Antirealism in LIS
Antirealism is widespread in LIS, not as an explicit position but as an
underlying tendency in most research. We encounter, for example, this
tendency in research on relevance and on knowledge organization (KO)
and in the assumptions underlying much research in information seeking
and information retrieval (IR).
The nature of this antirealism can be illustrated by an example. Our
knowledge of reality is often produced by specialists in society.15  Our geo-
graphical knowledge is, for example, represented by maps, which are pro-
duced by geographers; our medical knowledge is often produced by bio-
medical researchers and our zoological knowledge by zoologists, etc.
Whether Copenhagen is a part of Sweden or not should not be decided by
the users of an information system but rather should be decided by con-
sulting a cognitive authority in geography. Whether or not a certain sub-
stance is relevant as a cure for cancer is ultimately decided in medical re-
search, not by asking patients or users of medical services.16  The
validity—and thus the relevance—of a document claiming that a certain
substance is relevant as a cure for cancer is also ultimately decided in med-
ical research, not by asking users of information services.17, 18  Thus we have
a central realist claim: A given document may be relevant to a given pur-
pose, whether or not the user believes this to be so.19
Both a reality and beliefs about that reality exist. In information science,
most research activities have in recent decades been directed toward user
preferences and attitudes, not toward the basis for the knowledge claims
represented in information systems. Most relevance research seems to as-
sume that the relevance of given kinds of information can be established
by studying the relevance criteria of the users. This is clearly an idealist
position, although probably nobody would like to admit that. This is not
to say that one should always trust experts—they may have their own inter-
ests or views.20  It is rather to claim that relevance is not a subjective phe-
nomenon but rather an objective one. To be engaged in how to identify
what is relevant is to be engaged in scientiﬁc arguments, ultimately in epis-
temology (for a more detailed discussion of the realist position in relevance
research, see Hjørland, 2000a and Hjørland & Sejer Christensen, 2002).
The ﬁeld of information-seeking behavior has in a similar way been
dominated by antirealist tendencies. When people seek information, they
have given systems of information resources with given potentialities at
their disposal.21  All available knowledge may turn out to be useless in
relation to a given problem, or relevant knowledge may be misjudged.
What users know about these given resources and potentialities, how they
evaluate them, and how they utilize them are different matters compared
with their objective possibilities. Users’ information behavior should be
interpreted on the basis of how they utilize these objective possibilities.
This is the realist perspective on information behavior, while the antire-
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alist or idealist perspective is to study the information-seeking behavior
of users while neglecting to relate this behavior to the objective possibil-
ities. While information science has largely neglected to study informa-
tion behavior from this realist perspective, it has removed the attention
from reality to subjective phenomena with no real explanatory power (for
a more detailed discussion of the realist position in information-seeking
research, see Hjørland, 2000b).
IR has also traditionally been antirealist. This is partly a consequence
of the antirealist view of relevance, which understands relevance as users’
criteria of relevance, not as relevance in an objective sense. Partly it is a
consequence of views related to users’ query formulations and to the sys-
tem of information resources. From a realist position the users’ questions
and terminology may be more or less optimal in relation to given goals. They
are not the given point of departure from which all IR theory must start.
The users’ questions and terminology reﬂect their subjective view, not nec-
essarily insight in the subject matter. People subscribing to different theo-
ries or “paradigms” see things differently and formulate different questions.
A question is not a thing that should be regarded as empirically “given,”
but a thing that must be interpreted in relation to accumulated human
knowledge on the issue.
Also, the system of information resources is not something divided from
the user in a dualistic way. The user and the system are more or less parts
of, and inﬂuenced by, the same theoretical, conceptual, and linguistic en-
vironments. I would say that different semantic distances are at play. The
information system may or may not contain relevant information. The us-
er’s expectations about what information exists, where it exists, and what
terms have been used to describe it may be more or less realistic. Existing
documents have given informative potentialities (Hjørland, 1992). Any
theory of IR has to relate to the relative degree of realism in users’ expec-
tations, to the users’ subject knowledge, and to the semantic distances be-
tween queries and documents: the basic elements in a realist theory of IR.
Historical research methods, among others, may provide some help. Pri-
mary information sources are objectively more reliable compared to sec-
ondhand information sources. This is well known and taught in courses
about historical source criticism. People learn this when they study history
at a university. Primary recordings of, for example, parliamentary debates
are more reliable than newspaper quotes of those debates. There are giv-
en qualities in information sources, whether or not the users realize this.
Research libraries and information centers should facilitate the use of such
primary information sources when this is appropriate, and the criteria for
their collection and organization of information resources cannot be based
on user surveys or similar methods based on antirealist philosophy. It is
shocking that such elementary considerations seem to be almost totally
absent from theories of IR and information seeking. Hjørland (1998) and
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Hjørland and Kyllesbech Nielsen (2001) provide more information about
a realist approach to IR.
The ﬁeld of KO in LIS has generally developed from a realist to an
antirealist position during the twentieth century. Around 1900, Charles A.
Cutter, W. C. Berwick Sayers, and Ernest Cushington Richardson strongly
emphasized that the classiﬁcation of books in libraries is basically informed
by the organization of knowledge, which is represented in (new) docu-
ments. The origin of the phrase “knowledge organization” in LIS is clearly
related to their works, according to which book classiﬁcation is basically KO
and the knowledge needed to classify books comes from knowledge pro-
duction, of which the books are the tangible expression. Cutter, for exam-
ple, wrote:
I believe . . . that the maker of a scheme for book arrangement is the
most likely to produce a work of permanent value, if he keeps always
before his mind a classiﬁcation of knowledge. (Cutter, 1888)22
Sayers expressed it in the following way:
A book classiﬁcation must hold the minuteness of the knowledge
classiﬁcation as an ideal to which it must approximate as nearly as pos-
sible (p. 34). It must be clearly borne in mind, however, that the classiﬁ-
cation of knowledge should be the basis of the classiﬁcation of books;
that the latter obeys in general the same laws, follows the same se-
quence. (Sayers, 1915, p. 31).
And Richardson said:
In general the closer a classiﬁcation can get to the true order of the
sciences and the closer it can keep to it, the better the system will be
and the longer it will last. (Richardson, 1964/1930, p. 33)
These quotations may sound very “positivist” compared with more recent
views of science, but in my opinion they are more realistic than later views.
Although they may underplay the question of how to cope with different sci-
entiﬁc theories or “paradigms” in KO, they knew that this problem existed.
They also knew that there were no shortcuts. They did not confuse reality
with users’ beliefs or preferences. During the twentieth century, however,
this view was sadly weakened. Especially user-oriented and cognitive views
represent a strong idealist tendency by neglecting that principles of KO are
based on knowledge as contained in the documents to be organized.
Today, library students in Denmark read a textbook that interprets the
above mentioned founders of KO in LIS in the following way:
. . . today most philosophers would argue against them [Cutter, Sayers,
and Richardson]. The relativist and pragmatic trend has caused that
most people today would argue that knowledge is subjective and that dif-
ferent people in different times would perceive the world differently. The
aim of bibliographical classiﬁcation is thus to a large degree founded
500 library trends/winter 2004
in some practical considerations concerning the construction of the sys-
tem, and not necessarily on particular philosophical movements.
(Grauballe, Kaae, Lykke Nielsen, & Mai, 1998, p. 18; my translation)
Although the quoted compendium is otherwise excellent, this speciﬁc quo-
tation is an example of a problematic antirealist position. The important
thing in this conclusion is that it connects the basis of KO to the problem
of epistemology in general and realism in particular. This underlines the
needs for epistemological studies within LIS and KO. Cutter, Sayers, and
Richardson knew and considered the problems related to realism versus
idealism. This is not new but has been neglected for a long time. The ques-
tion is, What kind of implications should be drawn from “relativist, prag-
matist, and subjectivist views”? 23  Grauballe, Kaae, Lykke Nielsen, and Mai
(1998) draw the conclusion that because scientiﬁc knowledge is subjective,
we should not consider it, apparently implying that the librarian’s own
common sense should form the basis of systems of KO. However, I do not
agree with this conclusion. The domain analytic view that I have proposed
(Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 1995; Hjørland, 2002) does not disregard the
scientiﬁc view. In this respect it may be more closely related to Cutter, Say-
ers, and Richardson than it is to the above-cited view, not to mention “user-
oriented” and “cognitive” views. Domain analysis emphasizes, however, that
scientiﬁc claims should not be confused with facts. It is important to con-
sider different views and to remain skeptical toward knowledge claims and
toward social and cultural biases (see Hjørland, 2003). LIS cannot ignore
science and scholarship. It does not have its own private alternative (nor
do the users). This is not to say that one should uncritically accept scien-
tiﬁc knowledge claims. In fact, the most important function of libraries and
information systems is to enable critical users to question established knowl-
edge and investigate alternative views.
I ﬁnd a connection between antirealist trends in IS, lack of domain-
speciﬁc knowledge, and the critique that David Bade raises concerning KO
in databases:
Virtually all of the literature on cataloging and on database quality is
concerned with technologies or methods and standards. Acknowledge-
ment that cataloging is an intellectual activity that requires an ability
to understand what an item is about, and prior to that, an ability to read
the speciﬁc language of the text, is so rare as to be disturbing. Howev-
er librarians may have thought in the past, in the present climate of
technological possibilities and the excitement they generate, librarians
increasingly see themselves as information scientists, and their work as
information handling, brokering, and management. What must not be
forgotten is that information always has a speciﬁc content. Catalogers,
bibliographers, and reference librarians in fact work not with abstract
information devoid of content, but with autopoiesis, prosopography,
logotherapy, Rechtsextremismus, amparo, Ujamaa, sultawiyya, Babad Bule-
leng, Yuan chao pi shih, arianism, Brownian motion, Empﬁndungslosigkeit,
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chocolate chip cookies, and anti-semitism. Information science knows
nothing of these matters, in any language. (Bade, 2002, p. 18, empha-
ses in original)
This connection is related to the neglect of subject knowledge in LIS. The
founders of KO recognized this need. Richardson/Bliss, for example, wrote:
“Again from the standpoint of the higher education of librarians, the
teaching of systems of classiﬁcation . . . would be perhaps better con-
ducted by including courses in the systematic encyclopedia and meth-
odology of all the sciences, that is to say, outlines which try to summa-
rize the most recent results in the relation to one another in which they
are now studied together. . . .” (Ernest Cushing Richardson, quoted
from Bliss, 1935, p. 2)
This suggestion was in practice followed in schools of LIS. The Royal School
of Library and Information Science in Denmark, for example, actually had
departments for science and technology, social sciences, and humanities
teaching subjects such as special bibliography, subject literature, subject
encyclopedism, and the philosophy and communication of subject knowl-
edge. These departments were gradually fusioned, and the last trace of them
disappeared from the organizational structure of the school in February
1999. Students still have to take courses in KO and information seeking in
speciﬁc domains, however, and the Domain Analytic approach to informa-
tion science (especially Hjørland, 2002) was developed as a theoretical
frame of reference of IS to cope with the core problem of how to tackle
subject knowledge in the education of information specialists.
In this section, I have made a connection between interdisciplinarity
and realism. The main thought is that if a piece of research is reﬂecting a
reality, then this will be conﬁrmed by other researchers (and practitioners),
and knowledge will tend to grow in a cumulative way. On the other hand,
if a ﬁeld of research is isolated, it might well be an indication that the ﬁeld
is just construing some kind of pseudo-knowledge based on, for example,
a professional ideology. Eugene Garﬁeld wondered that psychiatry journals
were very rarely cited by psychology journals, and he opined:
I would not go so far as to say that psychologists and behavioral scien-
tists work in a closed tower, but very obviously they seem not to look
too much at the research world elsewhere. If they do, they seem not to
have found much that is helpful. If they have, they aren’t admitting the
fact in their citations. (Garﬁeld, 1975, p. 9)
In this way, I believe, there are connections between interdisciplinary ex-
change and realist philosophy.24  Some ﬁelds like psychology and LIS may
isolate themselves too much. In seeking to avoid the hard work of coordi-
nating their research efforts and also to avoid criticism of their basic assump-
tions, such ﬁelds may to some degree construe “knowledge” in a manner
that fails to cumulate satisfactorily.25  Some disciplines may try to “become
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independent” by neglecting knowledge produced by other disciplines and
thereby fail to confront their own knowledge claims with more generally
accepted claims.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued why I consider philosophical realism to be
important to information science. My attitude has been that in ﬁelds of
knowledge such as information science and cognitive science there may
exist theoretical errors, which can be corrected. A philosophy is not some-
thing that you just choose, it is something you work out or construe to solve
problems related to your ﬁeld of study and your profession. I should has-
ten to add, however, that research carried out from antirealistic perspec-
tives will not always be fruitless. Some interesting research today in IS, for
example, is done under the banner of social constructivism. Pragmatic re-
alism and social constructivism share the view of the importance of socio-
historical perspectives as an alternative to epistemological individualism. In
the end, however, it is important to base a discipline on a proper philosoph-
ical framework.
Notes
1. Closely related to the problem of realism is the problem of objectivity and subjectivity
because objectivity implies that a representation is in accordance with its object, while
subjectivity implies that it is in accordance with the subject that has produced it. Objectiv-
ity should not be confused with intersubjectivity. Indexing, for example, is not necessarily
objective, even if all indexers agree. They may be consistently wrong. Measurement of
indexing consistency is a typical empiricist/positivist strategy. If all members of a profes-
sion share the same fundamental ideas, their knowledge is intersubjective, but not neces-
sarily objective. Social constructivists, for example, may be able to demonstrate that such
knowledge just represents a dominating ideology. An alternative to the positivist measure-
ment of indexing consistency could thus be to unravel how different theories/epistemo-
logical views imply different kinds of indexing. An underlying assumption in this approach
might be that objectivity is more likely to occur if the indexer has a high degree of reﬂec-
tivity based on knowledge of different views. Objectivity is thus connected with realism,
while subjectivity may or may not be connected with antirealism (see more about subjec-
tivity later in this article).
2. Although I would add that ﬁsh can be classiﬁed in different ways and that the concept of
tropical ﬁsh may be a problematic one in some situations—or perhaps in all. “It is charac-
teristic of many antirealists to take semantic issues pertaining to language as primary,
whereas realists often give priority to ontology and view semantic theses as derivative of,
or motivated by, ontological positions” (Mäki, 2001, p. 12818).
3. Boyd is, however, correct in stating that kinds of realism are difﬁcult to identify as clearly
demarcated philosophical doctrines. As Niiniluoto (1991, p. 762) writes, “the ontological
position of scientiﬁc realism is opposed to all forms of subjective idealism (such as solip-
sism and phenomenalism). On the other hand, the minimal thesis that at least part of reality
is independent of human minds can be combined with reductionist materialism or phys-
icalism (Smart, Armstrong), emergent materialism (Engels, Popper, Bunge), mind-body
dualism, or even objective idealism (Peirce, Bohm). It is compatible with nominalism (Sell-
ars) as well as ‘scholastic’ realism about universals (Peirce, Armstrong), or with object
ontology as well as process (Popper) or system ontology (Bunge). Further, it may, or may
not assert the reality of potencies (Harré).”
4. Boyd’s demand that it should be a good textbook and not just a typical textbook or even
any textbook is perhaps a curious reservation because it may move discussions about sci-
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entiﬁc realism to a discussion about which books are representing a realist picture of sci-
entiﬁc knowledge. Also his remark “you have good reason to think that such phenomena
have the properties attributed to them in the textbook independently of our theoretical
conceptions in chemistry” is strange, because the theoretical conceptions in chemistry
cannot be independent of the knowledge claims in chemistry. The theoretical conceptions
together with the speciﬁc knowledge claim represent a whole, although we may have dif-
ferent interpretations of some data. The question is, Does this whole represent a mind-
independent reality or just an idea, a theory, a view, or a mental, or social construction?
(e.g., a masculine construct). This is again related to the question, Do, for example, dif-
ferent cultures tend to develop different kinds of chemistry? If they do not, we may fur-
ther ask if this is the case because there is only one possible way of developing chemistry
or because there is a kind of cultural hegemony that suppresses possible alternatives?
5. “Realist theses about possible reference and possible truth in scientiﬁc theories are often
complemented with claims about actual properties of actual science. One such claim—
made by Richard Boyd, Michael Devitt, and others—is that the theoretical terms of most
current (or the best of ‘mature’) scientiﬁc theories typically refer and that their lawlike
statements are at least approximately true. Another related claim is the convergence the-
sis: as science develops, its theories get progressively closer to the truth. Both of these are
empirical claims about actual science and should not be made part of the concept of sci-
entiﬁc realism. Their truth is dependent on contingent matters such as the institutional
structure and other resources of scientiﬁc research as these happen to be in any given
society and time period.” (Mäki, 2001, p. 12818).
6. In general, it is the scientists’ job to produce trustable knowledge claims. The political
sphere and the rest of society turn to scientists and to scholars to obtain knowledge they
can rely on. To make their claims reliable, scientists follow certain standards, e.g., to com-
municate the basis of their claims, to apply the most respected research methods, to allow
criticism, to maintain an open and transparent communication system, and to be inde-
pendent of direct economic, moral, or political interests. No such norms can, however,
guarantee the truth of scientiﬁc claims.
7. Indeed, that strong antirealist trends ﬂourish in many ﬁelds of science and scholarship is
in itself an indication that huge amounts of knowledge claims are wrong, or at least founded
on problematic assumptions.
8. Niiniluoto (1991) mentions Karl Popper, J. J. C. Smart, Wilfrid Sellars, David Bohm, Hi-
lary Putnam, Mario Bunge, and Rom Harré as scientiﬁc realists.
9. Niiniluoto mentions Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Larry Laudan, Nelson Goodman,
Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, and Bas van Fraassen as antirealists.
10. The most recent trends in realism have been brought forward under the labels “critical
realism” (Bhaskar, 1978, 1979, & 1989; Collier, 1998; Creaven, 2000), which also has been
applied to information systems research (Dobson, 2001a and 2001b) and “activity theory”
(Leontyev, 1981) and its application in library and information science (LIS) (Spasser,
2002) and in various works by Hjørland.
11. Rorty, for example, is clearly antirealist. According to Laudan (1977, 1996), however, Rorty
is not even regarded as a pragmaticist.
12. Earlier, under the inﬂuence of another theoretical trend, they were often termed “the
behavioral sciences.”
13. Recently more social approaches have been introduced in the behavioral and cognitive
sciences; most noteworthy is social constructionism. As discussed in Nightingale and Crom-
by (1999), such approaches also may be antirealist. A social perspective might thus be a
necessary, but not a sufﬁcient, attribute for realist theories.
14. Aarseth (2003) discusses the meaning of three core terms in electronic media: interactiv-
ity, hypertext, and virtuality. He writes: “Perhaps the most important reason for using these
distinctive terms is to create an enthusiasm (‘Hype’) that will make a difference eventual-
ly where no difference of importance yet exists. Maybe this is the only way to innovate, to
bring about something new” (p. 418).
15. Social constructivists and other idealists may argue that specialists do not produce knowl-
edge of reality, but that they construct or claim a reality. It is still, however, the question of
epistemology to determine if one kind of construction is as good as another. I think that
Feyerabend’s position of methodological anarchism is untenable. In most cases, experts
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are simply in a better position to produce valid knowledge. There may be exceptions, e.g.,
connected to ideological bias, but such exceptions cannot in my opinion make the gener-
al rule invalid. My guess is that even people who are most critical of scientists make use of
their ﬁndings, such as computers and medical treatments. In this way they indirectly
conﬁrm the principle of expertise in knowledge production. If somebody would defend
the view that the opinions of experts are not generally better founded than those of lay
people, this would have serious implications. Among those implications would be that we
have to give up all education and research because people are just as well-informed with-
out these processes. This is obviously absurd.
16. It is always legitimate to be skeptical about a knowledge claim. This will lead into a discus-
sion about the basis for that claim and ultimately to epistemological discussions. Such dis-
cussions are, by principle, part of the discourse on a given subject. There is no privileged
or neutral platform that can substitute for arguments.
17. The experts may, of course, be wrong, as we have already discussed. This is no argument,
however, why nonexperts should be right. They might be. The only way to settle disputes
between different views is to examine the basis for the arguments raised in favor of them,
as this is done in, for example, courts, scientiﬁc experiments, and epistemological argu-
ments. To ﬁnd the relevance criteria by empirical studies of users and their needs or by
considering experimental studies in cognitive science is simply misplaced.
18. In some domains, e.g., rock music, there may be a lack of researchers. Musicology seems
to neglect nonclassical music. In such cases, the users may be “experts,” at least until this
ﬁeld is properly represented in musicology. In other ﬁelds, such as child psychology, ex-
perienced mothers may have adequate competencies for which a degree in developmen-
tal psychology cannot be a substitute. This last example is related to different epistemolo-
gies, i.e., to different views of how to obtain knowledge. Developmental psychology has
mainly been dominated by a “positivist” epistemology, while other epistemologies give a
higher status to the kind of experiences that motherhood represents. In both cases, the
realist view applies: A given document may or may not be relevant to a given purpose,
whether or not the user believes this to be so.
19. Of course, a document is not relevant in a situation if the user cannot understand it. In
higher education, it is normally attempted to provide students with the knowledge neces-
sary to study the documents that are deemed to be relevant. In the sciences, one learns
mathematics and in theology one learns Greek, Latin, and Hebrew. The underlying phi-
losophy is that the relevant texts presuppose these kinds of learning. Again, different opin-
ions may exist. Different views of what is relevant may exist as different “paradigms” in all
subjects.
20. This was also emphasized by the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey, who saw one way to
tackle this by the enlightening of people.
21. The users confront in principle a given system of information resources. However, if they
are researchers, they may of course also contribute to the system of information resources.
Many research activities may be motivated by dissatisfaction with given resources.
22. This quotation is cited from Grauballe, Kaae, Lykke Nielsen, and Mai (1998, p. 18). I have
been unable to identify or verify it.
23. It is wrong, however, to claim that Cutter, Sayers, and Richardson did not consider the
practical considerations of systems of KO. They explicitly stated that this was their most
important consideration. Richardson (1964, p. v) stated: “It seems to be worth repeating,
therefore, that the attitude of this book is ‘that in the case of conﬂict the practical always
prevails over the theoretical’.”
24. Although I claim that there exists a mind-independent reality, I do not claim that our
knowledge is or can be mind-independent. Although our knowledge is subjective, it may,
however, also be objective, in accordance with its object, which is always an object for some-
body. For the pragmatist, the criterion for the truth of a claim is connected to the conse-
quences for action and the building of coherent knowledge. This is opposed to a dualistic
view in which the mind is seen as separated from a reality and having knowledge that cor-
responds more or less with that reality.
25. I am aware, of course, that other factors are also at play. Isolated ﬁelds may be isolated for
other reasons, and even seemingly ﬂowering ﬁelds may be based on problematic assump-
tions. As discussed in the philosophy of science it is difﬁcult to decide which research pro-
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grams are fruitful and which turn out to be degenerated. The history of science brings the
lesson that it often takes a very long time before it can be decided whether a research pro-
gram is fruitful or turns out to be a deadend, and even then ideas once given up may later
be positively evaluated and reintroduced.
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Knowledge Proﬁling: The Basis for
Knowledge Organization
Torkild Thellefsen
Abstract
How are we able to construct truly realistic representations
of knowledge organizations (KOs)? The paper introduces and deﬁnes the
knowledge proﬁle as a method to investigate the epistemological basis of
any KO to outline the consequences this basis has upon its research object.
The knowledge proﬁle is inspired by C. S. Peirce’s doctrine of pragmati-
cism, and it further reﬂects the relevance of pragmaticism in the context
of KO.
Introduction
When trying to make a representation of a given knowledge organiza-
tion (KO)1  the best place to start is to investigate the epistemological basis
of the knowledge domain—this foundation is the fundamental sign of the
knowledge domain (Thellefsen, 2002, 2004). The basic premise is, “When
trying to identify a KO and afterward trying to represent it, the least we can
ask for is that the representation truly represents the KO in the knowledge
domain and in respect of its knowledge structures. If this is impossible due
to the character of the knowledge domain, then the least we can ask for is
that the representation truly represents distinctive features of the knowl-
edge domain, and by distinctive features I mean the essence of the knowl-
edge domain.” Therefore, I do not think that either the structure of the
classical thesaurus as we know it from library and information science (LIS)
or the way LIS identiﬁes knowledge2  is capable of representing the true KO
of a knowledge domain. On the contrary, the thesaurus structure is a non-
realistic structure that is forced upon the domain, often by librarians or
information specialists. Instead, I suggest a drawing of a knowledge proﬁle
Torkild Thellefsen, Aalborg, Department of Communication, Kroghstraede 3, 9220 Aalborg
Sø, Denmark
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of the knowledge domain. Indeed, this article aims to deﬁne the knowledge
proﬁle and to clarify how to draw a knowledge proﬁle. In my opinion, that
is a far better way of identifying the KO of a knowledge domain than the
rigid and nonrealistic thesaurus structure. Moreover, as shown in Thellef-
sen (2003), the knowledge proﬁle also can be used to sharpen the termi-
nology of a certain research project; it is a method that helps to keep a re-
search project on its terminological tracks. It is a method that I impose on
my students to keep their project in accordance with their chosen episte-
mological basis. If someone chooses to study a problem from a hermeneu-
tic angle, it has other consequences for the research problem than using a
phenomenological theory or a pragmatical one for that matter; these con-
sequences have to be identiﬁed and dealt with or else we end up in a situ-
ation that the American philosopher C. S. Peirce refers to as “terminolog-
ical unethical behavior.”
By drawing a knowledge proﬁle, we are able to identify the epistemo-
logical basis of a knowledge domain, and we are capable of identifying the
consequences of this epistemological basis. The consequences reside in the
way the knowledge domain correlates its research objects and in the ways
in which it develops concepts and theories. In the following, we shall take
a closer look at how to draw a knowledge proﬁle and where we can use it.
Basically, the knowledge proﬁle is about sharpening terminology. It is
about removing redundant and misleading connotations in order to make
the single concept or related term appear as sharp and precise as possible.
Indeed, it is necessary to sharpen terminology to create a scientiﬁc termi-
nology that is able to communicate knowledge in a precise way. There are
several ways of using the knowledge proﬁle; here, I will develop a knowl-
edge proﬁle for the concept “fundamental sign,” which is a concept I have
deﬁned in relation to the semiotic KO method called SKO (Thellefsen,
2002, 2004). The knowledge proﬁle also can be used to identify the episte-
mological basis of knowledge domains, both small domains involving few
researchers and vaster domains both scientiﬁc and nonscientiﬁc. The es-
sence of the knowledge proﬁle is that every choice made results in conse-
quences and these consequences are identiﬁable. Theoretically, this is an-
chored in Peirce’s doctrine of pragmaticism, which, in short, is deﬁned as
follows: “Pragmaticism consists in holding that the purport of any concept
is its conceived bearing upon our conduct” (CP 5.442). And further: “ . . .
pragmatism does not undertake to say in what the meanings of all signs
consist, but merely to lay down a method of determining the meanings of
intellectual concepts, that is, of those upon which reasonings may turn” (CP
5.8). Furthermore, Peirce writes: “Now pragmaticism is simply the doctrine
that the inductive method is the only essential to the ascertainment of the
intellectual purport of any symbol” (CP 8.209). Hence, it is the conse-
quences of intellectual action that grant us insight in meaning or in a more
biblical way: it is “by their fruits ye shall know them” (Matt. 7:15–20).
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Knowledge Profile for the Fundamental Sign
Figure 1 is a diagrammatic knowledge proﬁle of the fundamental sign.
When creating a knowledge proﬁle of a concept, project or a knowledge
domain, the ﬁrst thing to do is to consider the most general level that has
an inﬂuence on the concept. In the case of the fundamental sign this gen-
eral level is the concept “semiotics.” This concept is so general and vague
because it contains all kinds of theories that deal with signs. It contains both
the European structural semiotics and the American pragmatic semiotics,
and this almost makes the concept useless. By preﬁxing “pragmatic” to
“semiotics” we get a much more precise concept. “Pragmatic semiotics” re-
fers to Peirce, and this rules out the pragmatic theories of Dewey and James,
for example. However, we can sharpen the knowledge proﬁle even further
by deﬁning the fundamental sign in relation to Peirce’s doctrine of prag-
maticism. At this time, we have deﬁned the fundamental sign in relation
to Peirce’s pragmaticism. We could say that we have preﬁxed the fundamen-
tal sign with pragmaticism. This means that it is within the doctrine of prag-
maticism that we understand the fundamental sign. Now we are getting clos-
er to the knowledge proﬁle of the fundamental sign. However, we are able
to sharpen the deﬁnition a bit more. Using pragmaticism involves under-
standing knowledge and thus concepts such as fallibilism, idealism, realism,
and within Peirce’s phaneroscopy. In short (referring to Thellefsen, 2004
for a thorough discussion of these concepts), fallibilism means that knowl-
edge is provisional. Knowledge contains a potential of development. In this
pragmaticistic context, idealistic means that the concepts strive for the truth.
Epistemological basis
SemioticsL
Pragmatic semioticsL
PragmaticismL
   FallibilismL
   IdealismL
   RealismL
   PhaneroscopyL
Semiotics of Terminology
The fundamental sign is L
a symbolL
L
As a symbol it developsL
according to the hyper-L
bolic philosophy of PeirceL
L
It is general and it is realL
L
The meaning of the L
fundamental sign resides L
in its conceivable conse-L
quencesL
L
It is the fundamental signL
of any knowledge organi-L
zation; hence it organized L
all knowledge relatively to L
its epistemological basis
Consequences
Fundamental sign
Figure 1. Knowledge proﬁle of the fundamental sign.
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A concept’s strive for truth means that the truth of a concept lies in its con-
sequences, and the sum of consequences is the true meaning of the con-
cept.
I believe that the following long quote of Peirce sums up the idealistic,
the realistic, and the phaneroscopic angle: idealism being the truth (the
meaning) of the concept derived through dialogue and governed by a habit
of conduct; realism being the concept’s ability to inﬂuence our future con-
duct, and the habit of conduct equals Thirdness in Peirce’s phaneroscopy.
It is this last element that ensures interpretational stability when speaking
of habits of conduct and concepts. Peirce writes:
Since I have employed the word “Pragmaticism,” and shall have occa-
sion to use it once more, it may perhaps be well to explain it. About
forty years ago, my studies of Berkeley, Kant, and others led me, after
convincing myself that all thinking is performed in Signs, and that
meditation takes the form of a dialogue, so that it is proper to speak of
the “meaning” of a concept, to conclude that to acquire full mastery
of that meaning it is requisite, in the ﬁrst place, to learn to recognize
the concept under every disguise, through extensive familiarity with
instances of it. But this, after all, does not imply any true understand-
ing of it; so that it is further requisite that we should make an abstract
logical analysis of it into its ultimate elements, or as complete an anal-
ysis as we can compass. But, even so, we may still be without any living
comprehension of it; and the only way to complete our knowledge of
its nature is to discover and recognize just what general habits of con-
duct a belief in the truth of the concept (of any conceivable subject,
and under any conceivable circumstances) would reasonably develop;
that is to say, what habits would ultimately result from a sufﬁcient con-
sideration of such truth. It is necessary to understand the word “con-
duct,” here, in the broadest sense. If, for example, the predication of
a given concept were to lead to our admitting that a given form of rea-
soning concerning the subject of which it was afﬁrmed was valid, when
it would not otherwise be valid, the recognition of that effect in our
reasoning would decidedly be a habit of conduct. (CP 6.481)
I believe Peirce is saying here that it is necessary to develop a knowledge
proﬁle for the concept we investigate. If we fail to recognize the concept
under every disguise and if we are unable to make a complete analysis of it,
we can investigate the truth of the concept by investigating what habits would
ultimately result from a sufﬁcient consideration of such truth. In other words,
if we investigate the consequences of the concept, we will reach its fallible
truth. In my interpretation, consequences are relations, and tested relations
are related terms that can be investigated within a knowledge domain.
Returning to the knowledge proﬁle of the fundamental sign; the four
very important concepts (fallibilism, idealism, realism, and phaneroscopy)
constrain the concept of the fundamental sign, and it must be understood
in relation to these important concepts. Once again we have sharpened the
epistemological basis of the fundamental sign. However, it can be sharpened
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even further. The fundamental sign is developed within the concept of
semiotics of terminology: to understand the fundamental sign, we must
understand the epistemological basis upon which the fundamental sign is
developed. We cannot rule out, e.g., the idealistic or the realistic angle.
These aspects are crucial to the understanding of the fundamental sign.
Based on the knowledge proﬁle, we can deﬁne the fundamental sign as
• Developed within general semiotics
• Developed within the pragmatic semiotics of Peirce
• Developed within the doctrine of pragmaticism
• Developed in accordance with the fallibilism, the idealism, the realism,
and the phaneroscopy of Peirce
• Developed within the semiotics of terminology and part of the SKO-
method.
However, the epistemological basis is only half of the knowledge proﬁle.
The other half consists of the consequences of this epistemological basis.
In the following, we shall take a closer look at the consequences of the
epistemological basis trying to complete the knowledge proﬁle for the fun-
damental sign.
The Fundamental Sign in the Light of Its
Epistemological Basis
In Thellefsen 2002, 2003, and 2004, I have thoroughly deﬁned the fun-
damental sign. However, to make my points clear, I will brieﬂy deﬁne the
fundamental sign. The fundamental sign is the central idea of a knowledge
domain; it is the historical basis of the knowledge domain that organizes
the knowledge in the knowledge domain. The terminology of a knowledge
domain is centered around the fundamental sign. Therefore, the funda-
mental sign is a symbol consisting of and containing the sum of the terms
in a knowledge domain. It puts constraints on all the terms so that the terms
can only be understood in relation to the fundamental sign. The fundamen-
tal sign is an abstract entity, which contains a potential for development.
However, as the consequences of the fundamental sign are learned, the
knowledge potential is reduced. I call this process the hardening of the
symbol3. In the following, I will outline the consequences that make up the
fundamental sign based on its epistemological basis.
• In Peircean semiotics, it is sign.
• The meaning of the fundamental sign is identiﬁable in its related terms.
• Related terms are consequences of the fundamental sign that have been
tested and that have become symbols. Consequences, which cannot
endure testing, wither away.
• New consequences can alter the knowledge structure of the fundamental
sign; hence, knowledge is fallible. In other words, knowledge is provi-
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sory. However, since the fundamental sign is a symbol that has grown
stable due to the use and experience of the actors in a knowledge do-
main, only parts of the fundamental sign can alter or else we are deal-
ing with a shift in paradigms and this seldom occurs.
• As a symbol, the fundamental sign is a sign of a particular habit of con-
duct; namely, the conduct of a given knowledge domain based on its
epistemological basis.
• By drawing a knowledge proﬁle, the fundamental sign is identiﬁable.
The fundamental sign is not the same as a knowledge proﬁle, but it is a
sign that develops in accordance with the knowledge proﬁle. The knowl-
edge proﬁle is a method that can be used to identify the fundamental
sign.
• Research has shown that the fundamental sign in Danish Occupational
Therapy is activity (Thellefsen, 2002). The meaning of activity is a con-
sequence of a given epistemological basis. To understand the meaning
of activity and to identify its KO, it is necessary to draw a knowledge
proﬁle for occupational therapy identifying its epistemological basis and
to identify the consequences of the epistemological basis.
• Since the fundamental sign is the centre of a KO in a knowledge domain,
we must alter our way of conducting KO, that is, if we truly want to rep-
resent the KO. If we do not have this intention, we may go on using the
classic method, e.g., construction of thesauri and classiﬁcation schemes.
In summary, in accordance with the knowledge proﬁle method, I have
drawn a knowledge proﬁle for the concept “fundamental sign” by outlin-
ing its epistemological basis and the consequences of this basis, which leaves
us with a well-deﬁned concept.
How to Make the Knowledge Profile
Then how can we use the knowledge proﬁle? In the following six steps,
I generalize the method and make it useful in other situations besides deﬁ-
nition of the fundamental sign. First: Draw the knowledge proﬁle of your
concept, your project, or your knowledge domain by identifying its episte-
mological basis and the consequences of this epistemological basis. Use
Figure 2 as inspiration.
Second: Start by writing the name of your research object (the concept,
the problem, the knowledge domain) in the middle.
Third: Consider what theoretical basis you will unfold upon the re-
search object; ﬁnd the most general state and write it in the outer circle.
This is the most general mode of the theory. In the case of the fundamen-
tal sign, this mode was semiotics.
Fourth: Consider how to sharpen this general mode by preﬁxing or
sufﬁxing terms to the concept. In the case of the fundamental sign, I preﬁxed
“semiotics” with “pragmatic” and got “pragmatic semiotics.” Peirce also did
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this to “positivism,” which he preﬁxed with “prope,” and deﬁned his prag-
maticism as “prope-positivism” (CP 5.412). This is the second circle.
Fifth: Consider whether you can sharpen the concept even further, e.g.,
by using a subtheory that reduces the knowledge potential of the concept or
another theory that may make your concept or project become more pre-
cise. In the case of the fundamental sign, I used the doctrine of pragmati-
cism to narrow down pragmatic semiotics further. This is the third circle.
Sixth: Consider whether you need to sharpen you concept even further,
or if you are ready to identify consequences of your concept.
The six steps correspond to the left side of Figure 2, the epistemological
basis of the research object. However, to draw a complete knowledge proﬁle,
we have to identify the consequences that occur when viewing the research
object from a certain epistemological basis as was the case in Figure 1.
Figure 2 functions as a general model for investigating the epistemo-
logical basis of a research object, and when this has been done, the next
step is to outline the consequences of the epistemological basis to main-
tain coherence between the epistemology and the way in which the research
object is interpreted based on the basis of that epistemology. The knowl-
edge proﬁle helps to keep the project on terminological tracks.
I have neglected to discuss the consequences of the fundamental sign
when dealing with KO. Of course, the discovery of the fundamental sign
has an important impact on how we shall conduct KO. In fact, I do not
believe that librarians and information specialists conduct KO at all since
KO exists prior to any investigation. To assume that KOs do not exist be-
fore we organize the knowledge of any knowledge domain would be to
dismiss reality and, indeed, it would end in pure nominalism and subjec-
tivism. It would be much more precise to say that we identify KOs and, as a
consequence of the identiﬁcation, we try to make representations of the
KOs. Here, both the knowledge proﬁle and the fundamental sign become
Epistemological basis Consequences
Research object
Knowledge profile
Figure 2. The diagrammatic knowledge proﬁle.
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very important. Having drawn a knowledge proﬁle of a knowledge domain
and having accepted that the knowledge proﬁle in fact has a considerable
inﬂuence on the understanding of terms in the knowledge domain (and
indeed the KO is organized in accordance with the knowledge proﬁle), then
it is time to identify the fundamental sign. The method for identiﬁcation
of the fundamental sign of a knowledge domain is developed in Thellefs-
en 2002 and Thellefsen 2003 and further elaborated in Thellefsen 2004 and
will not be repeated here.
Notes
1. I understand a knowledge organization (KO) as the sociocognitive knowledge structure
of a given knowledge domain. This means that a KO is the ongoing sociocognitive semi-
otic processes that take place within a knowledge domain. Indeed, a KO is an abstract entity.
However, it is the terminology of the knowledge domain that is the manifested represen-
tation of a KO. Hence, within library and information science (LIS), we do not perform
KO; we make representations of KO, and our task, as I see it, is to develop methods that
enable us to make these representations as realistic as possible.
2. Often, thesauri build on bibliometric studies, which primarily build upon statistic terms
extracting methods that basically are nonintellectual. The empirical data used to construct
thesauri are almost exclusively derived from documents disregarding the impact nonpub-
lished knowledge and tacit knowledge have on the knowledge structures in a knowledge
domain.
3. The hardening of symbols refers to the hyperbolic philosophy of Peirce. When the sym-
bol develops, that is, when its consequences are learned, the developmental potential of
the symbol is reduced: a hardening of the symbol makes the symbol stable. However, since
no one knows the future consequences of a symbol, knowledge cannot be viewed as stat-
ic; this leaves an amount of unstable potentiality in the symbol.
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Classiﬁcation and Categorization:
A Difference that Makes a Difference
Elin K. Jacob
Abstract
Examination of the systemic properties and forms of interaction
that characterize classiﬁcation and categorization reveals fundamental syn-
tactic differences between the structure of classiﬁcation systems and the
structure of categorization systems. These distinctions lead to meaningful
differences in the contexts within which information can be apprehended
and inﬂuence the semantic information available to the individual. Struc-
tural and semantic differences between classiﬁcation and categorization are
differences that make a difference in the information environment by in-
ﬂuencing the functional activities of an information system and by contrib-
uting to its constitution as an information environment.
Introduction
Many different and sometimes conﬂicting responses can be made to the
question “What is information?” Floridi (in press) identiﬁes three broad cat-
egories intended to elucidate the predominant approaches to understand-
ing the ambiguous phenomenon called information: information as reality
(or ecological information), information for reality (or instructional infor-
mation), and information about reality (or semantic information). The ap-
proach adopted here is that information is “differences that make a differ-
ence” (Bateson, 1979, p. 99). It is an emergent property—the result of
meaningful differences—inherently semantic and therefore about reality.
Analysis of the syntactic differences that distinguish systems of classiﬁ-
cation from systems of categorization can contribute to a philosophy of
information (PI) because these distinctions portend signiﬁcant conse-
quences for the processes that contribute to what Floridi (2002) describes
Elin K. Jacob, School of Library and Information Science, Indiana University–Bloomington,
1320 E. 10th St., Bloomington, IN 47405–1801
516 library trends/winter 2004
as the “dynamics of information”: “(i) the constitution and modelling of infor-
mation environments, including their systemic properties, forms of interac-
tion, internal developments etc.; (ii) information life cycles, i.e., the series of
various stages in form and functional activity through which information
can pass . . . and (iii) computation, both in the Turing-machine sense of al-
gorithmic processing and in the wider sense of information processing” (p. 15.
emphasis in original). Examination of the systemic properties and forms
of interaction that characterize classiﬁcation and categorization reveals fun-
damental differences in their respective organizational structures—differ-
ences that inﬂuence the functional activities of an information system and
contribute to its constitution as an information environment.
The argument elaborated here is that fundamental syntactic distinc-
tions exist between the structure of classiﬁcation systems and the structure
of categorization systems; that these distinctions lead to meaningful differ-
ences in the contexts within which information can be apprehended; and
that these differences, in turn, inﬂuence the semantic information—the
information about reality—that is available to the individual.
Information Systems
Shera (1960/1965) has observed that retrieval must be the focus of a
theory of library and information science (LIS) and thus “the end toward
which all our efforts are directed” (p. 136). Unfortunately, retrieval is too
often viewed not as one component in an information system but as a self-
contained and independent process. This emphasis on the end product—
the retrieval of resources—tends to obscure the fact that effective retrieval
depends on both the representation and the organization of a collection
of information resources.
Soergel (1985) points out that, because information is used for prob-
lem-solving, information systems are developed and extended in response
to the problems that confront society. Although this deﬁnition of informa-
tion is not universally accepted, it is useful in understanding the complex
set of processes that contribute to the ultimate effectiveness of an informa-
tion system. Such a system identiﬁes information resources that may be of
use in addressing a particular problem; represents the attributes of re-
sources that are relevant to the problem area; organizes these resource rep-
resentations or the resources themselves for efﬁcient access; and ultimate-
ly retrieves a set of resources in response to queries presented to the system
by the individual. It would appear, then, that a more productive approach
to the problem of retrieval would be to view an information system as a mul-
tidimensional whole comprised of several interrelated processes, including,
at a minimum, collection development, representation, organization, and
retrieval.
Retrieval is the ﬁnal and therefore the most obvious of the processes
that contribute to an information system. Because it is the only process in
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which an individual actively participates, it is frequently the only process
to which she gives serious consideration. When the individual is seeking
information on a particular topic, her attention is focused on the set of
resources retrieved by the information system. If these resources appear to
be pertinent to the immediate problem, she may not give a second thought
to the appropriateness of the terms used to query the information system.
Nonetheless, it is the processes of selection, representation, and organiza-
tion that provide the foundation without which information retrieval (IR)
is less than effective, if not impossible. How resources are represented con-
strains the organizational structure(s) that can be imposed on a collection
of information resources; the organizational structure of the collection
dictates the search strategies that can be used for retrieval; and the repre-
sentations themselves determine the set of resources that will be retrieved
by the system.
Shera (1956/1965) afﬁrmed the critical roles of representation and or-
ganization when he observed that effective retrieval requires an accord be-
tween the cognitive organization imposed on information by the individu-
al and the formal organization imposed upon representations by the system.
Shera’s argument for accord between the individual and the retrieval sys-
tem rests on three basic assumptions: that there are certain cognitive struc-
tures that can be identiﬁed and described; that it can be demonstrated that
these structures are shared across individuals; and that identiﬁcation of these
shared structures will provide the basis for a theory of organization.
That cognitive accord can be achieved across individuals is a fundamen-
tal assumption of the shareability constraint proposed by Freyd (1983). She
argued that the intent to communicate without loss of information causes
the individual to modify her internal conceptual representations to reﬂect
the cognitive organization assumed to be held by the other participant(s)
in the communicative process. If participation in an intentional act of com-
munication does promote normalization of conceptual representations
across individuals, as Freyd (1983) argues, it follows that an intentional act
of communication between the individual as natural intelligence and the
information system would be subject to a similar shareability constraint.
Assuming that the processes of representation, organization, and retrieval
are necessarily interdependent, failure to address communication between
the individual and the information system from the perspective of the sys-
tem is a signiﬁcant omission. Thus, an accounting of the dynamics of in-
formation should address the role of representation and organization in
the creation and communication of meaningful information. More impor-
tantly, it should account for the semantic implications occasioned by dif-
ferences in the forms of organization that can be used to structure an in-
formation system.
The need for effective communication between the information system
and the individual points to ﬁve areas of research: (i) Is communication
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between the information system and the individual inﬂuenced by the rep-
resentation of resources? (ii) Does the organizational structure of the in-
formation system cause the individual to adjust her internal cognitive struc-
tures? (iii) Does the organization of resources contribute to the creation
of a meaningful context for information? (iv) Is the meaning of informa-
tion inﬂuenced by the organizational structure of the information system?
and (v) What consequences follow from the different organizational struc-
tures that can be applied to a collection of information resources?
An understanding of the different forms of organizational structure and
the implications that each holds for creating a meaningful context for in-
formation is foundational and must therefore precede any discussion of the
role that representation and organization play in the dynamics of informa-
tion. Accordingly, the focus here is on the ramiﬁcations of organizational
structure for communication between the information system and the in-
dividual as natural intelligence. More speciﬁcally, the argument presented
here addresses the fundamental structural and semantic differences be-
tween classiﬁcation and categorization and how these differences make a
difference in the information environment.
Categorization
Categorization is the process of dividing the world into groups of enti-
ties whose members are in some way similar to each other. Recognition of
resemblance across entities and the subsequent aggregation of like entities
into categories lead the individual to discover order in a complex environ-
ment. Without the ability to group entities based on perceived similarities,
the individual’s experience of any one entity would be totally unique and
could not be extended to subsequent encounters with similar entities in the
environment. Consider a situation in which each separate entity—each tree,
each ﬂower, or each drop of rain—was distinct from all other entities and
carried its own unique set of deﬁning characteristics. As Markman (1989)
observes, the individual would not be able to handle the variety and com-
plexity of her day-to-day interactions with the environment. By reducing the
load on memory and facilitating the efﬁcient storage and retrieval of infor-
mation, categorization serves as the fundamental cognitive mechanism that
simpliﬁes the individual’s experience of the environment.
Categorization divides the world of experience into groups or catego-
ries whose members share some perceptible similarity within a given con-
text. That this context may vary and with it the composition of the catego-
ry is the very basis for both the ﬂexibility and the power of cognitive
categorization. Zerubavel (1993) contends that the individual ﬁnds order
and meaning in the environment by imposing boundaries—by splitting and
lumping objects of experience so as to create distinct “islands of meaning”
(p. 5). How an entity is categorized creates a context or conceptual frame
that not only provides information about the entity but also shapes the in-
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dividual’s interaction with it. For example, the historic period known as the
English Renaissance (1500–1650) is perceived as fundamentally different
from the English Middle Ages even though England in the sixteenth cen-
tury was, in many respects, quite similar to England in the ﬁfteenth centu-
ry. Splitting the sixteenth century from the ﬁfteenth century by labeling
them as belonging to two distinct historical periods focuses attention on
the differences between them rather than on their similarities and provides
the information that, in England, these differences were of greater import
than differences between the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries.
Barsalou (1987) points out that this ability to manipulate the environ-
ment through the creation of categories allows the individual to forge new
relationships and thus to create new information whose value exceeds the
simple grouping of objects in the environment. He proposes that, because
different features or properties are used to represent the same category at
different times and in different contexts, the information associated with
a particular category varies across individuals and across contexts. Thus the
set of features associated with a category on any given occasion is composed
of both context-dependent and context-independent information. Context-
dependent information is relevant only within a particular context. For
example, a high temperature of 50 degrees Fahrenheit might be described
as cold on a summer day in southern Indiana, but warm or even hot on a
winter day in the same locale. To say that it is cold outside conveys context-
dependent information that is meaningful only in relation to the seasonal
context. In contrast, context-independent information provides informa-
tion about a category that is relevant across contexts. Even when used met-
aphorically, for example, the word “ﬁre” connotes heat, light, and energy.
The apparent instability of categories is therefore a reﬂection of the ﬂexi-
bility and the plasticity that are the power of the cognitive process of cate-
gorization and of the individual’s ability to create and modify the informa-
tional content of a category as a function of immediate context, personal
goals, or past experience.
The acquisition and transmission of information are dependent not
only on the cognitive ability to create new categories—and thus new infor-
mation—through the discovery of new patterns of similarity across entities,
but also on the ability to capture information about these patterns through
the medium of language. With the accumulation of more specialized knowl-
edge and the creation of disciplinary domains, however, these categories
and the relations between them have a tendency to become formalized
(Jacob, 1994). The need to ensure that disciplinary knowledge is consis-
tent across individuals and across time privileges the stability of reference
provided by well-deﬁned classes. As experientially-based categories evolve
into well-deﬁned, domain-speciﬁc classes that facilitate sharing of knowl-
edge without loss of information, they lose their original ﬂexibility and
plasticity as well as the ability to respond to new patterns of similarity.
520 library trends/winter 2004
The Classical Theory of Categories
Until Rosch’s publication in the 1970s of her seminal work on catego-
ries and categorization (Rosch, 1973, 1975), research in the area of cate-
gorization had focused on concept formation not as a process of creation
but as a process of recognition. The world of experience was assumed to
consist of a set of predetermined categories, each deﬁned by a set of essen-
tial features represented by a category label; and all members of a given
category were assumed to share a set of essential features that was identiﬁed
by the category label and could be apprehended by all members of the lin-
guistic community. Thus Hull (1920) wrote of the child’s discovery of mean-
ing in the word “dog” as the gradual recognition of a preexisting and in-
variant concept: “The ‘dog’ experiences appear at irregular intervals. . . .
At length the time arrives when the child has a ‘meaning’ for the word dog.
Upon examination this meaning is found to be actually a characteristic
more or less common to all dogs and not common to cats, dolls and ‘ted-
dy-bears’” (Hull, 1920, pp. 5–6; cited in Brown, 1979, p. 188).
The presumption that a category is determined by a set of deﬁning
criteria is known as the “classical theory of categories.” This is a simple but
powerful theory that rests on three basic propositions (Smith & Medin,
1981; see also Taylor, 1989):
1. The intension of a category is a summary representation of an entire
category of entities.
2. The essential features that comprise the intension of a category are in-
dividually necessary and jointly sufﬁcient to determine membership
within the category.
3. If a category (A) is nested within the superordinate category (B), the
features that deﬁne category (B) are contained within the set of features
that deﬁne category (A).
Proposition I states that the deﬁnition (intension) of a category is the
union of the essential features that identify the membership (extension) of
that category. Furthermore, because all members of a single category must
share this set of essential features, each member is equally representative
of the category as a whole. For this reason, the internal structure of a cate-
gory is said to be ungraded, or without rank, because no member can be
more typical or more representative of a category than any other member.
Proposition II states that, because each member of the category must
exhibit all of the essential features that comprise the intension of the cate-
gory, possession of the set of features that deﬁnes the category is sufﬁcient
to determine membership in the category. And, because there is a binary,
either/or relationship that exists between an entity and a category such that
an entity either is or is not a member of a particular category, the bound-
aries of categories are said to be ﬁxed and rigid.
Proposition III identiﬁes the inheritance relationship that exists be-
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tween categories in a hierarchical structure: any member of a category that
is a subset of a superordinate category must exhibit not only the set of es-
sential features that determine membership in the subset but also the set
of essential features that determine membership in any superordinate cat-
egory within which the subset is nested.
In its most rudimentary form, categorization can be deﬁned as the
placement of entities in groups whose members bear some similarity to each
other. Within the framework of the classical theory of categories, however,
categorization is the process of systematically dividing up the world of ex-
perience into a formalized and potentially hierarchical structure of cate-
gories, each of which is deﬁned by a unique set of essential feature(s).
Because the intension of a category deﬁnes the set of essential features that
each member of the category must exhibit, the classical theory maintains
that intension equals extension—that membership within a particular cat-
egory (extension) entails possession of the essential and deﬁning charac-
ter (intension) of the category. For example, if the intension of the cate-
gory “bird” consists of the features “lays eggs,” “has wings,” “ﬂies,” and
“builds nests in high places,” every member of the category must exempli-
fy the complete set of deﬁning features. If an entity does not ﬂy, it cannot
be accorded membership in the category “bird” even if it does lay eggs, have
wings, and build nests in high places. And, because all members of the cat-
egory are deﬁned by the same set of features, no one bird can be more typ-
ical or more representative of the category than any other bird. Thus, ac-
cording to the classical theory, a parrot, a pigeon, and a pufﬁn would be
equally representative of the category “bird.”
Brown (1979) observes that within the formalized and rigidly con-
strained ordering of reality established by the classical theory, category
membership is absolute: “. . . any given thing is either in or out of the set”
(p. 189). It is this stipulation that is the source of the classical theory’s ex-
planatory power: because it requires that intension equals extension—that
membership in a category demonstrates possession of the set of essential
features that deﬁne the category—the classical theory of categories would
provide a simple yet elegant explanation for both the internal structure of
cognitive representations and the semantic meanings of words.
Until recently, the classical theory of categories exempliﬁed “the ‘right
way’ to think about categories, concepts, and classiﬁcations” (Gardner, 1987,
p. 340). But empirical research conducted over the past thirty years has
challenged the validity of the assumptions on which this theory is found-
ed. Critics of the classical theory have argued that the inability of subjects
to identify the deﬁning characteristics of an entity (Hampton, 1979; Rosch
& Mervis, 1975) not only undermines the assumption that the set of essen-
tial features determining category membership is absolute but also calls into
question the notion that these features are available to and can be speciﬁed
by all members of a linguistic community. Demonstration of graded typi-
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cality effects—the observation that subjects do judge certain members to
be more representative of a category than others (McCloskey & Glucksberg,
1978; Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; Rosch, 1973, 1975)—controverts the
assumption that category structure is ungraded because all members are
equally representative of the category. There is evidence, too, that subjects
are able to rank both members and nonmembers of a category on a single
continuum of representativeness. For example, Barsalou (1987) demon-
strated that subjects could rank a robin, a pigeon, an ostrich, a butterﬂy,
and a chair on a single continuum of representativeness for the category
“bird”—a continuum extending from the most typical member of the cat-
egory (robin) to the most atypical member (chair). The evidence for graded
structure of categories points to the lack of ﬁxed and determinate bound-
aries separating members of a category from nonmembers; and, buttressed
as it is by demonstrations of category membership based on family resem-
blance (Rosch & Mervis, 1975), graded structure casts doubt on the classi-
cal assumption that there is an explicit inclusion/exclusion relationship
between an entity and a category.
Classification
In LIS, the term “classiﬁcation” is used to refer to three distinct but
related concepts: a system of classes, ordered according to a predetermined
set of principles and used to organize a set of entities; a group or class in a
classiﬁcation system; and the process of assigning entities to classes in a
classiﬁcation system. The focus here is on the ﬁrst of these—on the classiﬁ-
cation system as a representational tool used to organize a collection of
information resources—but a full appreciation of the implications of
classiﬁcation for information environments requires a basic understanding
of the classiﬁcation process itself.
Classiﬁcation as process involves the orderly and systematic assignment
of each entity to one and only one class within a system of mutually exclu-
sive and nonoverlapping classes. This process is lawful and systematic: law-
ful because it is carried out in accordance with an established set of princi-
ples that governs the structure of classes and class relationships; and
systematic because it mandates consistent application of these principles
within the framework of a prescribed ordering of reality. The scheme itself
is artiﬁcial and arbitrary: artiﬁcial because it is a tool created for the express
purpose of establishing a meaningful organization; and arbitrary because
the criteria used to deﬁne classes in the scheme reﬂect a single perspective
of the domain to the exclusion of all other perspectives.
Taxonomic Classiﬁcation.
Classiﬁcation is perhaps best exempliﬁed by the discipline of taxono-
my. Broadly deﬁned, taxonomy is the science of classiﬁcation or, as Mayr
(1982) deﬁnes it, “the theory and practice of delimiting kinds of organisms”
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(p. 146). The objectives of taxonomic investigation are to provide an or-
derly and systematic organization of knowledge about the biological world;
to identify the deﬁning characteristics that distinguish a biological entity;
and, based on those characteristics, to place the entity within a hierarchi-
cal ordering of mutually exclusive superordinate and subordinate classes
in accordance with a set of established and widely accepted principles.
Taxonomic classiﬁcation establishes stability of nomenclature through
the aegis of a formalized and universally accepted language that facilitates
transmission of knowledge across time and the barriers of natural language.
Each class in the taxonomic scheme is given a unique name that is used to
refer to all entities that display the complete set of features deﬁning the
class. And, because it is universally employed to identify all members of a
given class, this label provides access to the accumulated knowledge about
those entities, not as individuals but as members of a particular class. The
taxonomic name establishes a relationship of equivalence between the set
of features that deﬁne the class (its intension) and the set of entities that
are members of the class (its extension). Using the taxonomic name, a
member of a biological class is recognizable wherever it occurs, regardless
of natural language or the local name(s) by which it may be known.
Through the inheritance of deﬁnitional criteria made possible by en-
forcing a principled structure of superordinate and subordinate classes,
taxonomic classiﬁcation also serves as an external cognitive scaffolding
(Clark, 1997; Jacob 2001, 2002) that provides for the economical storage
and retrieval of information about a class of entities. For example, the ob-
servation that Bleu is a poodle provides information about Bleu that is as-
sociated with the class “poodle.” More importantly, however, it also provides
information about Bleu that is available from the hierarchical structure
within which the class “poodle” is nested—information associated with the
superordinate classes dog, mammal, vertebrate, etc.
The essential observation, however, is that the practice of taxonomy is
carried out within the arbitrary framework established by a set of universal
principles. For example, while the naturalist Adanson, a contemporary of
Linneaus, proposed a method for organizing botanical phenomena based
on the identiﬁcation of differences between individual specimens (Foucault,
1970), Linneaus advocated a systematic approach based on similarity of re-
productive structure. For the naturalist following Linneaus’s lead, any phys-
ical differences between two specimens not directly related to the process
of reproduction would be irrelevant: for example, differences of leaf, stem,
or root structure that might be used to distinguish between two plants would
be ignored if the plants exhibited similar reproductive structures.
Taxonomic classiﬁcation supports the efﬁcient storage and retrieval of
information about a class of entities, but reliance on a systematic approach
such as that advocated by Linneaus constrains the information context by
limiting the identiﬁcation of knowledge-bearing associations to hierarchi-
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cal relationships between classes. Furthermore, class deﬁnitions based on
a single feature such as reproductive structure effectively reduce the amount
of meaningful information that can be represented about each class in the
taxonomy.
Classiﬁcation Schemes.
A classiﬁcation scheme is a set of mutually exclusive and nonoverlap-
ping classes arranged within a hierarchical structure and reﬂecting a pre-
determined ordering of reality. Because a classiﬁcation scheme mandates
that an entity can be a member of one and only one class, it provides for
communication of meaningful information through the systematic and
principled ordering of classes. Furthermore, it establishes and enforces
stability of reference by providing each class with a unique label that links
individual members of the class to the class deﬁnition.
Shera (1951/1965) observes that, throughout history, attempts to clas-
sify knowledge have relied on four basic assumptions: universal order, uni-
ty of knowledge, similarity of class members, and intrinsic essence. The
assumption of universal order posits an immutable conception of reality that
serves as a unifying framework for all knowledge. The assumption of unity
of knowledge presupposes that past, present, and future knowledge can be
represented within a single, inclusive hierarchy of superordinate and sub-
ordinate classes. The assumption of similarity of class members holds that
a class can be deﬁned by a set of essential features and that these features
are shared by all members of the class and distinguish that class from all
other classes in the structure. And the assumption of intrinsic essence
maintains that there is a set of individually necessary and jointly sufﬁcient
features that is intrinsic to all members of a class and that these features
constitute the essence of the class.
With the possible exception of universal order, Shera’s exposition of
the assumptions that support efforts to organize knowledge can be inter-
preted in terms of the three propositions that constitute the classical theo-
ry of categories: the assertion that a category is deﬁned by a summary rep-
resentation (Proposition I) is a statement of the essential similarity of class
members; the assertion that a category is deﬁned by a set of essential fea-
tures (Proposition II) is a statement of the intrinsic essence of a class; and
the assertion that deﬁning features are inherited in a hierarchical structure
of categories (Proposition III) is a statement of the unity of all knowledge.
It is instructive that, although the classical theory of categories is unable to
account for the variability and ﬂexibility of cognitive categorization, it does
provide an elegant accounting of the fundamental assumptions on which
classiﬁcation schemes have historically been constructed.
Bibliographic Classiﬁcation Schemes.
Traditionally, bibliographic classiﬁcations have been deductive, top-
down schemes that enumerate a set of mutually exclusive classes. An enu-
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merative classiﬁcation scheme begins with a universe of knowledge and a
theory of organization or set of principles that establishes the conceptual
structure of the scheme. Whether the universe encompasses all knowledge
or is limited to a speciﬁc domain, construction of the scheme involves the
logical process of division and subdivision of the original universe such that
each class, or each level of classes in the structure, is differentiated by a
particular characteristic or property (e.g., the property “color” or “shape”).
The result is a hierarchical structure of generic (genus/species) relation-
ships wherein each subordinate class is, theoretically, a true species of the
superordinate within which it is nested.
Faceted (analytico-synthetic) classiﬁcation systems are inductive, bot-
tom-up schemes generated through a process of analysis and synthesis.
Construction of the faceted structure begins with analysis of a universe of
knowledge to identify the individual elements—properties and features—
of the universe. These elements are then organized into mutually exclusive
groups on the basis of conceptual similarity, and these groups are, in turn,
arranged in successively larger groupings to form facets (aspects) that can
be used to represent entities in the universe. In this way, meaningful rela-
tionships are established not only between the elements in a group but
between the groups themselves. The result is not a classiﬁcation scheme but
a controlled vocabulary of concepts and their associated labels that can be
used, in association with a notation and a prescribed citation order, to syn-
thesize the classes that will populate the classiﬁcation scheme. A faceted
vocabulary for classifying cars might include mutually exclusive facets for
“color” (red, blue, black), “body style” (sedan, convertible, minivan), and
“transmission” (manual, automatic). Following the citation order body style—
transmission—color, classes would be constructed by selecting a single value,
or isolate, from each facet. Examples of the classes that could be constructed
in this faceted scheme would be convertible—manual—red and minivan—
automatic—blue.
Because a faceted classiﬁcation scheme adheres to a ﬁxed citation or-
der during the construction of individual classes, the resulting structure,
like an enumerative scheme, is necessarily hierarchical. In fact, it is the
hierarchical nature of bibliographic classiﬁcation schemes that allows for
the arrangement of physical resources on the shelves of the library. “Read-
ing” a classiﬁcation scheme involves moving down the hierarchy, from su-
perordinate to subordinate and from left to right, to generate a series of
relationships between classes that can be translated into the linear order
of the library shelf. It is just this linear structure that Ranganathan captured
in the notion of APUPA (or Alien-Penumbral-Umbral-Penumbral-Alien).
The umbral class (U) represents the focal topic; penumbral classes (P) are
those most closely related to the focal topic; and alien classes (A) are those
removed from and therefore unrelated to the focal topic. When the indi-
vidual reviews a collection of resources arranged in classiﬁed order, she
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generally begins with the most relevant class or focal topic (U); moving
either to the right or the left, she progresses from resources on the focal
topic through closely related materials (P) to those resources which are
unrelated (A). In this fashion, the linearity inherent in the hierarchical
structure of a classiﬁcation scheme is used to create a meaningful context
by bringing into proximity those classes within the hierarchical structure
which are theoretically most closely related.
Linearity is, in fact, the ﬁrst of seven properties that Shera (1953/1965)
identiﬁes as characteristic of a bibliographic classiﬁcation scheme: lineari-
ty; inclusivity of all knowledge within the classiﬁcation’s universe; well-
deﬁned, speciﬁc, and meaningful class labels; an arrangement of classes that
establishes meaningful relationships between them; distinctions between
classes that are meaningful; a mutually exclusive and nonoverlapping class
structure; and an inﬁnite hospitality that can accommodate every entity in
the bibliographic universe. Each of these properties contributes to Shera’s
deﬁnition of a bibliographic classiﬁcation scheme as
a list of terms which are speciﬁcally and signiﬁcantly different each from
the other, capable of describing the subject content of [resources],
inclusive of all knowledge, inﬁnitely hospitable, in an arrangement that
is linear, unique, and meaningful, and which when applied to [re-
sources], usually, though not necessarily, through the medium of a
notation, results in their arrangement on the shelves according to the
logical principles that inhere in the schematism. (Shera, 1953/1965,
p. 99)
In other words, a bibliographic classiﬁcation establishes a controlled vocab-
ulary in the form of a set of uniquely labeled classes that serve both to deﬁne
and to organize the intellectual content of a collection of resources. Fur-
thermore, this vocabulary determines the conceptual boundaries of the
scheme’s universe by including only the knowledge that is relevant within
the immediate universe. The resulting arrangement is meaningful precisely
because it constitutes a principled context for information—a context
shaped by class deﬁnitions, by information-bearing, hierarchical relation-
ships and by meaningful distinctions between classes and, by extension,
between the concepts that those classes represent.
Classiﬁcation as a Disciplinary Language.
A classiﬁcatory structure frequently inheres in a disciplinary language
when it is used to establish a speciﬁc conceptual context that both deﬁnes
and organizes the domain of investigation (Foucault, 1970; Jacob, 1994).
The language serves to prescribe the boundaries of the domain; to deter-
mine both the subject matter of the domain and the relationships that
obtain between phenomena of investigation; to legitimize speciﬁc concepts
and methodologies; to ensure effective transmission of knowledge by sta-
bilizing the vocabulary; and to foster a domain-speciﬁc perspective or dis-
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ciplinary episteme. Because a disciplinary language reﬂects the underlying
classiﬁcatory structure of the domain, the meaning of any class term can
only be apprehended within the conceptual context established by the
classiﬁcatory structure.
The Difference between Classification
and Categorization
Although there are obvious similarities between classiﬁcation and cat-
egorization, the differences between them have signiﬁcant implications for
the constitution of an information environment. Failure to distinguish
between these two systems of organization appears to stem from the mis-
conception that they are, in fact, synonymous—a misconception that may
be reinforced by the fact that both are mechanisms for organizing infor-
mation.
The literature on categorization is riddled with passages where the
terms “classiﬁcation” and “categorization” are used indiscriminately to re-
fer to the same process. Rosch et al. (1976) provides an illustrative exam-
ple of how these two terms are used indiscriminately:
. . . one purpose of categorization is to reduce the inﬁnite differences
among stimuli to behaviorally and cognitively usable proportions. It is
to the organism’s advantage not to differentiate one stimulus from
others when that differentiation is irrelevant for the purposes at hand.
The basic level of classiﬁcation, the primary level at which cuts are made
in the environment, appears to result from the combination of these
two principles; the basic categorization is the most general and inclusive
level at which categories can delineate real-world correlational struc-
tures. (Rosch et al., 1976, p. 384. Emphasis added)
This lack of distinction between category/categorization and class/classiﬁcation
is frequently compounded by the use of concept as yet another synonym for
category (e.g., Gardner, 1987, p. 340). Unfortunately, this terminological
imprecision obscures the fact that researchers are actually dealing with two
similar but nonetheless distinct approaches to organization.
Although systems of classiﬁcation and categorization are both mecha-
nisms for establishing order through the grouping of related phenomena,
fundamental differences between them inﬂuence how that order is effect-
ed—differences that do make a difference in the information contexts es-
tablished by each of these systems. While traditional classiﬁcation is rigor-
ous in that it mandates that an entity either is or is not a member of a
particular class, the process of categorization is ﬂexible and creative and
draws nonbinding associations between entities—associations that are based
not on a set of predetermined principles but on the simple recognition of
similarities that exist across a set of entities. Classiﬁcation divides a universe
of entities into an arbitrary system of mutually exclusive and nonoverlap-
ping classes that are arranged within the conceptual context established by
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a set of established principles. The fact that neither the context nor the com-
position of these classes varies is the basis for the stability of reference pro-
vided by a system of classiﬁcation. In contrast, categorization divides the
world of experience into groups or categories whose members bear some
immediate similarity within a given context. That this context may vary—
and with it the composition of the category—is the basis for both the ﬂex-
ibility and the power of cognitive categorization ( Jacob, 1992).
Figure 1 identiﬁes six systemic properties that serve as a starting point
for comparing systems of classiﬁcation and categorization: (i) process, (ii)
boundaries, (iii) membership, (iv) criteria for assignment, (v) typicality, and
(vi) structure.
(i) The process of classiﬁcation involves systematic arrangement of class-
es of entities based on analysis of the set of individually necessary and jointly
sufﬁcient characteristics that deﬁnes each class. In contrast, the process of
categorization is generally unsystematic but inherently creative in that it
need not rely on predetermined deﬁnitions but is able to respond to sim-
ilarity assessments based on immediate context, personal goals, or individ-
ual experience.
Figure 1. Comparison of Categorization and Classification.
Categorization Classification
Process
Creative synthesis of entities Systematic arrangement of entities
based on context or based on analysis of necessary and
perceived similarity sufficient characteristics
Boundaries
Because membership in any group Because classes are mutually-exclusive
is non-binding, and non-overlapping,
boundaries are “fuzzy” boundaries are fixed
Membership
Flexible:  category membership is Rigorous:  an entity either is or is not
based on generalized knowledge a member of a particular class
and/or immediate context based on the intension of a class
Criteria for Assignment
Criteria both context-dependent Criteria are predetermined
and context-independent guidelines or principles
Typicality
Individual members All members are
can be rank-ordered by typicality equally representative
(graded structure) (ungraded structure)
Structure
Clusters of entities; Hierarchical structure
may form hierarchical structure of fixed classes
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(ii) Systems of classiﬁcation and categorization are also distinguished
by the boundaries imposed on groupings. Because the classes in a classiﬁ-
cation system are rigidly circumscribed by the intension of the class and
further constrained by the requirement that they be mutually exclusive and
nonoverlapping, boundaries between classes are ﬁxed, determinate, and
persistent. In a categorization system, however, membership of an entity in
any one category is nonbinding and does not prohibit membership in any
other category. Thus the membership of any two or more categories in a
system of categorization may overlap or vary across time in response to
changing contexts. This is possible because category boundaries are not
simply fuzzy but are, in fact, mutable and potentially ﬂuid.
(iii) and (iv) Membership and criteria for assignment are two closely
related characteristics that distinguish systems of classiﬁcation from systems
of categorization. In a classiﬁcation system, criteria for class assignment—
the set of necessary and sufﬁcient features that constitutes the intension of
a class—are governed by principles that establish the conceptual framework
of the system. Membership in a class is rigorous in that it is determined by
the intension of the class: an entity either is or is not a member of any class
in the system. More importantly, however, membership in a class is abso-
lute simply because an entity can belong to one and only one class. In con-
trast, the criteria for category assignment employed by a system of catego-
rization are potentially variable, allowing the membership of a category to
respond to the demands of the context in which it is used. In this way, the
membership of a category may vary across time based on the combination
of context-dependent and context-independent information that is used
to deﬁne category membership.
Differences in the criteria for assignment emphasize an important dis-
tinction between classiﬁcation and categorization. In systems of classiﬁca-
tion, class assignment relies on deﬁnitions that are “idealizations” or “the-
oretical abstractions” (Barsalou, 1987) to determine class membership. In
systems of categorization, however, category assignment is ﬂexible and dy-
namic, reﬂecting the ability of the individual to modify category deﬁnitions
in response to variations in the immediate environment. Thus Barsalou
argues that
. . . the concepts that theorists “discover” for categories may never be
identical to an actual concept that someone uses. Instead, they may be
analytic ﬁctions that are central tendencies or idealizations of actual
concepts. Although such theoretical abstractions may be useful or
sufﬁcient for certain scientiﬁc purposes, it may be more fruitful and
accurate to describe the variety of concepts that can be constructed for
a category and to understand the process that generates them.
(Barsalou, 1987, p. 120)
(v) Typicality is closely related to the characteristics of membership and
criteria for assignment. However, typicality is potentially ambiguous: on the
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one hand, typicality is used as an indication of the individual’s assessment
as to how representative a member is of its particular class or category; and,
on the other hand, it is used as a reﬂection of the assumptions regarding
membership and membership criteria that govern a system of classiﬁcation
or categorization. Because empirical research indicates that subjects are
capable of ranking members according to typicality even when working with
well-deﬁned, either/or classes such as odd number or even number (Armstrong,
Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983), attempting to distinguish between classiﬁca-
tion and categorization on the basis of an individual’s typicality judgments
would be an exercise in futility. In contrast, systemic assumptions govern-
ing membership do provide an important point of distinction between
classiﬁcation and categorization.
In a system of classiﬁcation, all members of a class must display the full
set of essential features prescribed by the class deﬁnition (see Proposition
I of the classical theory). It follows, then, that all members are assumed to
be equal and therefore equally representative of the class. For this reason,
the internal structure of a class is said to be ungraded because no entity can
be a “better” member of the class than any other member. However, in a
system of categorization, there is no assumption of equality of membership.
The fact that individuals can identify particular members as more typical
of a category reﬂects the dynamic nature of category deﬁnitions and the
corresponding variability of category membership as a reﬂection of imme-
diate context. The internal structure of a category is said to be ungraded
because it is possible to rank category members as to how typical or repre-
sentative they are of the category as a whole.
(vi) Structure is perhaps the single most important characteristic that
can be used to discriminate between systems of classiﬁcation and categori-
zation because it is inﬂuenced by distinctions based on process, boundaries,
membership, and criteria for assignment. A classiﬁcation system is gener-
ally a hierarchical structure of well-deﬁned, mutually exclusive, and non-
overlapping classes nested in a series of superordinate-subordinate or ge-
nus-species relationships. The structure of a classiﬁcation system provides
a powerful cognitive tool—an external scaffolding (Clark, 1997; Jacob 2001,
2002)—that minimizes the cognitive load on the individual by embedding
information about reality through the organization of classes within the
system. For example, because an entity either is or is not a member of a
particular class in a system of classiﬁcation, it provides for determination
of class membership as a relatively simple pattern-matching or pattern-com-
pleting activity. At a more complex level, the structure of the classiﬁcation
system establishes information-bearing relationships between classes: ver-
tical relationships between superordinate and subordinate classes that are
subject to the mechanism of inheritance illustrated above in the example
of the poodle Bleu; and lateral relationships between coordinate classes that
occur at the same level in the hierarchy and, when taken together, consti-
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tute the immediately superordinate class within which they are nested. In
this fashion, the structure of a classiﬁcation system serves as a medium for
the accumulation, storage, and communication of information associated
with each class in the structure; and, by capitalizing on the hierarchical and
lateral relationships between classes, it minimizes the information that must
be stored with each class and reduces the load on memory.
In contrast, the structure of a categorization system consists of variable
clusters of entities that may or may not be organized in a hierarchical struc-
ture. Because categories are not constrained by a requirement for mutual-
exclusivity, membership in one category does not prohibit membership in
any other category. More importantly, however, the very plasticity that is the
creative power of categories may actually prohibit the use of categorization
as a persistent information structure. The potentially transitory and over-
lapping nature of categories provides that any relationships established
between categories are themselves mutable. Thus a system of categorization
creates a conceptual framework whose meaning may be short-lived and
ephemeral—a conceptual framework that cannot function as cognitive
scaffolding and whose ability to serve as a medium for the accumulation,
storage, and communication of information is limited.
Ordering, Grouping, and Organization
A system for ordering ( Jacob & Loehrlein, 2003) provides access to
resources by arranging them in some recognizable order. Typically, these
systems will employ alphanumeric or chronological sequences because
these arrangements generate syntactic patterns that are familiar to a ma-
jority of individuals. Although such a system is intended to support access
to known items, it may appear to create groupings of similar resources (e.g.,
all individuals with the last name Smith or alumni who graduated in the year
2000), but the imposition of sequential order is nonetheless a purely syn-
tactic device that cannot create meaningful relationships either between
individual entities or between groups of entities.
In contrast, a system of organization ( Jacob & Loehrlein, 2003) is a
uniﬁed structure that establishes a network of relationships among the class-
es or categories that comprise the system. These relationships are mean-
ingful and information-bearing because they specify principled connections
between two or more groups within the same system. Thus, with a single
possible exception, classiﬁcation systems are systems of organization be-
cause they provide for the conceptual arrangement of a set of mutually
exclusive and nonoverlapping classes within a systematic structure of hier-
archical, genus-species relationships.
The exception is a constitutive classiﬁcation ( Jacob, Mostafa, & Quiro-
ga, 1997) consisting of a set of mutually exclusive classes that comprise the
totality of a given universe but lack nested, superordinate-subordinate re-
lationships. For example, the classes freshman, sophomore, junior, and
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senior comprise the universe of college undergraduates. These classes ap-
pear to evince a hierarchical ordering (e.g., from freshman to senior), but
they fail to demonstrate meaningful, information-bearing relationships:
although a senior may be assumed to have been a junior at some point in
time, the class junior is not a true species of its purported superordinate
senior. Thus a constitutive classiﬁcation does not qualify as a system of or-
ganization because, even though it is comprised of a set of mutually exclu-
sive and nonoverlapping classes that constitute the totality of a particular
universe, it fails to establish meaningful relationships between its constitu-
ent classes. It is interesting, too, that neither a hierarchical nor a constitu-
tive classiﬁcation can serve as a system for ordering: because the distinctions
between classes are conceptual, the classes cannot conform to a recogniz-
able, syntactic pattern of arrangement. Furthermore, both hierarchical and
constitutive systems of classiﬁcation require an index or other auxiliary
mechanism to support access, whether to unique resources or to individu-
al classes in the structure.
A system of categorization may or may not be a system of organization.
Although a categorization system groups entities on the basis of similarity,
the example of a constitutive classiﬁcation demonstrates that the simple
identiﬁcation of a set of categories without the establishment of meaning-
ful, information-bearing relationships does not constitute a system of or-
ganization. But, even though a categorization system does not indicate
meaningful relationships, it is not a system for ordering: the simple fact of
grouping entities into categories does not support access. Because catego-
rization reﬂects conceptual distinctions between groups of entities, it, too,
requires an auxiliary mechanism to provide access, whether to individual
categories or to unique category members.
If a system of categorization does not impose a systematic, syntactic
order on its member categories and if it does not establish meaningful re-
lationships between categories, then it is simply a mechanism for grouping.
For example, dividing the items on a shopping list into categories deﬁned
by place of purchase (e.g., grocery store, gas station, and ﬁve-and-dime
store) is a mechanism for grouping that simpliﬁes the individual’s interac-
tion with her environment but neither creates meaningful relationships
between categories nor imposes any recognizable order on them. A con-
stitutive classiﬁcation is also an example of a simple mechanism for group-
ing: in this case, for dividing a universe of entities into a set of well-deﬁned
and mutually exclusive groups without the identiﬁcation of any meaning-
ful relationships among them.
Implications of Structure
The functional role of structure in the creation and enhancement of
information contexts can be addressed through analysis of four general
approaches to the organization and retrieval of resources: free-text search-
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ing, postcoordinate indexing, precoordinate indexing, and classiﬁcation
(see Figure 2). Although cognitive categorization serves as the baseline for
this analysis, it is removed from consideration as a system of organization,
not because it lacks semantic foundation or relational structure, but be-
cause, contrary to the arguments proffered by Shera (1956/1965), the or-
ganization imposed on cognitive categories is so dynamic and responsive
to changes in context that it cannot establish persistent, knowledge-bear-
ing relationships between categories.
Of the four general approaches to organization, free-text searching is
the least constrained. Although it shares with systems of classiﬁcation the
creation of mutually exclusive, nonoverlapping, and rigidly bounded classes
whose membership is constrained by an explicit criterion of assignment
(i.e., the alphanumeric search string used to query the system), free-text
searching lacks an established set of principles that governs the structure
of classes and class relationships. It can be described as a system of catego-
rization in the very broadest sense, but it is, at best, a very elementary mech-
anism for grouping. Even as a grouping mechanism, however, it has two
signiﬁcant ﬂaws. In the ﬁrst place, the basis for grouping is purely syntac-
tic: because the criterion for group assignment involves the simple match-
[Free-Text Searching]
Cognitive Categorization
Postcoordinate Systems
Classiﬁcation
Precoordinate SystemsT
(subject headings)
Figure 2. Systems of Organization.
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ing of alphanumeric strings, groups produced by this process share a su-
perﬁcial similarity without deeper semantic implications. In the second
place, the process of free-text grouping is binary in that it generates only
two groups of entities—those that match the query string and those that
do not. However, because free-text searching lacks a semantic base, it can-
not support meaningful distinctions between these two classes, and, because
it exempliﬁes the very simplest of structures (i.e., two antonymous classes),
a free-text retrieval system cannot contribute to an information environ-
ment that will support or enhance the value of system output through the
establishment of meaningful context.
Unlike free-text searching, postcoordinate systems, precoordinate sys-
tems, and classiﬁcation systems are all indexing systems in that each involves
the assignment to a resource of one or more descriptors intended to rep-
resent the intellectual content of that resource. These descriptors are usu-
ally drawn from a controlled vocabulary or indexing language that normal-
izes the vocabulary used in representation and retrieval by creating an
indexical, one-for-one correspondence between a descriptor and the con-
cept to which it points. The indexing language also provides for commu-
nication between the system and the individual by specifying the set of
authorized terms or subject strings that can be used to pose search queries
to the system. Although a descriptor may be a class label, a subject heading
or a single term or phrase, depending on the nature of the system, each
descriptor serves to identify or describe the intellectual content of a group
of resources. Unlike an access point in a system for ordering that supports
the retrieval of a unique entity, a descriptor is a surrogate for (or a pointer
to) the intellectual content shared by a group of resources. Indeed, index-
ing, like categorization, would be impossible if every resource were to be
treated as a unique entity.
In the progression from postcoordinate indexing systems through pre-
coordinate indexing systems to systems of classiﬁcation, organizational struc-
ture becomes increasingly more constrained (see Figure 2). It is appropri-
ate, then, to begin this analysis with classiﬁcation, the most highly
constrained of these three systems, and to work back through the less con-
strained systems toward the baseline of cognitive categorization.
Theoretically, a classiﬁcatory structure epitomizes a system of organi-
zation because it creates a principled structure of well-deﬁned classes that
are linked by a system of hierarchical, genus-species relationships. Although
practice does not always adhere to theory in the development of classiﬁca-
tion schemes, classiﬁcation is nonetheless the most rigid of organizational
systems because its structure of mutually exclusive and nonoverlapping
classes mandates an absolute relationship between a resource and its class:
each resource may be assigned to one and only one class in the structure.
Thus the process of classiﬁcation is inherently systematic because it is gov-
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erned by a set of principles that serves as a persistent conceptual framework
for the creation of meaningful, structural relationships between classes.
Although the well-deﬁned structure of a classiﬁcation system provides
for the creation of meaningful, information-bearing relationships between
classes—relationships that facilitate the use of classiﬁcation as an external
cognitive scaffolding—it places powerful limitations on communication
between the individual and the information system. In an information sys-
tem whose class structure is predetermined, the retrieval set returned for
any query posed to the system is necessarily limited to the membership of
a single class. Thus the structure of the classiﬁcation system constrains the
questions that can be presented to the system by prescribing the set of
possible answers before a query has actually been posed. Within a classiﬁ-
catory structure, then, communication is one-way—from the system to the
individual—and the individual must rely on her understanding of or intu-
itions about the structural relationships between classes in order to inter-
act with the system in an effective and meaningful way.
Information systems are identiﬁed as precoordinate when the catego-
ries or classes that comprise the system are either assigned or built by the
indexer at the time of indexing. A classiﬁcation system is obviously a pre-
coordinate system because its classes are either established by the classiﬁ-
cationist during scheme generation or built by the classiﬁer at the time of
class assignment using a faceted vocabulary and a ﬁxed citation order. A
subject heading system is also a precoordinate system but it is generally less
constrained—and less constraining—than a classiﬁcation system. Where-
as classiﬁcation mandates assignment of a resource to one and only one
class, a precoordinate system of subject headings does not require individ-
ual groups to be mutually exclusive. Rather, subject heading systems allow
for the assignment of multiple descriptors to a single resource, thereby
providing multiple access points for each entity rather than the single ac-
cess point (the unique class label) prescribed by a classiﬁcation system.
Because it does not demand a well-deﬁned and absolute relationship
between a resource and a subject heading—because it does not require that
the groups of entities associated with individual subject headings will nec-
essarily be mutually exclusive—a precoordinate subject heading system is,
in fact, a system of categorization. Categories formed by the subject head-
ing system are not rigidly bounded but frequently overlap, with individual
members spilling over into penumbral and even alien categories. Although
allowing multiple descriptors for a single resource provides for greater vari-
ability in the range of resources that can be retrieved with a single query,
the questions that can be posed to the information system are nonetheless
limited, as they are in a system of classiﬁcation, by the authorized set of
subject heading strings that comprise the system. And, as with a classiﬁca-
tion system, the retrieval set generated in response to a query is determined
536 library trends/winter 2004
by the indexer: the assignment of subject headings as descriptors not only
constrains the questions that can be posed to the system but serves to es-
tablish the speciﬁc set of resources that can be retrieved in response to each
query posed to the system.
Unlike the systematic and principled structure of a classiﬁcation system,
the structure of a subject heading system is frequently unprincipled, unsys-
tematic and polyhierarchical. And, unlike the relationships established
between well-deﬁned and mutually exclusive classes in a classiﬁcation, any
relationships created between the categories of a subject heading system
cannot be assumed to be either meaningful or information-bearing. An
example from Subject Headings for Schools and Public Libraries (Fountain, 2001)
illustrates the lack of knowledge-bearing relationships that characterizes
many subject heading systems. The heading “Rats as carriers of disease”
combines two broader concepts: “rats” and “disease.” Although it is obvi-
ous that “Rats as carriers of disease” is somehow related to both rats and
disease, this heading is neither a kind of “Rat” nor a kind of “Disease.”
Because the speciﬁc value of any relationship that might link this heading
to its broader concepts is unidentiﬁed, the relationship must be supplied
by the individual if the heading is to be linked in a meaningful way to oth-
er concepts in the subject heading system.
Although subject heading systems appear to create relationships be-
tween headings, these relationships are often descriptive, idiosyncratic, and,
sometimes, potentially meaningless. For example, the Library of Congress
Subject Headings (Library of Congress. Cataloging Policy and Support Ofﬁce,
Library Services, 2002) identiﬁes the subject heading “Humanities” as the
broader term for the heading “Philosophy.” It then proceeds to list “Hu-
manism” as the broader term for “Humanities” and “Philosophy” as the
broader term for “Humanism.” Thus the supposed nesting structure is cir-
cular: “Philosophy” > “Humanities” > “Humanism” > “Philosophy.” Obvious-
ly, the absence of either a well-deﬁned indexing language or principled and
meaningful relationships between subject headings undermines the abili-
ty of the system to establish a context that can contribute to the apprehen-
sion of information.
As with classiﬁcation, communication between the individual and a
subject heading system tends to be one-way—from the system to the indi-
vidual—but the unprincipled structure of many subject heading systems and
the general lack of a prescriptive conceptual framework that can support
information-bearing relations undermines the potential for meaningful
communication between the user and the system. This is an important dis-
tinction between subject heading systems and the more structured classiﬁ-
cation system that can be explained, in part, as a difference between the
processes of identiﬁcation and predication. Classiﬁcation involves a process
of identiﬁcation (or deﬁnition) in that it asserts a meaningful, one-for-one
relationship between an entity and its class, but a precoordinate system of
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subject headings involves a process of predication (or description) that
allows for multiple assertions to be ascribed to a single resource. While a
system based on predication demonstrates greater creativity, ﬂexibility, and
hospitality than the well-deﬁned structure of a system based on identiﬁca-
tion, the very rigidity of the latter actually supports the creation and per-
sistence of information-bearing relationships that are simply not possible
in the looser structure of the former.
Precoordinate systems constrain communication between the individ-
ual and the system through the establishment of a ﬁnite collection of class
labels or subject headings that serve as the complete set of possible search
queries and predetermine the composition of retrieval sets. In contrast,
postcoordinate systems predetermine neither the queries nor the retrieval
sets but allow the individual to build her own category deﬁnitions that can
be presented to the system as search queries at the time of retrieval. Descrip-
tors representing the intellectual content of a resource are assigned by the
indexer at the time of indexing. During retrieval, the individual builds her
own search categories by combining descriptors with Boolean logic.
By allowing the individual to generate her own queries, the postcoor-
dinate system supports a more interactive form of communication between
searcher and system. In most postcoordinate systems, descriptors are as-
signed from a controlled vocabulary. In others, however, communication
between the individual and the information system is complicated by the
fact that the indexing language does not exist as a controlled vocabulary
but is extracted by the indexer from terms occurring in the resource be-
ing indexed. Generally, however, the generation of category deﬁnitions as
postcoordinate search queries is limited only by the set of individual terms
that comprise the indexing language. Although the resources that partici-
pate in a retrieval set are determined by the indexer’s assignment of descrip-
tors, communication between the system and the individual is greatly en-
hanced by her ability to create her own queries that will capture her
immediate information need.
Unfortunately, however, the ﬂexibility of category generation, like the
process of cognitive categorization, goes hand-in-hand with the absence of
meaningful relationships. As with any free-text information system, posing
a query to a postcoordinate system simply divides the collection into two
groups: the set of resources whose assigned descriptors match the search
query and the remaining resources whose descriptors do not match the
query. Obviously, postcoordinate systems, like free-text systems, are simply
mechanisms for grouping, not systems of organization. Unlike free-text
systems, however, the basis for grouping in a postcoordinate system is se-
mantic, not syntactic. Although the postcoordinate system is simply match-
ing strings, the indexer imposes a certain level of conceptual control by
assigning simple descriptors from an indexing language that establishes an
indexical, one-for-one relationship between a descriptor and its referent.
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The individual is empowered to create unique and potentially idiosyncrat-
ic search categories precisely because the system itself does not establish any
but the simplest categories—those deﬁned by the individual descriptors
assigned by an indexer. Because the system fails to establish a principled
framework that provides for the establishment of information-bearing re-
lationships between categories, the postcoordinate system can neither cre-
ate nor contribute to an information context precisely because there is no
persistent structure that could support meaningful relationships between
categories.
Conclusion
This very preliminary review of the properties and features of the dif-
ferent approaches to organizing, ordering, or simply grouping information
resources has barely scratched the surface in addressing structural distinc-
tions between systems of classiﬁcation and systems of categorization and how
these distinctions affect interaction with the system as an information en-
vironment.
For example, at a very superﬁcial level, the strength of classiﬁcation is
its ability to establish relationships between classes that are stable and mean-
ingful. But the rigidity of structure that supports these relationships has its
corresponding disadvantages. In particular, traditional classiﬁcation systems
are context-independent: because the relationships established by classiﬁ-
cation are invariant and persist across time and space, these systems are
resilient to the context of use and severely constrain the individual’s abili-
ty to communicate with the system in a meaningful and productive man-
ner. In contrast, systems of categorization, and especially postcoordinate
systems, are highly responsive to—even dependent on—the immediate
context. The utility of these systems as information environments depends
ultimately on provisions for effective communication with the individual.
But the responsiveness and ﬂexibility of the postcoordinate system effec-
tively prohibit the establishment of meaningful relationships because cat-
egories are created by the individual, not the system, and are thus ﬂeeting
and ephemeral.
It is important for philosophers, theoreticians, and developers to work
toward a more in-depth and comprehensive understanding of how the struc-
ture of an information system contributes to the establishment of seman-
tic context; how different forms of organization support communication
between the searcher and the system; and how concrete organizational
structures and speciﬁc types of relationships contribute to the production
of meaningful information environments. The search for adequate expla-
nations of these issues will ultimately contribute to a deeper understand-
ing of the “dynamics of information” (Floridi, 2002) and the implications
that the structure of information systems holds for the composition of and
interaction with information environments.
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Faceted Classiﬁcation and Logical Division in
Information Retrieval
Jack Mills
Abstract
The main object of the paper is to demonstrate in detail the role of
classiﬁcation in information retrieval (IR) and the design of classiﬁcatory
structures by the application of logical division to all forms of the content
of records, subject and imaginative. The natural product of such division
is a faceted classiﬁcation. The latter is seen not as a particular kind of li-
brary classiﬁcation but the only viable form enabling the locating and re-
lating of information to be optimally predictable. A detailed exposition of
the practical steps in facet analysis is given, drawing on the experience of
the new Bliss Classiﬁcation (BC2). The continued existence of the library
as a highly organized information store is assumed. But, it is argued, it must
acknowledge the relevance of the revolution in library classiﬁcation that has
taken place. It considers also how alphabetically arranged subject indexes
may utilize controlled use of categorical (generically inclusive) and syntac-
tic relations to produce similarly predictable locating and relating systems
for IR.
1. Introduction
As a memorable aphorism prefacing his novel Howard’s End, E. M. For-
ster gave simply “Only connect.” It could claim to be the ﬁnest, even though
briefest, deﬁnition of intelligence we have. To understand anything, wheth-
er it is the operation of a complicated mechanism or the complex social
factors that underlie almost any human situation, understanding it means
seeing the connections. The basic intellectual instrument we use to do this
is classiﬁcation. It is appropriate that libraries, which seek to organize ev-
Jack Mills, Editor, Bliss Bibliographic Classiﬁcation (BC2) c/o Bliss Classiﬁcation Association,
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erything in the way of recorded human knowledge should ﬁnd explicit
classiﬁcation as central to their organization.
1.1. Indexing and searching
Indexing and searching are the two fundamental operations in retriev-
al. The usual situation in the library is that the librarian prepares the scene
for retrieval by indexing each document (assigning to them retrieval han-
dles such as classmarks, subject headings, etc.). Searching may then be done
directly, by examining the documents on the shelf or vicariously via their
surrogates in the catalog. Although the term “indexing” is used with vari-
ous connotations, especially ones involving terms in alphabetical order, the
central meaning of pointing out or indicating describes exactly what librar-
ians do when, in response to any enquiry, they indicate where the inquirer
may best begin looking and, perhaps, where they might next look should
the ﬁrst search prove inadequate. This function is neatly summarized in
cataloging theory as one of locating and relating.
1.2. Classiﬁcation
This is the most fundamental operation in indexing. In its broadest
sense, it is the action of recognizing and establishing groups of classes of
objects, the subclasses and members of which all manifest (even though in
different ways) a particular characteristic or set of characteristics. The dif-
ferent kinds of shared characteristic(s) used to deﬁne a class for retrieval
have been called index devices (Cleverdon et al., 1966). Library classiﬁca-
tion, via shelf order and the classiﬁed catalog, uses a number of different
devices; two of these reﬂect the sort of class deﬁnition usually understood
by the term “classiﬁcation”—those deﬁned by generic and whole-part rela-
tions; but coordination (combination), synonym control, role indication
(by inclusion of terms in facets deﬁning their relation, such as agent, prop-
erty), and some confounding of word forms (via their adjacency in the A/
Z index) are also prominent. Mechanized retrieval systems developed a
number of less direct devices, e.g., an extended confounding of word forms
and oblique ways of deﬁning a set of documents sharing the same subject
content such as is found in citation indexing. Electronic systems have now
extended these oblique forms of class deﬁnition (see Section 3.5).
2. What Is Classified in the Library
Library materials physically are the object of relatively rudimentary
classiﬁcation in that signiﬁcantly different physical forms are separately
housed and may be separately indexed. However, in nearly all cases it is their
content which is their ultimate justiﬁcation and the problems of informa-
tion retrieval (IR) are paramount. Whether this content is best described
as information or knowledge is best left to the philosophers. Early writers
on library classiﬁcation tended to use the term “knowledge” as the object
of classiﬁcation and retrieval. A dissident voice at the beginning of the last
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century, when Bliss began opting ﬁrmly for a knowledge basis, was
Wyndham Hulme (1911–1912). Hulme distinguished mechanical classiﬁ-
cation from philosophical and claimed that library classiﬁcation belonged
to the ﬁrst kind. He coined a term “literary warrant” and described library
classiﬁcation as the plotting of areas preexisting in literature. This was, in
fact, not a bad description of what the Library of Congress was doing in
many of its classes but interpreting preexistence as being what they held
in stock. When we consider content only, a major distinction is found in
all general libraries (and some special) between subject content and what
we may call, for lack of better words, “imaginative content.” Much discus-
sion of the exact nature of information reﬂects the unease over the use of
the term “information retrieval” when it is clear that the content of a signiﬁ-
cant class of documents is not deﬁned sensibly as information. The term
“knowledge” appears to be somewhat more receptive to the inclusion of
imaginative works than the term “information.”
2.1. Subject content and imaginative content
The latter has received attention by and large only in respect of ﬁction
(Beghtol, 1994; Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 1999). But the well-established
dichotomy between ﬁction and nonﬁction is somewhat misleading. Fiction
is only one example of imaginative content; the latter includes also other
literary forms (poetry, drama), all musical compositions, and all forms of
the visual arts that can form the content of a record (e.g., a folio of paint-
ings). If ﬁction offers viable characteristics of division whereby it can be
organized, the same characteristics, in principle, should be applicable to
all of them. The folio of paintings (say) might be classiﬁed by creator or by
place (French paintings, etc.) or by period (twentieth century, etc.). But
the above characteristics represent logical categories that are common to
all kinds of record content. Music scores are classiﬁed by instrument (vo-
cal, instrumental, etc.) and only secondarily by creator. But some charac-
teristics might be thought to be special to imaginative works. For example,
the new Bliss Classiﬁcation (BC2) (see Section 5.2) includes in its Proper-
ties facet of Class W The Arts such terms as “didacticism, parody, sentiment,
realism” and in its Elements facet terms like “symmetry, rhythm, symbolism,
fantasy.” By the process of speciﬁcation (see Section 7.3), this allows imag-
inative works to be classiﬁed as didactic, parodic, sentimental, symmetrical,
rhythmic, symbolic, fantastic, and so on. But many of these could also char-
acterize subject content (in individual behavior, social behavior, technolog-
ical work, etc.). In practice, much of the classiﬁcation of imaginative works,
especially ﬁction, is by subject content. But iconographic art (and its op-
posed nonﬁgurative or abstract art) inevitably uses the concepts making up
a subject classiﬁcation itself. The Subjects of art facet in BC2, for example,
makes direct use of the whole classiﬁcation, which gives a comprehensive
and predictable order. Insofar as the classiﬁcation of imaginative works
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raises problems of cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural inﬂuences, it does
not differ essentially from subject classiﬁcation. The rules developed for the
systematic handling of such relationships (see Sections 5/7) are as appli-
cable to imaginative content as they are to subjects. Where imaginative
content does present a special problem is that the categorization of a giv-
en imaginative work by some or many of the characteristics available would
most likely be very subjective, and this factor almost certainly limits the
degree to which they are practically feasible. But this does not mean that
the rules present a rationalistic bias when applied to imaginative works, only
that they are essential to the aim of achieving predictability in location,
whatever the content of the record.
2.2. Common-sense view
The interpretation assumed in this paper of what exactly is classiﬁed
may be described, for better or for worse, as the common-sense view of most
librarians. The object of attention in library classiﬁcation is the content of
records; they will have embedded in them, to varying degrees, matters of
fact (as Hume would say, in a famous phrase that, incidentally, begins with
“When we run over libraries . . .”) accompanied by considerations of anal-
ysis, discussion, prediction, opinion, and other matter (much of which
might be considered to fall within the category of “relations of ideas”) and
other less concrete matter that may or may not be deemed worthy of inclu-
sion in the index description. But if it does appear, it will be susceptible to
logical division.
3. Levels of Indexing in the Library
A reader so far may have assumed that the catalog is the form par ex-
cellence of an index to the library collection and the prototype of indexes
to larger collections and networks. This is not quite true. A library is indexed
for retrieval at three levels: the systematic order of documents on the shelves
(assuming complete or partial open access), the A/Z index to the classiﬁ-
cation governing the systematic order, and the catalog.
3.1. Shelf order
This is scarcely ever mentioned in the literature on retrieval, being treat-
ed very much as a poor relation, if not a terminally ill one. This is most
unfortunate, since it is the very ﬁrst index to the resources of the library
for the great majority of library users and in many cases the main or even
only one. Although this level of retrieval may be regarded as small beer and
not deserving much attention, the special demands it makes because of its
limitation to a single, linear order has had an important effect on the de-
velopment of the theory of library classiﬁcation. The limitation to a linear
sequence throws into sharp relief a crucial property sought in indexing—
that of predictability as to the location of any given class of information.
The physical document can only go in one place. But the concepts that
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deﬁne the class represented by that one place are in most cases multiple,
e.g., a class represented by the rubric Bone—Cancer—Therapy—Radiog-
raphy could legitimately go in any of twenty-four different places, everyone
of them making sense. The expectations of users reﬂect this. A radiogra-
pher would like to see it under medical radiography; the cancer specialist
would like to see it under cancer, and so on. The implication is clear. The
classiﬁcation must have comprehensive rules governing the order in which
the different component parts of a compound subject are to be taken when
locating a class. This does not depend in any way on the speciﬁcity of the
index descriptions given to the documents; even if the classmark locating
it is not speciﬁc (i.e., reﬂects “broad classiﬁcation”) the librarian and library
user still need to know where it will go—under skeletal system, or therapeu-
tics, or radiography, or cancer.
3.2. The A/Z index to the classiﬁcation
The relative index that Dewey provided for his classiﬁcation has been
an outstanding example of this indexing component since the scheme was
ﬁrst published in 1876. It intuitively recognized that the central weakness
of the classiﬁed index represented by the shelf order is that it distributes
many subject concepts over many ﬁelds according to the rules for combi-
nation already mentioned. So, for example, literature on children will be
scattered as a result of its subordination to different containing classes—
medicine, psychology, education, welfare, and so on. Hence, Dewey’s (1985)
term “Relative Index” and the general use of the term “distributed relatives”
to describe the situation.
3.3. The catalog
This consists of surrogates representing the records themselves, each
surrogate containing, to a greater or lesser degree, a bibliographical descrip-
tion and rubrics to act as retrieval handles (indications of its subject, au-
thor, title, etc.). It has two central functions: ﬁrst, as an inventory of the li-
brary’s holdings; second, it provides for multiple access in searching (by
author, title, form, or subject). Accessing by subject presents the central
problem, and it is the subject catalog that is considered below.
3.4. Precoordinate indexes
Apart from a few special collections, this was the only form of subject
catalog used until the 1950s. The term refers to the handling of compound
subjects, which constitute the vast majority in the literature. The constitu-
ent terms that in combination (coordination) describe the subject are co-
ordinated in the subject heading or classmark in anticipation of the needs
of searchers. Compounding immediately raises the problem of distribut-
ed relatives; this problem, absolutely central to shelf order, continues to be
central to the organization of the surrogates also, despite their much greater
facilities for providing multiple access. How the separate concepts needed
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to describe the compound subject are linked depends on the relationships
subsisting between them, and these, in turn, determine the search strate-
gies for locating the information sought. The problem of distributed rela-
tives that this poses can be ameliorated (but never completely resolved) by
making multiple entries for a document with a compound subject so that
a separate entry appears directly under each of its major constituent con-
cepts. For example, the document referred to earlier might get a separate
entry under each of the four constituent concepts: Skeletal system, Cancer,
Therapy, and Radiography (but omitting separate entries for the other
twenty permutations theoretically possible). Such permutation is standard
practice in libraries using the Universal Decimal Classiﬁcation (UDC),
whose notation particularly provides for it. Such permutation of multiple
entries is rarely found in the alphabetical subject catalog. Notably, most
subject cataloging takes as its unit a complete and discrete record (a book
or article), and its classiﬁcation and indexing involve a process of summa-
rization. The subject description is of the record as a whole, and this deter-
mines its position.
3.5. Postcoordinate indexes
The development of mechanical aids to indexing (e.g., peek-a-boo,
machine punched-cards) from the 1920s onward saw the removal of the
need to summarize the overall content in a single precoordinated subject
description. Now, only single constituent terms were assigned, and their
combination to form a search request for the subject concerned was left to
the search stage. This system was called postcoordinate indexing since the
coordination appeared after the indexing step, requiring less effort since
it moved the burden onto the searcher. The absence of recognized relation-
ships could result in ambiguity, e.g., a search for fertilizers for sugar beet
by the simple coordination of Sugar and Beet and Fertilizers would also
produce documents on the use of sugar-beet tops as fertilizers. This led to
the reintroduction of classiﬁcation at the indexing stage in the form of role
indicators and other devices that are implicit in the precoordinate index.
Mechanical aids were soon supplanted by electronic systems, and a still
more drastic change in indexing practice followed. With the development
of networks for electronic retrieval, the economic burden presented by the
prior indexing of individual records (typically, for services operated com-
mercially) became prohibitive. Now, it was not just a case of abandoning
the intellectual precoordination of index terms but the abandoning of
preindexing altogether. Reliance was to be entirely on keywords found in
the record and recognized by electronic searching. Indexing devices devel-
oped by librarians can only be used indirectly, by assisting the framing of
requests to search engines. The limited discriminatory powers of keywords,
with all their attendant ambiguities in the unruly natural language, were
now supplemented by new index devices, with machines operating on the
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relatively raw text of the documents. All of them are based on the measure-
ment of relatively artiﬁcial characteristics of documentary texts, such as
frequency of occurrence of particular words, contiguity of particular words,
etc., using statistical techniques and mathematical algorithms. These are
deemed sufﬁciently correlative to conceptual meanings to form classes al-
lowing searches deﬁned conceptually. They constitute new index devices,
but they are still classiﬁcatory in operation, establishing subclasses of the
total store identiﬁed by the parameters of the technique used. They are not
assigned by an indexer but must utilize the computer programs of the
store’s service provider.
The shift from IR from stores of limited size, in which trained librari-
ans have prepared the ﬁeld for searching by the prior indexing of materi-
als, to much larger stores in which there has been only minimal prepara-
tion of the ﬁeld has important implications for the relationship of libraries
to information science. The cognitive processes connecting the producers
of texts stored and the would-be recipients of the knowledge stored in the
texts are the subject of much current research. However, the highly struc-
tured maps of knowledge developed by modern faceted classiﬁcation ap-
parently have considerable potential in assisting these processes.
4. Indexing in the Library Today
The inroads on the librarian’s time made by the need to master rapidly
developing computer techniques has had a particularly unfortunate effect
on the curriculum of library schools, where the study of the organization of
knowledge has been eroded just when the need for it has become greater.
The information explosion led, inter alia, to the development by librarians
of greatly improved index languages, largely based on facet analysis. The
relevance of these to the future of the profession assumes two things: ﬁrst,
that the library will continue to be an integral part of our culture and that
reports of the birth of the paperless society have been greatly exaggerated;
and second, and following from the above, we have an obligation to seek
the best possible ways of facilitating its work. The development of logically
structured classiﬁcations covering the whole of knowledge is still unique in
the ﬁeld of LIS. These provide detailed maps of knowledge to assist in the
searching of stores of records and can be used as the basis of, or valuable
supplements to, numerous other retrieval languages.
5. The Design of a Modern Library Classification
Two conceptual areas must be distinguished: general classiﬁcations cov-
ering all knowledge and special classiﬁcations restricted to a speciﬁc ﬁeld.
The signiﬁcant developments in classiﬁcation design claimed above refer
primarily to the second area and will be considered in detail under that.
Here, some distinctive features of a general classiﬁcation are considered.
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5.1. General classiﬁcations
Remember that all special classiﬁcations need to draw on a more gen-
eral one, often extensively. Another reason why IR cannot afford to ignore
the concept of a general classiﬁcation is that it alone can provide a bird’s-
eye view of the whole ﬁeld of knowledge, offering a comprehensive con-
text within which searches in a very large store can be framed. How the main
classes (a loosely deﬁned but reasonably well-understood concept) are
handled within a general classiﬁcation is the main theme of this paper. But
whereas the central feature of the faceted special classiﬁcation is its rigor-
ous observance of the rules of logical division (see Sections 5.3/7), this
cannot be said to apply initially to a general classiﬁcation. If the ﬁrst step
in establishing what are loosely called its main classes were to be the divi-
sion of the whole ﬁeld of knowledge by applying explicit characteristics of
division, the only feasible contenders would be of the nature of fundamental
categories. The earliest and best-known set of such categories is seen in
those advanced by Aristotle. Some of these are ostensibly feasible as con-
stituting the initial divisions of the whole ﬁeld of knowledge, e.g., substance,
quantity, quality, place, time, and action. Such a ﬁrst step has not been at-
tempted by any of the general library classiﬁcations produced since Dew-
ey’s annus mirabilis in 1876, although something like it was attempted by
the Subject Classiﬁcation of the British librarian James Duff Brown (Brown,
1939/1906) with its quadruple division into Matter, Life, Mind, Record.
Brown’s scheme was notorious in its day for its subordination of music to
sonics in physics—an example of its attempt to ignore disciplines as a pri-
mary level of division. What did emerge, with a relative unanimity that is
not really surprising, was an initial division into main classes reﬂecting the
division of labor—intellectual, imaginative, and practical. The division of
labor is a fundamental feature of society, which is itself the producer of the
knowledge in the records that are the objects of IR. It is manifested in ev-
ery sphere of society, including academia as well as in the practical produc-
tion of material wealth. The term “discipline” is frequently used to refer to
these specialized ﬁelds, but is ambiguous insofar as a truly main class (e.g.,
the natural sciences) is usually susceptible to logical division into subclasses
that are themselves known as disciplines.
The particular notion of the fundamental forms of knowledge that
underpin main classes has received signiﬁcant attention by Langridge
(1976), who has drawn extensively on the work of a number of philosophers,
particularly that of Hirst (1974) and of Phenix (1964) in the philosophy
of education. Of particular signiﬁcance is the distinction Langridge draws
between the forms of knowledge on the one hand and the objects of knowl-
edge (the phenomena they examine) on the other. The order in which
main classes might appear became a particular focus of attention in the work
of Bliss (1929, 1933), and a modiﬁed form of the general order he advo-
cated is considered in Section 5.2.
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A common criticism of the viability of any schema of universal knowl-
edge is that the interaction of existing ﬁelds tends to dissolve their bound-
aries. While this interaction and its tendency are indisputable it does not
invalidate the search for relatively permanent structures. Work on BC2
(Mills & Broughton, 1977–) has not found the great waves of new special-
izations an insurmountable obstacle. With enduring principles like grada-
tion and integrative levels, together with highly practical principles such as
the subordination of means to ends to reﬂect the concept of purpose or
end-product to determine citation order within a given class (see Section
8.2), the predictability in the location of quite intricately mixed specializa-
tions is ensured. For example, modern forensic science draws on chemical
analysis, molecular biology, and any number of medical specializations, but
the purpose it serves—to validate the evidence in legal processes—deter-
mines its location in the law class with high predictability.
5.2. Two modern general classiﬁcations
The Colon Classiﬁcation (Ranganathan, 1960) is not included here; its
signiﬁcance is primarily that it pioneered faceted classiﬁcation and provided
an experimental test-bed for its development. But its main-class order is
quite conventional and offers no solutions to the problem of general classiﬁ-
cations per se. The Broad System of Ordering (1978), or BSO as it is usual-
ly called, was ﬁrst designed as a switching language—i.e., an intermediary
through which other classiﬁcations could translate into each other. Its lack
of detail stems from the fact that it was initially based on an institutional
warrant—i.e., of subjects displaying institutional organizations underpin-
ning them rather than on the much larger literary warrant of library col-
lections. One feature is the break it makes with the generally recognized
ﬁelds of knowledge, e.g., it has separate general classes for important con-
cepts normally distributed under different contexts, e.g., Communication
and information, Management, Human needs. It also has a Phenomena
class (see Section 5.1) for works that cannot be accommodated in any of
the largely disciplinary main classes, which are in BSO all fully faceted. It
has also been very inﬂuential in the development of the next system, BC2.
For historical reasons, as well as theoretical ones, the BC2 (Mills &
Broughton, 1977–) has largely taken the main-class order of the original
Bibliographic Classiﬁcation (Bliss, 1940/1953). This order reﬂects the
Comptean principle of gradation and that of integrative levels (Feibleman,
1954; Foskett, 1961). The major sequence these give is modiﬁed in a few
respects, as is shown in the outline in Appendix 1. BC2 has completely re-
structured all the individual classes, and each class is now fully analytico-
synthetic in structure and notation. It is now virtually a new general classiﬁ-
cation and constitutes the most detailed, fully faceted general classiﬁcation
in existence. For this reason it is used in this paper as an exemplar of facet-
ed structures, which are now (from the work done on it) seen to be appli-
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cable to every ﬁeld of knowledge. Like BSO, it also includes a separate
Phenomena class, in which the order of phenomena closely follows the
main-class order and uses the principle of unique deﬁnition to determine
the location of multidisciplinary works on a given phenomenon. An out-
line of the system is given in Appendix 1.
5.3. Faceted classiﬁcation of a subject ﬁeld
This has been the major development in classiﬁcation for IR in librar-
ies in the past ﬁfty years, although its ﬁrst formulation was in the work of
Ranganathan. Although, curiously enough, Ranganathan never referred
explicitly to the fact, the fundamental feature of his Colon Classiﬁcation is
that it divides any given subject in accordance with the rules of logical divi-
sion. But logical division is not the whole story. The work on BC2, covering
every ﬁeld of knowledge, clearly has shown that the design of a special
classiﬁcation requires recognition of six fundamental steps. These steps
must of necessity be taken in the same order, since each step depends on
the completion of the previous one. Only the ﬁrst two use logical division;
the other four use extralogical procedures. The steps are easily summarized:
5.4.The six fundamental steps in design are
• Division of the subject into broad facets (categories);
• Division of each facet into speciﬁc subfacets (usually called arrays, fol-
lowing Ranganathan);
• Deciding the citation order between facets and between arrays;
• Deciding the ﬁling order between facets and between arrays and the
order of classes within each array;
• Adding a notation;
• Adding an A/Z index.
5.5. The role of logical division
Before considering each of these steps in detail, the general role of
logical division, which governs the crucial ﬁrst two steps, must be noted. The
rules of logical division, developed more than two millennia ago, are ad-
mirably brief:
• Only one characteristic of division should be applied at a time;
• Division should not make a leap; steps should be proximate;
• Division should be exhaustive.
The ﬁrst and crucial rule is purely one of conceptual analysis and doesn’t
depend on practical considerations. The second and third rules involve to
some extent subjective practical considerations as to the size of vocabulary
to be accommodated and the degree of speciﬁcity with which compound
classes are to be described. They are manifested only at the level of arrays
(see Section 7). Observance of the ﬁrst rule is the hallmark of faceted
classiﬁcation; a classiﬁcation that fails to observe it rigorously throughout
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the system cannot claim to be fully faceted. The operation of distinguish-
ing the subclasses of a genus has been well-described by Broadﬁeld (1946).
6. Division into Facets
The ﬁrst step is to assign all the terms constituting the vocabulary of
the subject into a limited number of broad categories. The use of the term
“category” requires some explanation here. The outcome of the classiﬁca-
tion is an almost inﬁnite number of possible subject descriptions of docu-
ments or parts of documents, nearly all of which will be compound classes
—i.e., requiring two or more terms to summarize their content. For exam-
ple, a document on radiographic diagnosis of bone cancer reﬂects four
different categories of concepts in medicine; if the human body is seen to
be the entity with which all medicine is concerned, bone is seen to be a Part,
cancer a Process (an action internal to the body), diagnosis an Operation
(an action performed on the body), and radiography an Agent of the op-
eration. But the notion of Part is not a category in the traditional sense
of the term, since it implies being a part of something—i.e., it is a relation,
not a unique and independent category. Similarly, Agent is relative to the
action it assists—it is a relation. So facet analysis might be said to be the
assignment of terms to true categories (Time, Space, Matter, etc.) and to
relational categories (Kind, Part, Agent, etc.).
6.1. Categories in subject ﬁelds
All or most of the categories will be found in all or most subject ﬁelds.
Ranganathan was the ﬁrst to see the need for initial categories. He provid-
ed ﬁve and called them Fundamental Categories—Personality, Matter,
Energy, Space, Time (widely referred to as PMEST). He claimed that this
order represented one of decreasing concreteness; so Colon displayed not
only a template for logical division but also a citation order (see Section
8.1). The (British) Classiﬁcation Research Group (CRG), formed in 1952,
developed a more detailed set of categories, entirely consistent with PMEST
in outcome but aiming to be more explicit—particularly in its interpreta-
tion of Personality; the set may be summarized as Deﬁning system or enti-
ty, its Kinds, its Parts, its Materials, its Properties, its Processes, Operations
on it, Agents of the Processes and Operations, Place, Time, Forms of pre-
sentation (of the information in the documents). The sequence above also
embodies a citation order (see Section 8.1).
Assigning terms to categories is a deductive approach to concept orga-
nization, and it may be noted that one member of the CRG advocated and
developed an inductive approach (Farradane, 1950). This he appropriate-
ly called relational analysis, since it is the relations between concepts that
are at the heart of retrieval and categories are really a ﬁrst step in recog-
nizing those relations. Classiﬁcations resulting from Farradane’s system
proved to be remarkably similar to those of faceted classiﬁcation.
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6.2. Facet analysis
The operation of logical division in assigning concepts consists in es-
sence of taking the whole vocabulary of the subject to be classiﬁed and ask-
ing of each concept, represented by a word or words, what category it be-
longs to in the context of the subject. This assignment to categories is simply
another way of expressing how a particular characteristic of division is ap-
plied to obtain classes that share that characteristic, although in different
ways (as division of objects by color will produce classes of different colors).
The process is best explained by considering some examples of subjects and
seeing how it handles every kind of concept.
6.3. Classiﬁcation of “Politics”
When classifying the subject “Politics,” a document may be found en-
titled “The British Nuclear Deterrent: For and Against.” Taking Politics as
the summum genus, we ﬁrst decide on an acceptable deﬁnition of the class;
this may be something as follows: Politics is the process in a social system
(not necessarily conﬁned to the level of the nation state) by which the goals
of that system are selected, ordered in terms of priority, both ideologically
and as to resources allocation, and implemented. Collectively, these func-
tions often are summarized as being the exercise of power within the po-
litical system. Bearing in mind the categories already recognized, the title
is analyzed to reveal the hidden concepts implicit in it; for the purposes of
this demonstration these could be stated in a string: Britain—Foreign re-
lations—National security—Weapons systems—Nuclear-Policy-Deterrence.
This string reﬂects the following category assignments: Britain is a particu-
lar state; although it could be assigned to a number of different species of
political systems (parliamentary democracies, monarchies, etc.), its logical
status (as deﬁning a particular political system) is technically that of a mem-
ber rather than a species of the genus. Foreign relations reﬂects the Sub-
systems, or Parts category; although the term “foreign relations” sounds like
a process, it reﬂects the main concern of an integral part of the wider pro-
cess of governing the political entity Britain. This analysis is consistent with
that distinguishing other major subsystems in politics (e.g., legislative sys-
tems) that are deﬁned by the political process. National security in the
context of politics is special to foreign relations and is treated as a Kind of
such relation. Weapon systems represent an Agent used in the exercise of
the process implicit in national security and Nuclear weapons represent a
Kind of weapons system. Policy is regarded as one of a number of general
activities or operations (in this case deﬁned by the social objectives sought)
that may apply at every level of political activity. Deterrence is a kind of
policy, applied here to the process of national security.
6.4. Classiﬁcation of “Medicine”
“Medicine” may be deﬁned as the technology concerned with the ac-
tions taken by the human person to maintain their health and treat their
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sickness. The deﬁnition of the subject leads directly to the primary catego-
ry (the deﬁning entity, the person), and all the other categories are real-
ized in their relationship to this. The categories disclosed are
• Kinds of human persons (females, males, young, old . . .)
• Parts of the person (anatomical and regional, and physiologically func-
tional subsystems—trunk, circulatory, neurological . . .)
• Processes in the person (normal physiology, pathology)
• Operations acting on the person (health maintaining or preventative,
diagnostic, therapeutic)
• Agents of operations (medical personnel, instruments, institutions—
hospitals, health services . . .)
So a particular document entitled “Rehabilitation Following Fracture of the
Femoral Neck [in old persons]” would get the index description: Old per-
sons (geriatrics)—Bone—Femur—Neck of femur—Fracture—Therapy—
Rehabilitation
Medicine also demonstrates a situation where two fundamental forms
of knowledge (here, the natural sciences and technology) may be said to
merge in response to the demands of a classiﬁcation for IR. This situation
is sometimes said to be one of the signs that the concept of separate disci-
plines is breaking down. But nothing is new in this situation; whether we
like to think, for example, of biochemistry as being a separate discipline
or not, the central conceptual relation between the disciplines of biology
and chemistry that meet in the class is clear: it deals with the chemical na-
ture of living things. Chemistry here is a ﬁeld of action serving the purpose
of explaining biological phenomena and as such serves primarily the study
of biology. It does not exist as a separate discipline outside the old-estab-
lished two. Medicine as a technology may be deﬁned as the application of
knowledge and skills to produce an artifact of some utility—in this case, a
healthier human person. It is inconceivable that the biological bases should
not be seen as part of it. Such collocations are at the heart of the notion of
helpful order that so appositely deﬁnes a main objective in indexing.
7. Division of a facet into its arrays
The classes constituting each facet are now organized into more speciﬁc
subfacets (called arrays by Ranganathan). At the facet level, classes are
undifferentiated and in most cases will not be mutually exclusive. An array
consists of mutually exclusive classes. To achieve this condition, which is
essential for the retrieval of a speciﬁc subject with a minimum of noise, these
classes now must be differentiated by applying speciﬁc characteristics of
division. For example, the primary category in building technology is Build-
ings, the entity reﬂecting the end-product or purpose of the technology.
These are now differentiated by function (to give residences, etc.), by dom-
inant material (timber buildings, etc.), by number of stories and so on. The
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classes in the arrays so formed are now mutually exclusive; one cannot have
a high-rise single-story building. But in some cases, certain arrays cannot
be so easily named. For example, in the large Subject of law facet (substan-
tive law), the ﬁrst step of division gives three very large subclasses (Private
law, Criminal law, Public law), each calling for further subdivision; the ar-
ray of subclasses of the ﬁrst includes Conﬂict of laws, Persons, Obligations,
Property, Commercial law—all with numerous subclasses of their own. At
this stage, numerous other characteristics still must be applied to distinguish
yet more speciﬁc arrays; this is clear from the fact that the subclasses are
not yet mutually exclusive, e.g., a compound class may be formed for torts
of property (in which torts comes from the class Obligations). So the pro-
cess of subdivision continues until characteristics are so speciﬁc that they
generate mutually exclusive classes in an array, e.g., Persons by age, Persons
by sex.
7.1. Division must be exhaustive
The constituent species collectively must be coextensive with the exten-
sion of the genus. The obvious difﬁculty encountered here is that of our
imperfect knowledge. This can be overcome in a technical sense by the
process of dichotomy, in which one species is named and all the others are
covered by its negative, e.g., the array (Buildings by material) could give
just two classes, brick buildings and nonbrick buildings, and this would ex-
haust the array—no buildings would be missed. In practice, of course, all
signiﬁcant kinds of other materials would be enumerated with a possible
residual class for “Others.”
7.2. Each step of division should be proximate
Division should not make a leap. Like exhaustivity, this is a counsel of
perfection, which in practice is limited by imperfections in our knowledge.
The price of failure is the obscuring of relations that might in fact be im-
portant in the deﬁnition of classes. Division of transport systems into road,
rail, sea, and air obscures the relationship of road and rail as being kinds
of land transport and of sea transport being a kind of water transport. In
this example, more than one characteristic of division has been overlooked,
e.g., land and water represent division by the characteristic of natural me-
dium, but road and rail reﬂect the characteristic of form of track, which is
special to land transport.
7.3. Special problems of division into arrays
As a faceted classiﬁcation moves into more and more detailed analysis
of a subject, more and more arrays are disclosed and some of these pose
special problems. Several examples have been given already of the situation
in which terms appearing in one facet (as properties, materials, parts, etc.)
appear also in other facets in a different relationship. For example, the
Materials facet in Building technology includes timber; this could qualify
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a structural unit (e.g., timber for fencing). But it also could deﬁne a unit
as being a kind of structure (e.g., timber houses). This relation is called
speciﬁcation (species-making). BC2 now generalizes this situation by assum-
ing the possibility of terms from any facet behaving in this way, and this may
be seen as a particular example of the general theory of analytico-synthet-
ic classiﬁcation. The distinction between qualiﬁcation and speciﬁcation was
regarded by Metcalfe (1957) as a major feature of the relations found in
indexing. At the most general level, it reﬂects the distinction between the
inclusion relation (generic, semantic, hierarchical) and syntactic relations
(see Section 12.3). It poses a particular problem in the entity (end-prod-
uct, purpose) facet (see Section 8.3) but can appear in other facets, e.g.,
the concept of prefabricated bathrooms (those fabricated off-site and in-
stalled in toto in different kinds of buildings) reﬂects a part of a building
(a room) speciﬁed by an operation (prefabrication). In BC2, wherever the
need is demonstrated, the array reﬂecting the primary entity in a subject
(e.g., in Building technology, the Buildings by function array) is preceded
by a number of arrays derived by speciﬁcation using other facets, for ex-
ample, Buildings by detachment, Buildings by number of stories. In chem-
istry, the primary entity array (Substances by chemical constitution—i.e.,
elements and their compounds) is preceded by a number of arrays deﬁned
by concepts from other facets (Behavioral properties, Structural properties)
and so on. In nearly all classes these other, derivative arrays appear in the
same order as their deﬁning facets appear in the class in general. In this
respect, it has been noted (Coates, 1973) that a faceted classiﬁcation pro-
vides a potent medium whereby newly emergent classes can be accommo-
dated in a consistent and predictable fashion.
A further problem exposed by speciﬁcation is that of dependent con-
cepts. For example, in chemistry, the concept of allotropy might appear in
the Properties facet, and by using it as a speciﬁer it could generate the sep-
arate class of substances Allotropes. But allotropy is a property special to
(dependent on) allotropes and should appear only under allotropes. In
BC2, such dependent classes may appear in their basic facet as ghost classes,
accompanied by a reference (e.g., Allotropy, see Allotropes). This situation
does not occur in the example of (say) an operation like prefabrication;
this could be used to specify a number of quite different objects in build-
ing technology (e.g., prefabricated bathrooms, as well as prefabricated
buildings) and would therefore appear in the Operations facet in its own
right.
8. Extralogical Steps in Classification Design
8.1. Citation order (combination order)
After logical division, this is the most important feature of a faceted
classiﬁcation. It may be deﬁned as the order in which the characteristics
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governing division of a class into its facets and arrays are applied. This in
turn is reﬂected in the order in which the constituent terms/concepts
(which together summarize the content of a document) appear in an in-
dex-description. This is seen most clearly in the rubric (heading) that rep-
resents a compound class in a speciﬁc alphabetical subject index (see Sec-
tion 12.2); the designation “speciﬁc” here relates to subject headings that
seek maximal precision (speciﬁcity) in describing a work’s subject. Nota-
bly, the subject headings in most alphabetical subject catalogs are rarely
precise enough to demonstrate this clearly; in a classiﬁed catalog, the full
rubric for an entry in a medical library catalog (say) might represent a string
of terms: Old persons: Bone: Femur: Neck of femur: Fracture: Therapy:
Rehabilitation. Usually, in a classiﬁed catalog, only the term(s) represent-
ing the last steps(s) in the hierarchy are given in the heading, the others
being provided for by the headings in the previous steps. The full rubric
will appear in the A/Z index to the classiﬁed catalog, but in reverse order
(see Section 11). Two crucial features of a classiﬁcation system are largely
determined by citation order: First, predictability in locating classes. The
citation order decided must be observed consistently if predictability is to
be achieved. Clearly, if documents on a disease are sometimes subordinat-
ed to the organ affected and sometimes vice-a-versa, the locating of classes
becomes unpredictable. Before the appearance of Ranganathan’s catego-
ries, a measure of consistency was attempted by sets of pragmatic rules,
exempliﬁed by Merrill (1939) in his Code for Classiﬁers. The advent of com-
prehensive category-based rules has now made such selective rules largely
redundant. Second, helpful order: This refers primarily to the helpfulness
of the collocations it produces—what is kept together and what is scattered
by subordination to other concepts. The number of different ways of clas-
sifying a subject is so huge that it would be rash to say that one order is better
than all the others. But the one decided upon should be one of which it
cannot be said that another is better.
8.2. Citation order of facets
The primary facet in a subject represents a summum genus and the
other categories at the facet level clearly reﬂect the different relationships
that concepts may have to it. For example, in the class Building technolo-
gy, the primary facet is that of Buildings. Terms in the other facets always
imply the relationship of the concept represented to buildings, e.g., weather
resistance in the Properties facet means weather resistance in buildings; sill
in the Parts facet means a sill in a building (usually in some kind of open-
ing). These relationships provide a clear and powerful basis for the citation
order. Agents serve the operations that may act on the processes or parts
or kinds of the deﬁning entity; the processes are inherent in the parts or
kinds; the parts belong to the kinds; properties may belong to any of the
foregoing and therefore constitute a sort of ﬂoating facet, qualifying which-
ever category they belong to.
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The problem of citation order was ﬁrst tackled by Ranganathan in his
Colon Classiﬁcation (see Section 6.1). His ﬁve fundamental categories
(PMEST) represented a citation order of decreasing concreteness. While
the practical demonstration of the categories and their order in Colon made
them reasonably clear, the CRG sought to develop a more detailed set of
categories, entirely consistent with PMEST in outcome, but more explicit,
particularly in its interpretation of the concepts Personality and Energy; like
PMEST, they were presented in a citation order that may be summarized
as Deﬁning system or entity, its Kinds, its Parts, its Materials, its Properties,
its Processes, Operations on it, Agents of the Processes and Operations,
Place, Time, Forms of presentation. In seeking to explain the relations more
fully, the deﬁning system came to be seen as reﬂecting the end-product of
the subject in that the other categories are all seen to be features of it or
actions directed at producing or sustaining it. The production of this end-
product, whether by natural forces or by human actions, is seen as reﬂect-
ing the purpose of the subject and the overall sequence reﬂecting the gen-
eral principle of the subordination of means to ends. Like “only connect,”
this principle (which may be seen as a species of the ﬁrst principle), reﬂects
a quite fundamental element in the perception of relationships.
Several other systems have been developed, primarily for speciﬁc alpha-
betical indexes, which incorporate comprehensive rules for citation order,
articulated by the relations between the terms in the heading. These are
considered in Section 12.3.
8.3. Citation order between the arrays in a facet
The powerful rules for citation order described above operate only to
a limited degree when deciding citation order between arrays. This is usu-
ally thought to be a weak element in the theory of faceted classiﬁcation, seen
as the essential basis of a fully predictable linear order. But this criticism
needs to be qualiﬁed by a number of factors, and notably it has not proved
to be a serious problem in the comprehensive testing ground provided by
BC2. The nature of the compound classes demanding a ruling varies greatly
with the subject concerned and would in any case rule out consideration
of an immutable rule for arrays in all subjects. The principle of purpose or
end-product in the facet formula continues to operate, e.g., in the Build-
ings facet of Building technology, the array (By function) is cited ﬁrst; in
any Materials facet, the array (By constitution) will cite before arrays reﬂect-
ing other facets (e.g., By property). The principle of decreasing concrete-
ness leads to the array deﬁned by membership rather than class being cit-
ed ﬁrst (e.g., in many social sciences—politics, law, etc., where the nation
state deﬁnes the ﬁrst characteristic of division).
Special (implicit) arrays and derivative arrays. The arrays in a facet usual-
ly fall into two groups; those that are special or peculiar to the facet and
deﬁne it and those that are derived by speciﬁcation (see Section 7.3), e.g.,
in Building technology, the ﬁrst-cited array in the Buildings array is that of
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Function, to give houses, prisons, etc.; this clearly deﬁnes the purpose and
is special to buildings. Other arrays include one characterized by predom-
inant material; this is a derived array, with speciﬁcation by terms from the
Materials facet.
Derivative arrays. These are not implicit; e.g., Prefabricated, as a differ-
ence “added” to the species Buildings, to give the subclasss Prefabricated
buildings, is not implicit in the species Building. Things other than build-
ings may be prefabricated—e.g., furnishing units. The concept Prefabricat-
ed derives from the operation of prefabrication, which is located in the
Operations facet. This feature characterizes all derivative species—they are
all derived from other facets. To meet this situation, BC2 now provides
classes with the facility to use all the other applicable facets in the role of
speciﬁers. Naturally, the order in which the donor facets are taken will be
the order they already have in the facet citation order. But in nearly all cases,
these arrays will be cited after those arrays that are special to the primary
facet. Similarly, the numerous arrays deﬁning kinds of semigroups in alge-
bra are cited according to the status of their deﬁnition in terms of the cat-
egories reﬂected, whose citation order has already been determined by their
categorical status. So Semigroups by system (matrix semigroups, topologi-
cal semigroups, etc.) are cited before Semigroups by property (linear, ﬁnite,
etc.) and these before Semigroups by relation (inverse, etc.) and these
before Semigroups by operation (multiplicative, etc.).
A simple example of how the above problem can occur at any level of
the hierarchy is that of Leatherwork in the Decorative arts class. The latter
is deﬁned in many cases by the material used, giving silversmithing art, tex-
tile arts, etc. This demonstrates the fact that a deﬁning array itself can some-
times reﬂect another facet, just as when Place features as the primary facet
in classes like politics and law. The same principle holds when the array (By
kind of leather) is taken as a deﬁning array in Leatherwork, whereas the
array (By technique) is derivative, giving, e.g., embossed leatherwork.
8.4. Problems of citation order in array
The absence of a comprehensive general formula for citation order be-
tween arrays can, however, present special problems on some occasions; a
prominent example is found in the classiﬁcation of the Arts; in analyzing
the literature to determine what categories and arrays to recognize, a docu-
ment might be found entitled “The Romantic Landscape in 19th-Century
British Painting.” Assume that a working deﬁnition of the arts has already
been made: that branch of creative activity concerned with the production
of works characterized by imaginative design and expression and in which
aesthetic considerations predominate. The concepts in the title, taken in
turn, might then be deﬁned in terms such as Romantic designates a move-
ment in art that reﬂects a commitment to feeling rather than intellectual
discipline (and so on); Landscape refers to an art (most often in painting)
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deﬁned by its subject matter; nineteenth century deﬁnes the art of a cultur-
al period; British deﬁnes a society or culture in which the art was produced;
Painting deﬁnes a particular medium. The trouble is that all these reﬂect
the primary facet of Kinds of art. Romantic is a Kind of art deﬁned by a style,
movement, or school; style reﬂects concepts from the Properties and Ele-
ments facets (e.g., didactic, eclectic, realistic, symbolic, fantastic); Movement
and School both imply concepts from Place and Period. These three con-
cepts overlap so seriously that they cannot bear the burden of being sepa-
rate arrays, although provision is made for general works on each of them.
The concepts of Landscape art, Nineteenth-century art, British art, and Paint-
ing are clearly all legitimate claimants to the status of kinds of art. When it
comes to deciding the citation order of the four arrays, several considerations
arise. The working deﬁnition clearly implies that the work of art produced
gives us the entity we start with. Also, the properties characterizing the work
clearly imply a human creator, and this facet, the artist, could be construed
as the primary one. But consideration of the role of the division of labor in
the classiﬁcation of knowledge (see Section 7) combined with the fact that
the vast majority of artists operate in a special medium suggest that the
medium should be treated as the primary facet. This is reinforced by prag-
matic considerations of helpful order. It is inconceivable, for example, that
music should be cited after any of the other arrays. This would mean citing
La Mer or the Enigma variations, say, under Subjects of art (landscape, por-
traiture). But the citation order of the others is less clear. If the artist is seen
to deﬁne the obvious second array, the importance of the culture in which
the artist produced his or her work suggests that place and time also may
be serious contenders. Here, the decision that a general classiﬁcation must
make may not meet the demands of all its users, and the provision of alter-
native citation orders becomes desirable.
8.5. Alternative citation orders
The problems posed must be seen in the context of the purpose of li-
brary classiﬁcation, which does not seek to educate the specialist (in the
above case, art historians and art critics) in the structure of their subject but
to provide an instrument that assists the ready locating and relating of
records according to their content. It also emphasizes that the arrangement
within a subject in a general classiﬁcation may not serve the needs of a spe-
cial collection, e.g., a college library may want its arrangement to reﬂect as
far as possible the curriculum in the subject as taught in that college. The
original Bliss classiﬁcation was notable for its provision for alternative ar-
rangements to meet this problem. BC2 has followed and extended this pol-
icy, and it is worth noting that a number of college librarians using it prefer
to use some of its alternative arrangements for the very reasons mentioned.
In this way, they enjoy the comprehensive analysis, vocabulary, and notation
of the general scheme and yet manage to ﬁt it to their special needs.
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9. Filing Order of Classes
This is the sequence in which the individual classes, simple or com-
pound, ﬁle one after the other in a linear order. It is quite different from
citation order. The latter is analogous to the order of constituents in a tele-
phone directory entry—Surname, Forename, Designation (Dr., Sir, etc.,
perhaps). But whereas the second dimension in the directory (the A/Z
ﬁling order of the names) has nothing in common with the ﬁrst in the
manner of its construction, this is not so with the classiﬁcation, in which
ﬁling order is determined to a large extent by the citation order. Filing order
has two quite separate components: ﬁrst, the ﬁling order of the facets and
arrays when each facet and each array is treated as a single block of classes,
and second, the ﬁling order of the individual classes within each array.
9.1. Facet ﬁling order
This is the order in which the individual facets (each regarded as a block
of classes) ﬁle, one after the other. It is usually the reverse of the citation
order, i.e., the ﬁrst-cited facet ﬁles last, the second-cited facet ﬁles next to
last, and so on. This is entirely due to its need to observe a general before
special order.
General before special (decreasing extension). This principle is quite inde-
pendent of faceted classiﬁcation. It is considered here because its imple-
mentation requires what is called an inverted order in the ﬁling of the fac-
ets and of the arrays within them. It is deﬁned thus: a class that completely
contains another class should ﬁle before that class. The observance of this
rule seems to be almost a universal expectation; perhaps it reﬂects a folk-
awareness of the holistic principle of distinguishing the wood from the trees.
For example, a work on marketing is expected to ﬁle before one on the
speciﬁc forms of marketing (retailing, etc.) and a general work on retain-
ing before its speciﬁc forms (self-service retailing, franchise, etc.).
The inverted schedule. To observe general before special necessitates a
design feature usually referred to as the inverted schedule; we use the layout
of the printed schedule here to demonstrate the problem because all librar-
ians are familiar with the situation whereby the classiﬁcation is laid out in
schedules before it is translated into the linear order of classes manifested
on the library shelves and in the classiﬁed subject catalog. For example, in a
medical classiﬁcation the ﬁrst-cited facet (Kinds of persons) ﬁles last; the
second-cited facet (Parts of the body) ﬁles next to last, and so on. As a result,
a work on the skeletal system of old persons would ﬁle not only after old
persons in general, but also after the class Skeletal systems in general. If the
schedule were not inverted, the special would ﬁle before the general.
9.3. Filing order of arrays
In the ﬁling order of the arrays within each facet, the situation is ex-
actly analogous to the ﬁling order of facets; the arrays ﬁle in an order that
is the reverse of their citation order, e.g., in the Building technology class,
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the ﬁrst-cited array is the array (By function) and it ﬁles last; the second-
cited array (By attachment) ﬁles next to last, and so on.
9.4. Filing order within arrays
 This is another problem, quite distinct from the ﬁling order of the
arrays (as blocks of classes) themselves. An array results from the applica-
tion of a characteristic of division so precise that its subclasses are mutual-
ly exclusive; so it does not contain compound classes and the problem of
general before special doesn’t arise. Numerous helpful orders in array have
been identiﬁed: operations are often given in order of performance (e.g.,
preparation of soil, sowing, protection of crop . . .); this is really a special
example of chronological order, which is a major feature in many classes
in the Humanities; geographical (contiguity) order is also a major one in
many arrays besides its role in the ﬁling order in the Place facet. For some
arrays, no obvious systematic order of its classes is applicable, and these are
arranged alphabetically.
10. Notation
This assigns to each and every class in the system a symbol (classmark)
that possesses or is given an ordinal value; this locates any class mechanical-
ly, without the user having to know its hierarchical position. Although this
has nothing whatsoever to do with the problems of concept analysis and
knowledge organization per se, it is an essential feature of a library classiﬁ-
cation. Moreover, numerous misconceptions tend to persist that impede the
understanding of the conceptual arrangement. So the problems of notation
are considered here in more detail than would otherwise be justiﬁed.
10.1. Functions of notation
Notation may be deﬁned as a system of ordinal symbols that mechanizes
the order of classes in a bibliographical or other linear classiﬁcation. For
example: SL9 H is the classmark in BC2 for the subject Appellate proceed-
ings in common law systems. Assuming that users know the ordinal sequences
A/Z and 1/9, the only rule they need to know is that in BC2 a number ﬁles
before a letter. They can then locate the class exactly in the largest of law
collections and can do this mechanically, without knowing the conceptual
hierarchy in which the class occurs; in the example above, this is
Law [S]—Legal systems [SCY]—National systems [SHY]— Common
law systems [SL]—Practice and procedure [SL6]—Courts & court pro-
cedure [SL6 E] — Actions, lawsuits [SL8]—Trials, hearings [SL8 S]—
Trial procedure [SL8 ST]—Judicial decisions [SL9 D]—Remedies [SL9
G]—Administrative remedies [SL9 GV]—Appeal, appellate proceed-
ings [SL9 H].
This example demonstrates several points about notation. First, it in no way
determines the order of classes or the location of a particular class. The
latter is determined completely by the concepts deﬁning the class and the
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rules for citation order and ﬁling order. Notation is simply a servant, using
our common knowledge of the sequence conveyed by the basic ordinal
symbols used to represent the classes. Second, the quite secondary function
of “expressing the hierarchy” is neither necessary nor in a bibliographical
system, possible, in that the burden of adding a notational symbol for ev-
ery step of division in the hierarchy would be quite insupportable. That
some systems (DC, UDC, and to some extent Colon) claim to have expres-
sive notations is misleading in that their notations are expressive only up
to a point. This is like saying a chain is strong except that some of its links
are weak. Whether a given classmark in such systems is truly expressive is
quite unpredictable. Third, a major advantage of a nonexpressive notation
(often called an ordinal notation because it seeks only to serve the central
function of notation) is that it greatly simpliﬁes the allocation of notation
and the accommodation of new classes. Fourth, it makes possible much
briefer classmarks; this is demonstrated by the example above of Appellate
proceedings in common law, in which a classmark of four characters rep-
resents a conceptual sequence of twelve hierarchical steps following the
main class S Law. A fully expressive notation would require at least thirteen
characters.
10.2. Qualities of notation
These are described in detail in a number of textbooks and articles and
need only the briefest consideration here. The two basic qualities are sim-
plicity and hospitality. The ﬁrst depends mainly on the types of symbols used
and on brevity, both considered above. The second, hospitality, is the abil-
ity of the notation to accommodate whatever number of classes demand a
distinct classmark. In a faceted classiﬁcation, this means the ability to as-
sign a unique position to any compound class called for; theoretically, any
class may be combined with any other class other than the mutually exclu-
sive classes in its own array. This implies that the notation must be able to
provide for all these. So, just as the conceptual structure is called analyti-
co-sythetic, a faceted notation is called a synthetic notation (the analytico
component being the preserve of the conceptual classiﬁcation). The cen-
tral problem now is how to provide for the linking of any class with any other
while maintaining completely the conceptual order designed for the hier-
archy. One way of doing this is to use explicit “facet indicators” as in UDC
and Colon (e.g., arbitrary symbols like ( ).” “, :, -.).
An alternative method is known as retroactive notation as used in BC2.
Since BC2 is used in this paper as the main vehicle for demonstrating all
features of faceted classiﬁcation, a brief account of retroactive notation is
given here. The principle was (once again!) ﬁrst used by Dewey, who re-
served the zero to “introduce” three different facets (Bibliographic form,
Period, and Place). So the ﬁrst special subject division in a class is usually
given the next digit (one) since the zero is reserved, e.g., 61 is the ﬁrst sub-
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ject division in class 6. In BC2 this principle of reserving earlier symbols that
can then be added directly to the classmark they are qualifying is the main
device for notational synthesis; it is called retroactive because synthesis in
an inverted schedule is nearly always effected by qualifying one class by
earlier classes—i.e., working backward (retro) in the inverted schedule, e.g.,
in Class S Law the following classes are found:
• Damages (from the class Legal actions) S9M;
• Personal injury (from the class Tort) SBGQR;
• English law (from the class Common law) SN.
For the subject Damages for personal injury in English law, the classmark,
built retroactively, is SNG QR9 M. Note that (1) A special provision for na-
tional jurisdictions allows all the classes in SB Substantive law to be added di-
rectly, dropping the two initial letters SB. (2) A convention to assist the easy
reading of classmarks is to give the classmark in spaced multiples of three.
10.3. Hospitality to new subjects
This is, of course, an important conceptual problem (see Section 5.1),
but it is often considered in notational terms. A classiﬁcation system, regard-
ed purely as a sequence of terms representing a hierarchy of conceptual
classes, has no difﬁculty in inserting new classes once it has decided where
they logically go. Just how the notation can accommodate it exactly at that
theoretically desirable point is another problem. Ranganathan described
it as one in which “notation brings rigidity.” Remember that Ranganathan
assumed an expressive (hierarchical) notation in which rigidity is certain-
ly a major problem. In an ordinal notation, the only problem it poses is that
of brevity for the new class. It does not have to bother about what the class-
mark looks like in terms of expressing the hierarchy.
11. The Alphabetical Index to the Classification
The A/Z index to the printed schedule was mentioned brieﬂy in Sec-
tion 3.2. Here, the relations between the A/Z entries, using the natural
language, and the conceptual hierarchies governing the classiﬁcation itself
are brieﬂy considered. The A/Z index performs two essential functions: it
provides the user of the classiﬁcation with a key, linking the natural language
terms for the classes to the classmarks that locate them; it complements the
systematic display of relations in the hierarchy by showing under any term
the distributed relatives.
The main problem is the enormous number of compound classes that
are theoretically possible in a faceted classiﬁcation (or even a largely enu-
merative one like DC), which makes it quite prohibitive to show all the dis-
tributed relatives in the A/Z index. The optimal solution to this is to rec-
ognize that the classiﬁed index and the A/Z index complement each other
and that a fair division of labor is possible between the two parts. This solu-
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tion is found in what Ranganathan called chain indexing (see, e.g., Mills,
1960). This has one fundamental rule—that a term in the A/Z index should
never be qualiﬁed by one of its own subclasses from the classiﬁed hierar-
chy, e.g., using BC2, an A/Z index entry:
Appellate proceedings S9H I
would not be followed in the A/Z index by
Appellate proceedings: Right of appeal S9H I
because the latter will be found in the classiﬁed sequence, following S9H.
If it is sought via the latter, it will be found there, at
S9H I Right of appeal in appellate proceedings
Chain indexing is a highly economical method of constructing an A/Z
index, since it does not duplicate work already done in the classiﬁed se-
quence. It is necessary to distinguish here the printed index from the classiﬁ-
cation schedule and the much fuller index that may be provided to the
collection of a given library system or to a special bibliography or national
bibliography. So, for example, although no entry will appear in the print-
ed index to Class S in BC2 for
Appellate proceedings: Scots law SOB 9H
a classiﬁed catalog to a law collection would include the entry if the library
had literature on Scots law. The other major feature of chain indexing is
that it automatically provides a coherent and predictable order of the terms
qualifying the lead term. This order is the reverse of the hierarchy, e.g., in
BC2, the entries generated for the speciﬁc subject
Old persons–Femur neck–Fracture–Rehabilitation
in a medical index would be
Old persons HXW
Bones: Old persons HXW TKX
Femur: Old persons HXW TNP
Neck of femur: Old persons HXW TNP SR
Fracture: Neck of femur: Old persons HXW TNP SRN DL
Rehabilitation: Fracture: Neck of femur: Old persons HXW TNP SRN
DLG TR
This order of terms in each entry may be compared with the order most
likely to occur in the natural language statement of the subject as deter-
mined by the syntax of the language:
Rehabilitation [after] fracture [of the] neck [of the] femur bone [in]
old people.
It is clear that the standard citation produces structures that closely paral-
lel, in reverse order, those of the natural language.
Before leaving this example, it is worth noting that the rather daunt-
ing length that classmarks can reach reﬂects not on the order or notation
of the classiﬁcation but on the speciﬁcity it aims at in subject description.
Even relatively broad classiﬁcations like DC and LC occasionally reach the
length of classmark shown above, but for less speciﬁc subjects.
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12. Classification and Alphabetical Subject Catalogs
This term is used here to stand for any index to the information con-
tent that is alphabetically arranged and is independent of any classiﬁed
arrangement. This raises the twofold difﬁculty that catalog searchers have
to recognize: Just what are the concepts involved in the subject they seek,
and how can they cope with the vagaries of the natural language when phras-
ing that need for searching? While its basic principle is to give the user
known names in a known order (to use Metcalfe’s phrase) every practic-
ing librarian knows that this is only the second step. The ﬁrst requirement
is for users to know just where they want to get to; for this they need a map
of the subject terrain, showing exactly where the numerous sideroads
branching off the main highway lead to.
12.1. Subject headings
The original form taken by these is familiar to all librarians and is ex-
empliﬁed for general collections by the Sears and Library of Congress sub-
ject headings. The ﬁrst feature to be noted is the absence of any serious
provision for the speciﬁcity demanded by a special collection. This inevita-
bly impairs its ability to locate subjects precisely. The second is the relative
arbitrariness in the provision made for the relating function. While the
indication of broader and narrower terms inevitably invokes the classiﬁca-
tion, the choice of terms related in ways other than in generic and parti-
tive hierarchies is usually highly pragmatic and unpredictable.
12.2. Speciﬁcity in subject headings
If a subject heading is to provide for the multiplicity of relations con-
sidered earlier under faceted classiﬁcation and that frequently arise now
even at the level of books and monographs, predictability in locating de-
mands that comprehensive rules must be observed governing the citation
order of components in any given string of terms. The general principle
observed is said to be that of immediate access via the sought term. But this
only begs the question as to what that term is when faced with even quite
simple subjects; e.g., an inquirer looking for child psychology looks under
psychology of children; an enquiry for works on the economic history of
Britain in the Victorian period poses immediately which of the six likely (or
twenty-four possible) combinations of terms should be tried ﬁrst.
12.3. Relator systems
Since the 1950s, several different systems have been developed, each
using their own set of rules for citation order. The term “relators” is often
used to describe the conceptual relationships underlying their rules and
the symbols that may be used to signal those relationships. The main sys-
tems are Farradane’s relational analysis (Farradane, 1950), SYNTOL (Gar-
din, 1965), the British Technology Index (BTI) (1962–; Coates, 1960), and
PRECIS (Austin, 1984). The latter (its name standing for Preserved con-
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text indexing system) was originally designed as an alphabetical index to
the classiﬁed British National Bibliography (BNB) but with particular re-
gard for the way in which this might be computer-assisted. The syntactical
strings it developed were later applied to free-standing alphabetical indexes.
The interaction of classiﬁcation, categories, and relations is analyzed in a
key paper by Coates (1973). The distinction between categories and rela-
tions in the context of the classiﬁed index, was considered brieﬂy in Sec-
tion 6.1. The central problem in the case of speciﬁc alphabetical subject
headings is essentially the same. To achieve predictability in locating, rules
for citing the terms in a compound heading must be strictly observed. Clear-
ly, many of the same rules as those described in Section 8.1/3 can be ap-
plied. The resulting strings can be seen to consist of a leading term, how-
ever arrived at, followed by the other terms according to their relationship
to that leading term. A very practical advantage of this articulation of rela-
tionships independently of any given classiﬁcation system is that a special
library can set up such an index with minimal recourse to existing index
languages (Coates, 1973).
The conspicuous absentee in the alphabetical subject catalog is the
inclusion relation, generic or partitive, which is the bedrock of the classiﬁed
index. Ideally, systems like those above would be supplemented by a com-
prehensive classiﬁcation with a structure compatible with the principles of
the relator system. Perhaps because, theoretically at least, the speciﬁc alpha-
betical subject heading reﬂects the natural language more closely than that
of the classiﬁed index, the terminology used for them also reﬂects linguis-
tic terms; the relations between the terms are variously called syntactic, syn-
tagmatic, and analytic. The terms used to describe the generic inclusion
relation are variously semantic, paradigmatic, generic, and hierarchical; the
concept of speciﬁcation (see Section 7.3) is called predication in SYNTOL
and differencing in PRECIS.
12.4. The thesaurus
This is now well-established as an IR tool that provides a controlled
language for postcoordinate systems (although it is possible to conceive its
structure being accommodated within that of the A/Z index to a classiﬁca-
tion). Because its use of compound terms (bound terms) is severely limit-
ed, the problem of citation order is minimal. The situation regarding con-
nectives is almost identical to that in the conventional lists of subject
headings but is usually treated in much more detail. The inclusion relation
is covered by BTs and NTs; the scale of provision of other relations (asso-
ciative relations) is less predictable. The relevance of an attendant faceted
classiﬁcation system is obvious, and this is considered in general terms by
Aitchison, Gilchrist, & Bawden (1997) and speciﬁcally in relation to BC2
by Aitchison (1986). Fugmann (1994) gives a lengthy and illuminating re-
view of a special thesaurus utilizing classiﬁcatory principles.
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Appendix 1
Outline of Bliss Bibliographic Classification (BC2)
* See Section 5.2.
* 13 volumes have been published; 2 are in the press. All other classes have
detailed drafts in an advanced state, awaiting ﬁnalization before publi-
cation.
Introduction & Auxiliary Schedule
* Common facets for Form, Time, Place, Languages, Ethnic
groups.
2 Generalia
3 (Objects of knowledge, phenomena classes)
*Subjects treated from a multidisciplinary or nondisciplinary
point of view: Properties, Processes, Entities (mainly materials
and organisms), arranged by their unique deﬁnition.
4 Prolegomena to a universal classiﬁcation* The ﬁeld of knowl-
edge itself is the subject. Universe of knowledge.. Methods of
enquiry.. Information skills (Forms of knowledge, disciplines)
5 (Operations on information) Data processing.. Computers..
6 Recorded knowledge, library & information science & technolo-
gy
A Philosophy & logic... AM Mathematics & statistics
AY Science & technology in general.. Science.. Physical science..
B Physics.. C Chemistry.. D Astronomy.. Earth sciences..
E Biology.. Microbiology.. F Botany.. G Zoology
GS Applied biology.. Plant & animal husbandry.. Human ecology
H Human biology.. Physical anthropology..
HH Applied human biology.. Health & medicine.. I Psychology..
J Education.. JZ Social sciences & humanities in general
K Society.. Sociology & social anthropology.. Customs & folklore
L2 Area studies.. Travel & topography..
L6 History.. Biography..
P Religion.. {Alternative, preferred at Z)
Q Applied social sciences.. Social welfare.. Crime & criminology
R Political science.. S Law..
T Economics.. TQ Management of economic enterprises..
U Technology.. Materials.. Energy technologies.. Construction
technology.. Transport technology.. Process industries..
VV Household technology & management..
VW Recreation arts..
W The Arts.. Visual arts.. Applied arts & design.. Fine arts..
WP Performing arts.. Music.. Theatre.. Cinema..
X Philology.. Language & literature
Z Religion.. The Occult..
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Appendix 2
Examples of Hierarchies in BC2
* Both display inverted schedules and retroactive notation; e.g.,
Criminal court procedure SBW 6E; Children in primary care
HXO ELK (in which a special facet indicator E is used).
HH1 G HEALTH & MEDICINE
HIAP (Agents) HHG Personnel
HI (Operations) Technical procedures..
(Agents) Medical materials.. Equipment..
HJ Preventive medicine.. Public health.. Health maintenance
HL Curative medicine
HLK Primary care.. Secondary care.. Nursing..
HN Clinical medicine
HNG Investigation.. Diagnosis.. Treatment, therapy..
HNRE Physical therapy.. Radiation therapy.. Drug therapy..
(Processes)
HP Diseases & pathology.. By process.. By cause..
(Parts, organs, systems of the body)
HTF Regions.. HTJ Locomotor system, musculo-skeletal system..
HUG Cardiovascular system.. HUR Nervous system..
HWE Respiratory system.. HWI Digestive system..
HWV Urogenital system..
(Kinds of persons)
HXD Males.. Females.. HXO Children.. HXW Aged persons..
S LAW
S2 Primary materials (Works of law as distinct from works about)
(Common subdivisions)
S34 Legal profession
S5A Jurisprudence.. Sources of law.. Formal.. Case law..
S6 Practice & procedure, administration of justice
S6A Practice of law.. Preparation of documents.. Advocacy..
S6G Courts & court procedure.. Kinds of courts..
S8 Actions, lawsuits.. Parties to the action.. Proceedings..
S8 Hearings.. Trial procedure.. Evidence..
S9 Judicial decision.. Juries.. Remedies.. Appeal..
S9 (Special kinds of proceedings).. Summary.. Class actions
S9VB Substantive law, subjects of law
(By relation of jurisdiction to persons)
S9W Private law.. Civil law.. Conﬂict of laws..
SAP Persons.. Family & kinship.. Corporate persons..
SBD Obligations.. Liability.. Contract.. Torts..
SBH Property law.. Commercial law..
SBS Environmental law.. Social law.. Cultural law..
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SBW Criminal law
SBY Public law.. Constitutional law..
SCYX Jurisdictions, systems of law
SD (By political authority)
SD International law.. Law of war..
SE Supranational law.. European Union law..
SH National law, municipal law
SL Common law systems.. English law.. Anglo-American..
SR Civil law systems.. French law..
(By religious authority)
SWE Ecclesiastical law.. Christian law, canon law..
SYB Islamic law, Shari’a
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The Epistemological Foundations of
Knowledge Representations
Elaine Svenonius
Abstract
This paper looks at the epistemological foundations of knowl-
edge representations embodied in retrieval languages. It considers ques-
tions such as the validity of knowledge representations and their effective-
ness for the purposes of retrieval and automation. The knowledge
representations it considers are derived from three theories of meaning that
have dominated twentieth-century philosophy.
The discipline of philosophy impacts other knowledge disciplines, par-
ticularly in the theoretical constructs they employ. The purpose of this pa-
per is to explore how epistemology, that branch of philosophy concerned with
how and what we know, has contributed to the design of knowledge repre-
sentations embodied in retrieval languages designed for organizing informa-
tion. Different retrieval languages make different presuppositions about what
is meant by knowledge. These differences give rise to questions such as
• How valid are the knowledge representations embodied in different
retrieval languages, i.e., how well do they do what they purport to do,
i.e., to represent knowledge?
• How effective are they in facilitating the achievement of the objectives
of a retrieval language: collocation, discrimination, and navigation?
• How amenable are they to automation and semantic interoperability?
In the course of the twentieth century, the problem of what and how we
know has been dealt with through language analysis and theories of mean-
ing. Three theories of meaning are especially relevant to the discussion of
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knowledge representations: Operationalism, the Referential or Picture the-
ory of meaning, and the Contextual or Instrumental theory of meaning.
Operationalism
Operationalism is a theory of meaning emanating from the philosophy
of logical positivism. Logical positivism, an extreme form of empiricism,
dominated philosophy of science in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Empiricism holds that all knowledge is derivable from experience, i.e.,
from sense perceptions. For instance: our knowledge of time as used as a
variable in a mathematical equation, e.g., v = d/t, is ultimately derivable from
propositions recording our sensory experience of time. The experience
upon which knowledge is based must be objective. This condition is ex-
pressed by the Principle of Veriﬁability, which states that in order to be
meaningful, a proposition must be capable of veriﬁcation. The totality of
knowledge consists of all meaningful propositions. Examples of nonmean-
ingful propositions are those of an ethical, religious, or “esthetic kind,” e.g.,
“truth is beauty” is not meaningful because it cannot be veriﬁed, therefore,
it is excluded from the corpus of knowledge.
For a proposition to be veriﬁed, the concepts within it need to be
deﬁned operationally, i.e., they need to be deﬁned constructively. In prac-
tice, deﬁning a concept operationally often means deﬁning it as a variable.
Deﬁning concepts as variables enables a discipline to advance. The most
celebrated example of this phenomenon is Einstein’s use of operational
deﬁnitions in his analysis of simultaneity (Bridgman, 1938, p. 7). A graph-
ic example of the practicality of operational deﬁnitions is that of Edding-
ton’s elephant sliding down a hill of wet grass (Eddington, 1929, pp. 251
ff). Eddington asks us to consider the mass of this sliding elephant. Con-
ceivably it could be regarded as a property of the elephant (“a condition
which we vaguely describe as ‘ponderosity’”) (p. 251); on the other hand,
it could be regarded as a pointer reading on a scale, i.e., two tons. It may
be intuitive to think of mass as a property, but Eddington observes: “we shall
not get much further that way; the nature of the external world is inscruta-
ble, and we shall only plunge into a quagmire of indescribables” (p. 251).
He goes on to argue that it is more productive to regard mass as a pointer
reading, i.e., as a value of a variable. Not only does this give a method for
testing the proposition “the elephant weighs two tons”; it enables the two
tons of the elephant to be related to other pointer readings, i.e., to values
of other variables, such as velocity, coefﬁcient of friction, etc. Operational
deﬁnitions, by providing empirical correlates for concepts in the form of
variables, allow variables to be related one to another. Propositions that
express relationships among variables are “scientiﬁc” in the sense that they
take the form of generalizations and serve an explanatory function: if ver-
iﬁed, they assume the character of laws; if awaiting veriﬁcation, they have
the status of hypotheses.
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To the extent that problems of organizing and retrieving information
are deﬁnitional in nature, solutions to them can be approached by intro-
ducing operational deﬁnitions. An example of a productive operational
deﬁnition is the precision-recall measure, which was developed to measure
the degree to which a given retrieval system does or does not achieve its
discrimination and collocation objectives (Cleverdon, 1962). Precision
measures the degree to which the system delivers only relevant documents
and is deﬁned as the number of relevant documents retrieved divided by
the total number of documents retrieved, expressed as a ratio or percent-
age. Recall measures the degree to which the system delivers all relevant
documents and is deﬁned as the number of relevant documents retrieved
divided by the total number of relevant documents, again expressed as a
percentage or ratio. The use of these measures in quantifying the discrim-
ination and collocation objectives makes it possible to generalize about the
impact of various factors on retrieval effectiveness. One of the earliest fac-
tors studied was indexing depth, the number of index terms assigned to a
document. The more index terms assigned—or, alternatively, the more
access points a document admits of—the higher the recall, the lower the
precision. This is, in part, the scientiﬁc explanation of why keyword search-
ing nearly always results in infoglut.
Operational deﬁnitions are constructive; however, not all operational
deﬁnitions interpret concepts as variables. Some are constructive in the
procedural sense of specifying a deﬁniendum, i.e., stipulating how the
object being deﬁned can be recognized—the conditions needed to identi-
fy it. For example, a particular kind of cake, such as a Tosca torte, might be
constructively or operationally deﬁned by its recipe.
Procedural deﬁnitions are useful when it comes to deﬁning the ontol-
ogy of a retrieval language—its entities, attributes, and relationships. Con-
sider, for instance, the entity work, which ﬁgures in the language used to de-
scribe information-bearing documents. Conceptually a work is an abstract
Platonic concept. A work consists of a certain amount of delimited informa-
tion—some piece of intellectual or artistic content. Operationally, a work
can be deﬁned in terms of the procedures to be followed to construct a set
of documents that contain essentially the same information. A constructive
deﬁnition would specify how members of the work set can be identiﬁed, e.g.,
as being a transformation of a given ur-document by relationships that pre-
serve identity, such as revision, abridgement, or translation. Without an op-
erational deﬁnition of a work it would not be possible for a retrieval system
to automatically collocate, i.e., form the set of—all documents containing
essentially the same information, e.g., all editions of Dickens’ Bleak House.
Another entity that has been procedurally deﬁned is subject. Early deﬁ-
nitions, beginning in the 1960s, were based on simple word frequencies,
e.g., the more frequently a substantive word occurred in a document, the
greater the probability it was indicative of what the document was about.
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Over time the operational techniques used to identify subjects have become
increasingly sophisticated, incorporating different types of frequency dis-
tributions, parsing, and grammatical analyses and inferences based on sim-
ilarity algorithms. In addition to their usefulness in automatic indexing,
these techniques have the potential to improve indexing consistency and
are a sine qua non for the automatic merging and translating of knowledge
representations.
Useful as they may be, nevertheless questions can be raised about op-
erational deﬁnitions: (i) how valid are they, i.e., how well do they deﬁne
what they intend to deﬁne, e.g., concepts such as precision, recall, work,
and subject? and (ii) How valid are the knowledge representations that
depend on operational deﬁnitions, i.e., how expressive are they in their
representation of knowledge? Insofar as they introduce quantiﬁcation,
operational deﬁnitions are subject to the charge that they oversimplify. For
instance, the precision and recall measures have been faulted for oversim-
plifying the subjective concept of relevance. Automatic techniques for iden-
tifying subjects of documents have been faulted for being term- rather than
concept-based. All operational deﬁnitions lack validity, to some degrees but
this does mean they are ineffective. For instance, to improve keyword search-
ing, operational procedures used to automate the assignment of descrip-
tors to documents are advantageously being adapted for use in online
search engines. In the pursuit of knowledge, oversimpliﬁcation and abstrac-
tion can sometimes be valuable in clearing away confusing linguistic under-
brush to get at a clear picture of a phenomenon: outstanding examples are
the precision and recall measures that developed half a century ago and
continue to prove productive in advancing our understanding of the fac-
tors that contribute to retrieval effectiveness.
The Referential or Picture Theory of Meaning
The referential or picture theory of meaning also derives from an
empiricist view of knowledge. This theory is consistent with, but less radi-
cal than, that of the logical positivists in that it does not demand veriﬁabil-
ity. Its chief (and most brilliant) exponent was Ludwig Wittgenstein in his
Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1961/1921). The basic tenet of the picture theory
is that the extensional meaning of a word is its referent. For example, the
extensional meaning of the word “butterﬂy” is the set of all past, present,
and future butterﬂies. Words whose referents are things in the real world
can be taught by ostensive deﬁnition, simply by pointing to their referents.
A child learns the meaning of “butterﬂy” when someone points to a but-
terﬂy and says the word. For words that have no ostensive reality, referents
are postulated in the form of concepts, e.g., the referent of the general noun
“beauty” is the concept of beauty. Words are contained in propositions, and
these propositions, deriving directly or indirectly from sensory experience,
express properties and relationships. Empirical propositions picture reali-
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ty. A proposition has empirical meaning if and only if it corresponds to
(pictures) reality. “Snow is white” is a true proposition if and only if snow is
white. Matters of fact or states of affairs are expressed in true propositions—
those that represent real knowledge about the world, e.g., “Snow is white,”
“Tosca was written by Puccini,” and “Afghanistan borders on China.” Such
propositions contain words whose meanings are relatively ﬁxed and can be
formulated in ﬁrst-order predicate calculus. Knowledge consists of the to-
tality of true propositions—the totality of accurate pictures of the world.
In addition to propositions that picture the world, the empiricists rec-
ognized those that are tautological, in the sense of expressing logical rela-
tionships among propositions. It was David Hume who ﬁrst distinguished
the two types of propositions: those that express matters of fact and those
that express relationships among ideas. An example of a tautological rela-
tionship is the equivalence relationship, e.g., “Bachelors are unmarried
men.” Another is the logical relation of inclusion, e.g., “All parrots are
birds.” This relationship is logical in that it forms the basis of deductive
reasoning as exempliﬁed by the classical syllogism: “All parrots are birds.
Polly is a parrot. Therefore, Polly is a bird.” Logical hierarchy employing
the inclusion relationship is used in classical approaches to deﬁnition where-
by a general noun, regarded as a class, is deﬁned ﬁrst by its genus and then
by the characteristics or differentia that distinguish its members from those
belonging to other subclasses of the genus. The knowledge hierarchies
resulting from deﬁnitions constructed in this manner—for instance, the
biological taxonomies—represent descriptive knowledge of essences and
as such are seen to mirror the formal structure of external reality.
The picture theory of meaning, and its corollaries, particularly the one
that holds that true propositions can be formulated within a logical calcu-
lus, has been one of the great generative conceptions of the twentieth cen-
tury. It still holds sway. In the bibliographic area, it inspired Feibleman to
develop a theory of integrative levels, in which the order of classes in a
classiﬁcation reﬂects reality conceived as a hierarchy of organized wholes
(Feibleman, 1954). Ranganathan built his classiﬁcation on the analogy with
a meccano set, assuming thereby that all knowledge could be built out of a
standard set of concepts and relations among them (Ranganathan, 1965,
p. 20). Fairthorne (1961) promulgated the notion of mathematics of classiﬁ-
cation. He thought that a classiﬁcation of knowledge could be formulated
as a lattice, a form of Boolean algebra. Wojciechowski (1971, pp. 17–18)
speculated about the survival value of a classiﬁcation, concluding that it was
proportional to the degree to which it was formalized and urged that
classiﬁcations be mathematized.
Designers of information retrieval (IR) thesauri seized on the distinc-
tion implicit in the picture theory between tautological and empirical knowl-
edge. They favored the former. Bernier, in the 1960s, argued that the rela-
tionships among terms in a thesaurus should be permanent, rather than
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transient, a priori rather than a posteriori, true in all possible worlds, rath-
er than contingently true (Bernier, 1968). In other words, only tautologi-
cal, in the extended sense of deﬁnitional, relationships should be expressed
in the independent semantics of a retrieval language; contingent relation-
ships should be expressed by its syntax, or not at all. The relationship be-
tween parrots and birds belongs in a thesaurus (all parrots are birds), but
not that between parrots and pets (only some parrots are pets). This dis-
tinction, which has found its way into several thesaurus standards, is some-
times expressed as the distinction between paradigmatic1  or context-free
relationships and relationships that are syntagmatic or context-dependent.
The distinction is important. First, it operationally deﬁnes what it means
to say a knowledge representation exists above or independent of any giv-
en database. Second, the two types of relationships, paradigmatic and syn-
tagmatic, have different roles to play in retrieval.
The picture theory of meaning lay ready at hand when computers and
the discipline of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) came on the scene. AI research-
ers wanted to develop computer programs to process information—to
understand language and to model inductive and deductive reasoning. For
the most part, the data structures they used to represent knowledge were
founded upon a referential theory of meaning; necessarily they were also
limited to relatively small sublanguages or microworlds. Winograd’s natu-
ral language understanding program dealt with the discourse that could
take place in the microworld of movable blocks (Winograd, 1972). For the
program to work, all knowledge about movable blocks had to be assembled
and represented propositionally. Implicitly it was assumed that language
understanding could be reduced to the mechanistic manipulation of ele-
ments within closed data structures.
Based on a similarly reductionist assumption is Minsky’s concept of
frame (Minsky, 1974). A frame is a network of nodes and relations. Frames
are used to represent knowledge about everyday or stereotypical situations,
e.g., a birthday party. Knowledge about birthday parties is of two kinds: that
which is always true, i.e., true of birthday parties in general, and that which
is true of only a particular instance of a birthday party. Always true or es-
sential (i.e., deﬁnitional) properties, like always true relationships, are con-
text-free and, thus, via inheritance or by hierarchical force, apply to partic-
ular instances.
Attempts have been made to use frame-based systems for machine-as-
sisted indexing in the medical ﬁeld (Humphrey & Miller, 1987). For exam-
ple, assume a document is assigned the term “bone neoplasm.” Bone neo-
plasm is an instance of “neoplasm by site,” a term that has associated with
its two attributes: histologic type and disease process. By hierarchical force,
bone neoplasm can be characterized by histologic type and disease process.
The indexer, thus, is prompted to supply values for these attributes.
To evaluate the effectiveness and expressiveness of knowledge repre-
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sentations that view meaning as referential in nature, it is useful to com-
pare this theory of meaning with another theory, the instrumental theory
of meaning. This will be done in the next section.
Instrumental Theory of Meaning
Wittgenstein ended his Tractatus with the now famous words “whereof
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” (One of the questions con-
tributing to speechlessness was whether it is a true proposition that true
propositions mirror reality.) For many years Wittgenstein was silent, and
when he began writing again he did an about-face. He rejected the elabo-
rate ediﬁce of meaning that he constructed in the Tractatus and, in his new
work, Philosophical Investigations, and advanced a diametrically different
theory (Wittgenstein, 1953). (Such an about-face may be unique in the
history of philosophy.) Its premise was that instead of deﬁning the mean-
ing of a word in terms of its referent, it was to be deﬁned in terms of its use.
Meaning as use. Like most theories, this one has its antecedents. Frege
(Dummett, 1967) is credited with the dictum that words do not have mean-
ing in isolation, but only in the context of a sentence. Wittgenstein spun
out the implications of this dictum in almost excruciating detail.
The basic premise of the instrumental theory implies that we know what
a word means when we know how to use it. Words convey meaning both in
themselves and by virtue of the contexts in which they appear. Thus, what
a word conveys is, in part, variable, enabling it, chameleon-like, to assume
different meanings in different contexts; and, in part, ﬁxed. The ﬁxed part
is its dictionary or context-free meaning. Some words have meanings that
are more variable, more colored by context, than others. Words used in
scientiﬁc discourse, e.g., mass, are for the most part ﬁxed; their meanings
are not negotiable. To change the meaning of a keyword in scientiﬁc dis-
course and to have this accepted would be cataclysmic; it would amount to
a major paradigm shift. On the other hand, words used in, say, the social
sciences are regularly used with changeable meanings, e.g., the terms “de-
mocracy” and “culture.” It’s almost as if changing the meaning of opera-
tive words is needed to provide a new viewpoint, thus, advancing the fron-
tiers of sociological knowledge.
The instrumental or contextual theory of meaning if pushed to its limit
would construe every word, if not as a homonym, at least as a polyseme.
Polysemy is when a given string of characters has a set of different but re-
lated meanings. Homonymy is when the several meanings attaching to a
character string are unrelated. Culture with its more than 100 related mean-
ings is a polyseme. Mercury (the planet, the metal, the Greek God, the car)
is a homonym. The linguistic implication of even a moderate instrumen-
talism is that there are more words with multiple meanings in a natural
language than were ever dreamt of in the philosophies of empiricism. The
implication for the design of retrieval languages is that disambiguation is
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a serious and very large problem. It is the homonym problem writ large,
writ in the extended sense of including polysemy and contextual meaning,
that is the chief cause of precision failures—i.e., infoglut—in retrieval.
The solipsistic implications of extreme instrumentalism are toyed with
by Iris Murdoch in her novel Under the Net, the net being a semantic net. In
a normal world, however, solipsism is avoided by virtue of the fact that words
do have some shared public meaning. Intuitively, through experience and/
or some wiring in the brain, we know how to use words. We know rules that
govern their use. These rules are embedded in what Wittgenstein calls lan-
guage games. Subscribing to the concept of language games entails subscrib-
ing as well to the position that knowledge representations are not descrip-
tive of things and relations in the real world; rather they are descriptive of
linguistic behavior. The use of knowledge representations to organize in-
formation is one kind of language game, one kind of linguistic behavior.
To lay the groundwork for a discussion of the implications of the in-
strumental theory of meaning in the design of knowledge representations
for IR, it is useful to begin with why the picture theory of meaning was found
wanting.
• First, the picture theory assumes a universal form of language in which
the meaning of propositions picturing the world are prescribed, rela-
tively ﬁxed, and generally understood. The objection here is that pic-
tures can be differently interpreted. A cup is half full or half empty. A
picture of a duck from another viewpoint could be a picture of a rab-
bit; a picture of a block could be interpreted as a triangular prism.
• Secondly, the picture theory implies ﬁxity of reference. But the mean-
ings of words are not necessarily ﬁxed in the sense of referring to sets
of homogeneous objects in the real world or clearly delineated mental
concepts. Many words have ﬂuid boundaries. (A chair with three legs is
still a chair.) Fluidity is necessary if words are to function in a variety of
different contexts. The picture theory falls down particularly in the case
of abstract words whose referents are mental constructs2  and function
words, such as adverbial particles and prepositions.
• A third problem with the picture theory is that it represents knowledge
of the world as the conjunction of knowledge of independent micro-
worlds. To regard the totality of knowledge as a simple aggregation is
simplistic. Winograd’s block world and Minsky’s birthday world have
been criticized on the grounds that it is not possible to isolate micro-
worlds (Dreyfus, 1981). Knowledge is an encyclopedic tangle of inter-
related propositions. It is all of a piece; it cannot be fragmented. Not
surprisingly, a critical goal of AI research today is to develop an ency-
clopedic representation of knowledge. An example is the research be-
ing pursued by Lenant and his team (Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2001,
pp. A1, A18). Their Cyc database consists of over a million propositions,
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but in addition to this it contains information about the use of hundreds
of thousands of root words, names, descriptions, and abstract concepts.
For instance, a Cyc robot knows that anthrax can mean the heavy metal
band, a bacterium, or a disease. More signiﬁcantly it knows that while a
piece of wood can be broken into smaller pieces, a table cannot be bro-
ken into smaller tables. Knowing rules for the use of words, it “under-
stands” language behavior.
In sum: the picture theory lacks expressive adequacy; it does not ade-
quately represent knowledge. Knowledge is elusive, dynamic, and kaleido-
scopic. One cannot take a snapshot of it—or, as Heraclitus observed, one
cannot step in the same river twice. Wittgenstein in the Investigations dealt
a death blow to traditionalist empiricism and the idea that knowledge was
reducible to sense perceptions embodied in elementary propositions. Lan-
guage, when it is released from its picturing role, is free to go on a holiday.
(However, too much holidaying is where madness lies.) Thus, instead of
speaking about how we know reality, we talk about the different conceptu-
al schemes we impose on reality. Wittgenstein likens a concept to a style of
painting and asks, Can we choose one at pleasure?
What then are the implications of the instrumental theory for the de-
sign of knowledge representations? They are profound and include
• what we understand by classes, e.g., the classes in a taxonomy or classiﬁ-
cation;
• what we mean by subject;
• how we design relationships in a knowledge representation, such as a
classiﬁcation, thesaurus, or topic map;
• how we disambiguate terms to improve the precision of retrieval;
• how we go about trying to achieve semantic interoperability, solving the
problems involved in the merging of knowledge representations and in
creating a universal representation from a set of representations with
specialized domains.
The traditional way of looking at categories or classes is tied to an objec-
tivist theory of knowledge whereby a knowledge classiﬁcation mirrors reali-
ty. The backbone of traditional classes is the logical genus-species relation-
ship. The guiding rule in such classiﬁcations, ﬁrst stipulated by Aristotle, is
that classes should be mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive—the reason
being there should be no cross-classiﬁcation in nature. Membership in a giv-
en class is deﬁned in terms of essential properties; that is, two members be-
long to a class if they share the same essential property(ies) to a sufﬁcient
degree. Essences or properties can be expressed as speciﬁcations or condi-
tions for class membership. It is this view of class formation that is exploited
in automatic procedures used to identify entities such as works and subjects.
But are there common essences? Wittgenstein questions the tendency
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to look for properties common to all entities subsumed under a common
noun. When the meaning of a word does not describe reality but is a func-
tion of language behavior, the instances of its use need not all share a com-
mon essence; they can be similar to one another in different ways. The
categories represented by general nouns are similar to families: their mem-
bers belong there by virtue of sharing family resemblances. Some have the
same nose, some the same eyes, some the same tail; there need not be a
single property that all share.
The idea that categories are formed on analogy with family resemblanc-
es, rather than by matching on a given property, has been another of the
great generative ideas of the twentieth century. It underlies the paradigm
shift in the biological sciences that led to the adoption of the methods of
numerical taxonomy, which has had spectacular success in challenging the
traditional biological dichotomy that divides beings into those that are or-
ganic and those that are nonorganic. In the ﬁelds of logic and computer
science, it is manifested in fuzzy set theory and in bibliographic classiﬁca-
tion by the use of ambiguity operators. In IR operational deﬁnitions, using
similarity matrices of family-resemblance-type categories has advanced tech-
niques of automatic classiﬁcation. An example is the U.S. Census (PACE)
system, an expert coding system developed to analyze U.S. census response
forms (Creecy et al., 1992). Employing a vocabulary consisting of 800 in-
dustry and occupation categories, the system assigns terms to a candidate
response form by comparing it with other forms that have been manually
indexed—a large number of them. At a rate of 10 responses per second,
the system was able to classify 22 million responses in three months—a task
that if done manually would have cost 15 million dollars in labor costs. The
system was reported to perform with an accuracy rate of 86 percent.
The instrumental theory is relevant to how subjects are deﬁned. In chal-
lenging the limits of propositional knowledge, it implicitly challenges the
traditional view of what is meant by a subject. This traditional view is based
on a grammatical model implicit in positivistic approaches to meaning
(Svenonius, 1994). In grammar, the subject of a proposition denotes the
object spoken of, which could be a concept or a thing in the real world. The
role of the predicate of the proposition is to say something about that ob-
ject. The proposition “Snow is white” has as its subject snow; its predicate
says something about snow, viz., it is white. A number of propositions about
snow collected into a document would warrant saying that the document is
about snow or has as its subject snow. (That there is a repeated mention of
snow in these propositions is the rationale behind frequency-based tech-
niques of automatic indexing.) Extend the model further: a sufﬁcient num-
ber of documents about snow collected into a systematized body of knowl-
edge about snow would warrant hypostasizing a subject named Snow.
The traditional view of what a subject is belongs to a reductionist, pos-
itivistic theory of knowledge. As such it is simplistic. Subjects are complex
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and at times linguistically indeterminate. They are complex to the extent
that they represent not a single concept, but a system of concepts. As not-
ed, instrumentalism holds that the meanings of words—and, thus, words
used to name subjects—are in part ﬁxed and, in part, variable. The vari-
able part assumes its value by being contextualized within a system of con-
cepts. Any use of a word or words to name a subject emphasizes one of these
concepts more than others. “Basil” to a gardener has different connotations
than “basil” to a cook. Polysemy abounds.
Some subjects cannot be named; they are linguistically indeterminate.
Susan Langer in her book, Philosophy in a New Key, introduced the idea of
different kinds of symbolism (Langer, 1949). Music and art, on the one
hand, and written text, on the other, represent different symbolic transfor-
mations of experience. Only the latter, which employs a discursive symbol-
ism, is capable of conveying propositions. Sometimes music and, more of-
ten, art are representative in that they are about something: they have a
subject. Richard Strauss believed he could make music depict the cups,
plates, and silverware on a table. Paintings in medieval churches depicting
the lives of the Holy Family, apostles, and saints were used to enlighten those
who could not read. Generally, however, what is expressed by music and art
uses a presentational symbolism and tends to be linguistically indetermi-
nate in the sense that its subject, if it has one, cannot be encapsulated in a
word or phrase. Linguistic indeterminacy, however, is not limited to art and
music. Poetry often uses a presentational symbolism; belle lettres can have
subjects it would take an extended exegesis to depict. It may be possible to
describe in an essay what Moby Dick is about, but this cannot be named.
Nor are the various relationships employed in IR nameable. Traditional
subject-heading lists, thesauri, and classiﬁcations use generic see-also and
related-term relationships to link subjects. Attempts have been made to
regularize these relationships, that is, to introduce some consistency into
their assignment by stipulating the conditions under which they can be
used, e.g., the related-term relationship can be used between two terms if
they are associated by cause-effect, symptom-disease, industry-product, etc.
However, even a cursory analysis of related-term relationships in thesauri
will show many to be un-nameable.
An interesting, if somewhat quixotic, attempt to cope with un-name-
able relations was made by Farradane (1970).3  He argued that Boolean
operators were too generic to provide useful linking information and that
the speciﬁc relationships needed for discrimination could be derived from
a study of cognition. To this end he developed a system of relational oper-
ators based on Guilford’s psychology. The system involved two mechanisms:
three stages toward complete association and three stages toward complete
distinction. The combination of these yielded nine categories of relation-
ships, the names of which are somewhat arbitrary.
Attempts to show the effectiveness of these relationships in retrieval
582 library trends/winter 2004
have not been conclusive. This does not mean cognitive psychology, which
has become considerably more sophisticated since Farrandane’s time, might
not yield useful relationships. It seems more likely, however, that useful
relationships can be discovered by studying linguistic behavior as evidenced
in users’ online search and navigation maneuvers.
The instrumental theory impacts how we disambiguate terms to achieve
precision in retrieval. To some extent the resolution of homonyms and
polysemes can be effected in the vocabulary of a retrieval language by the
use of parenthetical qualiﬁers. But given the meaning-is-use philosophy,
wherein most words are to a degree polysematic, it cannot all be done there.
Some of the burden must be shouldered by the relational semantics of the
retrieval language as these are lodged in its vocabulary structures (e.g., sub-
ject-heading lists, thesauri, and classiﬁcations), in its syntax or in both. Re-
trieval languages differ with respect to the types of relationships they ex-
press and where these relationships are articulated. An example of
disambiguation using vocabulary structures is the placement of “mercury”
in a number of different hierarchies, e.g., Greek mythology, metals, etc. An
example of disambiguation using the syntax of a language is the placement
of “ﬂight” in the syntagm “ﬂight of stairs.”
Knowledge Representations Embodied in Thesauri
and Classifications
As was mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the problem of knowl-
edge is approachable through language analysis and theories of meaning. The
theory (or theories) of meaning subscribed to by a retrieval language entails
a particular way of representing knowledge. The various knowledge repre-
sentations embodied in retrieval languages can be evaluated with respect to
their validity, their effectiveness in achieving objectives, and their amenabil-
ity to automation and semantic interoperability. To illustrate this, it is instruc-
tive to compare two different types of retrieval language, thesauri and ana-
lytico-synthetic classiﬁcations, e.g., the Dewey Decimal Classiﬁcation (DDC).
Two structural differences distinguish retrieval languages that use the-
sarui from those using analytico-synthetic classiﬁcations (Svenonius, 2000,
chapters 9, 10).4  The ﬁrst difference is in their relational semantics. Many
thesauri, in accordance with established standards, try to limit their tree struc-
Table 1.
Temporary Fixed
Awareness Association Association
Concurent /ø concurrence /* self-activity /; association
Not distinct /= equivalence /+ dimensional /( appurtenance
Distinct /) distinctness /– action /: functional dependence
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tures to paradigmatic relationships, whereas classiﬁcations such as the DDC
freely admit of both paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships. As noted
earlier, paradigmatic relationships are those that are context-free, deﬁnitional,
and true in all possible worlds. Syntagmatic relationships are space-time de-
pendent, a posteriori, empirical, synthetic, and often transient. Another way
of drawing the distinction is between relationships that are logical, e.g., the
all-some relationships used in classical syllogisms; and those that are psycho-
logical in nature in the sense that they reﬂect ordinary language behavior.
The former may be said to mirror the world as seen by the logical-positivistic
lens; the latter creates the world as this is seen through the use of language.
Chief among the syntagmatic relationships embodied in classiﬁcatory
tree structures are the perspective hierarchies. These hierarchies serve not
so much the function of deﬁning scientiﬁcally—though they do this to some
extent—as to indicate a point of view or method of treatment. Whereas in
a thesaurus, following the all-some rule, rats would be given only the broader
term “rodents,” in a classiﬁcation; where this rule is relaxed, rats also might
be hierarchically related to laboratory animals. Moreover, in a traditional
thesaurus, the kinds of relationships that abstract concepts participate in
are limited, if for no other reason than they have fuzzy boundaries. How,
for instance, is a term such as “freedom” to be treated in thesaurus construc-
tion? To determine if it has a broader term, one must ask, All Freedom is
———? Possibly the blank could be ﬁlled in by “liberation,” but then “lib-
eration” would have to have at least one other subclass in addition to “free-
dom.” Compare this with the handling of “freedom” in a classiﬁcation like
DDC, which has a number of different hierarchical placements for Free-
dom, e.g.,
300 SOCIAL SCIENCES
320 POLITICAL SCIENCE
323 CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS
323.4 SPECIFIC CIVIL RIGHTS
323.44 FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Insofar as hierarchical perspectives such as these are based on literary war-
rant, they are reﬂective of linguistic behavior.
A second way thesaurus-based retrieval languages differ from analyti-
co-synthetic classiﬁcation is in their syntax. The syntax rules of a retrieval
language are used on the syntagmatic axis to combine terms to form syn-
tagms. In natural languages, syntagms may take the form of sentences; in
retrieval languages they may be called statements, subject headings, strings,
or chains. An example of a DDC syntagms is
323.4430976 [Free Speech in the South Central U. S.]
The contextualizing of a term in syntagm is an instance of its use; it is there-
fore a method of disambiguation.
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While there are exceptions, e.g., PRECIS, most thesaurus-based retrieval
languages index using descriptors; they do not employ a precoordinate
syntax. Thesauri for the purpose of improving IR emerged in the 1950s and
were predicated on the assumption that all the complicated syntax rules in
subject heading and classiﬁcatory languages could be replaced by Boolean
operators: the And operator would be used for discrimination, the OR
operator for collocation. In time, as the limiting nature of these operators
became apparent, proximity operators were introduced to exploit contex-
tual relationships as these occurred in the natural language of the databases
being searched. The relative effectiveness of pre- vs. postcontextualization
is part of the broader question of the efﬁcacy of vocabulary control, a ques-
tion beyond the scope of the present paper. Sufﬁce it to say that the pre-
contextualization of terms in syntagms offers the possibility of structured
displays to facilitate disambiguation through browsing (Svenonius, 1995).
As knowledge representations, thesauri are limited. First they are lim-
ited in what they can express insofar as they manage—and frequently they
don’t—to limit their hierarchy structures to paradigmatic relationships. Sec-
ond, they are limited in assuming Boolean and proximity operators are
sufﬁcient to express synthetic relationships. Being limited in what they can
express, they are limited as knowledge representations and, consequently,
limited in their ability to facilitate precision in retrieval. In comparison,
much can be said in favor of a classiﬁcation like the DDC. Compared with
other types of retrieval languages, it achieves a great deal of expressive
adequacy by virtue of the distinctions it can make. Using a notational cod-
ing, it can express complex subjects better even than word-based systems.
By virtue of its perspective hierarchies, it can express a great deal of rela-
tional information, more than can be expressed by traditional thesauri.
Trade-offs
Many years ago Shera introduced the term “social epistemology” to de-
note the study of the products of man’s classiﬁcatory behavior, which he sees
as being relative to both time and place (Shera, 1973). He believed each new
age required a new classiﬁcation of knowledge, which is to say each new age
represents knowledge differently. But might we not go even further than this
and suggest that knowledge representations, and the epistemologies upon
which they are founded, are relative also to purpose? In the design of a re-
trieval language, a decision must be made as to what knowledge representa-
tion to adopt. An obvious choice would be to choose one that adequately
expresses what knowledge is, i.e., the representation that ranks highest on a
validity scale. Such a representation might be expected also to rank high in
promoting precision and recall. With respect to expressive validity, a classiﬁ-
cation like the DDC ranks higher than traditional thesauri, being to a great-
er degree based on an instrumental approach to meaning—an approach that
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offers an alternative to a single picture of the world, one that is jammed into
the procrustean structure of logical hierarchies and propositional calculi.
But validity is not the only consideration in the choice of a knowledge
representation. It can be argued that as a knowledge representation be-
comes more expressive, its semantics become overrich, the plethora of
choice it offers confusing, and the elaborate rule systems on which it is
based make it expensive to apply. A retrieval language that incorporates
an expressive knowledge representation if too elaborate does not lend
itself to collaborative efforts in its creation and application. More serious,
it does not lend itself to automation, in particular to automatic indexing
and semantic interoperability, i.e., the automatic merging of two or more
retrieval languages. This latter is a Herculean task, one that amounts to
combining two or more language games and their concomitant rules for
play, a task difﬁcult in itself, and more difﬁcult especially if the languages
rest on different epistemological foundations causing them to differ in
every aspect of their vocabulary, semantics, syntax, and pragmatics. Giv-
en these considerations and the need to deal in a timely fashion with the
increasing deluge of information pressing upon us, considerations other
than validity become relevant.
The knowledge representations resting upon the epistemological foun-
dations of logical positivism in its operationalist and representational ap-
proaches to meaning are further distanced from natural language than
those resting upon an instrumental approach to meaning. They are formal-
ized to a greater degree and as such are simpler, more uniform, and rela-
tively free from subjective interpretation. The objectivity they provide
through deﬁnitional rigor is essential for automated applications in retriev-
al, is useful in insuring consistency in programs of distributed indexing, and
is helpful in attempts to merge two or more retrieval languages.
Arguably, in the design of a retrieval language, a trade-off exists between
the degree to which the language is to be formalized and the degree to
which it is to be reﬂective of language use. As mentioned earlier, Wojcie-
chowski hypothesized that the survival of a retrieval language depended on
the degree to which it can be formalized. The truth of this hypothesis re-
mains to be seen, but certainly it is true that a highly formalized language
advances the twin goals of automation and distributed indexing. On the
other hand, the greater the expressiveness of a retrieval language, in par-
ticular the greater its ability to convey the contextual and relational infor-
mation needed for disambiguation, collocation, and navigation, the great-
er validity it has as a knowledge representation. Wittgenstein asked if we
could choose a conceptual scheme at pleasure. We might now ask, Can we
choose a knowledge representation for a particular purpose? Perhaps we
don’t always need a valid representation, when a useful one will do.
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Notes
1. The term “paradigmatic” is used in the indexing literature differently from its use in lin-
guistics.
2. Plato was the ﬁrst to address the referential problems attending abstract concepts. He
suggested that the referents of these were instances in the real world, e.g., the referent of
(the ideal of) “beauty” was the totality of instances of beauty.
3. Farradane is credited with being the ﬁrst person to use the expression “information sci-
ence.”
4. This is a broad generalization, one that has exceptions, but it is true in the main.
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Classiﬁcation, Rhetoric, and the
Classiﬁcatory Horizon
Stephen Paling
Abstract
Bibliography provides a compelling vantage from which to study
the interconnection of classiﬁcation, rhetoric, and the making of knowl-
edge. Bibliography, and the related activities of classiﬁcation and retrieval,
bears a direct relationship to textual studies and rhetoric. The paper ex-
amines this relationship by brieﬂy tracing the development of bibliography
forward into issues concomitant with the emergence of classiﬁcation for
retrieval. A striking similarity to problems raised in rhetoric and which
spring from common concerns and intellectual sources is demonstrated
around Gadamer’s notion of intellectual horizon. Classiﬁcation takes place
within a horizon of material conditions and social constraints that are best
viewed through a hermeneutic or deconstructive lens, termed the “classiﬁ-
catory horizon.”
Introduction
Current scholarly work in classiﬁcation and rhetoric has converged on
a remarkably consistent set of ideas about the role of context, history, and
material conditions in the dissemination of texts. Speciﬁcally, scholarship
addressing classiﬁcation for access bears a direct relationship to scholarship
in material rhetoric. It is easiest to understand this relationship by brieﬂy
tracing the development of bibliography and the concerns that develop-
ment has carried with it into current scholarship in classiﬁcation for access.
These concerns, and scholarly conclusions about them, show a striking sim-
ilarity to a particular set of problems raised in rhetoric and spring from
common concerns and intellectual sources. This paper argues, in part, that
classiﬁcationists should consider rhetoric a valuable part of what they do,
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and that rhetoricians should view classiﬁcation as an underdeveloped part
of rhetorical studies.
This paper will relate a set of ideas that have helped shape the related
areas of classiﬁcation and material rhetoric. It will refer to secondary schol-
arly sources where these ideas have been derived. Many of the ideas spring
from common sources, while others represent similar conclusions reached
by different paths. All, though, can be understood as grouped around a cen-
tral idea, the idea of an intellectual horizon. This paper argues that the works
in question, taken together, support the idea that classiﬁcation takes place
within a horizon of material conditions and social constraints that are best
viewed through a hermeneutic or deconstructive lens. This application of
hermeneutics or deconstruction to classiﬁcation does not represent a graft-
ing of alien ideas onto the study of information but rather the reconvergence
of ideas that come from common sources. The idea of intellectual horizons
has implications in two areas. First, it can offer us a theoretical understand-
ing of classiﬁcatory practices, and second, it also can begin to suggest possi-
ble limits to our ability to fully represent texts through classiﬁcation.
To describe the conclusions reached by these scholars and relate the
ways in which they reinforce each other, this paper will take the following
steps:
• Trace a set of ideas originating in bibliographic scholarship that led to
later work in classiﬁcation and material rhetoric, described in two senses
by Selzer and Crowley (1999) as the study of “the material aspects and
groundings of language as rhetorical action” and “the rhetorical nature
of material realities” (p. 9).
• Brieﬂy describe deconstruction and postmodern hermeneutics and
trace their relationship to classiﬁcation and rhetoric.
• Discuss the recent relationship between classiﬁcation and rhetoric, par-
ticularly in the area of material rhetoric, and posit the idea of a classiﬁ-
catory horizon.
• Discuss similar but independent ideas advanced in the contemporary
study of information.
The paper will conclude with a brief summary of these relationships and
discuss what they might offer for future scholarship.
Early Bibliography
Besterman (1940) provides us with a concise history of early bibliogra-
phy, and that history foreshadows contemporary critiques surrounding the
implication of classiﬁcation for access in the use and reception of texts.
Besterman begins by distinguishing two basic types of bibliography, system-
atic and critical. He follows W. W. Greg in deﬁning systematic bibliography as
“the classiﬁcation of individual books according to some guiding principle,”
or in his own terms, “enumeration and classiﬁcation of books.” Critical bib-
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liography, in contrast, is “the comparative and historical study of their make-
up” (Besterman, 1940, p. 1). Besterman argues for a deﬁnition that com-
bines elements of the two, labeling a bibliography “a list of books arranged
according to some permanent principle” (Besterman, 1940, p. 2). He ac-
knowledges the difﬁculty inherent in any idea of permanent principles, and
questions surrounding permanency and change in texts themselves and the
way we classify them is an issue to which we will return.
For the moment, though, the focus should remain on the contrast
drawn by Besterman. Systematic bibliography is closely related to classiﬁ-
cation for access, which arranges texts according to some principle meant
to facilitate retrieval. Critical bibliography, in contrast, bears a strong resem-
blance to editing in its concern for the origin and make-up of texts. In turn,
both editing and classiﬁcation for retrieval eventually point to a particular
strand of material rhetoric. Material rhetoric, as a whole, addresses a range
of questions surrounding the materiality of discourse, including topics like
the rhetoric of public monuments and the rhetoric of the body. The strand
of material rhetoric that concerns us here, though, studies the range of
accretions, from prefaces to classiﬁcatory marks, that are attached to texts
and affect the way those texts are used and interpreted. Bibliographic schol-
ars have shown concern for similar issues.
While Besterman does not use the term “rhetorical,” he does show us
that from its earliest inception, bibliography has been rhetorical in the sense
of being an attempt at persuasion. It is important to this paper to revisit the
emergence of bibliography and describe how the problems it ﬁrst addressed
persist into current scholarship.
Besterman argues that the earliest bibliographies, which predate print-
ing, had clear ideological goals. Authenticity seems to have been promi-
nent among them. As early as the second century, Galen felt compelled
to mention works falsely attributed to him (Besterman, 1940, p. 3). St.
Jerome took pains to “show those he regarded as heretics that the Church
had produced many able writers” (Besterman, 1940, p. 4). Besterman ar-
gues that “Jerome . . . looked upon his compilation as a piece of theolog-
ical propaganda. He did not put out his bibliography to guide or instruct,
but rather to convert.” He also says more generally that the writers of ear-
ly bibliographies “. . . usually, if not always, had some ulterior motive . . .”
(Besterman, 1940, p. 9). While later scholars like Johann Tritheim in the
ﬁfteenth century and Conrad Gesner in the sixteenth did begin to con-
sider bibliographies practical works of reference, earlier scholars deployed
bibliography in service of religion. Even compilation of a bibliography or
reference work, though, assumes some organizational or retrieval princi-
ple. We are perhaps not accustomed to considering these principles ideo-
logical, but when we reach the discussion of material rhetoric and the in-
volvement of library research in composition and rhetoric, we will have
strong reason to do so. Any attempt to persuade, whether of authenticity
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or relevance for a particular purpose, constitutes an important part of the
horizon within which classiﬁcation occurs.
The religious orientation of early bibliographies raises questions of
their connection with hermeneutics, which began as the study of correct
biblical interpretation. While there is no evidence here to directly connect
bibliography with hermeneutics, bibliography clearly shared with early
hermeneutics a sense of propriety in what was to be admitted to the can-
on. This sense of propriety and hewing to a sense of original or authorita-
tive speech constitute part of what Jacques Derrida (1976) has called the
metaphysics of presence, the idea that original thought enjoys primacy over
speech, and speech over writing. The next section will describe ways in
which bibliographic scholarship contributed to the progression of ideas that
played a role in the deconstructive critiques of that tradition.
Modern Bibliography
While Besterman looks backward to the history of bibliography, these
questions surrounding the social milieu in which bibliography takes place
persist in more recent scholarship. Brookes (1975/1973) discusses Jesse
Shera and Margaret Egan’s attempts to build a theory of bibliography.
Brookes’s discussion of their work ranges widely, but their concern with
social epistemology is of particular importance here as it relates to the idea of
an intellectual horizon. Brookes quotes two deﬁnitions of social epistemol-
ogy from Shera:
. . . the study of those processes by which society as a whole seeks to
achieve a perceptive or understanding relation to the total environ-
ment—physical, psychological and intellectual. . . . (Brookes, 1975/
1973, p. 68. Emphasis in original)
. . . the analysis of the production, distribution and utilization of intel-
lectual products in much the same fashion as that in which the produc-
tion, distribution and utilization of material products have long been
investigated. Graphic communication provides objective evidence of the
process. (Brookes, 1975/1973, p. 68. Emphasis mine)
Brookes, referring to the second quote, suggests the substitution of
“bibliography” for “graphic communication,” and “cognitive elements” or
“ideas” for “intellectual products.”
Shera’s linking of bibliography and social epistemology appears again
when Brookes cites him as arguing, “Even a cursory examination of the
history of classiﬁcation of the sciences emphasized the extent to which any
attempt to organize knowledge is conditioned by the social epistemology
of the age in which it was produced” (Brookes, 1975/1973, p. 69). The re-
lationship Shera posits between bibliography and social epistemology does
not ﬂow in only one direction, though. Shera implicates bibliography in the
making of knowledge, arguing that it is “by the grouping and regrouping
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of his data that the scholar discovers new relationships, new approaches to
old problems, and new areas for exploitation” (Brookes, 1975/1973, p. 69).
Shera also observes, on a distinctly ontological note, that, as knowledge
becomes more complex, it becomes subject to fragmentation and centrif-
ugal forces. Bibliography serves as a cohesive counterforce.
For Shera, the study of these processes is an objective, and often quan-
titative, process. We should not construe his work as postmodern or criti-
cal. But Shera’s references to social epistemology and specialization
preﬁgure the critiques that have emerged since then. While these critiques
have tended to come from ﬁelds not directly concerned with the study of
information, we will still ﬁnd shared concerns informing those critiques.
It is important to note that even modernist scholars like Shera feel com-
pelled to locate bibliographic activities in a social and epistemological con-
text in much the same way as scholars who show more overt concern for
the term “horizon” in its various forms.
At about the same time as Shera’s work, Tanselle (1971/1975) discuss-
es the connections between bibliography, textual studies, and literary judg-
ment. This line of thought eventually leads to a discussion of deconstruc-
tion’s role in such scholarship and forms another connection to material
rhetoric. Tanselle was not uniformly supportive of deconstruction, but some
of the authors who followed him have been. Despite Tanselle’s reservations,
though, his work represents another important piece of scholarship for this
paper. He draws connections to social milieu and epistemology that are
similar to Shera’s, but which move further in the direction of deconstruc-
tive and hermeneutic critiques. The next section will discuss how these
strands of scholarship began to come together in the work of Tanselle.
Deconstruction and Classification
Tanselle begins with the assertion that “Bibliographers have been re-
minded on many occasions that their ﬁeld is not an exact science” (Tanselle,
1971/1975, p. 353). He argues that editorial and bibliographic work can be
scientiﬁc only in the sense of being systematic, methodical, or scholarly. He
uses a number of examples to point to the inherent uncertainty in any deci-
sions about what a particular author has said in a particular text. The exam-
ples show the ambiguity that occurs even in distinguishing accidental changes
like typographical errors from actual alterations during the editing and type-
setting process. Throughout the article, he emphasizes the need for literary
judgment. While he primarily shows concern for textual studies, he clearly
includes bibliography in his discussion.
Tanselle’s doubts about bibliography’s scientiﬁc status do not amount
to advocacy of careless or subjective work, and he praises efforts to make
editing and bibliography systematic. His argument, though, acknowledges
the indeterminacy that remains inherent in these decisions. Like Shera, he
also shows a concern for epistemology. On a distinctly epistemological note,
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he admonishes textual scholars to avoid trying to make their work appear
scientiﬁc, because such a stance can accord those works “a higher level of
certainty than they deserve and can thus affect any further thinking based
on those conclusions” (Tanselle, 1971/1975, p. 354). Shortly later he points
to two perspectives from which we can examine the relationship between
literary judgment and textual studies, arguing “one is the effect which the
ﬁndings of bibliographical and textual research have on the ultimate mean-
ing of the work of literature as evaluated by the critic; the other is the role
which critical judgment plays in producing these ﬁndings in the ﬁrst place”
(Tanselle, 1971/1975, p. 355).
Taken together, these two perspectives bear a strong resemblance to
the hermeneutic circle, the idea that all knowledge depends, in part, on fore-
knowledge that alerts us to salient features of the environment. This new
knowledge, in turn, becomes part of our foreknowledge for future situa-
tions. The idea of a hermeneutic circle is also not far from Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s idea of intellectual horizons, an idea echoed by other herme-
neutic thinkers in various forms. Hermeneutics began as the study of cor-
rect biblical interpretation but has expanded to include the study of inter-
pretation more generally. Recent hermeneutic scholarship like Gadamer’s
has often focused speciﬁcally on the role played by an interpreter’s mem-
bership in a community of ideas and expectations and how that horizon
affects the reception of a text. Gadamer (1975) argued that the “horizon
is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a par-
ticular vantage point” (p. 269). Horizon, though, does not serve solely as
a limiting principle. Gadamer (1975) maintained that “To acquire a hori-
zon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand—not in
order to look away from it, but to see it better within a larger whole and in
truer proportion” (p. 272). This sort of horizon is an idea that emerges in
work that follows Tanselle.
Tanselle quotes D. F. McKenzie in arguing that “‘scientiﬁc’ refers sim-
ply to ‘an honesty of method’” (Tanselle, 1971/1975, p. 355). He goes far-
ther, though, than arguing that bibliography uses soft scientiﬁc methods
and argues for the inevitable role of judgment: “. . . when bibliographic
analysis provides anything less than demonstrable certainty, literary judg-
ment must necessarily take over” (Tanselle, 1971/1975, p. 361).
Tanselle (1974/1979) echoes and reemphasizes these ideas. He com-
pares analytical bibliography to historiography, deﬁning analytic bibliog-
raphy as “a form of historical investigation; its conclusions are on a lower
plane of probability than the inductive generalizations of many sciences
because of the impossibility in bibliography of repeating past events as
experiments . . . ” (Tanselle, 1974/1979, p. 13).
He also expresses impatience with any continuing debate over the sci-
entiﬁc status of bibliography, saying, “. . . the last word on the subject would
seem to have been said, and said repeatedly” (Tanselle, 1974/1979, p. 19).
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These concerns with the role of judgment and epistemology become
more explicit in Tanselle (1990/1998), where he explores the application
of deconstruction to textual criticism. Tanselle is in partial agreement with
deconstructionists, but takes them to task for an insufﬁcient “understand-
ing of the medium of literature” and a failure to question “the logic of ac-
cepting any sequence of words as it comes to us” (Tanselle, 1990/1998, p.
204). Tanselle’s objection stems from his distinction between texts and
works. He deﬁnes a text as a “speciﬁc oral or written sequences of words and
pauses (or marks of punctuation)” (Tanselle, 1990/1998, p. 206). Works,
in contrast, are the referents to which texts imperfectly point. He preﬁgures
Jerome McGann’s concern with reading as a phenomenal event by distin-
guishing between the stationary and sequential arts. Stationary arts, like
painting and sculpture, use tangible media. Sequential arts (like literature
and music) use intangible media, and we preserve them through instruc-
tions for their repetition (Tanselle, 1990/1998, p. 235). These instructions,
though, are imperfect, and the phenomenal event cannot be taken as a strict
re-creation of an author’s intent.
Tanselle’s distinction between texts and works puts him very close to a
deconstructionist position. The question of whether we can faithfully rep-
resent speech in writing, and whether speech or original thought possess-
es primacy over writing lies at the center of Derrida’s critique of the meta-
physics of presence in Of Grammatology. Chronologically, Tanselle’s 1990
article comes after Derrida, but conceptually it comes prior to it. This clus-
ter of concerns, the (im-)possibility of representation, the role of judgment,
and the indeterminacy of reading, serves as an effective introduction to the
issues central to deconstruction. Later authors like McGann take up
Tanselle’s ideas and ally themselves with deconstruction and postmodern
rhetoric. Tanselle was perhaps right to take deconstructionists to task for
too frequently ignoring the material circumstances of reading, but his own
ideas about indeterminacy and the impossibility of perfect representation
actually lie very close to the ideas of other scholars who are willing to go
farther than he did in praising deconstruction and similar postmodern
thought. They also lie close to the hermeneutic idea of horizons. Herme-
neutic and deconstructive thinkers have broad, at times even antagonistic,
differences, but they also have shared concerns. Both show interest in in-
terpretive shifts and indeterminacy in texts as readers within different set-
tings or horizons encounter them. All of the arguments about the role of
judgment and epistemology in literary criticism and bibliography will have
little bearing on classiﬁcation for access, though, unless they remain con-
nected to activities like the construction of retrieval systems and library
catalogs. Tanselle (1977/1979) maintains this connection and argues that
descriptive bibliography and library cataloging “have many points of con-
tact and many elements in common. Their history has been intertwined in
many respects.” He refers to them as being “parts of a larger undertaking—
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the recording of intellectual products and their physical embodiments”
(Tanselle, 1977/1979, p. 37).
Tanselle argues for three sets of paired concepts that elucidate this
connection:
• Works vs. texts, a distinction we have already discussed.
• Reference bibliography (a guide to a set of works) vs. physical bibliography (a
description of the physical makeup of books).
• Enumeration vs. detail (Tanselle, 1977/1979, pp. 48–50).
The ﬁrst distinction is central, with the second also being important,
but the third less so, because it pertains mostly to the speciﬁc use to which
a bibliography or catalog is put. Tanselle also distinguishes between cata-
logs, which are concerned with the books that happen to be in a particular
collection, and bibliographies, which are concerned with books that are
related in some way, but are not concerned with speciﬁc copies of those
books (Tanselle, 1977/1979, p. 40).
The particular distinctions are not the most important ideas here, al-
though Tanselle writes at length about the way the distinctions play out in
different kinds of activities. What is important about Tanselle (1977/1979)
is that it points to literary criticism, bibliography, and cataloging as related
activities. He seems to argue that we can make no perfect distinction between
physical and intellectual retrieval. Library catalogs show traces of physical
bibliography, and enumerative physical bibliographies are created for some
(perhaps ideological) purpose, frequently either retrieval or intellectual col-
location. All of these concerns remain bound up with our efforts to under-
stand not just texts, but works as a product of an author’s intent.
While Tanselle takes the ﬁrst steps toward a postmodern understanding
of the way in which we organize and retrieve information, Jerome McGann
adopts an overtly postmodern approach that draws on hermeneutics and
deconstruction. McGann (1991) calls for what he terms a materialist herme-
neutics (p. 15). While he follows a general hermeneutic orientation, he ar-
gues that “Reading appears always and only as text. . . [and] reading itself
can only be understood when it has assumed speciﬁc material constitutions”
(McGann, 1991, pp. 4–5). He shares some of the doubt that Tanselle har-
bors about deconstruction but applies it to hermeneutics in criticizing the
modern hermeneutical tradition for paying too much attention to the read-
ing of texts and not enough to their making. He goes much farther than
Tanselle, though, in adopting a postmodern orientation.
McGann follows ﬁgures like Derrida in arguing that texts do not pro-
vide simple representations of reality and shares in the more radical idea
that such representation is unattainable. He argues that “The textual con-
dition’s only immutable law is the law of change. . . . [T]exts do not simply
vary over time. Texts vary from themselves (as it were) immediately, as soon
as they engage with the readers they anticipate” (McGann, 1991, pp. 9–10).
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This indeterminacy across groups has implications for the organization
of resources, and we will see later that recent scholarship in classiﬁcation
has begun addressing it.
As with many postmodern thinkers, we should not view McGann’s ideas
as something alien being grafted onto the study of bibliography and classiﬁ-
cation. McGann follows Gérard Genette in referring to paratexts, which
include items such as footnotes and prefaces that do not constitute part of
the original text (Genette’s work predates McGann [1991], but is available
in English as Genette [1997]). McGann extends the idea of paratexts to
include bibliographic elements and refers to text as “a laced network of
linguistic and bibliographic codes” (McGann, 1991, p. 13). We should also
remember that his work draws directly from that of Tanselle, who very clear-
ly was concerned with bibliographic work in its various forms.
McGann’s work is important for that connection to bibliography alone,
but it leads to other salient issues, as well. He posits an editorial horizon,
the social conditions that surround the production or reproduction of a
text and constitute the context in which these actions occur. The works
discussed so far have pointed, in various ways, to the idea of an intellectual
horizon. Besterman points out the persuasive intent present in some bibli-
ographies. Both Tanselle and McGann compare bibliography with the lit-
erary judgment involved in editing. Shera shows concern for epistemolog-
ical context in the production of ideas. When we take these together, we
are not far from positing a classiﬁcatory horizon, the material and social
context within which classiﬁcatory decisions are made and in which they
have efﬁcacy in shaping discourse. McGann gives no concise deﬁnition of
what he means by “horizon” but argues that “texts are produced and repro-
duced under speciﬁc social and institutional conditions, and hence . . . every
text, including those that may appear to be purely private, is a social text.
This view entails a corollary understanding, that a ‘text’ is not a ‘material
thing’ but a material event or set of events, a point in time (or a moment
in space) where certain communicative interchanges are being practiced
(McGann, 1991, p. 21).
If one substitutes “classiﬁcation” or “classiﬁcatory act” for “text,” they
will have a workable deﬁnition of what is meant in this paper by “classiﬁca-
tory horizon.”
Unless we wish to disregard the concern for social epistemology, cul-
tural conditions, and the inevitably interpretive elements of bibliography
raised by the authors discussed so far, the idea of a classiﬁcatory horizon is,
if not inevitable, certainly worth considering. It is no stretch to say that
classiﬁcation for retrieval affects the utilization of material products referred
to by Shera through its constitution of some of the paratexts referred to by
scholars like McGann. These notions of horizon, i.e., McGann’s and the one
expressed here, are also not far from ideas of horizons, interpretive tradi-
tions, and shifts in textual meaning that ﬁgure prominently in hermeneu-
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tics and deconstruction. The idea of a classiﬁcatory horizon ﬁnds support
in recent rhetorical scholarship, as well.
Classification and Material Rhetoric
Similar concerns over horizons, communities, and other bounds placed
on discourse by classiﬁcation also show up, even though sometimes indi-
rectly, in rhetorical scholarship. The connection is most clear in material
rhetoric, but other rhetoricians show varying levels of concern with classiﬁ-
cation for access.
Bruffee (1997) focuses on collaborative learning in American colleges
but touches on questions with implications for the study of classiﬁcation and
retrieval. Following a number of other textual scholars, Bruffee observes
that “Writing is a technologically displaced form of conversation” (Bruffee,
1997, p. 400). Whether we call it displaced speech, displaced communica-
tion, or something else, this idea of displacement from one discourse com-
munity or horizon to another ﬁts well with the concerns expressed previ-
ously. In being displaced and stored for later use, any text becomes a
potentially classiﬁable object, and the way it is classiﬁed affects its later use.
While referring speciﬁcally to the teaching of English, Bruffee’s statement
that such work “is one way of introducing students to the process by which
communities of knowledgeable peers create referential connections be-
tween symbolic structures and ‘reality’” (Bruffee, 1997, p. 410) could easi-
ly be a description of classiﬁcation as used in academic libraries.
Bruffee (1997) focuses on the rise of collaborative learning as it grew
in response to the inﬂux of college students less well-prepared for academic
life than their predecessors. Similar concerns have been voiced about learn-
ing bibliographic systems. Metcalfe (1976), in tracing the evolution of
modern information retrieval from early bibliography and classiﬁcation,
argues that “One trouble in the past has been that bibliographies have dif-
fered widely in arrangement, each of which has had to be mastered before
consultation can be relied on” (Metcalfe, 1976, p. 24). So when Bruffee
argues that “collaborative learning inducts students into established knowl-
edge communities and teaches them the normal discourse of those com-
munities” (Bruffee, 1997, p. 409), we should remember that an important
part of that discourse is bibliographic.
Other rhetoricians have referred more overtly to connections with li-
braries and archives. Berlin (1987) refers to the use of library tools such as
periodical indexes for research papers that found their way into the cur-
rent-traditional rhetoric curriculum. While Berlin assigned the research
paper a relatively minor role in this development, he linked it to current-
traditional views about the creation of meaning, arguing that “the research
paper represented the insistence in current-traditional rhetoric on ﬁnding
meaning outside the composing act, with writing itself serving as a simple
transcription process” (Berlin, 1987, p. 70). Library research creates this
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connection to a larger context outside the text through classiﬁcatory sys-
tems that alternately highlight or obscure works. These processes are most
directly addressed in strands of material rhetoric that address the physical
production and dissemination of texts.
Scholars of material rhetoric have been the most insistent in linking
the work of classiﬁcationists and archivists to that of rhetoricians. Sharer
(1999) suggests, “fundamentally, that we expand our professional respon-
sibilities into realms previously marked off as the territory of library and
information science” (p. 136). She expresses great concern over the dete-
rioration of physical resources in libraries and archives and argues for a
greater voice for rhetoric scholars (and others) in deciding what is preserved
and what is weeded out or allowed to deteriorate as an “accepted loss” (Shar-
er, 1999, p. 125).
Sharer’s arguments are simple, but telling. She argues that writing a
historical account constitutes an act of power that depends on “previous
acts of power that conﬁgure the physical and material conditions of histor-
ical research” (Sharer, 1999, p. 120). She expresses concern with Louis
Willard’s idea that “The most reliable predictor of later use is past use”
(Sharer, 1999, p. 126), pointing out that “Description and indexing prac-
tices . . . establish and perpetuate cultural and social values by allowing only
certain materials to become visible to researchers, while obscuring others”
(Sharer, 1999, p. 128). Past use, then, is, in part, a product of the social
values that guided classiﬁcatory decisions, and those values may haunt fu-
ture research with their seeming objectivity. This argument bears strong
similarity to McGann’s assertion of the editorial horizon and to Shera’s
concern with social epistemology. It also serves as an example of how classiﬁ-
catory horizons might show their effects in practice. Not only does classiﬁ-
cation occur within an intellectual horizon, in a striking example of the
hermeneutical circle, it also helps constitute that horizon.
Tollar Collins (1999) also draws on McGann’s work to develop a meth-
odology for material rhetoric, which she deﬁnes as “the theoretical inves-
tigation of discourse by examining how the rhetorical aims and functions
of the initial text are changed by the processes of material production and
distribution” (p. 547). As McGann refers to paratexts, Tollar Collins re-
fers to rhetorical accretions, which accumulate in a “process of layering
additional texts over and around the original text. . . .” (Tollar Collins,
1999, p. 547).
In Tollar Collins’s work, we ﬁnd a familiar nexus of concerns. While
she does not refer explicitly to classiﬁcation, she alludes to bibliographical
studies aimed at establishing authoritative versions of works (Tollar Collins,
1999, p. 549). She also talks about how the horizon of expectations can
shape, and be shaped by, a work’s rhetorical functions (Tollar Collins, 1999,
p. 548). This notion of horizon tracks well with McGann’s notion of the
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editorial horizon, the idea of a classiﬁcatory horizon posited in this paper,
and hermeneutic notions of interpretive horizons.
The three traditions—bibliographic scholarship, rhetoric, and herme-
neutics—have converged on a strikingly similar set of ideas about horizons
and context. Another of this paper’s contentions is that even this relatively
brief review shows that these ﬁelds bear the marks of common wellsprings,
and the tendency to consider them completely separate ﬁelds of endeavor
is a mistake. Their respective ideas are strengthened by the presence of sim-
ilar conclusions in the other ﬁelds under discussion. We also will see in the
next section that scholars in classiﬁcation have reached similar ideas about
horizons by different paths.
The Study of Information
While this paper argues strongly for a set of shared intellectual origins,
notably, contemporary scholars of information have come to similar con-
clusions by different means. Buckland (1991) posits information-as-thing—
a broad term including data, documents, and objects taken to have infor-
mative value (p. 351). He calls on the work of European documentalists
such as Paul Otlet and Suzanne Briet in deﬁning a broad range of objects
as potentially informational. He uses the example of antelope-as-document
from Briet’s work, arguing that an antelope in the wild is not a document,
but an antelope in a zoo might well be considered one. However, Buckland
argues against such an animal being discourse:
Perhaps a better term for texts in the general sense of artifacts intended
to represent some meaning would be “discourse”. . . . However, we
could hardly regard an antelope or a ship as being “discourse”. . . . Their
value as information or evidence derives from what they signify about
themselves individually or, perhaps, about the class or classes of which
they are members . . . they could be viewed as representative. If an ob-
ject is not representative of something, then it is not clear how far it
can signify anything, i.e., be informative.” (Buckland, 1991, p. 355,
emphasis and quotes in original)
This raises questions of representation, but the disposition of those
questions is not what should concern us here. What is important is the place-
ment of artifacts at the center of discussion about information. Information,
then, comes to us borne by a contextualized thing, and this constitutes a
conclusion strikingly similar to the ones reached by Tanselle, Shera, Mc-
Gann, Sharer, and Tollar Collins.
Buckland (1997) makes this similarity more apparent. He returns to
Briet’s deﬁnition of documents and infers four rules she used to determine
when something is a document: the objects must be material; they must be
intended as evidence or documentation; the objects must be processed; and
there is a phenomenological position that the object is perceived as a doc-
ument (Buckland, 1997, p. 806). He also refers brieﬂy to a suggestion that
600 library trends/winter 2004
Briet saw documentary status as stemming from indexicality, “the quality of
having been placed in an organized, meaningful relationship with other
evidence” (Buckland, 1997, p. 806).
Buckland makes an additional comment near the end of the paper,
which bears even greater similarity to the thought of material rhetoricians
and breaks with the modernist leanings of scholars like Otlet. He argues that
“one difference between the views of the documentalists discussed above and
contemporary views is the emphasis that would now be placed on the social
construction of meaning, on the viewer’s perception of the signiﬁcance and
evidential character of the documents” (Buckland, 1997, p. 807).
Social construction of meaning comes very close to the concept of horizon
by calling attention to the role of context in meaning and communication,
bringing Buckland even closer to scholars like McGann.
Albrechtsen and Jacob (1998) raise a similar set of concerns about
scholarship in classiﬁcation. They criticize both the one-size-ﬁts-all univer-
salism of rationalism, and empirical approaches that seek to compile large
amounts of factual information about user actions (Albrechtsen and Jacob,
1998, p. 295). They call for a new approach based on social constructivism
or historicism, which they argue can offer “a view of knowledge as a prod-
uct of historical, cultural, and social factors, where the fundamental divi-
sions and the fundamental concepts are products of the divisions of scien-
tiﬁc/cultural/social labor in knowledge domains” (Albrechtsen and Jacob,
1998, p. 296).
They incorporate Star and Griesemer’s idea of boundary objects, “ob-
jects that are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints
of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a
common identity across sites. They are weakly structured in common use,
and become strongly structured in individual-site use” (Albrechtsen and
Jacob, 1998, p. 311).
Under this characterization of classiﬁcation, classiﬁers become epistemic
engineers who facilitate access across diverse user groups, rather than plac-
ing documents in a priori categories. This concern for the local rather than
the purportedly universal, for the contingent rather than the permanent,
bears strong similarity to deconstruction and contemporary hermeneutics
in spirit if not in word and ﬁts well with the previously discussed scholar-
ship overtly concerned with horizons and meaning. It also answers Bester-
man’s earlier concern over the position of permanent principles in the
arrangement of texts. This very practical concern can ﬁnd theoretical justiﬁ-
cation in these shared ideas.
Brown et al. (1996) employ the notion of boundary objects in a relat-
ed criticism of the conduit metaphor. This metaphor posits information sys-
tems as transmission systems designed to impart information with a mini-
mum of noise or distortion. In discussing documents as boundary objects,
the authors employ language very close to the discussion of horizons, ar-
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guing “Documents that pass successfully between communities need to be
able to engage (at least) two interpretive strategies and to survive where the
recipients can no longer be assumed to share the interpretive assumptions
of the members of the originating community” (Brown et al., 1996, p. 12).
In a different context, this statement could serve as an adequate reca-
pitulation of Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence. It also cor-
responds well with McGann’s ideas about textual change and lies not far
from Gadamer’s idea of merging horizons in human communications.
Unlike Albrechtsen and Jacob, Brown et al. (1996) do refer directly to
rhetoricians, in this case pointing to Stephen Toulmin and Stanley Fish’s
writing on the social negotiation of meaning (Negotiating Meaning section,
para. 2). Their focus falls on documents as deﬁning properties of commu-
nities, and they address this issue in terms of the Web and other informa-
tion technologies.
As with so much else in this paper, these scholars refer to each other’s
work, or take up problems that put them at a short remove from each oth-
er. These concerns over context and horizon began, in part, with the study
of bibliography, and they now extend into our study of online information.
These longstanding, shared concerns seem likely to remain.
Conclusion
From its beginnings, classiﬁcation has been closely concerned with
many of the same issues present in rhetoric. The early bibliographies which
contributed to modern classiﬁcation showed persuasive intent, and contem-
porary scholars of classiﬁcation for access have developed critiques of their
own ﬁeld that track closely with the critiques put forward in rhetoric.
Rhetoricians, in turn, have shown both overt concern with the way
classiﬁcation affects discourse, as well as more subtle concern for the dis-
cursive environments into which documents enter and which they, in part,
constitute. Certain material rhetoricians in particular have argued that the
material conditions of textual production and dissemination shape the use
and understanding of documents. This echoes the arguments by bibliog-
raphers that material conditions alter the ways in which we use texts to
understand works.
This paper derives its importance from its attempt to begin unifying
the trends represented by these scholarly questions, not in the way that
individual authors attempt to resolve these questions. All of the authors
refer to social context, and many do so in a way that at least obliquely con-
nects them to the other ﬁelds. In the case of Tanselle and McGann, the
connections are overt and easy to trace. McGann’s idea of the editorial
horizon has power here not just in similarity of word use, but in the fact
that he derives his ideas, in part, directly from bibliography, hermeneutics,
and textual studies. Some of the work in material rhetoric, in part, builds
on McGann’s work and also refers to classiﬁcation.
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A great deal of work in these related ﬁelds circles around the idea of
horizon, expressed in various ways. This article has made a preliminary
attempt to unify these notions under the term classiﬁcatory horizon and ar-
gues that the concept derives naturally from historical roots common to
classiﬁcation, rhetoric, and hermeneutics. The notion of a classiﬁcatory
horizon is more than a simple metaphor. It represents a convergence of
ideas from related ﬁelds that, taken together, can provide a theoretical
framework for studying the rhetorical aspects of classiﬁcation. This frame-
work might eventually lead to a better understanding of the material and
cultural limits that act on the representations in our classiﬁcatory systems.
We should pay less attention to the way the individual authors handle
these questions and more attention to the fact that they all arrive at a sim-
ilar set of concerns and conclusions that serve to strengthen each other. We
should be surprised not by the similarities that we can ﬁnd, but by the fact
that these similarities don’t receive more attention.
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The Ubiquitous Hierarchy: An Army to
Overcome the Threat of a Mob
Hope A. Olson
Abstract
This article explores the connections between Melvil Dewey and
Hegelianism and Charles Cutter and the Scottish Common Sense philoso-
phers. It traces the practice of hierarchy from these philosophical inﬂuences
to Dewey and Cutter and their legacy to today’s Dewey Decimal Classiﬁcation
and Library of Congress Subject Headings. The ubiquity of hierarchy is linked
to Dewey’s and Cutter’s metaphor of organizing the mob of information
into an orderly army using the tool of logic.
Introduction
Much of Western philosophy implies or expounds directly a notion of
hierarchy. From Aristotle through Francis Bacon to Hegel and beyond,
logic, in particular, bears a hierarchical stamp. At the same time, systems
for topical organization of information typically exhibit hierarchical struc-
tures. The pervasiveness of hierarchy is not surprising in a culture such as
our Western culture derived from Greek and later European thought and
further developed in the settler cultures such as those of the Americas.
However, examining it more closely helps us to understand both its opera-
tions and its ramiﬁcations. This paper will examine two schools of philoso-
phy and two streams of organization of information to trace the inﬂuence
of philosophy on the founders of our systems of subject access and on cur-
rent standards with an emphasis on their hierarchical structures.
The Army and the Mob in Dewey and Cutter
Melvil Dewey and his Dewey Decimal Classiﬁcation (DDC ) show the in-
ﬂuence of Hegel and American Hegelians while Charles Cutter and his
Hope A. Olson, School of Information Studies, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, P.O. Box
413, Milwaukee, WI 53201
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legacy, the Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH), show the inﬂuence
of Thomas Reid and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers. In doing
so, both Dewey and Cutter, the two “fathers” of modern subject access prac-
tice, used the metaphor of an army to justify their imposition of a hierar-
chical structure to order the chaotic mob of information.
Dewey was particularly dramatic in his use of the mob/army metaphor.
He asserted (in his “simpliﬁed speling”) that:
A larj business or work unclasifyd or uncharted is not a worthy organi-
zation but mere material from which a clever brain may construct one.
It differs in efﬁciency from the ideal as a mob of men differs from a
wel disciplind army. Piles of brik and mortar ar not a templ any more
than heaps of typ ar Shakspere’s works, tho if “clasifyd” and set, each
in ryt relation to the rest, the transformation is bro’t about. (Dewey,
1932, hereafter DDC13, p. 44—emphasis added in all quotations)
Dewey viewed information as a chaotic jumble needing order. He used a
variety of metaphors to bring home this point. Taking examples from busi-
ness, the military, religion, and literature, Dewey asserted that classiﬁcation,
broadly conceived, is necessary for overcoming chaos. In each instance,
Dewey offered only two choices: mob or army, bricks or a building, miscel-
laneous words or a masterpiece. Order, in Dewey’s view, comes from “a clev-
er brain”—which I interpret to mean one that employs reason or logic.
Charles Cutter, on the other hand, was not creating a classiﬁcation. He
was creating a dictionary catalog to assign names to information. The cha-
os addressed by Cutter comes from the alphabet rather than from a mob
of raw material. Cutter wanted to change the mob for an army, absurdity
for logic:
The dictionary catalog sets out with another object and a different
method [than the classiﬁed catalog], but having attained that object—
facility of reference—is at liberty to try to secure some of the advan-
tages of classification and system in its own way. Its subject-entries, in-
dividual, general, limited, extensive, thrown together without any logical
arrangement, in most absurd proximity—Abscess followed by Absentee-
ism and that by Absolution, Club-foot next to Clubs, and Communion to
Communism, while Bibliography and Literary history, Christianity and The-
ology, are separated by half the length of the catalogue—are a mass of
utterly disconnected particles without any relation to one another, each
useful in itself but only by itself. But by a well-devised net-work of cross-
references the mob becomes an army, of which each part is capable of
assisting many other parts. The effective force of the catalog is immense-
ly increased. (Cutter, 1904, p. 79)
As with Dewey, the choice that Cutter offered is a limiting duality. Either
the catalog can be made up of individuals (a mob of individuals) or it can
be a highly restrictive hierarchical structure (an army). No other options
were considered. Cutter identiﬁed two options for a structure: the logical
and the absurd. The absurd juxtapositions of alphabetical structure are like
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a mob. A logical structure, however, creates an order as efﬁcient as that of
an army. Cutter’s implied presumption is that there are only these two
options: logic or absurdity, the army or the mob. His acceptance of this
dualism led him to adopt a hierarchical structure for his universal language.
The structure that Cutter devised to arrange entries so that they may be
easily found is a hierarchical structure formed by cross-references.
Cutter and Dewey may well have chosen as they did without speciﬁc
philosophical inﬂuences. Western philosophy has hierarchy as one of its
underlying themes. However, the entrenched and ubiquitous nature of
hierarchy in Dewey’s and Cutter’s writings and in DDC and LCSH suggests
a particularly intense operation of the discourse of hierarchy. Their link-
ing of reason or logic with the structure of an army invites further explora-
tion of such strong hierarchical tendencies.
Hegel and Dewey
G. W. F. Hegel has been speciﬁcally linked to Dewey (Wiegand, 1998).
Dewey’s philosophical mentor at Amherst College, Julius Seelye, was a fol-
lower of Hegel (Wiegand, 1998, p. 185) and William T. Harris, whose St.
Louis Public School Library’s classiﬁcation was a basis for DDC (Wiegand,
1996, p. 23), was a leader of the American, or St. Louis, Hegelians, publisher
of their Journal of Speculative Philosophy, and author of a book explicating
Hegel’s logic (Harris, 1895).
Seelye was not only a professor and later president at Amherst. He trans-
lated Albert Schwegler’s History of Philosophy, viewed by Harris as a signiﬁ-
cant work in the study of Hegel (Harris, 1867, p. 250). Wayne Wiegand trac-
es Seelye’s Hegelianism and its inﬂuence on Dewey and his classiﬁcation
in his article on the “Amherst Method” (1998), including the impact of texts
used by Seelye and others in Dewey’s subarrangement of classes. Wiegand
illustrates that Dewey was clearly subject to inﬂuence, with Hegelians high
on the list of his authority ﬁgures.
Harris’s classiﬁcation for the St. Louis public schools is widely credited
for the choice and sequence of main classes in DDC. In the acknowledgments
from the ﬁrst edition to the thirteenth (the last to which he personally con-
tributed), Dewey notes that although he did not see Harris’s scheme before
he had completed the most important parts of his own, “In ﬁlling the 9 clas-
es of the skeme, the inverted Baconian arranjement of the St Louis Library
was followd” (Dewey, 1932, p. 46). Harris, in turn, served as a cooperating
editor of Dewey’s Library Journal and used DDC at the United States Bureau
of Education’s library when he was head of the Bureau (Leidecker, 1946, pp.
341, 468). Harris (1895) wrote an explication of Hegel’s logic credited with
being more Hegelian than Hegel. In a tribute to Harris, Edward E. Richard-
son describes Harris’s Hegelianism as characterized by a devout belief in
rationalism and its reliance on logic alongside a belief in history as a progress
toward the ideal of freedom and individuality (1936, pp. 33–35).
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The actual progression of main classes in DDC seems to be drawn from
Hegel, probably via Harris (Graziano, 1959; Comaromi, 1976, pp. 25–29;
Olson, 2001). Harris’s biographer, Kurt Leidecker, accepts that Harris in-
ﬂuenced Dewey in this regard (1946, p. 340). Given earlier Hegelian in-
ﬂuences on Dewey, it is altogether likely that Dewey and Harris were
sufﬁciently in tune to share ideas about classiﬁcatory structure consonant
with the fundamental logic that Hegel propounded.
Hegel’s system of logic implies hierarchy. He deﬁned three quantita-
tive “moments”: individual, particular, and universal in increasing order of
generality. Each of these moments characterizes an element in each ﬁgure
of the three syllogisms Hegel proposed in his system of logic. As an exam-
ple, the ﬁrst is the commonly identiﬁed syllogism linking the individual (I)
instance of “Gaius” to the universal (U) notion of mortality via the partic-
ular (P) category of “man”:
All P are U All men are mortal
I is P Gaius is a man
∴I is U ∴Gaius is mortal
In classiﬁcatory terms, “mortal beings” is the main class, which is subdivid-
ed by various species including “man,” and “Gaius” is a further subdivision
of “man.” This syllogism follows the pattern of deductive logic in which a
conclusion is inferred from accepted premises. Hegel used the whole/part
or genus/species hierarchy of universal/particular/individual to structure
the inference. Hegel’s syllogism reﬂects basic Aristotelean logic—part of
the Western philosophical tradition (see Olson, 1999 for a related discus-
sion of Aristotle and classiﬁcation).
The syllogisms that Hegel proposes in his system also include an induc-
tive syllogism as a subclass of his syllogism of allness. The inductive syllo-
gism follows the following pattern:
I1, I2, I3, . . . In are P Gaius et al are mortal
All P include I1, I2, I3, . . . In All men include Gaius et al
∴P are U ∴Men are mortal
The operation of induction, like the deduction of the ﬁrst syllogism, rests
on a hierarchy. But in the inductive syllogism, it is a hierarchy in which
the individual instances are the evidence that implies the link between the
particular and the universal. In either instance, the three moments—
individual, particular, universal—relate to each other via hierarchical ge-
nus/species or whole/part relationships. “Everything is a syllogism, a uni-
versal that through particularity is united with individuality. . . .” (Hegel,
1969, p. 669).
Hegel built on the three moments of deﬁnition through a second pro-
cess, division. Harris interpreted Hegel’s “division” as “classiﬁcation”:
“Classiﬁcation is a synthetic operation in which is expressed the necessary
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relation of all the determinations of the universal. The contents are exhibit-
ed exhaustively” (Harris, 1895, p. 394). Or as Hegel put it: “The universal
must particularize itself; . . . the individual content of cognition ascends
through particularity to the extreme of universality. . . .” (Hegel, 1969, p. 800).
This pattern is identical to W. C. Berwick Sayers’ description of how tradi-
tional classiﬁcations are structured: “The major principle originally ex-
pounded was that classiﬁcation should start with knowledge in its totality
and divide it up into classes . . . the idea of starting with large subject ﬁelds
and dividing them up, using one characteristic at a time, so that eventually
they had attempted to list all departments of knowledge in a systematic
sequence moving, from the very general to the highly specialised, in a se-
ries of regulated steps” (Sayers, 1967, pp. 43–44).
The dialectic to which this cognitive technique contributes is a method
that proceeds through stages to an absolute. “The dialectic is no inﬁnite
progress, but it brings us to a ﬁnal category. . . .” (Harris, 1895, p. 402). Hence,
the pinnacle of the logical progression that depends on the link of individu-
al, particular, and universal is an absolute idea or absolute knowledge.
Harris and his fellow St. Louis Hegelians applied Hegel’s dialectic in
their everyday concerns. They used it to explain what they saw as the nec-
essary evil of the Civil War as well as a means of reforming education and
even improving turkey and squirrel hunting (Pochmann, 1948, p. 33). So
applying it to a library classiﬁcation as Harris and then Dewey did was no
far stretch.
Dewey created his hierarchical arrangement by gathering like entities
in a structure that progresses through ranks of relationships between things,
much like a syllogism:
The ﬁeld of knowlej is divided into 9 main clases, numberd 1 to 9, and
cyclopedias, periodicals etc. so jeneral as to belong to none of these clas-
es ar markt 0 (naught) and form a 10th clas; e.g. clas 1 is library of
Filosofy; clas 5, library of Syence; clas 9, History, etc. These special clases
or libraries ar then considerd independently, and each is separated
again into 9 special divisions of the main subject, numberd 1 to 9, as
wer the clases, jeneral works belonging to no division having 0 for their
division number. Thus 59 is division 9 (Zoolojy) of clas 5 (Syence). A
3d division is then made by separating each of these divisions into 10
sections, numberd in same way with 0 and the 9 dijits; and this deci-
mal subdivision is repeated, til it secures as many subsections as may
be needed in any topic. Thus 513 is section 3 ( Jeometry) of division 1
(Mathematics) of clas 5 (Pure syence). (Dewey, 1932, p. 15)
Dewey’s use of classes, divisions, and sections recalls the hierarchy of an
army (indeed, his tens and hundreds recall the Roman army). The Oxford
English Dictionary deﬁnes them as:
class . . . A division or order of society according to status; a rank or
grade of society. . . . A division of things according to grade or quality,
as high or low, ﬁrst, second, etc. . . .
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division . . . The action of dividing or state of being divided into parts
or branches; partition, severance. . . . The fact of being divided in opin-
ion, sentiment, or interest; disagreement, variance, dissension, dis-
cord; . . . classification; . . . A portion of an army or ﬂeet, . . .
section . . . A part separated or divided off from the remainder . . . Mil.
A fourth part of a company. . . .
Each differentiation of the hierarchical arrangement compounds the sep-
aration of classes, dividing same from different as more levels are added in a
chain of facets like a chain of command. Instead of the chaos of a mob,
Dewey introduced the rigidity of an army. “Thus all books on any givn sub-
ject stand together, and no aditions or chanjes ever separate them” (Dew-
ey, 1932, p. 22).
Nonetheless, one of the problems that Dewey addressed was the inﬂex-
ibility of everything being in its place if that place was a speciﬁc position
on a library shelf. His hierarchical arrangement possessed another attribute
of an army:
In relativ location it is like ﬁnding a soldier if yu know his army, divi-
sion, rejiment and cumpany. If John Smith is 3d man in 2d row of
Cumpany B, rejiment 69, 4th division, whether the rejiment is in camp,
on parade or on march, his place is not determind by the bit of ground
on which he stands, but by his relation to the rest of the army. If sol-
diers ar ded and in the cemetery they ar as eazily found by ﬁxt as by
relativ location. But if the army is alive and militant, as every library or
private working colection o’t to be, its resources shud be ﬁndabl whether
in camp, on march or in action. (Dewey, 1932, p. 22)
Having lived through both the American Civil War and World War I, by the
time these words were published in the last edition of DDC during his life-
time, it is not surprising that Dewey wanted to link his classiﬁcation to the
living soldiers as opposed to the dead. He will have been familiar with the
image of mass cemeteries of both wars in which individuals were named on
row upon row of white crosses. However, his living soldiers are “in camp,
on parade or on march,” not in battle where even decimal systems cannot
overcome chaos.
The Scottish Common Sense Philosophers and Cutter
Charles Cutter’s use of the mob vs army metaphor is present in his Rules
for a Dictionary Catalogue from the ﬁrst edition (1876) to the generally cited
fourth edition (1904). Cutter’s educational and social contexts reﬂected the
American version of the Scottish common sense philosophical tradition
(Miksa, 1977, pp. 32–34; Miksa, 1983, p. 40). As a student at Harvard, a
Unitarian, and a member of Boston’s intelligentsia, Cutter was exposed to
the ideas of Scottish philosophers such as Thomas Reid1  and Dugald Stew-
art, especially through the interpretation of Ezra Abbot, textual scholar,
assistant librarian, and chief cataloger at Harvard at the time (Miksa, 1977,
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pp. 19, 32). Cutter was at Harvard as a student and then a librarian from
1851 to 1868 (Miksa, 1977, pp. 19–20). Before and during that time, the
Scottish Common Sense philosophers were required reading at the major
colleges in the eastern United States. Their views were widely popularized
and became a pervasive inﬂuence on American society (Martin, 1961, pp.
13–39; Bryson, 1968, p. 3; Miksa, 1977, p. 34; Miksa, 1983, p. 40). Even in
the 1870s the Scottish school was still inﬂuential enough to be the old guard
(Martin, 1961, p. 162). Abbot helped Cutter translate the Scottish philoso-
phy prevalent at the time into the concept of systematized library catalog-
ing (Miksa, 1977, p. 49). Cutter developed from this inﬂuence the notion
of three levels of subject: individual, lower order abstractions, and ﬁrst
principles (Miksa, 1977, p. 52). These levels are parallel to Hegel’s individ-
ual, particular, and universal moments.
The Scottish common sense school began as a reaction to David Hu-
me’s skepticism—a concern held in common with Hegel.2  Reid described
this skepticism as “absurd” (1997, p. 32), just as Cutter described the mob
of the alphabet as analogous to absurdity. Philosophy had built up to such
a level of esoteric argument in Hume that Reid found its artiﬁciality more
than he could bear. Further, Reid suggested that Common Sense should
be the measure of sound philosophy and that its opposite is absurdity:
If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitu-
tion of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a neces-
sity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being
able to give a reason for them; these are what I call the principles of
common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call
absurd. (Reid, 1997, p. 33)
In the service of common sense, Reid (along with Dugald Stewart) endorsed
inductive reasoning on the basis of mutual causation of particular effects
(Olson, 1975, pp. 46ff, 115; Marcil-Lacoste, 1982, pp. 149–150). That is, the
common cause of particular phenomena can be identiﬁed inductively by
drawing generalizations from these speciﬁc instances. Francis Miksa ex-
plains: “Given this way of relating kinds of ideas, all ideas could be viewed
as elements of a single classiﬁcatory hierarchy. . . .” (1983, p. 43). As de-
scribed above in relation to Hegel’s second syllogism, induction depends
on a whole/part or genus/species hierarchical relationship between con-
cept and evidence.
Cutter was following just such a model when he created a structure he
termed “syndetic” to achieve a hierarchical arrangement in the dictionary
catalog. His deﬁnition belies the primacy he gave to hierarchical relationships:
Syndetic, connective, applied to that kind of dictionary catalog which
binds its entries together by means of cross-references so as to form a
whole, the references being made from the most comprehensive sub-
ject to those of the next lower degree of comprehensiveness, and from
each of these to their subordinate subjects, and vice versa. These cross-
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references correspond to and are a good substitute for the arrangement
in a systematic catalog. References are also made in the syndetic cata-
log to illustrative and coördinate subjects, and, if it is perfect, from
speciﬁc to general subjects. (§§ 187–188.) (Cutter, 1904, p. 23)
Only as an aside in the last sentence of his deﬁnition did he mention the
possibility of relationships other than hierarchical ones. He imposed a hi-
erarchy on the chaos of language as if it had no order already. He rejected
the structure of the alphabet and, instead, chose the only other option he
saw: hierarchy.
Cutter’s notion of a dictionary catalog ﬁt logically with Reid’s “common
theory of ideas,” which followed an empiricist line in linking ideas to ma-
terial things (Seth, 1890, p. 18; Broadie, 1990, p. 113). Reid also believed
that language reﬂects our experience, with words having “a just foundation
in nature” (Reid, 1785, p. 22). In addition to the senses as a source of em-
pirical knowledge, Reid and other Scottish Common Sense philosophers
recognized certain powers innate to humanity, including “memory, concep-
tion, abstraction, judging, reasoning, taste, moral perception [and] con-
sciousness” (Bryson, 1968, p. 132). The Scottish Common Sense philoso-
phers did not develop a full-blown system of rational logic as Hegel did, but
rather focused on intuitional principles and knowledge as a reﬂection of
the world around them (Seth, 1890, pp. 196–197). These characteristics
seem to foster principles more suited to a dictionary catalog such as liter-
ary warrant. However, the simple occurrence of a topic does not make it a
valid subject in this sense. It must have its place in the inductively deter-
mined hierarchy (Miksa, 1983, p. 60).
Another Scottish Common Sense philosopher widely studied in the
United States in Cutter’s time, Adam Ferguson, suggests that “In other class-
es of animals, the individual advances from infancy to age or maturity; and
he attains, in the compass of a single life, too all the perfection his nature
can reach: but, in the human kind, the species has a progress as well as the
individual; they build in every subsequent age on foundations formerly laid;
and, in a succession of years, tend to a perfection in the application of their
faculties, to which the aid of long experience is required, and to which many
generations must have combined their endeavours” (1995, p. 10). In his An
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1995), Ferguson described the progress
of “rude nations” as they developed systems of property ownership and the
arts (including the “civil and commercial arts”) as having standard progres-
sions from one stage to another. Reid was less explicit about historical pro-
gression, but seems to be following the same kind of logic linking hierar-
chy and teleology: “The chain of natural causes has, not unﬁtly, been
compared to a chain hanging down from heaven: A link that is discovered
supports the links below it, but it must itself be supported; and that which
supports it must be supported, until we come to the ﬁrst link, which is sup-
ported by the throne of the Almighty. Every natural cause must have a cause,
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until we ascend to the ﬁrst cause, which is uncaused, and operates not by
necessity but by will” (Reid, 1785, p. 115).
In Cutter’s dictionary catalog, the chain is forged by references until a
general heading is reached that has no broader concept. The references
proceed only one level at a time. As Reid put it in a letter: “Human knowl-
edge is like the steps of a ladder. The ﬁrst step consists of particular truths,
discovered by observation or experiment: the second collects these into
more general truths: the third into still more general. But there are many
steps before we come to the top. Ambitious of knowledge, and unconscious
of weakness, we would fain jump at once from the lowest to the highest. But
the consequence of this is that we tumble down and ﬁnd that our labor must
begin anew” (Olson, 1975, p. 36).
Legacy of a Metaphor
The standards that follow from Cutter’s and Dewey’s work reﬂect the
hierarchical structures of the army. The Dewey Decimal Classiﬁcation (DDC)
and the Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH) are their legacy. These
structures are as arbitrary as the alphabetical proximities that concern
Cutter in that they privilege hierarchical relationships over all other types
of relationships. They also embody a rigidity that inhibits LCSH and DDC
in their ability to adapt to changing contexts.
Hierarchy in DDC
The hierarchical nature of DDC is still as Dewey described it. In the
introduction to the twenty-ﬁrst edition, there is an explanation of DDC’s
“principle of hierarchy” manifested in both the structure and notation of
the classiﬁcation. “Structural hierarchy means that all topics (aside from the
ten main classes) are subordinate to and part of all the broader topics above
it” (Dewey, 1996, hereafter DDC21, p. xxxiii). This arrangement is a clear
indication of classiﬁcation as an inductive tool. If one is to use the lower
levels of the hierarchy as evidence of the generalization, then it is impera-
tive that those lower levels carry the characteristics of the generalities they
represent.
The introduction also points out that “The corollary is also true: what-
ever is true of the whole is true of the parts. This important concept is some-
times called hierarchical force. Any note regarding the nature of a class holds
true for all the subordinate classes, . . .” (DDC21, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv). As a
result, the hierarchy shapes the topics within it as Hegel’s universal shapes
the individual through the particular. The multitude of commonalities that
offer possibilities for classiﬁcation are represented in the rigidity of a chain
of facets rather than as they might relate in different ways. The rejection
of relationships other than hierarchical ones is apparent in the need to
instruct classiﬁers in handling them. If, for example, a document has more
than one subject in the same discipline: “Class a work dealing with interre-
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lated subjects with the subject that is being acted upon. This is called the
rule of application, and takes precedence over any other rule. For instance,
class an analytical work dealing with Shakespeare’s inﬂuence on Keats with
Keats” (DDC21, p. xxxvi).
There is not a way to represent the relationship between Shakespeare
and Keats as there is to represent the relationship between dogs and poo-
dles. Of all of the nonhierarchical relationships possible, the best that DDC
can do is to offer a “table of last resort” for deciding which of the dismem-
bered aspects of an unrepresentable topic one should choose to represent
(DDC21, p. xxxviii). In a system grounded exclusively on hierarchy, there
is not room for other inﬂuences.
Hierarchy and LCSH
A similar situation holds for the Library of Congress Subject Headings
(LCSH). In assigning subject headings, the cataloger is instructed in the
Subject Cataloging Manual: Subject Headings to assign the most speciﬁc head-
ing available (Library of Congress, 1996, hereafter SCM:SH, H 180, p. 2).
The cataloger ﬁnds this speciﬁc heading by following the reference struc-
ture of NARROWER TERMS (NT) down the hierarchy as far as it applies. Given
the hierarchical structure of LCSH, this dictum is logical. However, it pre-
sumes that all headings and, therefore, all topics ﬁt neatly into hierarchies.
If they do not ﬁt, then the cataloger will be led astray by the NT references.
This rule also presumes that all catalogers think in the same hierarchies.
Miksa (1983) explicates a change in the concept of a subject between Cut-
ter and his successors, losing its “classiﬁcatory referent.” However, the pres-
ence of hierarchy is still clear in the current LCSH (see, for example, Wein-
berg, 1993).3
The construction of the hierarchical NT/BT (BROADER TERM)
references is governed by strict rules. Three types of hierarchical relation-
ships require references: genus/species, whole/part, and instance
(SCM:SH, H 370, p. 1). Further, all headings are required to have a BT
unless they fall into one of ﬁve categories of “orphans” (SCM:SH, H 370,
pp. 3–4). Every heading must be part of a hierarchical genealogy with that
context affecting the meaning of headings similar to hierarchical force in
DDC. Another telling instruction for showing hierarchical relationships
requires that an intermediate heading be established if needed to ﬁll a
hierarchical gap created by a new heading (SCM:SH, H 370, p. 5). This
requirement avoids unnecessary “orphans” by making certain that all head-
ings in a hierarchy have a BT without jumping the chain of command. What
is interesting about this rule is that LCSH operates on the basis of literary
warrant, which requires that a subject heading be established “for a topic
that represents a discrete, identiﬁable concept when it is ﬁrst encountered
in a work being cataloged, . . .” (SCM:SH, H 187, p. 1). Headings are not to
be created for new topics not yet identiﬁable and topics for which there is
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not consensus on terminology. It is surprising to ﬁnd, in the context of rules
governing the creation of references, a clear contravention in the cause of
avoiding “orphans” of this principle of literary warrant. It is another indi-
cation of the primacy of hierarchy in subject access.
Another reinforcement of the hierarchy comes in the rules for creat-
ing associative references (RELATED TERMS—RT) representing all
nonhierarchical relationships. RTs are to be minimized “to focus empha-
sis on hierarchical references” (SCM:SH, H 370, p. 10). There are only three
instances in which associative references are allowed: linking overlapping
terms, linking a discipline with its object of study, and linking a person with
their ﬁeld. However, RTs may be made for these relationships only if they
do not begin with the same word stem, have a BT in common, or have broad-
er terms that are already associatively linked (SCM:SH, H 370, pp. 10–11).
The second and third exclusions once again demonstrate hierarchical re-
lationships overriding other considerations.
The requirements for making hierarchical references, the overriding
of literary warrant, and the minimizing of associative references for the
stated purpose of focusing on the hierarchical leave no doubt about the
intended structure of LCSH. It is as unrepentantly hierarchical as DDC.
Conclusion
Although Sayers said that for Dewey and Cutter “classiﬁcatory practice
forged ahead of theory” (1967, p. 43), it seems that they did draw at least
the hierarchical aspect of their practice from the prevailing philosophies
of their day. Reid and the Scottish common sense tradition were interest-
ed mainly in theories of perception. Hegel and the American Hegelians
espoused a system of dialectical progress toward an absolute knowledge or
ideal. However, both perspectives offered a structure of hierarchy ingrained
in Western philosophy and derived anew by Dewey and Cutter as armies of
information, even though from two quite different schools of thought.
The choice that both Dewey and Cutter made was clearly the army rath-
er than the mob. The idea that it was a binary choice is one of the prob-
lems we continue to confront. Even as LCSH tries to implement literary
warrant, it is held in check by the discipline of the hierarchy. An army rep-
resents a particular type of regimented, circumscribed, hierarchical orga-
nization. As we face the continuing complexities of organizing information
in our hybrid environment of traditional, digital, and multimedia resources,
it behooves us to bear in mind that our one pervasive basis for organiza-
tion is not the only one.
Notes
1. Reid was at one point college librarian at Marischal College in Aberdeen, Scotland (Broad-
ie, 1990, p. 105).
2. For a comparison of Hegel and the Scottish Common Sense philosophers, see Seth (1890).
3. See Dykstra (1988) for a critical discussion.
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A Human Information Behavior Approach
to a Philosophy of Information
Amanda Spink and Charles Cole
Abstract
This paper outlines the relation between philosophy of informa-
tion (PI) and human information behavior (HIB). In this paper, we ﬁrst
brieﬂy outline the basic constructs and approaches of PI and HIB. We ar-
gue that a strong relation exists between PI and HIB, as both are explor-
ing the concept of information and premise information as a fundamen-
tal concept basic to human existence. We then exemplify that a heuristic
approach to PI integrates the HIB view of information as a cognitive hu-
man-initiated process by presenting a speciﬁc cognitive architecture for
information initiation based on modular notion from HIB/evolutionary
psychology and the vacuum mechanism from PI.
Introduction
Many disciplines are grappling with the concept of information in the
information age. Researchers in library and information science (LIS) are
using tools from hermeneutics, cybernetics, and semiotics to deﬁne its
parameters and nature (Herold, 2001). However, there is also a need to
examine the subject from a broader perspective, as Herold (2001) suggests
within the emerging ﬁeld called philosophy of information (PI).
As well as providing LIS with a broader perspective on the question of
information, PI provides an alternative to LIS’s reliance on computer sci-
ence and its diverse theoretical orientations such as the philosophy of com-
puter science, the philosophy of computing or computation, the philoso-
phy of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI), etc. (Floridi, 2002b). The primary
proponent of PI is Floridi (2002a, b). Floridi argues that AI acted as a “Tro-
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jan horse,” bringing a computational/informational paradigm into philos-
ophy (i.e., with its own subjects, methods, and models, and its own perspec-
tive on traditional philosophical concepts such as the mind, consciousness,
experience, knowledge, truth, etc. (Bynum & Moor, 1998). As a result of
AI, information “acquired the nature of a primary phenomenon” (Floridi,
2002b). However, in PI, information, not AI’s primary concept computa-
tion, becomes the more fundamental concept.
Our paper discusses the relationship between PI and human informa-
tion behavior (HIB), which is a developing perspective in LIS. A strong
relation exists between PI and HIB, as both explore the concept of infor-
mation as a fundamental human concept that deﬁnes human existence and
gives life meaning. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the HIB perspective or ap-
proach facilitates the occurrence of LIS’s role as applied PI, as suggested
by Herold (2001) and Floridi (2002a).
As an applied form of PI, the HIB perspective in LIS should concern
itself with the design of services and systems that facilitate the role of infor-
mation in human existence. In effect, this widens information retrieval (IR)
design’s traditional emphasis on the focused information seeking/search-
ing behavior of individuals, predominantly in the school or workplace. The
Internet and its ability to offer information to a wide range of people at
work, school, but most importantly at home, have widened LIS’s deﬁnition
of its role to the home information situation as well—for example, the seek-
ing of health information that is widely available on the Web. Other forms
of home information-seeking behavior, such as surﬁng the Web without real
purpose and with constantly shifting tactical goals, are widening LIS’s deﬁ-
nition of its role still further (e.g., Spink et al., in press).
HIB looks at the entire human condition, thus expanding information
and its role in human life to its widest possible level. Why do we seek infor-
mation all the time, often without apparent reason, often without even
being aware of it, seemingly for its own sake? HIB answers the question by
linking the human condition and information together. Information and
information acquisition are seen as fundamental to human existence, en-
abling us to constantly adapt so that we can survive in an ever-changing
physical and social environment (Spink & Cole, in press). This broad, fun-
damental perspective makes HIB the ideal LIS perspective through which
the tenets and theoretical constructs of PI can be applied to theoretical and
real-world information-related problems.
In this article, we link the basic constructs and approaches of PI to
parallel constructs in HIB. We further argue that a heuristic approach to
PI should account for and integrate the HIB view of information as a cog-
nitive human-initiated process. We then provide an example of an HIB
approach to information as a human-initiated cognitive process, based on
HIB’s developing modular approach to human information/cognitive ar-
chitecture.
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PI
Floridi’s approach to a PI starts from the view that information in the
information age has become “a concept as fundamental and philosophi-
cally important as ‘being,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘life,’ ‘intelligence,’ ‘meaning,’ or
‘moral good and evil.’ All these pivotal concepts are interdependent with
information and are equally worthy of autonomous investigation” (Floridi,
2002a). Therefore, Floridi (2002a) suggests that such a fundamental con-
cept requires a new ﬁeld of research.
Floridi deﬁnes the emerging ﬁeld of PI research as the “philosophical
ﬁeld concerned with (a) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature
and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilization, and
sciences and (b) the elaboration and application of information-theoretic
and computational methodologies to philosophical problems” (Floridi,
2002b, p. 137). Included in (a) and (b) is a prescriptive function: “PI is
prescriptive about, and legislates on, what may count as information, and
how information should be adequately created, processed, managed, and
used” (Floridi, 2002a, p. 44).
Information’s Conceptual Nature in PI
For information’s conceptual nature in a PI, Floridi gives basic princi-
ples of information and its role in the human condition. For our present
purposes, we deﬁne the human condition as the set of human needs and
the consequences that occur as a result of those needs. According to Flori-
di (2002b), the human mind “needs to make sense of its environment by
continuously investing data (affordances) with meaning” (p. 129). Floridi
gives reasons for this need that we will not go into here. The process through
which humans make meaning out of our physical world is set off by four
conceptual thrusts.
• A metasemanticization of human narrative by putting oneself into the
narrative.
• A sharing of the narrative with others through language and other in-
formation entities like documents.
• A dephysicalization of nature whereby the physical world is virtualized
when we include it, and all the objects in it, in the narrative. We ﬁrst
manipulate objects by manipulating their virtual form in the narrative.
• A hypostatization (embodiment) of the concepts, in the narrative, we
devise to explain reality, making them as real, in the narrative, as objects
from the physical world.
Information, deﬁned as meaningful data (Floridi, 2002b), plays a predom-
inant role in these four conceptual thrusts, creating three “dynamics” or
subsidiary processes by which the conceptual thrusts are carried out. This
includes what are called “information life cycles,” or the stages “through
which information can pass, from its initial occurrence to its ﬁnal utiliza-
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tion. . . .” (Floridi, 2002b, p. 138). Floridi mentions brieﬂy, when citing
Dummett (1993, p. 186), that information, because it is partly a perceptu-
al process, may start “without one’s necessarily having a grasp of the prop-
osition which embodies it.”
LIS as Applied PI
Floridi (2002a) outlines the role LIS can play in applying the PI’s con-
ceptual principles by ﬁrst indicating LIS’s evolution toward a view of infor-
mation and the role that information plays that is similar to the history of
philosophy, and its evolution toward PI. In the history of philosophy, infor-
mation has become a more fundamental concept than knowledge, and this
due to a long line of philosophers beginning in the seventeenth century
who made the switch from focusing on the nature of the knowledge ob-
ject—i.e., metaphysics—to the relation between object and knowing sub-
ject—i.e., epistemology.
Floridi (2002a) outlines a similar switch in LIS, relying on Shera (1961).
Social epistemology (SE), argues Shera, is divided into the Sociology of
Knowledge (SoK) and the Epistemology of Social Knowledge (ESK). LIS
emphasizes the latter, which is the “critical and conceptual study of the social
(multi-agents) dimensions of knowledge” (Floridi, 2002a, p. 39). Shera
believed that LIS is the discipline that manages knowledge, but particular-
ly “the way in which knowledge is disseminated through a society and in-
ﬂuences group behavior” (Shera, 1961). Shera believed that the role of LIS
was an applied ESK.
Floridi (2002a), however, believes a conﬂict exists between ESK, which
is knowledge-centric, and LIS, which is actually information sources-cen-
tered. He describes the difference as LIS being concerned with the role
of information sources in enabling knowledge to occur. Floridi, follow-
ing Herold (2001), believes that because ESK is knowledge-centric rath-
er than information-centric, therefore, PI would be a better philosophi-
cal home for LIS.
Since Brookes (1980), LIS has used Popper’s (1975) Three Worlds
concept to describe a more general theory of information exchange. Brieﬂy,
Popper’s notion of Three Worlds describes the problem solver grasping for
understanding (World 2) of the physical world (World 1) to produce the
concepts and ideas that make up knowledge about that physical world in
recorded documents (World 3). It also works the other way, describing a
person’s interaction with World 3 in books and documents to acquire in-
formation/knowledge about the physical world (World 1).
Before LIS focused on the production, organization, and dissemination
(distribution) of recorded information, primarily document production,
organization, and delivery. The beneﬁt of making information fundamen-
tal is that it recognizes the two positions mentioned by Shera and the two
forces that remain in LIS. First, the social production and distribution of
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information. Second, the individual’s psychological acquisition and produc-
tion of information. By making information fundamental for survival, they
join at one point.
The traditional perspective has the observer examining World 1. How-
ever, the place of previous work on the part of the world this observer is
examining has become paramount. The researcher ﬁnds some sort of prob-
lem in World 1 for which he or she wishes to do more research. The re-
searcher ﬁrst goes to the literature to investigate the problem (World 3).
The process or stages whereby the problem solver reaches for an under-
standing of World 1 via recorded knowledge is theoretically deﬁned by
Popper (1975) in his schema of conjectures and refutations:
P1 >> TT >> EE >> P2 and repeat until problem solved . . .
P1 is a conceptualization of the problem. In the Popper schema, the
problem solver begins with a conceptualization of the problem (P1), then
interacts with the world of information objects (World 3), including text,
to arrive at a state of understanding, a conjecture, or tentative theory (TT)
about the problem and its solution. In the ﬁnal stage of the schema, the
problem solver tests the conjecture for error elimination (EE) before ar-
riving at a revised conceptualization of the problem (P2). The problem
solver repeats this process until the problem is either solved or he/she quits
the problem.
The problem Popper’s schema poses is the ﬁrst round conceptualiza-
tion of the problem (P1), which results from the person interacting with
both World 1 and the objectiﬁcation of theories, concepts, and principles
from the human study of World 1 in the human knowledge record (World
3). In Herold’s (2001) description, the preproblem actualization state and
information is pre- or a-categorical:
Information is: A-categorical. Information happens without pre-deﬁni-
tion into certain or rigid structures, orders, or classes in any exclusive
or preferred way. Information is rich in potential taxonomies and ca-
pable of varying interpretation schematically, while at the same time
conditional and dependent in the sense of not having an assigned ﬁnal
status. (p. 1)
Both PI and HIB look at and comment on the information problem con-
ceptualizing stage through a perspective of theories, concepts, and princi-
ples that offer LIS solutions to users’ information problems:
• The PI principle of human sense-making that drives the individual to
invest unmeaningful data in the environment with meaning, but in HIB
it also has the evolutionary function of enabling human adaptation to
changes in the environment (signaled by data in the environment that
has not been previously invested with meaning) for purposes of ensur-
ing human survival.
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• The concept of information being a process (Buckland, 1991), the in-
stantiation of which is started by some sort of interaction with the envi-
ronment (Popper’s World 1), or recorded knowledge or other informa-
tion objects (Popper’s World 3); this process can be divided into phases
(in HIB, e.g., Popper’s [1975] schema of conjectures and refutations),
stages, or cycles (in PI, cf. Floridi, 2002b, p. 138).
• The shared PI-HIB concept of a data-information-knowledge continu-
um to describe the whole range of HIB, with data being more impor-
tant in the early, conceptualization phase of human meaning creation
(PI), problem solving, and adaptation to new or transformed features
of the environment (HIB), and knowledge being more important in the
later phase of meaning-knowledge production and human adaptation
to the environment, for example, in Popper’s (1975) EE phase in his
schema of conjectures and refutations (described above) where a re-
searcher’s conjecture is tested before it is placed by the researcher in
the knowledge canon.
• The HIB principle of uncertainty, an information theoretic concept
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949), but increasingly used in LIS by Kuhlthau
(1993) and Wilson et al. (2002).
To develop this issue further, the next section of the paper discusses and
extends the Spink and Cole (2002) uniﬁed theory of HIB as the human-in-
formation basis for the application of principles and concepts from PI.
Unified Theory of HIB
The Spink and Cole (in press) uniﬁed theory of HIB provides a basis
for applying PI theories, concepts, and principles to LIS methods and prac-
tice, particularly the methods and practice of creating systems to facilitate
user access to information via IR systems.
The Spink and Cole HIB theory integrates the four principal LIS in-
formation approaches that framework user information-seeking: the user
as problem solver, sense-maker, everyday life information-seeker, and infor-
mation forager; HIB accomplishes the integration by using theories, con-
cepts, and principles from evolutionary psychology to widen the tradition-
al LIS perspective to a perspective on the total human information
condition.
The principles and issues that have arisen from recent advances in evo-
lutionary psychology widen the traditional LIS focus on information-seek-
ing and problem-solving, not only by indicating that other forms of HIB are
ignored by the current LIS information-seeking paradigm, but also by set-
ting a prehistorical framework for the human information condition, one
that operates as a constant throughout the history of human-information
interaction. The most important implication of the evolutionary psycholo-
gy perspective, however, is its elevation in status of information need from
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a secondary to a fundamental human need, due to the primacy that evolu-
tionary psychology gives to information foraging for human adaptation and
survival.
The Spink and Cole HIB theory utilizes the evolutionary psychology
perspective on the human condition to integrate four information-seeking
approaches. The integrated theory of HIB attempts to be a global, more
fundamental theory of information behavior, in which the four current
information science information behavior approaches ﬁnd their place as
part of a description of the human “information condition.”
The Spink and Cole HIB theory is based on some sort of human state
(preattentional, a problem state, a need state, etc.) being actualized by
uncertainty, which acts as an energy input moving the human state along a
“data-information-knowledge” continuum. High uncertainty is linked to a
preattentional state of information foraging for adaptation and survival,
while low uncertainty is linked to information behaviors whose purpose is
knowledge (e.g., the common sense precepts by which most of us live in
everyday life, or make sense of life).
The next section of the paper discusses the implications of HIB’s ad-
aptation of evolutionary psychology’s modular cognitive architecture on
HIB and PI.
Implications of Modular Cognitive Architecture
on HIB Processes
Modular: Metaphor: The Process of Information Acquisition in Evolutionary
Psychology
Homo sapiens are unique among species in their ability to think sym-
bolically, representing the world around them in terms of symbolic imag-
es. This ability allows us to think in the past and to think about, even plan
and therefore inﬂuence, our future. The ability to control our destiny
through predictive thinking gives us a decided advantage in terms of sur-
vival and adaptation to a changing environment.
Two views are taken about how we evolved to our present state: (a) that
our ability to represent the world symbolically was gradual, created by cul-
ture or (b) that 30,000 to 50,000 years ago a chance mutation occurred in
human cognition that led to a sudden change in how we were hard-wired,
giving us the ability to think in symbolic representations (Mithen, 1996, p.
42); this, in turn, led to our transformation from being one among many
species competing for limited resources to a species so clever that it is now
almost a “geological force” in the world (Wilford, 2002). We take the sec-
ond view in this article, that a dramatic revolution in human cognition re-
sulted from a chance mutation occurring in our cognitive apparatus some
30,000–50,000 years ago that established the way humans think and con-
duct HIBs up to the present day.
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The chance mutation led to the human ability to think representation-
ally, or symbolically, leading to language, art, religion, information behav-
ior, and eventually science. It also allowed humans to think in the past,
construct problem solutions over time in the present, and think into the
future, via these representations. These representations also allowed hu-
mans to predict behavior based on past experiences. The ways these repre-
sentations were constructed induced Homo sapiens to engage in a certain
kind of information behavior that we will broadly deﬁne here as (a) infor-
mation behavior for some immediate purpose and (b) information behav-
ior for no immediate purpose, but which, in the context of our hunter-gath-
erer ancestor, allowed Homo sapiens to adapt their behavior and survive.
It does this through its cognitive architecture, which has several important
features according to modular theorists.
The ﬁrst feature is that the cognitive architecture is designed to be
adaptive. Essential to the notion of adaptation for survival is the ability to
transform your way of thinking so that in effect you see the world or at least
a part of the world differently, which means that information acquisition is
controlled by a cognitive architecture that can be described as a generative
system (Boden, 1998). Tooby and Cosmides (1992) describe a modular
architecture capable of generating new information about the subtle kinds
of issues related to social interaction, by combining together from dispar-
ate pieces of nonpurposive data both consciously and unconsciously col-
lected by the hunter-gatherer over the course of time. The architecture must
be able to bring these ﬂoating pieces of data together, perhaps because of
an entirely new stimulus that causes them to come together (Renfrew, 1998),
resulting in the production of a transformed or new way of looking at the
world, adaptation, and increased chances of survival.
Lake (1998) divides these adaptations into both improbable and im-
possible transformations. An example of improbabilist learning or associ-
ation (Renfrew, 1998) is the transformation of the hunter-gatherer’s use of
the horse as a food source to using it as traction or transportation. This
occurred sometime before 1200 B.C. when we ﬁrst see these representations
depicted in artifacts. Before this time, the horse was domesticated as a
source of food, and oxen pulled the carts. Funerals in complex hunter-
gatherer societies were used as social messaging events, to create alliances
“by advertising the success of the deceased’s kin group” (Schulting, 1998).
The change in using the horse from food to mode of traction occurred as
a result of funeral ceremonies where horses were used to pull ceremonial
carts with the bodies of rich men to indicate to other members of the group
the rich man’s social position.
Based on impossibilist learning or association, Bradley (1998) believes
that the change in funeral monuments from monuments that did not re-
quire the alteration of the natural state of the raw materials used—like using
boulders or large rocks that required only accurate planning and measure-
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ment to transport them to the site and position them—to where the raw
material itself was modiﬁed, constituted a radical transformation in the
structure of man’s relationship with nature and the natural world.
In the evolutionary psychology view of human development and behav-
ior we take here, what allowed improbabilist and impossiblist learning or
change to occur was a chance genetic mutation 30,000–50,000 years ago,
which caused a change in the hard-wiring of Homo sapiens. Mithen (1996)
hypothesizes about the effect of this chance mutation. He believes, essen-
tially, that the various intelligence modules of the Homo sapiens cognitive
apparatus, formerly separated and independent, suddenly developed an
integration mechanism that allowed knowledge and memory data from one
module to ﬂow into another.
Integration Mechanism in Modular Thinking
The mechanism of creating symbolic markings is due to, according to
Mithen’s thesis, the modular architecture of human intelligence. Because
of this architecture, the various types of thinking have their own separate
modules (made up of module speciﬁc rules and memory links). Mithen
(1996) hypothesizes that the Homo sapiens cognitive mechanism is divid-
ed into four intelligence modules, each in charge of a certain kind of in-
telligence cognition, but all connected to a general intelligence base (con-
taining general-purpose learning and decision-making rules). The four
Mithen intelligence modules are
• a technical intelligence module (tool making, technology);
• a linguistic intelligence module (language acquisition and use);
• a social intelligence module (group dynamics, Machiavellian behavior,
empathetic behavior); and
• a natural history intelligence module (about animals, plants, and geog-
raphy; mental maps and hunting behavior).
According to one theory, some chance mutation in human cognitive
architecture, called the Big Bang, allowed data or information to ﬂow be-
tween the modules, creating a type of metaphorical thinking (as data or
information from the sender module would, by deﬁnition, be metaphori-
cal or introduce metaphorical thinking of some sort to the destination
module in this ﬂow). The modular notion of cognitive architecture and the
ﬂow of data from one module into another, when seeking information for
adaptation and survival, are based on broad deﬁnition of metaphor as in-
volving all types of human thinking that transform unmeaningful data in
the environment into meaningful information.
Metaphorical Thinking
The current research approaches in LIS are largely attentional—that
is, they assume that even if we are passively seeking information, we are
paying attention to the stimuli on some level, like acquiring information
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while watching TV or aimlessly surﬁng the Internet. Evolutionary psycholo-
gy, on the other hand, posits a type of information foraging where informa-
tion is acquired without attending to it. Perhaps unattended-to information
or data is somehow attached to other information we are attending to. This
may be the basis of what we have termed here “metaphorical thinking.”
In effect, all representational thinking and communication are meta-
phorical. When we attempt to represent reality using symbolic forms, like
a cartographic mapping of a geographical area, the representational nature
of the symbols used to achieve this is necessarily metaphorical—i.e., the blue
color used to indicate an ocean, a line to represent the coastline and the
green color used on the other side of the line to indicate land; all these
symbols are metaphors trying to represent the actual physical form.
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that “the essence of metaphor is
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”
Metaphors are not mental models. However, metaphors are an important
phase between intuitive model formation and mental models (Hill & Lev-
enhagen, 1995), allowing us to ﬁll in missing details in our comprehension
of a concept, event, or object (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). They thus help us
to bridge the gap between what we do and do not know (Hill & Levenhagen,
1995). Metaphors can form a link between left- and right-brain thought, or
theory-in-use and theory.
Metaphor Priming the Pump
In the Spink and Cole HIB theory, we used a continuum of data-infor-
mation-knowledge, and the image of a tap and uncertainty/water energiz-
ing a pump that drives the mental state of information user into data for-
aging mode, an information-seeking mode or a knowledge creation mode
of HIB. Metaphor causes superordinate category instantiation, like prim-
ing a pump, creating new properties to ﬂow from its home module to the
topic module. The topic module is the module that is controlling the at-
tention of the individual at the moment the pump is primed by metaphor-
ical or intermodular data ﬂow. Suddenly, the person’s acategorical think-
ing (deﬁned by Herold [2001] and cited above) assumes some category
deﬁnition as a result of this ﬂow, but it would probably, we assume, be a
superordinate category of some kind that jump starts topic category forma-
tion based on a sudden information process, which is, in turn, based on this
category conceptualization process—i.e., there is an inclusion, or class in-
clusion process mechanism connected to the process (Glucksberg et al.,
1997). It does this by promoting abstractions rather than speciﬁcity (cf. also,
Lowenstein et al., 1999).
After the metaphor priming of the pump occurs, we assume that the
result of the process is that the superordinate category and the abstraction
of the category effectuated by the process create a structure containing the
following:
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1. Dimensions of category (Glucksberg et al., 1997).
2. It provides relevance criteria.
3. Therefore, it provides relevance dimensions for subsequent information
seeking, search, and use.
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to describe the relationship between
HIB and PI. Extending our theory of HIB, we discuss what occurs when,
based on modular cognitive architecture and evolutionary psychology the-
oretic principles, a person’s information behavior and thinking mechanism
leads to adaptation of the human organism to new or unmeaningful data
in the environment for the purpose of ensuring survival in the environment.
In this type of behavior, the human gathers or forages for data constantly,
without awareness, and for no purpose other than adaptation to the envi-
ronment for survival. So the person is very sensitive to the environment as
this behavior is constant and does not demand attentional mechanisms
needed for other types of more search-oriented information behavior.
According to one theory, the Big Bang in human thinking allowed the
interﬂowing of modular data from one module to the other, thus creating
the ability for human metaphorical thinking. In this article, we have attempt-
ed to describe how metaphorical thinking causes this interﬂow, leading to
the facilitation of human adaptation to changes in the environment. We
assume that this process, or something like this process, underlies all orig-
inal thinking in both the human species and at the level of the individual
human organism—i.e., modular and metaphorical thinking is the mecha-
nism that allows the single individual to survive by adapting in the group
and in his/her environmental framework.
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Cybersemiotics and the Problems of the
Information-Processing Paradigm as a Candidate
for a Uniﬁed Science of Information Behind
Library Information Science1
Søren Brier
Abstract
As an answer to the humanistic, socially oriented critique of
the information-processing paradigms used as a conceptual frame for li-
brary information science, this article formulates a broader and less objec-
tive concept of communication than that of the information-processing par-
adigm. Knowledge can be seen as the mental phenomenon that documents
(combining signs into text, depending on the state of knowledge of the re-
cipient) can cause through interpretation. The examination of these “cor-
rect circumstances” is an important part of information science. This arti-
cle represents the following developments in the concept of information:
Information is understood as potential until somebody interprets it. The
objective carriers of potential knowledge are signs. Signs need interpreta-
tion to release knowledge in the form of interpretants. Interpretation is
based on the total semantic network, horizons, worldviews, and experience
of the person, including the emotional and social aspects. The realm of
meaning is rooted in social-historical as well as embodied evolutionary pro-
cesses that go beyond computational algorithmically logic. The semantic
network derives a decisive aspect of signiﬁcation from a person’s embod-
ied cultural worldview, which, in turn, derives from, develops, and has its
roots in undeﬁned tacit knowledge. To theoretically encompass both the
computational and the semantic aspects of document classiﬁcation and
retrieval, we need to combine the cybernetic functionalistic approach with
the semiotic pragmatic understanding of meaning as social and embodied.
For such a marriage, it is necessary to go into the constructivistic second-
order cybernetics and autopoiesis theory of von Foerster, Maturana, and
Luhmann, on the one hand, and the pragmatic triadic semiotics of Peirce
Søren Brier, Copenhagen Business School, Department for Management, Politics, and Phi-
losophy, Blaagaardsgare BB. DK–2200 Koebenhaven
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in the form of the embodied Biosemiotics, on the other hand. This combi-
nation is what I call Cybersemiotics.
Introduction
Library information science (LIS) devotes itself primarily to the study
of systems and methods for classiﬁcation, indexing, storing, retrieval, and
mediation of documents that can cause the creation of information in the
user’s mind. The aim is to create information in the user’s mind to be un-
derstood as meeting social, cultural, or existential needs. The crucial ques-
tion is that of the interpretation of the document’s meaning for the indi-
vidual in a given organizational or institutional connection, and in a given
historical situation. Ingwersen (1996) describes the information need as built
from a cognitive state (including previous knowledge), a work task, inter-
est, and a domain. These social-pragmatic circumstances form the context
for understanding our informational desires and problems. He develops a
matrix with four distinct cognitive forms of information needs relevant for
determining search behavior and types of polyrepresentation. But thus far,
we do not have an explicit theoretical treatment of how varying forms of
aboutness come into existence and function in a social context. As informa-
tion, in this view, develops primarily in an individual mind in front of a doc-
ument-mediating system, there are no explicit theories about how informa-
tion develops in social practice. We still have difﬁculties with the construction
of a comprehensive theoretical framework, which can improve consistency
in our use of scientiﬁc concepts within LIS, guide our research and devel-
opment of research methods, and ﬁnally, provide the background for the
interpretation of empirical research. As in Machlup’s (1983) theory of in-
formation, the cognitive viewpoint focuses on the individual.
Hjørland and Albrechtsen (1995) describe the inﬂuence of knowledge
domains on concept formation and interpretation in the domain analytic
paradigm. They give theoretical reasons why classiﬁcation and indexing
should be directed toward the ways signiﬁcation is created in discourse
communities related to different knowledge domains, especially within the
different ﬁelds of science. This is followed up in a book by Hjørland (1997)
that has an activity approach to information science. But as Blair (1990)
points out in his foundational book Language and Representation in Informa-
tion Retrieval, then we need to add a pragmatic semiotic and language game–
based theory of interpretation to make the above-mentioned new develop-
ments function in a common framework and get access to the mystery of
meaning in human language that goes beyond computational approaches
(Fodor, 2001, points out that mystery). See also Bowker and Star’s (1999)
development of a pragmatic semantic embodied theory of classiﬁcation.
This insight leads to the need for a general semiotic framework of com-
munication and sign interpretation. We need to open LIS to the results and
constructive thinking of a more general theory of how signs—such as words
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and symbols—acquire their meaning through communication, be it oral
or written (Warner, 1990; Suominen, 1997; Thellefsen, Brier, & Thellefs-
en, 2003). Semiotics should encompass not only social and cultural com-
munication but also should be able to address natural phenomena such as
the communication of biological systems. It should have categories for tech-
nical information processing. At the same time, this transdisciplinary the-
ory should distinguish between physical, biological, mental psychological,
and social-inguistic levels and not reduce them to the same process of in-
formation.
Thus, LIS requires a theory of the cognition and communication of
signiﬁcation by different types of systems. Neither the objective syntactic
approach of the information-processing paradigm nor the personal phe-
nomenological approach of Machlup can deliver a framework encompass-
ing communication processes in social, biological, and technical systems.
As Buckland (1991) points out, we also must draw on systems theory and
cybernetics, and I especially will point to the new second-order cybernet-
ics and autopoiesis theory. In contrast to Suominen (1997), who builds on
the French culture-centered structualistic semiology originating in Saussure’s
work, I chose to build on the American pragmatic transdisciplinary semiot-
ics founded by Charles Sanders Peirce as it promises to cover nature and
technology as well. More than anything LIS—and many other informational
ﬁelds—needs a theory that can dissolve the mutual ignorance and hostili-
ty between Snow’s two cultures. See, for instance, the work of Zadeh (1999)
and Sinha et al. (2000),2  making computing with words possible. The great
conceptual and methodological differences between the computational and
semantical approaches to communication divide LIS in two paradigms to
a degree that one can hardly talk about one knowledge domain—a prob-
lem that psychology, computer science/informatics, and medicine, to name
a few, also have.
Analyzing the Possibility of an Information Science
Science—especially natural science—has a double role as both devel-
oper of technology and worldview producer. Reliance on science as an in-
strument for obtaining knowledge is an important part of our faith in tech-
nology as the correct means for developing society. Science is also the
foundation of “the modern worldview,” indicated by rationalism and phys-
icalism and embedded in a theory of evolution. Science is therefore an
important element in the system world’s strengthening of its self-conscious
belief of having special access to the truth about reality and holding the key
to perpetual progress based on the steadily increasing control of nature.
The ideological tendency to view the acquisition of scientiﬁc knowledge
as a unique and privileged path to truth and reality is, in my opinion, one
of the main problems of the modern information society. All knowledge
other than the “laws of nature” determined by physics and mathematics is
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regarded as uncertain and subjective. Part of our cultural project is to un-
cover all “laws of nature” to fulﬁll the desire to display the ultimate safe
basis for the construction of objective, true, and provable knowledge. Stone
by stone, we will erect the cathedral of truth and reach the ﬁnal realiza-
tion and control of our own selves and surrounding nature, and with this
we hope to liberate the human intellect from natural and material forces.
This is the project that—according to our self-understanding—separates
us from, and raises us above, other human cultures and is central to our
view of ourselves as “modern.” Today this idea is embraced by great scien-
tiﬁc thinkers like Stephen Hawkins (1989) and E. O. Wilson (1999) but
questioned by philosophers and sociologists of science like Thomas Kuhn
(1970) and Bruno Latour (Latour, 1993). The latter argues, “we have never
been modern.”
One characteristic of modernity is faith in rationalism as the highest
value and the associated tendency to see science as a “meta-narrative.” The
empirical-mathematical science, formulated by Galileo among others, has
come to play a great role in our cultural self-understanding and worldview.
In the mechanical physics that consequently gradually developed lies a vi-
sion that Laplace clearly articulated about the possibility of achieving a
complete mathematical description of the collective expression for “The
Laws of Nature,” in short, a World Formula.
This belief in science and technology, where science becomes a “great
story,” has much in common with the myth of dogma-based cultures where
myth deﬁnes true knowledge, true values, and real beauty. Instead of be-
coming true liberating knowledge, science is, to a certain degree, ﬁnding
its limited viewpoint raised to a dogma called “the scientiﬁc worldview” that
promises to uncover the algorithms behind language and intelligence and
implement them in the computer.
From the French Age of Enlightenment’s philosophers, through
Comtes’s positivism, the ramiﬁcations of the Vienna Circle and logical
positivism, the idea of information has been interpreted in an increasingly
rationalistic and materialistic direction. Today this path has ended with the
split portrayed by C. P. Snow (1993) between “the two cultures,” where the
modern humanities in their divided specialization and often highly reﬁned
aestheticism stand in weak opposition to ﬁnancial power joined with a sci-
entiﬁc-technological system. The humanities have difﬁculty ﬁnding a com-
mon basis from which to formulate their value assumptions since they wish
neither to make ethics into religion or science, nor to deﬁne human na-
ture beyond sociolinguistic material consciousness. But even the mechan-
ical philosophy of nature’s rationality is being undermined inside science
itself through the so-called paradigm shift.
Here the task of formulating a new quantum mechanics has shown it-
self to be important. The discussions about Heisenberg’s Interdetermina-
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cy Principle, the problems of measurement, and Bohr’s Complementarity
Theory relate to the cognitive limitations that quantum mechanics cogni-
tion sets for the traditional sciences. Ultimately concepts such as nonlin-
earity, chaos, and unpredictability are establishing themselves as fundamen-
tals in mathematics and science. In relation to its own self-understanding,
science has ended in a series of situations of powerlessness that should even-
tually lead to a deliberation over the status of scientiﬁc knowledge in a highly
industrialized society.
In spite of the increasing number of theoretical scientists and research-
ers who have acknowledged limitations in the scientiﬁc form of knowledge,
the Laplacian ideology of science seems to nevertheless inﬂuence a large
part of the system world. It is in this market-sphere that researchers must
ﬁnd their grants. Perhaps that is why the “World-Formula Ideology” still
inﬂuences the headings of a series of larger research projects. For exam-
ple, work with the united Quantum Field Theoretical formulation of all pow-
ers’ and particles’ basic dynamics in the common mathematical description
today moves from the grand uniﬁed theory (GUT) to be formulated as “the
heterotic super string theory” as well as efforts to ﬁnd and manipulate “the
fundamental laws of life” by uncovering “the genetic program in the hu-
man genome project.”
A similar idea is the assumed connection between the laws of nature,
logic and thought, and linguistic syntax. This lies behind the project that
attempts to uncover and transfer “the laws behind human intelligence” to
computers to create “artiﬁcial intelligence.” This also pertains to the
project’s more sophisticated continuation in “cognitive science” and cer-
tain forms of “information science.” The last project especially shows the
severe limitations of the mechanistic view of knowledge, nature, language,
and consciousness.
The information-processing paradigm will never succeed in describing
the central problems of mediating the semantic content of a message from
producer to user because it does not address the social and phenomeno-
logical aspects of cognition. Furthermore, it will fail because it is built on a
rationalistic epistemology and a mechanistic worldview with an unrealistic
world-formula-attitude toward science. Science can deal only with the de-
cidable, and, as Gödel has shown, there are undecidables even within math-
ematics. The problem with the now-classical functionalistic information-
processing paradigm is its inability to encompass the role of the observer.
It is the human perceptive and cognitive ability to gain knowledge and
communicate this in dialogue with others in a common language that is the
foundation of science. An awareness of this will lead one to start in the
middle instead of at the extremes, to start not with either subject or object,
but with the process of knowing in living systems. This is precisely what
second-order cybernetics and Peircian biosemiotics do.
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The Cybernetic Turn
As one of the founders of second-order cybernetics, Heinz von Foerster
is keenly aware of the paradoxes of objectivity, the deterministic mechani-
cism of classical physics, and even modern quantum physics and relativity
thinking. He develops a position where he can offer dialogic theories of cog-
nition, language, and how reality and meaning are created in society.
Von Foerster (1984) demonstrates that if an organism is modeled as a
machine then it cannot be trivial (i.e., there is no deterministic mathemat-
ical description of its behavior). He therefore speaks of living systems as at
least nontrivial machines. The system organizes itself and produces its own
parts. The self-organizing ability and the historical dimension of living sys-
tems are important reasons why organisms are not trivial machines. They
are closed, self-organized systems. But this actually only makes the whole
problem more difﬁcult. If information is not transferred from the environ-
ment to a mechanically describable system, what kind of dynamics are we
dealing with?
Von Foerster answers this question of information and dynamics as
follows: The organism reacts to disturbances/perturbation in its system by
means of self-referential dynamics (so as to conserve the sort of system it
seeks to be). The concept “outside” is not used because according to these
theories the concept “outside” or (objective) “reality” has no signiﬁcant
objective meaning. As von Foerster explains:
. . . I see the notion of an observer-independent “Out There,” of “The
Reality” fading away very much . . . (Von Foerster, 1984, Preface)
In understanding the organization and function of information systems, it
is important to appreciate the role of system-regulated feedback from in-
ﬂuential user groups of different parts of the system. This organizational
structure includes retrieval systems and user-interfaces. These feedback
analyses allow us to see information-storing and intermediary systems as self-
organizing cybernetic systems in a constant inner interaction that includes
users as causal parts of the system. Von Foerster formulates this basic insight
of cybernetics as follows:
Should one name one central concept, a ﬁrst principle of cybernetics,
it would be circularity. Circularity as it appears in the circular ﬂow of
signals in organizationally closed systems, or in “circular causality,” that
is, in processes in which ultimately a state reproduces itself. (Von Foe-
rster, 1992a, p. 226)
Transferred to document-mediating systems, this means that these systems
develop in a constant inner exchange between the producers’, indexers’,
and users’ intellectual horizons. Such an understanding is inspired by sys-
tems science and especially by the new second-order cybernetics (von Foe-
rster, 1979, 1984, 1992a), which works intentionally with the integration of
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the observer’s observation process into the actual system description. This
promotes the understanding of the document-mediating systems and oth-
er informational systems as self-organizing processes.
Such systems cannot be controlled exclusively from within or without,
and the adequacy of their behavior and cognition should be judged by their
viability rather than by an objective idea of absolute truth, says another im-
portant contributor to second-order cybernetics, the radical constructivist
Ernst von Glasersfeld (1992). This places second-order cybernetics in the
same pragmatic as Wittgenstein’s language philosophy and Peirce’s semi-
otics. Blair (1990) makes use of a combination of these two theories in his
important book. Hjørland and Albrechtsen also rely to some degree on
pragmatic views of language, although not speciﬁcally on Wittgenstein
(1958) and Peirce (1931–58).
Cybernetics seeks to describe and explain how the function of struc-
tural constraints inﬂuences the development of self-organizing systems that
are now, due to the work of Maturana and Varela (1980), called autopoie-
tic systems. “Auto” means self and “poietic” means creation. Maturana and
Varela deﬁne an autopoietic system as one that produces its own limits and
organization through the production of the elements it consists of. It is
typical for second-order cyberneticians like Maturana (1988a) and von
Glasersfeld (1991) to take a deeper step into biology than most humanists.
Like Piaget, they descend to biology’s prelinguistic creatures. With their
concept of autopoiesis, Maturana and Varela (1980) show one of the rea-
sons for this. Maturana’s strength is his broad biological starting point in
living systems. With the concept of autopoiesis, he shows that organisms are
organizationally closed. The nervous system is also a closed circular system
that does not accept outside information in any objective sense. Perturba-
tions of the organism’s vital organization produce only knowledge in rela-
tion to the domain of distinctions that the organism has developed in rela-
tion to its own domain of living. Knowledge, therefore, also has a biological
foundation. The forms of distinguishing whether an organism or an observ-
er develops are not “true” in any universal sense. They acquire, however,
an operational effectiveness in relation to the life praxis of the system in
question. Viable patterns of differences are then established in the domain
of distinction as various kinds of objects. Along the same line of thinking,
von Foerster explains this bringing forth of objects and concepts:
Of interest are circumstances in which the dynamics of a system trans-
forms certain states into these very states, where the domain of states
may be numerical values, arrangements (arrays, vectors, conﬁgurations,
etc.), functions (polynomials, algebraic functions, etc.), functionals,
behaviors, and so on. Depending on domain and context, these states
are in theoretical studies referred to as “ﬁxed points,” “eigenbehaviors,”
“eigenoperators,” and lately also as attractors, a terminology reintro-
ducing teleology in modern dress. Pragmatically, they correspond to
636 library trends/winter 2004
the computation of invariants, may they be object constancy, percep-
tual universals, cognitive invariants, identiﬁcations, namings, and so on.
(Von Foerster, 1992a, p. 226)
When we look at language as a means of information, it appears clear that
a word’s metaphorical meaning is dependent on the organization of the
living system (its body) and its context of living, as opposed to context-free
computer language (Lakoff, 1987). Meanings are the result of a coupling
process based on joint experiences. This is an important foundation for all
languages and all semiosis. Words do not carry meaning, rather meanings
are perceived on the basis of the perceiver’s background experience. Per-
cepts and words are not signals, but a perturbation whose effect depends
on system cohesion. After a long period of interaction, a concept acquires
a conventional meaning (eigen behavior) within a certain domain. The
perception and interpretation of words force choices that give opportuni-
ties for action and meaning (Luhmann, 1990, p. 32).
This conception is complementary to “the transmission model” where
one imagines packages of information sent via language from a sender to
a receiver. In the cognitive view, this is modiﬁed to consider that which is
sent as only potential information. In second-order cybernetics, biological
and societal contexts are made explicit through the theory of autopoiesis,
and there is a clear understanding of the pragmatic origins of knowledge
from different knowledge domains. Von Foerster summarizes this position
in the following:
Another case of a net with circular organization that cannot be mapped
onto a plane is autopoiesis . . . an autopoietic system consists of interac-
tive components whose interactions produce these very same compo-
nents. Autopoiesis is thus a special case of self-organizing systems, whose
organization is its own eigen-organization . . . the notion of autopoiesis
allows the phenomenon of language to emerge as a consequence, as
the eigen behavior, of the recursive interactions of two organisms, each
in need of the other for the realization of its own autopoiesis . . .
Because language can speak of itself having language, syntax, word, and
so forth in its vocabulary, in conversations speakers can speak of them-
selves, thus preserving their autonomy in a social context by uttering,
for example, the ﬁrst-person singular pronoun in the nominative case,
“I,” thus generating the shortest self-referential loop . . .
It is precisely at this point that the perspectives of second-order cyber-
netics can be seen. . . . Second-order cybernetics invites you to leave
Helmholtz’s locus observandi and to step into the dynamic circularity of
human give-and-take by becoming part and partner of the universe of
discourse and the discourse on the universe. (Von Foerster, 1992a, p. 311)
Language is therefore a self-organized, self-reﬂecting circular system based
on interactions of autopoietic systems that have the same kind of organi-
zation.
637brier/cybersemiotics
In this view, language emerges from a mutual coupling between humans
in society (whose consciousness emerges in the self-same process) through
a long historical process. Meaning and the semantic level in language are
“sense created in common,” and it is this understanding, and not some di-
rect objective empirical reference, that is language’s most important refer-
ence. The meaning of a word changes as a consequence of historical drift,
which is largely accidental. The development occurs partly because people
that communicate never have completely identical “horizons of understand-
ing” (Gadamer, 1975). The meanings of concepts are created, maintained,
or developed within discourse communities, a domain, a culture, or a soci-
ety among biopsychological systems having a material body.
What are the organizational principles, if any, of the observation or
cognition generating the living systems? Organisms are not only dissipative
structures. They are also self-organized. As systems, they produce their own
elements, internal organization, and boundaries. The system is organiza-
tionally closed, including the nervous system. All nerve cells impinge upon
each other. The senses have no privileged position. Maturana and Varela
claim that there is no “inside” or “outside” for the nervous system, but only
a maintenance of correlations that continuously change. The nervous sys-
tem thus does not “pick up information” from its surroundings. Instead it
“brings forth a world.” This is done by specifying which perturbations of
the sensory surface will lead to changes in the system’s behavior. This is
determined by the system’s organization. As these interactions are repeat-
ed over a period of time, the changes of states that are triggered by the
interactions will be adapted by the structure of the nervous system. These
repetitions will be conserved as sensory-motor correlations. The repetitions
of sensory-motor correlation patterns are conserved as part of the structural
dynamics of the network. Structural couplings are established. Thinking is
the part of sensory-motor correlations that occurs in the relations of the
observer. Thinking takes place in the interactions or relations of the observ-
er as coordination of behavior.
The problem here is how the scientiﬁc community sees the connection
between nature and mind or between the universe and the world of life,
mind, and meaning. In Maturana and Varela’s vision, the autopoietic sys-
tem is closed in its structure-dependent organization. The environment, or
a world, is only constructed by another observer. But who is this observer?
Is it another autopoietic system that also only exists through the observa-
tion of another autopoietic system, observing the observing system and its
surroundings? The “picture” of the environment is constructed through a
society of observers making structural couplings to the environment and
to each other through languaging. This leaves unanswered the question
about who made the ﬁrst distinction between system and environment.
Maturana and Varela take biological systems, society, and language for grant-
ed, but not the environment. Instead of the usual physicalism, this is a bi-
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ologistic worldview. It is an important step forward, but not a sufﬁcient
answer to the basic epistemological and ontological questions of how cog-
nition, information, and communication are possible.
Spencer-Brown (1972), the philosopher and logician who came to
mean so much to second-order cybernetics and autopoiesis theory, was
aware of this question. He poses the metaphysical question differently than
others in the sciences. He includes the process of observing as an impor-
tant part of basic reality, which, as we shall see later, places him near Peirce,
who includes feeling in his concept of (unmanifest) Firstness. In light of
the developments of thermodynamics, chaos theory, and nonlinear dynam-
ics, today there is a tendency to change metaphysics from mechanics’ law-
determined to a probabilistic worldview. Many researchers, however, cling
to the mechanistic ideal while accepting the practical impossibility of deal-
ing with large ensembles of atoms. These cannot be modeled except with
probabilistic models. Prigogine and Stengers (1984) have shown the incon-
sistency in this approach that rejects chance as something real and only as
a subjective lack of knowledge. Their point is that objective chance is the
source of irreversibility and evolution, and therefore its products, such as
scientists themselves. There is a true metaphysical dilemma in modern
physics and information science. If one is a mechanicist and believes that
everything—including our brain and cognitive apparatus—is governed by
mathematical laws, then all we are is the expression of a world formula in
search of itself.
Alternatively, we are the products of chaos and chance, what Richard
Dawkins (1987) calls the blind watchmaker of evolution working through
selﬁsh genes. No matter what theories one holds, in this metaphysics they
will, in the end, only be a product of pure coincidence. Something is epis-
temologically wrong with this framework and its concepts. This is what sec-
ond-order cybernetics attempts to solve by developing sociobiological con-
structivism. But it then fails to answer the question of how the ﬁrst
observation that distinguished between system and nonsystem was possible.
How did the ﬁrst distinction between the marked and the unmarked state,
as stated by Spencer-Brown in “The Laws of Form,” come about in a world
of structure-dependent systems? Varela (1975) points to self-reference as
the crucial factor in his development of a calculus based on Spencer-Brown’s
work. But from where can it arise? Constructivism cannot avoid ontologi-
cal problems. Some believe that the special quality of constructivism as a
scientiﬁc paradigm is its avoidance of ontological questions. But in my view,
even constructivism cannot avoid stating its preconditions. Of course, I
speak of a constructivism that goes beyond the social constructivism that
takes nature for granted and as objective and therefore is not able to in-
corporate a natural history of observing systems. Even if one has a “cookie-
cutter-constructivist viewpoint,” where one’s perception and concept cuts
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out the form of some basic “world stuff,” one would have to say something
about the minimal requirement in order for this “stuff” to become con-
scious linguistic systems. As we saw in the above quote from Spencer-Brown,
he actually suggests a basic self-referent quality in the world/universe as the
process that started evolution.
Although the theories and concepts of von Foerster and Maturana led
to a much better grasp of the basic situation of observing and cognition,
they seem, in their radicalism, to have removed too much when they ne-
glect even “das Ding an sich.” The problem is that they have attempted to
ﬁnd a scientiﬁc solution to a basically philosophical problem. Many social
constructivistics, on the other hand, avoid these basic questions.
On the other hand, both von Foerster’s second-order cybernetics and
Maturana’s “bring-forth-ism” are correct to focus our attention on creative
processes in perception and cognition. As I have already attempted to dem-
onstrate, one cannot resolve the problem of mind and intentionality in an
evolutionary philosophy through either mechanical materialism or physi-
cal indeterminism. Nor do I believe that this can be accomplished through
pure phenomenalistic idealism, subjective constructivism, or mentalism, all
of which underestimate the importance of the relative stability of the “out-
side” world to the possibility of knowledge, communication, and meaning.
In the discussion of differences and similarities in cognition and prob-
lem-solving in people and computers, the Dreyfus brothers (1986) and
Winograd and Flores (1987) have used Heidegger’s concepts such as “das
ein,” which underlines the “thrownness” of humans in the world. They use
this concept to show that a person’s relationship to the world is fundamen-
tally different from that of the digital computer. Winograd and Flores use
Maturana’s theory of autopoiesis and the closure of the nervous system to
show that this basic condition is common to both people and animals. The
basic situation toward the environment is not objective and separated. The
“domain of living,” a basic concept from Maturana, is rather an integrated
part of the structure of the system predating any cognitive separation be-
tween self and nonself.
This epistemological foundation of second-order cybernetics connects
it to important points in Heidegger’s phenomenology. The important point
from Heidegger is that as observers we are always already a part of the world
when we start to describe it. When we start to describe it, we, to a certain
degree, separate ourselves from the wholeness of the world of our living
praxis. This is an important development of the second-order cybernetic
and system thinking.
Niklas Luhmann (1990, p. 3) continues this development when he
summarizes how cybernetics and the concept of autopoiesis in Maturana’s
deﬁnition provide a new way of looking at things, while he simultaneously
maintains a sophisticated realism:
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. . . autopoietic systems “are systems that are deﬁned as unities as net-
works of productions of components that recursively, through their
interactions, generate and realize the network that produces them and
constitute, in the space in which they exist, the boundaries of the net-
work as components that participate in the realization of the network.”
Autopoietic systems then are not only self-organizing systems, they not
only produce and eventually change their own structures; their self-ref-
erence applies to the production of other components as well. This is the
decisive conceptual innovation. It adds a turbocharger to the already
powerful engine of self-referential machines. Even elements, that is, last
components (in-dividuals) that are, at least for the system itself, unde-
composable, are produced by the system itself. Thus, everything that
is used as a unit by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself.
This applies to elements, processes, boundaries, and other structures
and, last but not least, to the unity of the system itself. Autopoietic sys-
tems, then, are sovereign with respect to the constitution of identities
and differences. They, of course, do not create a material world of their
own. They presuppose other levels of reality, as for example human life
presupposes the small span of temperature in which water is liquid. But
whatever they use as identities and as differences is of their own mak-
ing. In other words, they cannot import identities and differences from
the outer world; these are forms about which they have to decide them-
selves. (Luhmann, 1990, p. 3)
Hence, we need a more sophisticated theory of how these identities and
differences develop, rather than resorting to the usual materialistic mech-
anism, eliminative materialistic theories, or functionalistic theories of mind.
But it must be supplemented by a theory of signs and signiﬁcation, as well
as theories about those biological and social systems to which the difference
can make a difference, as cybernetics largely addresses the circularity of
differences in self-organized systems. To go deeper into an understanding
of the process, one must analyze the whole process of sign making, as C. S.
Peirce does in his semiotics, and discuss the functionality of meaning, which
is an important aspect of Luhmann’s theories.
My concern here has been the function of the concept of “outside re-
ality” in the analysis of behaviors of autopoietic or “observing systems.”
Although one has rightly abandoned the notion of “objective reality” in
second-order cybernetics, one should not give up the notion of a partly
independent “outside reality.” There is something lacking in the phenom-
enalistic or idealistic constructivist position that is not corrected by repeat-
edly referring to “experienced reality.” We cannot avoid ontological con-
siderations, but they must, of course, be constantly developed through
critical epistemological discussions and analysis. We need to develop a more
reﬁned and complex understanding of the role of the concepts of reality
in relation to our understanding of our own processes of knowing.
Since we cannot avoid speaking of the nature of aspects of reality as a
prerequisite for various scientiﬁc paradigms, I suggest it would be more
fruitful to regard it not just as complex, but also as hypercomplex. Reality,
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both in its entirety and its local manifestations, cannot be reduced to some-
thing simple, deterministic or random, material or spiritual, or be contained
in a linguistic or mathematical formulation. The spontaneous, intention-
al, anticipatory mind is an irreducible part of that same reality. We never
will be able to completely separate subject and object, for our own science
nor for the intentional systems we study.
For at least two hundred years, science has recognized that living beings
are an intrinsic part of physical and chemical realities. For more than one
hundred years, it has been recognized that humans and their culture are
an intrinsic part of the biological aspect of reality. Whereas physical and
chemical aspects have been considered basic for the universe, it is only within
the last thirty years that it has been realized how deeply connected our bio-
logical aspect is to the whole development of the universe. We are now on
the brink of discovering how the psyche penetrates the basic levels of our
reality as Bateson (1972), Bohm (1983), and Peirce (1931–58) have posited.
Because of reality’s hypercomplexity, there will always be “noise” in all
measurements that will affect our results unpredictably. We always “cut” in
an arbitrary way between the observed system and ourselves and between the
observed system and its “environment” as we deﬁne it through our own ex-
periences and our attempts to explain the “reactions” of observed system(s).
Galilean science has dominated us for over three hundred years. It has
shown that reality has aspects amenable to exact mathematical analysis. This
has been an enormously productive insight. We must admit that even mind
has its “sluggish” sides, especially in a primitive nervous system, which may
be partially describable by functional laws. This does not mean, however,
that the content of all behavior and language can be transferred to com-
puters, as some eliminative materialists and functionalists believe. There is
a hypercomplex “background problem” of individual and historical origin.
In both physics and psychology (especially the latter) that which can be
described formally has its background in that which is not formally describ-
able: the hypercomplex phenomena, which besides the predictable, and
regular, are also comprised of the spontaneous, unpredictable (chaotic),
intentional, and unconscious.
In evolutionary philosophy—which does not deny that reality can pos-
sess “deep” but formally indescribable absolute features—we may see the
development of even more complex and selectively unstable, “far from equi-
librium” individual environment systems. Maturana and Varela’s autopoi-
etic systems are one example of nature’s ability to reﬂect in ever-increas-
ing degrees the spontaneous, unpredictable, and intentional sides of reality.
This ability allows these systems to be centers of their own and to draw a
line between themselves as systems and their environment. Through the
use of language in society, systems can ﬁnally represent themselves socially
and by such means establish an individual, curious point of view from which
to reﬂect on knowledge, existence, and meaning.
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A productive point of departure is to assume that none of these knowl-
edge systems should be placed in a position of authority where it does not
need to answer to critiques from the others. It is dangerous to claim that
one of them can provide all necessary information. Let me give some ex-
amples of how this has been done in several moments in history.
In the classical period of Greece, general philosophy tried to dominate
empirical science. Most philosophers were skeptical about the value of
empirical knowledge and the development of technology.
In the Middle Ages, Catholic scholastics had the same position as Is-
lam has today in Iran. Revealed knowledge was true knowledge and deter-
mined the limits and inﬂuence of other kinds of knowledge.
In the Soviet Union up until the 1970s, dialectical materialism held the
same position, banning and destroying routes of investigation that were
leading in directions other than the basic ideology.
Right now the major problem in our culture seems to be that for a long
period a certain kind of mechanistic science had the major authority and
reduced the inﬂuence of other areas of knowledge. Ethical and aestheti-
cal knowledge, for example, has been reduced to subjective emotional
opinions to which no general value can be ascribed, and semantic content
has been neglected in linguistics.
The scientiﬁc endeavor in the postmodern age is becoming increasingly
complex and transdisciplinary. Researchers and practitioners within the
ﬁelds of the arts and natural, medical, and social sciences have been forced
together by new developments in communication and knowledge technol-
ogies that broke the traditional limits of professional knowledge. They are
further forced together by problems arising from the limitation of the kinds
of knowledge that we have cherished so far.
The shortcoming of traditional information and communication anal-
ysis based on data or information-ﬂow theories is raising fundamental prob-
lems with respect to the construction and organization of knowledge sys-
tems. New concepts of communication can help us understand and develop
social systems such as self-organizing and self-producing networks, and we
need a deeper understanding of the ethics and aesthetics foundational to
the existence of these new systems. Instead of communication of informa-
tion, we might speak of a jointly actualized meaning.
It is important to ﬁnd a genuinely nonreductionist interdisciplinary
view of knowledge that allows different kinds of knowledge to interact in a
nonideological way. Only then may we develop a new view of cognition,
signiﬁcation, information, and communication and the relation between
culture, nature, and our own bodies. It is difﬁcult to change the way we think
of the world, of our society, and of our own lives. But as Bateson (1972) has
pointed out, this is the major key to change, and many things point to the
need for such a change if we are to survive and make the leap to a new glo-
bal culture.
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At the present time, two nonmechanistic transdisciplinary frameworks
have drawn attention to their attempt to form a fruitful dialogue between
Snow’s two possible cultures. These are the second-order cybernetics and
autopoiesis theory of von Foerster, H. Maturana, F. Varela, and N. Luhmann
and C. S. Peirce’s triadic semiotics in the form of biosemiotics, especially
as developed by Thomas Sebeok (1976), Jesper Hoffmeyer (1997), and
Claus Emmeche (1998).
The theory of autopoiesis solves some of Bateson’s problems about for
whom the difference makes a difference, even though the relation between
mind and matter is still unclear. Maturana and Varela’s concepts of auto-
poiesis and multiversa are invoked. But where deriving information from
the concept of neg-entropy is too physicalistic, Maturana’s idea of a multi-
verse is too close to constructivistic idealism. To develop a more fruitful
nonreductionist worldview, it is shown that a more pragmatic understand-
ing of physics, such as Prigogine and Stengers, where thermodynamics is
understood as the basic discipline and mechanics as an idealization, opens
the space for a nonreductionist conceptualization of chaos. This is not ful-
ly developed in their theory. Attention is drawn to C. S. Peirce’s concep-
tion of pure chance as living spontaneity with a tendency to make habits as
a realistic but nonreductionist theory that comprises a solution to the world-
view problems of Bateson, Maturana, Prigogine, and Stengers and the ethol-
ogists. A fruitful connection between second-order cybernetics and semi-
otics will then be possible through the new biosemiotics, Hoffmeyer (1997),
and until and with Emmeche, and a bridge between the technical-scientiﬁc
and the humanistic-social parts of cybernetics can be developed as Cyber-
semiotics.
Let me brieﬂy sketch how I see Peirce’s work and its value as a trans-
disciplinary framework for information, communication, and cognitive sci-
ences before I attempt a more detailed analysis.
Following Peirce, I believe that our problem is that we view chaos as
the absence of law, which is a negative deﬁnition. It’s closer to the original
Greek deﬁnition of “Chaos” as the origin of the world of time, space, ener-
gy, and information (Gaia), where Eros is the creative evolutionary force
and mathematics only a way to bond back to the source, not the answer in
itself. Abraham (1993) points this out in his attempt to resurrect the Or-
phic tradition to encompass the knowledge of modern science and chaos
theory. Peirce already has done important work on this construction of a
new framework, and even more importantly he integrates it with both a
transdisciplinary theory of signiﬁcation in his semiotics and an evolution-
ary theory of logic through his concept of vagueness.
An important difference between modern physics and Peirce’s theory
lies in the conception of chaos and Peirce’s unique triadic theory of basic
categories. I will not describe or discuss the triadic theory of signiﬁcation
and semiosis at any length here. Instead, I offer a central quotation from
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the Monist-paper, “The Architecture of Theories,” which clearly states the
direction and possibilities of the theory of his three metaphysical catego-
ries: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (see also Christiansen, 1995).
Three conceptions are perpetually turning up at every point in every
theory of logic, and in the most rounded systems they occur in connec-
tion with one another. They are conceptions so very broad and conse-
quently indeﬁnite that they are hard to seize and may be easily over-
looked. I call them the conception of First, Second, Third. First is the
conception of being or existing independent of anything else. Second
is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction with,
something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a ﬁrst
and a second are brought into relation. . . . The origin of things, con-
sidered not as leading to anything, but in itself, contains the idea of
First, the end of things that of Second, the process of mediating be-
tween them that of Third. . . . In psychology Feeling is First, Sense of
reaction Second, General conception Third, . . . In biology, the idea of
arbitrary sporting is First, heredity is Second, the process whereby the
accidental characters become ﬁxed is Third. Chance is First, Law is
second, the tendency to take habits is Third. Mind is First, Matter is
Second, Evolution is Third.
Such are the materials out of which chieﬂy a philosophical theory
ought to be built, in order to represent the state of knowledge . . . it
would be a Cosmogenic Philosophy. It would suppose that in the be-
ginning—inﬁnitely remote—there was a chaos of unpersonalized feel-
ing, which being without connection or regularity would properly be
without existence. This feeling, sporting here and there in pure arbi-
trariness, would have started the germ of a generalizing tendency. Its
other sportings would be evanescent, but this would have a growing
virtue. Thus, the tendency to take habits would be started; and from
this, with the other principles of evolution, all regularities of the uni-
verse would be evolved. At any time, however, an element of pure
chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an absolutely
perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind is at last crys-
tallized in the inﬁnitely distant future. (Peirce, 1955, pp. 322–323)
Translated into second-order cybernetic concepts, Secondness is the ﬁrst
distinction made by an observer marked by a primary sign, the Represen-
tamen. The observer is Peirce’s Interpretant that belongs to Thirdness. Only
through this triadic semiosis can cognition be created. To become infor-
mation, differences must be seen as signs for the observer. This happens
when they become internally developed Interpretants. Peirce writes about
this in his famous deﬁnition of the sign process:
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining
a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. . . . A Sign is a Rep-
resentamen with a mental Interpretant. (Peirce, 1955, pp. 99–100)
The object here is that aspect of reality that the Representamen signiﬁes.
In a way, Peirce’s Object is also a sign. Peirce’s semiotic philosophy devel-
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ops cognitive science beyond the limitations of rationalistic and mechanis-
tic information, as I—and many others—have pointed out. It is an Aristo-
telian, golden middle between the mechanicist at one extreme and the pure
(nonontological) constructivist at the other. Like Aristotle, Peirce is a syn-
echist (“matter” is continuous) and a hylozoist (“matter” has an internal
cognitive-emotional aspect). From this we get a non-Cartesian cognitive
formulation for science with no absolute predistinction between mind and
matter and a ﬁeld view of “substance” that is compatible with modern quan-
tum ﬁeld theory and general relativity theory. Most forces are described
today by ﬁelds, as are subatomic “particles.” These ﬁelds are not actually
“matter” as classical physics perceived it in atomistic mechanics. The devel-
opment of thermodynamics as one of the most fundamental physical the-
ories deploys time and evolution at the basis of physical theory in a way
clearly beyond classical mechanistic physics.
When we create deep scientiﬁc theories such as information science,
we cannot avoid reﬂecting on the nature of reality as a prerequisite for our
various scientiﬁc paradigms. It is far too presumptuous to claim that basic
knowledge is expressible in one uniﬁed and precise form. There are no
“ideas” or mathematical “world formulas” waiting to be uncovered in basic
reality. Like Peirce, I believe that basic reality or Firstness starts as vague-
ness and only later develops into distinct forms. No doubt, mathematics has
a lot to say about the possibilities and limits of our epistemological situa-
tion and is able to connect us back to reality as Abraham (1993) suggests.
Nor can we a priori expect words to fully describe “the universe” or “basic
reality,” because our investigations show that signs and concepts work on
differences in local contexts. There does appear to be intrinsic order in re-
ality, although it may be partly created by the process of cognition itself.
In ethology one says that ritualized instinctive behavior becomes sign
stimuli in the coordination of behavior between, for instance, the two sexes
of a species in their mating play. So—as it is already in the language of ethol-
ogy—a piece of behavior or coloration of plumage in movement, for in-
stance, becomes a sign for the coordination of a speciﬁc behavior. It is the
mood and context that determine the biological meaning of these signs,
which are true triadic signs. Ethology presents a fundamental ecological and
evolutionary view on cognition and behavior that dovetails with how Peirce
conceives the construction of meaning. We see here the aptness of Peirce’s
sign deﬁnitions. It is from Collected Papers 1–339 and is an unidentiﬁed
fragment (he wrote about 100,000 pages), but it is still commonly recognized:
The easiest of those, which are of philosophical interest, is the idea of
a sign, or representation. A sign stands for something to the idea, which
it produces, or modiﬁes. Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind
something from without. That for which it stands is called its object;
that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which it gives rise,
its interpretant. The object of representation can be nothing but a
representation of which the ﬁrst representation is the interpretant. But
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an endless series of representations, each representing the one behind
it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. The mean-
ing of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In fact, it
is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of irrele-
vant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off;
it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an in-
ﬁnite regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another
representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as rep-
resentation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another inﬁnite series.
(Peirce, CP, 1–339)
There is no ﬁnal and true object and representation. Both are under con-
stant evolution. The meaning of a sign (a Representamen) is determined
by the context, christened “life form” by Wittgenstein, that makes the con-
cept usable in biological contexts. For instance, the red belly of a female
stickleback is the Representamen for a male autopoietic system languaging
with the female—because it is in a sexual mood—creating in him the In-
terpretant that she is worth mating with. Mating or reproduction is the
Object, which is a biosocial construct. It is a context for the play of signs
that in this speciﬁc mood of mating attains shared meanings based on an
evolutionary established habit:
In the ﬁrst place, a “Representamen,” like a word,—indeed, most words
are representamens—, is not a single thing, but is of the nature of a
mental habit, it consists in the fact that, something would be. (Peirce,
1911)
Peirce changed Kant’s categories of pure reason—with their awe for me-
chanical science and classical logic—to three natural categories bridging
mind and nature. As mentioned above, he called them Firstness, Second-
ness, and Thirdness. In Peirce’s semiotics, everything in nature is a poten-
tial sign. This is a meeting point with Bateson from cybernetics, where in-
formation is a difference that makes a difference, if one chooses to view
every difference as potential information that becomes informative through
semiosis. With Peirce we can say that differences become information when
an interpreter sees them as signs.
The implication of this is that qualia and “the inner life” are potentially
there from the beginning, but they need a nervous system to achieve full
manifestation. Peirce speaks of the potential qualities of Firstness. The point
is that organisms and their nervous systems do not create mind and qualia.
The qualia of mind develop through interaction with nervous systems, which
living bodies develop into still more manifested forms. Peirce’s point is that
this manifestation happens through the development of sign process.
Second-order cybernetics sees information as an internal creation of an
autopoietic system in response to a perturbation. Only in established struc-
tural couplings can signs acquire meaning. Second-order cybernetics brings
to semiotics the ideas of closeness, structural couplings, and languaging.
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The suggestive value is always working in the context of a life form, both
in biology and in human cultural life. The key to the understanding of
understanding and communication is that both animals and humans live
in self-organized Umwelts that they not only project around themselves, but
also project deep inside their systems. The organization of signs and the
meanings they attain through habits of the mind and body follow from the
principles of second-order cybernetics, in that they produce their own eigen
values of signs and meanings, and thereby their own internal mental orga-
nization that is then projected onto the environment.
In humans, these signs are organized into language through social self-
conscious communication, and accordingly our universe is organized as and
through texts. But that is, of course, not an explanation of meaning. It is
an attempt to describe the dynamics of meaning-generating and sharing
systems and how they are organized.
Peirce’s reﬂexive or cybernetic deﬁnition of the interpretant points to
culture, history, and the never-ending search for truth and knowledge. It
considers habits and historical drift—as Maturana and Varela (1980) do—
as the social constructors of meaning. Evolutionary science attempts to ﬁnd
relatively stable patterns and dynamic modes (habits); it is not a science of
eternal laws (a grand narration). As it is dealing with living systems in an
empirical manner, it cannot adopt the dualistic ontological view of mech-
anistic materialism. A more comprehensive view must be found.
The Necessity of an Alternative Epistemology in
LIS Context
I have not created a brand-new theory of LIS that reveals the correct
way to design, maintain, run, and mediate document-mediating systems to
different domains and user-groups on worldwide, connected computer
systems. My task has been to create a theoretical framework that encompass-
es the problematique that librarians and documentalists have struggled with
for centuries. No comprehensive, theoretical framework in LIS encompass-
es all interdisciplinary aspects of the subject, although the ﬁeld is becom-
ing increasingly scientiﬁc and technical.
A science must at least have a reﬂected metatheory of the subject area
over which it claims cognitive authority. Without that, the science cannot
compete and discuss with other sciences what “true” LIS is, or what is unique
about the work of librarians and documentalists such that the subject de-
serves to be recognized as a science with cognitive authority by other ﬁelds,
such as computer science and AI. Few computer scientists recognize that
DR (document retrieval) is as complex as the other many areas for which
computer science has tried to create automated expert systems, and that
DR attempts to form a new logic for the ﬁeld of LIS. Keith van Rijsbergen,
for instance, proposed a “logic of uncertainty” (1996, pp. 1–10) that seems
to have impacted ﬁelds outside of LIS.
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The computer has seduced us into framing our questions within its
algorithms, so that we have forgotten to maintain and develop a theoreti-
cal framework for our subject area that allows us to see beyond the hori-
zon of the computer and to make demands of those researchers develop-
ing computer systems. If we do not provide a metatheoretical description
of our own area, it becomes difﬁcult for others, such as computer scientists
and software developers, to understand that they have entered a new terri-
tory with different rules. We must provide a strong theoretical understand-
ing of the difference between physical and intellectual access. The growth
of the Internet makes this knowledge more important every day.
What is new in the Cybersemiotic approach is the knitting together of
a theoretical framework for LIS from recognized theories of cybernetics,
systems, semiotics, communication, and language that span the gap between
technical, scientiﬁc, social scientiﬁc, and humanistic approaches to the
design and development of DR-systems in LIS. This transdisciplinary frame-
work will make communication between the different approaches and the-
ories of these processes possible, without reducing everything to mere in-
formation processing, as was done in the textbook Information Science in
Theory and Practice. (Vickery & Vickery, 1989).
One of the most important theoretical moves within LIS, coined by
Belkin and Ingwersen as “The Cognitive Viewpoint,” was to change the
concept of information from Vickery and Vickery’s objectivistic-mechanis-
tic view where the observer plays no vital role, to a more semiotic and pro-
cess-oriented view where the observer is foundational. Belkin and Ingwers-
en posit that what are objectively exchanged between living communicators,
or between documents and users, are signs and not information. Signs are
potential information. They depend on the interpretation of the receiver.
There is no information without an interpreter. This theory is in accordance
with the practice in LIS of beginning a search for semantic relationships
between concepts used in documents, and indexing in the human social
realm of discourse communities and knowledge domains, rather than in
an objective universal classiﬁcation schema.
It is clear that the document is a sign of the domain and further that its
meaning is anchored in the ground of the domain. There is a semantic/semi-
otic exchange of meaning between the domain and the document. This se-
mantic exchange makes it possible to index while maintaining a contextual
understanding of the descriptor. What we (Thellefsen, Brier, & Thellefsen,
2003) call the signiﬁcance-level concepts of the domain is an expression of self-
understanding within the domain. It is a concept inspired by Rosch’s (1973,
75, 78)work on basic level use of classiﬁcation in ordinary language.
In specialized knowledge systems such as the sciences, there is a seman-
tic/semiotic relation between document and domain, and therefore the
context of the documents appears in the descriptors as a metaphorical dis-
placement that maintains their meanings through the ground of the
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domain. Indexing theory is capable of maintaining the context of the doc-
uments in the indexing, provided that it is possible to identify the basic level
use in that given knowledge domain. This is what we call the signiﬁcance-
level concepts of the domain.
The words Rosch uses as examples of basic-level concepts are all every-
day words—oak, chair, table, lamp—not words that are part of a scientiﬁc
domain. Is it possible, within a knowledge domain, to identify basic-level
terms at a scientiﬁc level?
If we posit that basic-level concepts are signs, we must expect that these
signs can alter their (information) nature according to the knowledge-lev-
el of a single user, so that the basic-level theory also will apply to special-
ized knowledge domains. We (Thellefsen, Brier, & Thellefsen, 2003) have
chosen to call this level the signiﬁcance-level, and to call the fact that the
concepts at this level submit the most information to certain users the signiﬁ-
cance-effect of the concepts.
As signs, the words oak, fugue, or autopoiesis are similar. As nouns
(Rhemes), they all refer to a certain idea on a basic-level. However, it is
decisive that the user of the sign is able to understand and thus conceptu-
alize the sign. Therefore signs, which are analogous to basic-levelness, ap-
pear to work as a conceptualizing function at all levels of cognition. This
argues solidly for the possibility of understanding terms within specialized
knowledge domains as signs of conceptualization at the signiﬁcance-level.
By indexing with the identiﬁed concepts at the signiﬁcance-level, is it pos-
sible to signal the ground of the domain in the descriptors. On this basis,
there is good reason to believe that the sign-function of the concepts at the
signiﬁcance-level has the greatest information value and strength of refer-
ence to the interpreter. That is why indexing with signiﬁcance-level concepts
speciﬁc to a deﬁned user group submits the most information to this group.
Embodied cognitive semantics and pragmatic semiotics are excellent tools
for analyzing the ground of a knowledge domain and are regarded as the
best way to index documents within a knowledge domain.
Summarizing the conceptual changes suggested by the above analysis,
I underline that knowledge is not just a lexically, logically organized, and
truth-oriented cognitive structure; it is also a historically and culturally de-
termined preunderstanding, as hermeneutics suggest, and a bodily-biolog-
ical evolutionary preunderstanding of the autopoietic system, as second-
order cyberneticians and cognitive semantics suggest. It is through body,
culture, and awareness that we create feelings, meaning, and rationality.
Knowledge is therefore both logical-rational-structural and meaning-emo-
tional-processual. One overlooks something decisively important about
human intelligence and cognitive ability if, as logical positivists attempted,
one separates these two aspects.
To accept a social pragmatic theory is to acknowledge that semantics
springs from a sociolinguistic context, not from referential truth conditions.
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One must adapt the system, or at least the mediation of it through human
or machine intermediaries, to both the domain of knowledge and to how
the organization actually uses that domain based on its interests and lan-
guage games. Liebenau and Backhouse (1990) have already seen this in MIS
(management information systems), of which document-mediating systems
are an integral part. They offer practical business examples of why it is
necessary to analyze the work task of the company, its knowledge domain,
and the practical meaning of concepts before attempting to implement an
information system.
Liebenau and Backhouse (1990) outline a research strategy for MIS that
also applies to bibliographic systems that ﬁt into an organization. One
should start with a pragmatic analysis of the informal communication sys-
tem. This is the most powerful semiotic force to which any information
system must adapt, and as Lakoff (1987) demonstrates, its semantic patterns
are neither logical nor random—they are motivated. This accords with the
cybernetic view of information as generated within an autopoietic system,
and language communication as occurring within generalized media.
Motivation stems from the type of media, but the actual language game
chosen within the media determines a large part of the motivation for the
relationship between concepts. If there is no proper feedback between pro-
ducers, indexers, and users, the system will not produce information—it
will not fulﬁll our expectations. We all participate in several language games
simultaneously, but professionally we must consciously select and maintain
one at a time whenever possible. As information is only potential when there
is no interpretant, the only information in our systems is relevant retrieved
documents. This further supports much of Bates’s work on the sense-mak-
ing approach (1989).
The pragmatic approach generally means, as previously mentioned,
that a philosophy of science analysis of the domains/subject area/work tasks
and paradigms in science, as well as a knowledge sociological analysis of
communication patterns such as the discourse analysis of written text, are
important for describing the decisive context of the use of our systems. They
must be adjusted to our context, work task, and the budget allotted the
research. These methods should be supplemented by questionnaires, as-
sociation tests, and registration methods. The expense of this research is a
challenge, but the willingness to pay for basic research is connected to the
users’ awareness of how central insights into the sociopragmatic linguistic
framework are to the performance of the designed systems. We are mov-
ing past the phase of unreﬂective fascination with electronic systems and
into a more realistic evaluation of how they can help us mediate commu-
nications between humans via documents. If one considers Ingwersen’s
(1992) analysis of what a mediator system must do to function properly, one
realizes we cannot expect machines to solve the complexity of human com-
munication without human mediation.
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This knowledge also tells us that there is limited utility to the enormous
scientiﬁc and technical bibliographic bases where many millions of docu-
ments have been categorized into Boolean systems by trained documental-
ists. Here, the users are the documentalists themselves, and the trained
researchers from part of the domain search bases that have not been made
generally accessible through the Internet. New digital libraries based on the
same outdated principles and word-to-word matches are constantly being
established. A bibliographic system such as BIOSIS, based on the present
theory, will only truly function within a community of biologists. This means
that both the producers and the users must be biologists—and so must the
indexers. Even then there will be difﬁculties, because the producers and
the users of the bibliographic database also will be researchers. This is a life
form that follows a language game different from that of indexers. But if
indexers maintain contact with both users and producers, solicit their feed-
back, attend their conferences, and investigate their ways of utilizing liter-
ature and scientiﬁc concepts, the system will holistically produce informa-
tion. One should not understand document-mediating systems as merely
information keepers and deliverers. They are information producers, once
we include interactions with users as part of the system!
In enormous, outdated, domain-speciﬁc systems, we have to accept a
centrally organized knowledge system. We can simplify through menu-driv-
en systems only at the cost of speed and precision. We can help users un-
derstand what kind of system they are working with by providing thesauri
to consult and work from directly. We can remind them to consider speciﬁc
vital details by asking them to answer questions as part of an obligatory
procedure. All this is now done in new types of interfaces. Blair (1990)
suggests offering users the opportunity to view extracts of papers that the
use of speciﬁc index terms will access, and what other users have accessed
using similar searches. Any technique that helps users understand the lan-
guage game they are participating in, how it is structured, and how words
work within it is fruitful when combined with opportunities to navigate,
explore, and learn the system by oneself.
In these cases we cannot bring the system to the user, so we must bring
the user to the system. This will not happen if we simply install a natural
language processing interface that tells users that this system will do most
of the thinking for them. We should clarify that these systems only help users
who do not have the time or ability for other types of search process, be-
cause users will have practically no control over the processes by which
papers are accessed. This might nevertheless be useful if these users want
only a few documents on a subject of interest. The same can be said for the
automatic indexing of full-text documents (Blair, 1990), unless it is in a
sharply delineated and rigidly formalized subject area. Automated proce-
dures give users little insight into what occurs within a system. Users have
very little opportunity to control the language game they are participating
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in. This does not even broach the issues that arise when index terms from
one language game are used to seek documents in another.
The problem of intellectual access cannot be resolved by intelligent
user-interfaces in the preexisting Boolean system. Nor will the addition of
automated indexing, including natural or knowledge-domain speciﬁc lan-
guage manipulation, or including full-text systems (Blair, 1990). Undoubt-
edly each is useful within limited contexts. In currently existing large sci-
entiﬁc bibliographic databases, considerable efforts have been made to
deliver interfaces that obligate users to pay attention to how the base is struc-
tured and remember its most relevant aspects. By reading manuals, one can
acquire a simpliﬁed theoretical impression of how the controlled index
terms are used. Blair’s strategy permits users to gain experience about how
words function within the language game of the classiﬁcation system and
through this learn their meanings. The BIOSIS Previews manual, for ex-
ample, gives theoretical examples of this kind. It is also important to allow
as much opportunity for exploring as possible.
When we contemplate designing a new document-mediating system
from the bottom up, the suggestion is to specialize document-mediating
systems for speciﬁc knowledge domains, knowledge levels, and points of
interest, and to consider the size of the system. This means constructing
bases entirely from users’ needs and conceptual worlds. We must supple-
ment current methods with pragmatic analysis of discourse communities
with various knowledge domains, both scientiﬁc and nonscientiﬁc.
Most current bibliographic databases contain documents produced by
different paradigms, specialties, and subject areas, all of which have differ-
ent language games even when they share a vocabulary. I only need men-
tion how data-engineers, cognitive psychologists, and information scientists
use the concept of information, or how Newtonian physics and Einstein’s
general relativity use the concept of space. Each subject area with interest
in the documents of a database should have these documents indexed ac-
cording to their own language game to make precise searches possible. As
is already acknowledged in BIOSIS, for example, chemists, physicians, and
biologists each have speciﬁc terms for chemicals, illnesses, and classiﬁca-
tions of plants and animals that are respected by the BIOSIS indexing pro-
cedure. But under current indexes, as a biologist, I must use chemical no-
tation searching for a chemical, and chemists must use the correct biological
name for a plant to ﬁnd articles about a chemical substance it produces.
What is not addressed are those words common to all three subject areas
but that have different meanings because they are part of different language
games. We must develop methods to more fully analyze the discourse com-
munities in various knowledge domains, both scientiﬁc and nonscientiﬁc,
theoretical and practical. We must get a ﬁrmer grasp on the social-pragmatic
connotations of words and concepts to integrate them into the semantics
of semiotic nets as a basis for thesaurus building.
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As a result, one of the large research areas of LIS is how to integrate
bibliographic databases and full-text databases into different domains, or-
ganizations, interests, and levels in organization. This demands one to dis-
tinguish and characterize different domains, levels, and language games in,
for instance, an organization. In addition to the methods already employed
by LIS, these analyses will beneﬁt from methods derived from discourse and
conversation analysis, as well as from socio- and ethno-linguistic empirical
analysis of cultural communication.
Most ﬁelds today are, at least to some degree, interdisciplinary—BIO-
SIS is a good example, as it is relevant to medicine, chemistry, and the be-
havioral sciences—and one could imagine that eventually interest groups
from different domains would develop their own systems for indexing doc-
uments so they can choose their own point of entry to these systems. In
addition, there will be various offers to visualize systems and their language
games aimed at searchers who lack domain knowledge or technical search
knowledge, combined with many possibilities for navigation. As Blair (1990)
suggested, one of the major problems of subject searching is that indexers
and searchers do not participate in the same language games. Their work
and social environments are different, and therefore their uses of words will
be different. Blair makes an interesting attempt to integrate Wittgenstein’s
language-game theory, aspects of Peirce’s semiotics, later developments
such as the speech act theory of Searle, and elements of Lakoff’s cognitive
linguistics into a theory of indexing and DR that connects information sci-
ence retrieval perspectives to social and cultural dynamics within a prag-
matic framework (Blair, 1990, p. 169).
Conclusions
To summarize, our major challenge in LIS now is how to map seman-
tic ﬁelds of concepts and their signifying contexts into our systems in ways
that move beyond the logical and statistical approaches that until now
seemed the only realistic strategies given available technology. We need a
deeper theory of both computation and interpretation. In summary, here
are seven basic steps to move in that direction:
1. Information is differences and patterns and is therefore only potential
knowledge until somebody interprets it as a sign. To develop Bateson’s
deﬁnition that “information is a difference that makes a difference,”
then it ﬁrst happens when it becomes a sign.
2. The objective carriers of potential knowledge are signs.
3. Signs need interpretation to release knowledge in the form of Interpret-
ants.
4. Interpretation is based on the total semantic network, horizons, world-
views, and experience of the person including the emotional and social
aspects.
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5. The realm of meaning is rooted in social-historical as well as embodied
evolutionary processes that go beyond computational algorithmically
logic.
6. The semantic network derives a decisive aspect of signiﬁcation from a
person’s embodied cultural worldview, which in turn derives from, de-
velops, and has its roots in undeﬁned tacit knowledge.
7. To theoretically encompass both the computational and the semantic
aspects of document classiﬁcation and retrieval, we need to combine the
cybernetic functionalistic approach with the semiotic pragmatic under-
standing of meaning as social and embodied.
A transdisciplinary (second-order) framework acknowledging the multidis-
ciplinary character of knowledge organization seems a more fruitful theo-
retical groundwork than the algorithmic rationalism of the information-
processing paradigm for including differences in knowledge organization
between domains. For further argumentation and developments of the
framework outside LIS, please see Brier (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000a, 2000b,
2001, 2002, 2003a,b,c). The book The Cybersemiotic Framework, describing the
whole new framework including LIS, is in the publication process.
Notes
1. The present paper is a follow up on my 1996 articles in Journal of Documentation (Brier,
1996a) and Cybernetica (Brier, 1996b). Theoretical development of the ﬁeld I am here de-
scribing can be found in Cybernetics & Human Knowing, of which I am the editor.
2. The BISC program (The Berkeley Initiative in Soft Computing) at Berkeley University,
http://www-bisc.cs.berkeley.edu/.
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Afterword
LIS as Applied Philosophy of Information:
A Reappraisal
Luciano Floridi
Library information science (LIS) should develop its foundation in
terms of a philosophy of information (PI). This seems a rather harmless
suggestion. Where else could information science look for its conceptual
foundations if not in PI? However, accepting this proposal means moving
away from one of the few solid alternatives currently available in the ﬁeld,
namely, providing LIS with a foundation in terms of social epistemology
(SE). This is no trivial move, so some reasonable reluctance is to be expect-
ed. To overcome it, the proposal needs to be more than just acceptable; it
must be convincing. In Floridi (2002a), I have articulated some of the rea-
sons why I believe that PI can fulﬁll the foundationalist needs better than
SE can. I won’t rehearse them here. I ﬁnd them compelling, but I am ready
to change my mind if counterarguments become available. Rather, in this
contribution, I wish to clarify some aspects of my proposal (Floridi, 2002a)
in favor of the interpretation of LIS as applied PI. I won’t try to show you
that I am right in suggesting that PI may provide a foundation for LIS bet-
ter than SE. My more modest goal is to remove some ambiguities and pos-
sible misunderstandings that might prevent the correct evaluation of my
position, so that disagreement can become more constructive.
We often hear about the differences between the ordinary librarian,
busily involved in managing and delivering a public service, and the infor-
mation scientist or the LIS expert, deep in theoretical speculations. The line
of reasoning here seems that a foundation for LIS should satisfy both and
that this is something that PI cannot achieve, hence the objection that PI
is not “social” enough. I accept the inference, but I disagree on the premise.
For I think we should distinguish as clearly and neatly as possible between
three main layers.
Luciano Floridi, Dipartimento di Scienze Filosoﬁche, Universitá di Bari, and Department of
Philosophy, Oxford University, Wolfson College, Oxford, OX2 6QP, UK
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There is a ﬁrst layer where we deal with libraries, their contents and ser-
vices. Compare this with the accountant’s calculations and ﬁnancial proce-
dures. One may wish to develop a theory of everyday mathematics and its
social practices—surely this would be a worthy and interesting study—but
it seems impossible to confuse it with the study of mathematics as a formal
science. The latter is a second layer. It is what LIS amounts to, what one
learns, with different degrees of complexity, through the university curric-
ulum that educates a librarian or an information specialist. There is then a
third layer, in which only a minority of people is interested. We call it foun-
dational. For mathematics, it is the philosophy of mathematics. I suggested
PI for LIS. My point here is that it is important to acknowledge and respect
the distinction between these three layers; otherwise one may criticize x for
not delivering y when x is not there to deliver y in the ﬁrst place. When check-
ing whether the bank charged you too much for an overdraft, you are not
expected to provide an analysis of the arithmetic involved in terms of Peano’s
axioms. Likewise, a scientist may be happy with a clear understanding of sta-
tistics without ever wishing to enter into the philosophical debate on the
foundations of probability theory. So I do not see why LIS cannot be pro-
vided with an equally theoretical approach, capable of addressing issues that
the ordinary practitioner and the expert would deem too abstract to deserve
attention in everyday practices (mind that I’m talking about layers not peo-
ple; one can wear different hats in different contexts; this is not the issue
here). In the end, I agree that PI should seek to explain a very wide range
of phenomena and practices. I would add that this is precisely the challenge
ahead. The scope of PI spans a whole variety of practices, precisely because
the aim of PI is foundationalist.
If we assume for a moment that LIS is applied PI, and that PI can pro-
vide LIS with a conceptual foundation, the next question concerns how,
more speciﬁcally, PI and LIS may interact. This special issue provides plen-
ty of evidence of the sort of fruitful investigations prompted by a PI ap-
proach to LIS. Three more examples may further illustrate the point and
shed some more light on the SE vs. PI debate. A PI approach to the foun-
dations of LIS may be expected to work on the ontology of its (i.e., LIS’s)
“objects,” on a substantial theory of information dynamics, and on an eth-
ical approach to the domain of information. I shall say a bit more on each
topic in the following pages, but let me stress here that if you ﬁnd these areas
of inquiry important, you also may want to concede that they fall beyond
the scope of any SE approach. Let us now return to PI itself.
A simple way of introducing PI is by referring to it as the philosophical
discipline that attempts to answer the question “What is information?” I
understand that the question itself can be tiresome, at least because there
is no simple way of answering it, despite its misleading simplicity. Ordinary
moves, like checking the dictionary, consulting an encyclopaedia, compil-
ing a survey, or piling up quotations, won’t do, and not just because we are
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the ones who write those sources and entries anyway. Imagine trying to
answer questions like “What is life?” “What is the mind?” or “What is mean-
ing?” in the same way. Questions such as these are ways of opening a dia-
logue and launching investigations that may keep generations of scholars
and scientists busy. They are like road signs indicating the direction in which
we should move. Complaining about the lack of precise answers is point-
less. Philosophical questions are inevitably open-ended. We have to leave
them behind to step ahead.
Information is a slippery topic. This explains its philosophical attrac-
tiveness but does not justify sloppy treatment. On the contrary, before we
attempt our ﬁrst steps beyond the “big-question sign” on this icy surface,
we should make sure that our skates are razor-sharp. The slipperier the
topic, the sharper the skates. Thus enters conceptual analysis, which can
help us to understand the next point.
It is vital to realize that there is no single concept or uniﬁed theory of
information (UTI) as such. The same people who think otherwise would
be happy to acknowledge that it makes no sense to ask for a satisfactory
single deﬁnition for food in general, and yet we have a much better idea
of what counts as food than of what may count as information. What we
need is analysis, analysis, and more analysis.
At this point we should be wary of the opposite mistake, namely think-
ing that if there is no UTI then there is no theory at all. Wrong. Abandon-
ing the search for a UTI implies giving up the assumption that there might
be an Ur-concept of information at the roots of a hierarchical reconstruc-
tion of the multifarious world of information phenomena. But, as I have
argued in Floridi (2003a), the various meanings, uses, applications and types
of information, including the related phenomena in the environment, still
can be interpreted as a system gravitating around a core notion with theo-
retical priority. The core notion works as a hermeneutical device that in-
ﬂuences, interrelates, and helps to access other notions. In PI, this central
role has long been claimed by factual or epistemically oriented semantic infor-
mation. The basic idea is simple. To understand what information is, the
best thing to do is to start by analyzing it in terms of the knowledge it can
yield about its reference. Factual information is the most important and in-
ﬂuential sense in which information qua information “can be said,” to use
an Aristotelian phrase. However, I strongly doubt (perhaps I should be more
honest and state that I do not believe at all) that any successful attempt can
be made to reduce all other concepts to factual information. Factual infor-
mation is like the capital of the informational archipelagos, crucially posi-
tioned to provide a clear grasp of what information is and a privileged gate-
way to other important concepts that are interconnected but not necessarily
reducible to a single Ur-concept. The right model is not a hierarchy but a
distributed network of connected concepts, linked by mutual and dynam-
ic inﬂuences that are not necessarily genetic or genealogical.
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From what I have just said, it should be clear that I do not think, let
alone suggest, that there is only one concept of information; that I do not
subscribe to a communication-based concept of information; that I am
skeptical of any uniﬁed theory of information based on any privileged con-
cept (including Shannon’s theory of information); that it is far from me
to argue that we need a philosophy of “digital” information because of the
IT revolution and the computational turn (although the latter has certain-
ly made the pressing need for PI more obvious and broadly felt); but that I
consider PI deeply concerned with the historical and logical dynamics of
information as well as with its conceptual analysis. In Floridi (2002c) I ex-
plicitly supported the importance of a reinterpretation of several episodes
in the history of philosophy in the light of the new informational paradigm.
And in Floridi (2002b) I have tried to apply the historical analysis to the
transmission of a speciﬁc corpus of texts.
Another thesis to which I do not subscribe concerns the existence of
information in the world. I’m neither a naive nor a critical realist, but I’m
not an antirealist either (one nice thing about PI is that it helps us to dis-
lodge old dichotomies). The position I have being trying to develop and
support is that information comprises data, which are (part of, or) in the
world independently of the epistemic agent. Data are better seen as con-
straining affordances, that is, differences that invite or facilitate (“afford”)
certain interpretations in relation to intelligent data-processors like us, while
impeding, or making more difﬁcult (“constrain”), some others. So “where”
is information? An analogy may help to introduce the right answer. Would
you say that there is no food in the world unless there are food-consumers?
Of course not. Even if there is no form of life on planet Z, there may still
be nutrients, let’s say some minerals or water, which could sustain some form
of life on Z. On the other hand, grass is food only for a grass-eater, and to
a cat it is as good as a piece of plastic. Mutatis mutandis, one may argue that
a radiograph is a piece of information about my lungs only for someone
who can read it, whereas someone else may object that reading the radio-
graph is only a way of acknowledging the presence of the relevant piece of
information in the environment. So where should we place “information”?
The debate about the locus informationis has seen a tension between inter-
nalists and externalists. Some people place information “inside” the mind
(e.g., the radiologist’s understanding of the radiograph of my lungs); some
others insist that it is in the world (e.g., the state of my lungs represented
by the radiograph). This is a pointless dispute. When we consider food, it
is clear that it is neither in the world, as mere nutrients, nor is just a func-
tion of the consumers’ digestive systems. Likewise, information, and seman-
tics in general, is one of those “two-dimensional things” that are neither here
nor there, but at the interface between us and the environment, like a
threshold between the two spaces. They are relational phenomena. This
“liminal” conception of information is not reducible to some form of ex-
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ternalism (naturalization of information) or internalism (information is in
the mind of the beholder), so I endorse neither. I’m a liminalist, if this can
be a label. I much prefer it to ontologically amphibious.
Is “liminalism” then just another form of antirealism? The answer de-
pends on what we mean by the latter, and it requires some further expla-
nations. When data acquire their meaning, we have what philosophers of
language call “content.” In Floridi (in press-a) and Floridi (in press-b), I
have defended the view that to have factual information we need meaning-
ful data (contents) that are also truthful. Two points need to be clariﬁed
here. First, content is a necessary condition for knowledge, but it is not the
only one. Knowledge means something very precise in epistemology: it is
content that is at least true (epistemologists speak of true beliefs) and pos-
sibly justiﬁed, that is, supported by some good reasons (guessing correctly
that p is not yet knowing that p). The analysis of knowledge as true, justiﬁed
belief is not satisfactory (see Floridi, in press-d), but this is no reason to think
that we can do without the true condition. Speaking of “false knowledge”
is nonsense, exactly like speaking of “married bachelors.” Nobody can know
that the earth is ﬂat for the simple fact that it is not. Yet libraries are full of
“false knowledge.” So speaking of LIS as a discipline in which we are con-
cerned with knowledge instead of content is at least imprecise and at worst
mistaken. LIS deals with contents understood as meaningful data. This has
nothing to do with data handling in the sense of a mechanical and brain-
less crunching and management of bytes. It is, rather, connected with the
activity of stewardship of a semantic environment.
The second point concerns a possible commitment to a standard cor-
respondence theory of truth. I said above that I do not think we should
privilege a communication-based concept of information. The usual alter-
native—another tempting dichotomy again—is to analyze information in
terms of the representational contribution it makes to our understanding
of the world. So do I believe that information represents the world, at least
in some cases? Not quite, for I consider it the wrong question to ask. I take
the view, neither uncommon nor very popular among philosophers, that
the semanticization of data is a modeling process at some level of abstrac-
tion (LoA). There is no space here to explain the methodology of LoAs
(Floridi & Sanders, in press-b), but one may grasp its gist by considering
that, according to the methodology, any access to data (and hence, any
access to whatever aspect of the world is under scrutiny) is mediated by an
ontological commitment to a level of abstraction that can be roughly un-
derstood as an interface. For example, we are epistemic agents inevitably
committed to a perception of space as Euclidean. Now, the primary func-
tion of factual information seems to me to be the design, by the agents
inhabiting it, of an environment as meaningful as possible to the agents
themselves. Only part of this semanticization is adaptation oriented. Most
of it is “superﬂuous.” Once again, don’t get me wrong: I’m not supporting
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the thesis that “adaptation is beautiful.” Quite the opposite, the secret of
our special place in nature seems to me to be hidden exactly in our “su-
perﬂuous” detachment from the world caused by our giving far more sense
to it than it actually needs to make us prosper like any other species. We
are the animals that oversemanticize, and for no survival purpose. But let’s
go back to the realist issue. We build our understanding of the world by
taking full advantage of the constraining affordances (data) offered by our
external sources at different LoA. Certainly, data only underdetermine the
choice of a particular LoA and the nature of its outcome, but underdeter-
mination itself is not Boolean and is inversely proportional to the degree
of coherence among our LoAs. Consider the following crossword analogy.
Normally, a crossword is a two-dimensional puzzle, but one can easily imag-
ine a three-dimensional version (a cube) in which coherence among the
string of letters is even more difﬁcult to achieve. Now consider an n-dimen-
sional version, with n as large as one may wish. For example, a four-dimen-
sional crossword would be one in which strings of letters have to satisfy the
constraints that also regulate the diagonals of the cube, and so forth. This
is what I mean by multidimensional intercoherence among LoAs.
Coherence among LoAs, however, may still guarantee at most some kind
of internal “realism,” if one forgets that the nature of the observables is also
determined, partly, by the data being modeled. Whether empirical or con-
ceptual, data afford only a certain range of models, and not all models are
afforded equally easily. Another analogy may help here. Suppose you have
to build a shelter. The design and complexity of the shelter may vary, but
there is a limited range of “realistic” possibilities, determined by the nature
of the resources available, the goals, etc. (size, building materials, location,
weather, physical and biological environment, working force, technical skills,
purposes, security, etc.). Not any shelter can be built. And the type of shel-
ter that will be built more often will be the one that is more likely to take
close-to-optimal advantage of the resources available. The same applies to
data. Data are resources that make possible the construction of certain
models, and the best models are those better tuned to their constraining
affordances. This is what I mean by adequacy. Coherence and adequacy do
not entail nor support naive or direct realism, or a correspondence theory
of truth as this is ordinarily presented. Ultimately, LoAs construct models
of data systems; they do not represent or photograph or portray or photo-
copy, or keyhole-spy or map or show or uncover or fax or monitor or . . . the
intrinsic nature of the systems they analyze no more than an igloo describes
the intrinsic nature of snow or the Parthenon indicates the real properties
of stones. We neither discover nor invent the world; we design it. So we
understand it derivatively, only insofar as we understand its models. The
world as we experience it every day is the outcome of our modeling its data
with a degree of intra-LoAs coherence as great as one may wish. This is nei-
ther a realist nor an antirealist but a constructionist view of information.
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Approaching PI from a liminalist and constructionist perspective means
adopting a metaphysical stance (Floridi, in press-c). And it is from this stance
that information ethics (IE) should be evaluated. I have explained in other
contexts why I believe in the importance of developing an ethics of stew-
ardship toward the infosphere (see Floridi, 1999; Floridi and Sanders, 2001;
Floridi and Sanders, 2002; Floridi and Sanders, in press-a). Here, I only wish
to clarify an apparent misunderstanding. When I defend the minimal and
overridable, intrinsic moral worth of informational objects (see Floridi, 2003b),
I do not mean to refer to the moral value of an e-mail, or of Newton’s Prin-
cipia, or of any other piece of well-formed and meaningful data. Honestly,
this would be rather silly. What I am suggesting is to approach the analysis
of Being informationally, by adopting a minimal common ontology whereby
human beings as well as animals, plants, artifacts, and so forth are interpret-
ed as informational entities.
I hope the following analogy may be helpful, even if it is not really fair
to the philosophical thesis at stake. Imagine looking at the whole universe
from a chemical level of abstraction: you are 70% water and 30% something
else. Now consider an informational level of abstraction. You are 100% a
cluster of data. More precisely, you (as any other entity) are a discrete, self-
contained, encapsulated package containing (i) the appropriate data struc-
tures, which constitute the nature of the entity in question: state of the
object, its unique identity, and attributes and (ii) a collection of operations,
functions, or procedures, which are activated by various interactions or stim-
uli, namely messages received from other objects or changes within itself,
and correspondingly deﬁne how the object behaves or reacts to them. At
this level of abstraction, informational objects as such, rather than just liv-
ing systems in general, are raised to the role of patients of any action. IE is
then just an evolution of environmental ethics. Its fundamental tenet is that
something is more elemental than life, namely Being understood informa-
tionally, and hence, something more fundamental than pleasure and pain,
namely “entropy” (this is not the physicists’ concept of entropy; entropy here
means destruction of informational objects, that is, nothingness, in the vo-
cabulary of the old substantialist metaphysics of Being). According to IE,
one also should evaluate the duty of any moral agent in terms of contribu-
tion to the growth of the infosphere and any process, action, or event that
negatively affects the whole infosphere—not just an informational object—
as an increase in its level of entropy and hence an instance of evil. The eth-
ical question asked by IE is “What is good for an informational entity and
the infosphere in general?” The answer is provided by a minimalist theory
of deserts: any informational entity is recognized to be the center of some
basic ethical claims, which deserve recognition and should help to regulate
the implementation of any information process involving it, if possible.
Approval or disapproval of any information process is then based on how
the latter affects the essence of the informational entities it involves and,
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more generally, the whole infosphere, i.e., on how successful or unsuccess-
ful it is in respecting the ethical claims attributable to the informational
entities involved, and hence in improving or impoverishing the infosphere.
IE brings to ultimate completion the process of enlarging the concept of
what may count as a center of minimal moral concern, which now includes
every informational entity. Clearly, the relation between IE and LIS would
be worth investigating.
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